Recently, the government announced that it plans to transfer benefits under various schemes directly into the bank accounts of individual beneficiaries.  Benefits can be the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MNREGS) wages, scholarships, pensions and health benefits.  Beneficiaries shall be identified through the Aadhaar number (Aadhaar is an individual identification number linked to a person’s demographic and biometric information).  The direct cash transfer (DCT) system is going to be rolled out in 51 districts, starting January 1, 2013.  It will later be extended to 18 states by April 1, 2013 and the rest by April 1, 2014 (or earlier).  Presently, 34 schemes have been identified in 43 districts to implement the DCT programme. Currently, the government subsidises certain products (food grains, fertilizers, water, electricity) and services (education, healthcare) by providing them at a lower than market price to the beneficiaries.  This has led to problems such as high fiscal deficit, waste of scarce resources and operational inefficiencies.  The government is considering replacing this with an Aadhaar enabled DCT system.  It has claimed that the new system would ensure timely payment directly to intended beneficiaries, reduce transaction costs and leakages.  However, many experts have criticised both the concept of cash transfer as well as Aadhaar (see here, here, here and here). In this blog, we provide some background information about cash transfer, explain the concept of Aadhaar and examine the pros and cons of an Aadhaar enabled direct cash transfer system. Background on cash transfer Under the direct cash transfer (DCT) scheme, government subsidies will be given directly to the beneficiaries in the form of cash rather than goods.  DCTs can either be unconditional or conditional.  Under unconditional schemes, cash is directly transferred to eligible households with no conditions. For example, pension schemes.  Conditional cash transfers provide cash directly to poor households in response to the fulfillment of certain conditions such as minimum attendance of children in schools.  DCTs provide poor families the choice of using the cash as they wish.  Having access to cash also relieves some of their financial constraints.  Also, DCTs are simpler in design than other subsidy schemes.  Even though cash transfer schemes have a high fixed cost of administration when the programme is set up, running costs are far lower (see here, here and here). Presently, the government operates a number of DCT schemes.  For example, Janani Suraksha Yojana, Indira Awas Yojana and Dhanalaksmi scheme. In his 2011-12 Budget speech, the then Finance Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, had stated that the government plans to move towards direct transfer of cash subsidy for kerosene, Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG), and fertilizers.  A task force headed by Nandan Nilekani was set up to work out the modalities of operationalising DCT for these items.  This task force submitted its report in February 2012. The National Food Security Bill, 2011, pending in Parliament, includes cash transfer and food coupons as possible alternative mechanisms to the Public Distribution System. Key features of Aadhaar The office of Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) was set up in 2009 within the Planning Commission.  In 2010, the government later introduced the National Identification Authority of India Bill in Parliament to give statutory status to this office.

  • The Aadhaar number is a unique identification number that every resident of India (regardless of citizenship) is entitled to get after he furnishes his demographic and biometric information.  Demographic information shall include the name, age, gender and address.  Biometric information shall include some biological attributes of the individual (such as fingerprints and iris scan).  Collection of information pertaining to race, religion, caste, language, income or health is specifically prohibited.
  • The Aadhaar number shall serve as proof of identity, subject to authentication.  However, it should not be construed as proof of citizenship or domicile.
  • Process of issuing and authenticating Aadhaar number: First, information for each person shall be collected and verified after which an Aadhaar number shall be allotted.  Second, the collected information shall be stored in a database called the Central Identities Data Repository.  Finally, this repository shall be used to provide authentication services to service providers.

For a PRS analysis of the Bill, see here. Aadhaar enabled direct cash transfers Advantages Identification through Aadhaar number: Currently, the recipient has to establish his identity and eligibility many times by producing multiple documents for verification.  The verification of such documents is done by multiple authorities.  An Aadhaar enabled bank account can be used by the beneficiary to receive multiple welfare payments as opposed to the one scheme, one bank approach, followed by a number of state governments. Elimination of middlemen: The scheme reduces chances of rent-seeking by middlemen who siphon off part of the subsidy.  In the new system, the cash shall be transferred directly to individual bank accounts and the beneficiaries shall be identified through Aadhaar. Reduction in duplicate and ghost beneficiaries: The Aadhaar number is likely to help eliminate duplicate cards and cards for non-existent persons or ghost beneficiaries in schemes such as the PDS and MNREGS.     Disadvantages Lack of clarity on whether Aadhaar is mandatory:  According to UIDAI, it is not mandatory for individuals to get an Aadhaar number.  However, it does not prevent any service provider from prescribing Aadhaar as a mandatory requirement for availing services.  Therefore, beneficiaries may be denied a service if he does not have the Aadhaar number.  It is noteworthy that the new direct cash transfer policy requires beneficiaries to have an Aadhaar number and a bank account.  However, many beneficiaries do not yet have either.  (Presently, there are 229 million Aadhaar number holders and 147 million bank accounts). Targeting and identification of beneficiaries:  According to the government, one of the key reasons for changing to DCT system is to ensure better targeting of subsidies.  However, the success of Aadhaar in weeding out ‘ghost’ beneficiaries depends on mandatory enrollment.  If enrollment is not mandatory, both authentication systems (identity card based and Aadhaar based) must coexist.  In such a scenario, ‘ghost’ beneficiaries and people with multiple cards will choose to opt out of the Aadhaar system.  Furthermore, key schemes such as PDS suffer from large inclusion and exclusion errors.  However, Aadhaar cannot address errors in targeting of BPL families.  Also, it cannot address problems of MNREGS such as incorrect measurement of work and payment delays. Safeguard for maintaining privacy: Information collected when issuing Aadhaar may be misused if safeguards to maintain privacy are inadequate.  Though the Supreme Court has included privacy as part of the Right to Life, India does not have a specific law governing issues related to privacy.  Also, the authority is required to maintain details of every request for authentication and the response provided.  However, maximum duration for which such data has to be stored is not specified.  Authentication data provides insights into usage patterns of an Aadhaar number holder.  Data that has been recorded over a long duration of time may be misused for activities such as profiling an individual’s behaviour.

Last week, the Power Finance Corporation reported that state-owned power distribution companies across the country made financial losses amounting to Rs 68,832 crore in 2022-23.  This is four times higher than the losses witnessed in 2021-22, and roughly equivalent to the annual budget of a state like Uttarakhand.   This blog examines some of the causes and implications of such losses.

Overview of financial losses

For several years now, electricity distribution companies (discoms), which are mostly state-owned, have witnessed steep financial losses.  Between 2017-18 and 2022-23, losses accumulated to over three lakh crore rupees.  In 2021-22, discom witnessed substantial reduction in their losses, primarily because states released 1.54 lakh rupees in subsidies to clear pending dues.  State governments provide discoms with subsidies, so that domestic and agricultural consumers receive affordable power.  These payments are typically delayed which creates cash flow constraints, and leads to an accumulation of debt.  In addition, costs incurred by discoms in 2021-22 remained unchanged.

Note: Data from 2020-21 onwards does not include Odisha, and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu since their distribution function was privatised in 2020-21.  Data for Ladakh is available from 2021-22 onwards.  Data for Jammu and Kashmir is not available.  The Delhi Municipal Council Distribution Utility has been included from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.

As of 2022-23, losses have increased again to reach Rs 68,832 crore.   This increase has been driven by rising costs.  At a per unit level, the cost of supplying one kilowatt of electricity rose from 7.6 rupees in 2021-22, to 8.6 rupees in 2022-23 (See Table 1).

Table 1: Financial details of state-owned power distribution companies

Details

2019-20

2020-21

2021-22

2022-23

Average cost of supplying power (ACS)

7.4

7.7

7.6

8.6

Average revenue realised (ARR)

6.8

7.1

7.3

7.8

Per unit loss (ACS-ARR)

0.6

0.6

0.3

0.7

Total losses (in Rs crore)

-60,231

-76,899

-16,579

-68,832

Note: Data from 2020-21 onwards does not include Odisha, and Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu since their distribution function was privatised in 2020-21.  Data for Ladakh is available from 2021-22 onwards.  Data for Jammu and Kashmir is not available.  The Delhi Municipal Council Distribution Utility has been included from 2020-21 onwards.
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.

Purchase of electricity from generation companies (gencos) forms about 70% of a discom’s total costs, and coal is the primary source for generating electricity.  The following chain of events took place in 2022-23: (i) consumer demand for electricity rose by 10% over the previous year, as compared to a 6% year-on-year increase in the past 10 years, (ii) coal had to be imported to meet the increased demand, and (iii) global coal prices were elevated.

Coal imported at elevated prices to keep up with rising electricity demand

In 2022-23, demand for electricity increased by 10% over 2021-22.  Between 2008-09 and 2018-19, demand increased at an annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6%.  Electricity demand grew as the economy grew (at 7%), and largely came from domestic and agricultural consumers.  These consumer categories account for 54% of the total electricity sales, and their demand rose by 7%.

Sources: Central Electricity Regulatory Commission; PRS.

Electricity cannot be stored at scale, which means that generation must be scheduled depending on anticipated demand.  The Central Electricity Authority anticipates annual demand for each year.  It estimated that demand in 2022-23 would be at 1,505 billion units.   However, the actual demand was higher than anticipated in the first few months of 2022-23 (See Figure 3).

To meet this demand, electricity generation had to be ramped up.  Coal stocks had already depleted from 29 million tonnes in June 2021 to eight million tonnes in September 2021, on account of high demand in 2021-22.  To ensure uninterrupted supply of power, the Ministry of Power directed gencos to import coal.  The Ministry noted that without imports, widespread power cuts and blackouts would have occurred.

Sources:  Load Generation Balance Report 2022 and 2023, Central Electricity Authority; PRS.

Coal imports rose by about 27 million tonnes in 2022-23.  While this constituted only 5% of the overall coal used in the sector, the price at which it was imported significantly impacted the sector.  In 2021-22, India imported coal at an average price of Rs 8,300 per tonne.   This rose to Rs 12,500 per tonne in 2022-23, a 51% increase.  Coal was primarily imported from Indonesia, and prices shot up due to the Russia-Ukraine war, and demand surge by countries like India and China.   

Sources: Ministry of Power; Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation; PRS.

Coal import situation going forward

In January 2023, the Ministry of Power advised gencos to import 6% of the required coal, to ensure sufficient stock until September 2023.   It noted that due to floods and variable rainfall in various parts of the country, hydro generation capacity reduced by about 14%.   This put additional burden on coal based thermal generation in 2023-24.  Following this, in October 2023, the Ministry directed all gencos to continue using at least 6% imported coal until March 2024.  

image

Sources: Ministry of Coal; PRS.

Structural issues in the power sector and its impact on state finances

Discoms witness persistent financial losses due to certain structural issues.  Their costs are typically high because of old contracts with generation companies (gencos).  Power purchase costs in these contracts  do not account for production efficiencies over the years, and costs remain unchanged.  Tariffs are only revised every few years, to ensure that consumers are protected from supply chain shocks.  As a result, costs are carried forward for a few years.  In addition, discoms sell electricity to certain consumers such as agricultural and residential consumers, below cost.  This is supposed to primarily be recovered through subsidy grants provided by state governments.  However, states often delay subsidy payments leading to cash flow issues, and accumulation of debt.  In addition, tariff recovery from the power sold is not optimal.  

Losses reported in the generation sector have also increased.  In 2022-23, state-owned gencos reported losses worth Rs 7,175 crore, as compared to the Rs 4,245 crore in 2021-22.  Rajasthan accounted for 87% of these, at Rs 6,278 crore.  Note that under the Late Payment Surcharge Rules, 2022, discoms are required to make upfront payments to gencos.  

Risk to state finances

Persistent financial losses, high debt and guarantees extended by states continue to pose a risk to state finances.  These are contingent liabilities for state governments, i.e., in the event a discom is unable to repay its debt, the state would have to take it over.  

Several such schemes have been introduced in the past to bail discoms out (See Table 2).  As of 2022-23, discoms have an outstanding debt worth Rs 6.61 lakh crore, 2.4% of the national GDP.  Debt is significantly high in states such as Tamil Nadu (6% of GSDP), Rajasthan (6% of GSDP), and Uttar Pradesh (3% of GSDP).  Previous Finance Commissions have recognised that strengthening discom finances is key in minimising the risk to state finances.    

Table 2: Key government schemes for the turnaround of the distribution sector over the years

Year

Scheme

Details

2002

Bailout Package

States take over the debt of state electricity boards worth Rs 35,000 crore, 50% waiver of interest payable by state electricity boards to central PSUs

2012

Financial Restructuring Package

States take over 50% of the outstanding short-term liabilities worth Rs 56,908 crore

2015

Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojana (UDAY)

States take over 75% of the debt of discoms worth Rs 2.3 lakh crore and also provide grants for any future losses

2020

Liquidity Infusion Scheme

Discoms get loans worth Rs 1.35 lakh crore from Power Finance Corporation and REC Limited to settle outstanding dues of generators, state governments provide guarantee

2022

Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme

Central government to provide result-linked financial assistance worth Rs 97,631 crore for strengthening of supply infrastructure

Sources: NITI Aayog, Press Releases of the Ministry of Power; PRS.

For more details on the impact of discom finances on state finances, see here.  For more details on structural issues in the power distribution sector, see here.  
 

ANNEXURE

Table 3: Cost and revenue structure of discoms on energy sold basis (in Rs per kw)

Details

2019-20

2020-21

2021-22

2022-23

Average cost of supplying power (ACS)

7.4

7.7

7.6

8.6

    of which

       

    Cost of procuring power 

5.8

5.9

5.8

6.6

Average revenue realised (ARR)

6.8

7.1

7.3

7.8

    of which

       

    Revenue from sale of power

5.0

4.9

5.1

5.5

    Tariff subsidy

1.3

1.4

1.4

1.5

       Regulatory income and revenue grant under UDAY

0.3

0.1

0.0

0.2

Per unit loss

0.6

0.6

0.3

0.7

Total financial losses

-60,231

-76,899

-16,579

-68,832

Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.

Table 4: State-wise profit/loss of power distribution companies (in Rs crore)

State/UT

2017-18

2018-19

2019-20

2020-21

2021-22

2022-23

Andaman and Nicobar Islands

-605

-645

-678

-757

-86

-76

Andhra Pradesh

-546

-16,831

1,103

-6,894

-2,595

1,211

Arunachal Pradesh

-429

-420

NA

NA

NA

NA

Assam

-259

311

1,141

-107

357

-800

Bihar

-1,872

-1,845

-2,913

-2,966

-2,546

-10

Chandigarh

321

131

59

79

-101

NA

Chhattisgarh

-739

-814

-571

-713

-807

-1,015

Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu

312

-149

-125

NA

NA

NA

Delhi

NA

NA

NA

98

57

-141

Goa

26

-121

-276

78

117

69

Gujarat

426

184

314

429

371

147

Haryana

412

281

331

637

849

975

Himachal Pradesh

-44

132

43

-153

-141

-1,340

Jharkhand

-212

-730

-1,111

-2,556

-1,721

-3,545

Karnataka

-2,439

-4,889

-2,501

-5,382

4,719

-2,414

Kerala

-784

-135

-270

-483

98

-1,022

Ladakh

NA

NA

NA

NA

-11

-57

Lakshadweep

-98

-120

-115

-117

NA

NA

Madhya Pradesh

-5,802

-9,713

-5,034

-9,884

-2,354

1,842

Maharashtra

-3,927

2,549

-5,011

-7,129

-1,147

-19,846

Manipur

-8

-42

-15

-15

-22

-146

Meghalaya

-287

-202

-443

-101

-157

-193

Mizoram

87

-260

-291

-115

-59

-158

Nagaland

-62

-94

-477

-17

24

33

Puducherry

5

-39

-306

-23

84

-131

Punjab

-2,760

363

-975

49

1,680

-1,375

Rajasthan

-11,314

-12,524

-12,277

-5,994

2,374

-2,024

Sikkim

-29

-3

-179

-34

NA

71

Tamil Nadu

-12,541

-17,186

-16,528

-13,066

-9,130

-9,192

Telangana

-6,697

-9,525

-6,966

-6,686

-831

-11,103

Tripura

28

38

-104

-4

-127

-193

Uttar Pradesh

-5,269

-5,902

-3,866

-10,660

-6,498

-15,512

Uttarakhand

-229

-808

-323

-152

-21

-1,224

West Bengal

-871

-1,171

-1,867

-4,261

1,045

-1,663

State Sector

-56,206

-80,179

-60,231

-76,899

-16,579

-68,832

Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu

NA

NA

NA 

242

148

104

Delhi

109

657

-975

1,876

521

-76

Gujarat 

574

307

612

655

522

627

Odisha 

NA

NA

-842

-853

940

746

Maharashtra 

NA

590

1,696

-375

360

42

Uttar Pradesh 

182

126

172

333

256

212

West Bengal 

658

377

379

398

66

-12

Private Sector

1,523

2,057

1,042

2,276

2,813

1,643

All-India

-54,683

-78,122

-59,189

-77,896

 -13,766 

 -67,189 

Note: Minus sign (-) indicates loss; Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu discom was privatised on April 1, 2022; New Delhi Municipal Council Distribution utility has been added from 2020-21 onwards. 
Sources: Power Finance Corporation reports for various years; PRS.