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Report of the 16th Finance Commission for 2026-31

Report Summary

The Finance Commission (FC) is a Constitutional body constituted by the President every five years to make recommendations on centre-state fiscal relations.  The Report of the 16th Finance Commission (Chair: Dr. Arvind Panagariya) was tabled in Parliament on February 1, 2026 for the five-year period between 2026-27 and 2030-31.  Key recommendations of the Commission include:

Share of states in central taxes

The share of states in the divisible pool of central taxes has been recommended at 41%.  This is same as the share recommended by the 15th Finance Commission.  Divisible pool is arrived at after excluding cost of collection and cesses and surcharges from the gross tax revenue collected by the central government. 

Criteria for devolution

To provide for the distribution of central taxes among states, Finance Commissions define a formula with weightage for certain parameters.  Table 1 below shows the criteria used by the 16th Finance Commission to determine each state’s share in central taxes and the weights assigned to them.  Table 3 in annexure shows the individual share of states.

 Table 1: Criteria for distribution of central taxes among states 

Criteria

15th FC

(2021-26)

16th FC

(2026-31)

Income Distance

45%

42.5%

Population (2011)

15%

17.5%

Demographic Performance

12.5%

10%

Area

15%

10%

Forest

10%

10%

Tax and Fiscal Efforts

2.5%

-

Contribution to GDP

-

10%

Total

100%

100%

Sources: Reports of the 15th and 16th Finance Commissions; PRS.

Per Capita GSDP Distance (Income Distance):  The 16th FC has defined income distance as the difference between the per capita GSDP of a state and the average of the per capita GSDP of the top three large states with the highest per capita GSDP.  Per capita GSDP has been computed as the average over the period 2018-19 and 2023-24, excluding the pandemic year of 2020-21.  States with a lower per capita GSDP will receive a higher share on this parameter, to maintain equity among states.

Population:  On this parameter, the share in devolution is determined based on the share in the population as per the 2011 Census.

Demographic Performance:  The 15th FC had introduced this parameter to award states for controlling population on the basis of Total Fertility Rate (TFR).  The 16th FC has redefined this to account for population growth between 1971 and 2011 instead of relying on change in TFR.  States with lower population growth will have a higher share under this parameter. 

Forest:  The 16th FC has assigned weightage to both the share of a state in the overall forest area, and its share in the increase in overall forest area between 2015 and 2023.  Further, it has also considered open forests in arriving at the total forest area.  In contrast, the 15th FC had considered only dense and moderately dense forests, and defined the parameter only in terms of share in the overall forest area.

Contribution to GDP:  The 16th FC has introduced this parameter to account for the contribution to national GDP.  This replaces the tax and fiscal efforts parameter used by the 15th FC which rewarded states with a higher tax collection efficiency.  Contribution to GDP by a state is calculated as the squared root of its GSDP to the sum of squared root of GSDP of all states.  GSDP of each state has been measured as the average nominal GSDP between 2018-19 and 2023-24 (excluding the pandemic year of 2020-21).

Grants-in-aid

The 16th FC has recommended grants worth Rs 9.47 lakh crore over the five-year period.  These comprise grants for: (i) urban and rural local bodies, and (ii) disaster management.  The 16th FC has discontinued the following grants recommended by the 15th FC: (i) revenue deficit grants, (ii) sector-specific grants, and (iii) state-specific grants.  See Table 5 in annexure for state-wise details.

Table 2: Grants-in-aid for 2026-31 (in Rs crore)

Grants

Amount

Local governments

7,91,493

Rural local bodies

4,35,236

          Basic Grant

3,48,188

          Performance Grant

87,048

Urban local bodies

3,56,257

  Basic Grant

2,32,125

Performance Grant

58,032

          Special Infrastructure Component

56,100

Urbanisation Premium

10,000

Disaster management

1,55,916

Total

9,47,409

Source: Report of the 16th Finance Commission; PRS.

Grants for local bodies: The 16th FC has recommended grants worth Rs 4.4 lakh crore and Rs 3.6 lakh crore for rural and urban local bodies, respectively.  These grants are divided into basic (80%) and performance-based (20%) components.  Special Infrastructure Grants and Urbanisation Premium Grants have also been recommended for urban local bodies.  These are discussed in further detail below.

All local body grants will be made available upon fulfilment of three entry-level criteria: (i) constitution of the local bodies as per the Constitution, (ii) publication of provisional and audited accounts of the local bodies in the public domain, and (iii) timely constitution of the State Finance Commission. 

Basic grants:  50% of the basic grant will be untied and the rest 50% will be tied to: (i) sanitation and solid waste management, and/or (ii) water management.

Special infrastructure grants:  This component will be tied to the development of a comprehensive wastewater management system in cities with population between 10-40 lakh as per the 2011 census (see Table 4 in annexure for list of eligible cities).  Grants worth Rs 56,100 crore have been recommended over five years. 

Urbanisation premium grant:  These will be released to states as a one-time grant for: (i) merger of peri-urban villages into adjoining urban local body areas and (ii) formulation of a Rural to Urban Transition Policy.  Rs 10,000 crore have been recommended under the urbanisation premium component. 

Disaster management grants:  The Commission has recommended disaster management corpus of Rs 2,04,401 crore for State Disaster Relief and Management Funds (SDRF and SDMF).  The cost-sharing pattern between the centre and states is recommended to be: (i) 90:10 for north-eastern and Himalayan states, and (ii) 75:25 for all other states.  Centre’s share in total will be Rs 1,55,916 crore.

Fiscal Roadmap

The Commission has recommended that the Centre should bring down fiscal deficit to 3.5% of GDP by 2030-31.  It recommended the annual fiscal deficit limit for states to be 3% of GSDP.  It also recommended strictly discontinuing the practice of off-budget borrowings for states and bringing all such borrowings onto their budgets.  The definition of fiscal deficit and debt should be expanded to uniformly include all off‑budget borrowings. 

The Commission has projected the combined debt of the central and state governments to decline from 77.3% in 2026-27 to 73.1% of the GDP in 2030-31.

Power-sector reforms

The Commission recommended that states should actively pursue privatisation of electricity distribution companies (DISCOMs).  To shield the private investor from debt burden after discom takeover, a special purpose vehicle may be created to warehouse the debt.  Pre-payment or eventual repayment of this debt may be allowed using the funds from the Special Assistance Scheme for Capital Investment.  It also recommended that states should be allowed to utilise this assistance only after the privatisation process is complete.

Subsidy Expenditure

The Commission recommended states to review and rationalise their subsidy expenditure.  It noted that schemes providing unconditional cash transfers tend to have large and untargeted beneficiaries.  It recommended setting clear exclusion criteria and a rigorous review process to ensure effective targeting.  In addition, it recommended discontinuing financing of subsidies through off budget borrowings.

The Commission also noted a lack of standardisation in defining and accounting of subsidies and transfers across states.  It observed that subsidies and transfers across states are being misclassified as assistance, grants, or other expenditure.  It recommended adoption of a uniform approach for accounting and disclosure of subsidies and transfers.

Public Sector Enterprise Reforms

The Commission recommended a review and closure of 308 inactive State Public Sector Enterprises (SPSEs).  It recommended formulation of a state-level PSEs disinvestment policy to target inactive and underperforming SPSEs. 

State or union PSEs, which incur losses for three out of four consecutive years, should be placed for the respective Cabinet’s consideration.  The Cabinet may decide closure, privatisation, or continuation depending on the strategic importance of the enterprise.

 

Annexure

 Table 3:  Individual share of states in the taxes devolved by the centre (out of 100) 

State

14th FC (2015-2020)

15th FC (2021-26)

16th FC (2026-31)

Andhra Pradesh

4.31

4.05

4.22

Arunachal Pradesh

1.37

1.76

1.35

Assam

3.31

3.13

3.26

Bihar

9.67

10.06

9.95

Chhattisgarh

3.08

3.41

3.30

Goa

0.38

0.39

0.37

Gujarat

3.08

3.48

3.76

Haryana

1.08

1.09

1.36

Himachal Pradesh

0.71

0.83

0.91

Jammu and Kashmir

1.85

-

-

Jharkhand

3.14

3.31

3.36

Karnataka

4.71

3.65

4.13

Kerala

2.5

1.93

2.38

Madhya Pradesh

7.55

7.85

7.35

Maharashtra

5.52

6.32

6.44

Manipur

0.62

0.72

0.63

Meghalaya

0.64

0.77

0.63

Mizoram

0.46

0.5

0.56

Nagaland

0.5

0.57

0.48

Odisha

4.64

4.53

4.42

Punjab

1.58

1.81

2.00

Rajasthan

5.5

6.03

5.93

Sikkim

0.37

0.39

0.34

Tamil Nadu

4.02

4.08

4.10

Telangana

2.44

2.1

2.17

Tripura

0.64

0.71

0.64

Uttar Pradesh

17.96

17.94

17.62

Uttarakhand

1.05

1.12

1.14

West Bengal

7.32

7.52

7.22

Sources: Reports of the 14th, 15th, and 16th Finance Commission Reports; PRS.

 Table 4:  Eligible cities under the Special Infrastructure Component of ULB grants 

City

State

Pune

Maharashtra

Jaipur

Rajasthan

Lucknow

Uttar Pradesh

Kanpur

Uttar Pradesh

Nagpur

Maharashtra

Indore

Madhya Pradesh

Bhopal

Madhya Pradesh

Vishakhapatnam

Andhra Pradesh

Patna

Bihar

Vadodara

Gujarat

Ludhiana

Punjab

Faridabad

Haryana

Rajkot

Gujarat

Dhanbad

Jharkhand

Amritsar

Punjab

Howrah

West Bengal

Ranchi

Jharkhand

Coimbatore

Tamil Nadu

Vijayawada

Andhra Pradesh

Jodhpur

Rajasthan

Madurai

Tamil Nadu

Raipur

Chhattisgarh

Source: Report of the 16th Finance Commission; PRS.

 

 

 Table 5: State-wise details of grants-in-aid for 2026-31 (in Rs crore) 

State

Rural Local Body Grants

Urban Local Body Grants

Disaster Management Grants

Basic

RLB Performance

State Performance

Basic

ULB Performance

State Performance

Andhra Pradesh

13,302

1,663

1,663

9,727

1,216

1,216

       6,125

Arunachal Pradesh

1,358

170

170

186

24

24

          616

Assam

11,663

1,459

1,459

2,598

326

326

       5,243

Bihar

41,539

5,192

5,192

7,335

917

917

     13,615

Chhattisgarh

9,331

1,167

1,167

3,992

499

499

       2,481

Goa

140

17

17

581

73

73

          112

Gujarat

15,042

1,880

1,880

19,011

2,377

2,377

       8,459

Haryana

6,616

827

827

6,267

784

784

       2,922

Himachal Pradesh

2,996

374

374

348

44

44

       2,682

Jharkhand

11,385

1,423

1,423

4,874

610

610

       2,806

Karnataka

15,111

1,889

1,889

14,786

1,849

1,849

       6,419

Kerala

2,647

331

331

13,347

1,668

1,668

       1,935

Madhya Pradesh

25,627

3,203

3,203

12,813

1,602

1,602

     11,697

Maharashtra

26,254

3,282

3,282

37,442

4,681

4,681

     29,619

Manipur

1,009

127

127

487

61

61

          259

Meghalaya

1,183

148

148

302

38

38

          437

Mizoram

453

57

57

302

38

38

          284

Nagaland

557

70

70

534

67

67

          408

Odisha

14,973

1,871

1,871

4,062

508

508

       8,900

Punjab

6,789

849

849

6,267

784

784

       2,477

Rajasthan

25,173

3,147

3,147

10,145

1,268

1,268

       9,211

Sikkim

174

22

22

162

21

21

          455

Tamil Nadu

13,544

1,693

1,693

20,054

2,508

2,508

       8,486

Telangana

7,974

997

997

9,239

1,155

1,155

       2,774

Tripura

941

118

118

813

102

102

          356

Uttar Pradesh

66,608

8,327

8,327

26,835

3,354

3,354

     15,321

Uttarakhand

3,237

405

405

1,997

250

250

       4,954

West Bengal

22,562

2,821

2,821

17,619

2,202

2,202

       6,869

Total

3,48,188

43,524

43,524

2,32,125

29,016

29,016

 1,55,916

Source: Report of the 16th Finance Commission; PRS.

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