On October 16, the Group of Experts on Privacy, Chaired by Mr. A. P. Shah, submitted its Report to the Planning Commission.  The Expert Group was appointed to set out the principles that Indian privacy law should abide by.   Even though privacy has been held to be a fundamental right as long back as in 1962, India does not have a law that specifies safeguards to privacy.  Moreover, recent government initiatives, such as the UID, involve collection of personal information and storage in electronic form.  The absence of a law on privacy increases the risk to infringement of the fundamental right. In this blog we list the recommendations made by the expert group, discuss the status of the right to privacy in India, and why there is a need for an enactment. Recommendations of the Expert Group on Privacy

  • The Expert Group recommended that the new legislation on privacy should ensure that safeguards are technology neutral.  This means that the enactment should provide protections that are applicable to information, regardless of the manner in which it is stored: digital or physical form.
  • The new legislation should protect all types of privacy, such as bodily privacy (DNA and physical privacy); privacy against surveillance (unauthorised interception, audio and video surveillance); and data protection.
  • The safeguards under the Bill should apply to both government and private sector entities.
  • There should be an office of a ‘Privacy Commissioner’ at both the central and regional level.
  • There should be Self-Regulating Organisations set up by the industry.  These organisations would develop a baseline legal framework that protects and enforces an individual’s right to privacy.  The standards developed by the organisations would have to be approved by the Commissioner.
  • The legislation should ensure that entities that collect and process data would be accountable for these processes and the use to which the data is put.  This, according to the Group, would ensure that the privacy of the data subject is guaranteed.

Present status of the Right to Privacy While the Supreme Court has held privacy to be a fundamental right, it is restricted to certain aspects of a person’s life.  These aspects include the privacy of one’s home, family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child-rearing.  Therefore, to claim privacy in any other aspect, individuals have to substantiate these are ‘private’ and should not be subjected to state or private interference.  For instance, in 1996 petitioners had to argue before the Court that the right to speak privately over the telephone was a fundamental right. Risks to privacy Government departments collect data under various legislations.  For instance, under the Passport Act, 1967 and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 persons have to give details of their address, date of birth etc.  These enactments do not provide safeguards against access and use of the information by third parties.  Similarly, information regarding ownership of property and taxes paid are publicly available on the MCD website. Furthermore, recent government initiatives may increase the risk to infringement of privacy as personal information, previously only available in physical form, will now be available electronically.  Initiatives such as the National e-Governance Plan, introduced in 2006 and Aadhaar would require maintenance of information in electronic form.  The Aadhaar initiative aims at setting up a system for identifying beneficiaries of government sponsored schemes.  Under the initiative, biometric details of the beneficiaries, such as retina scan and fingerprints, are collected and stored by the government.  The government has also introduced a Bill in Parliament creating a right to electronic service delivery.  As per news reports, a draft DNA Profiling Bill is also in the pipeline.  

Earlier today, the Supreme Court struck down the two Acts that created an independent body for the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. One of the Acts amended the Constitution to replace the method of appointment of judges by a collegium system with that of an independent commission, called the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC).  The composition of the NJAC would include: (i) the Chief Justice of India (Chairperson) (ii) two other senior most judges of the Supreme Court, (iii) the Union Law Minister, and (iv) two eminent persons to be nominated by the Prime Minister, the CJI and the Leader of Opposition of the Lok Sabha.  The other Act laid down the processes in relation to such appointments. Both Acts were passed by Parliament in August 2014, and received Presidential assent in December 2014.  Following this, a batch of petitions that had been filed in Supreme Court challenging the two Bills on grounds of unconstitutionality, was referred to a five judge bench.  It was contended that the presence of executive members in the NJAC violated the independence of the judiciary. In its judgement today, the Court held that the executive involvement in appointment of judges impinges upon the independence of the judiciary.  This violates the principle of separation of powers between the executive and judiciary, which is a basic feature of the Constitution.  In this context, we examine the proposals around the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. Appointment of judges before the introduction of the NJAC The method of appointment of the Chief Justice of India, SC and HC judges was laid down in the Constitution.[i]  The Constitution stated that the President shall make these appointments after consulting with the Chief Justice of India and other SC and HC judges as he considers necessary.  Between the years 1982-1999, the issue of method of appointment of judges was examined and reinterpreted by the Supreme Court.  Since then, a collegium, consisting of the Chief Justice of India and 4 other senior most SC judges, made recommendations for persons to be appointed as SC and HC judges, to the President.[ii] Recommendations of various bodies for setting up an independent appointments commission Over the decades, several high level Commissions have examined this method of appointment of judges to the higher judiciary.  They have suggested that an independent body be set up to make recommendations for such appointments.  However, they differed in the representation of the judiciary, legislature and executive in making such appointments.  These are summarised below. Table 1: Comparison of various recommendations on the composition of a proposed appointments body

Recommendatory Body Suggested composition
2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (2007) Judiciary : CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive : Vice-President (Chairperson), PM, Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leaders of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament. Other: No representative.
National Advisory Council (2005) Judiciary: CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive: Vice-President (Chairman), PM (or nominee), Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leader of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament. Other: No representative.
NCRWC (2002) Judiciary :CJI (Chairman), two senior most SC judges Executive: Union Law Minister Legislature: No representative Other: one eminent person
Law Commission (1987) Judiciary : CJI (Chairman), three senior most SC judges, immediate predecessor of the CJI, three senior most CJs of HCs, [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive: Law Minister, Attorney General of India, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: No representative Other: One Law academic

Sources: 121st Report of the Law Commission, 1987; Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002; A Consultation Paper on Superior Judiciary, NCRWC, 2001;  A National Judicial Commission-Report for discussion in the National Advisory Council, 2005; Fourth Report of the 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), ‘Ethics in Governance’, 2007; PRS. It may be noted that the Law Commission, in its 2008 and 2009 reports, suggested that Government should seek a reconsideration of the judgments in the Three Judges cases.  In the alternative, Parliament should pass a law restoring the primacy of the CJI, while ensuring that the executive played a role in making judicial appointments. Appointments process in different countries                   Internationally, there are varied methods for making appointments of judges to the higher judiciary.  The method of appointment of judges to the highest court, in some jurisdictions, is outlined in Table 2. Table 2: Appointment of judges to the highest court in different jurisdictions

Country Method of Appointment to the highest court Who is involved in making the appointments
UK SC judges are appointed by a five-person selection commission. It consists of the SC President, his deputy, and one member each appointed by the JACs of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.[iii]  (The JACs comprise lay persons, members of the judiciary and the Bar and make appointments of judges of lower courts.)
Canada Appointments are made by the Governor in Council.[iv] A selection panel comprising five MPs (from the government and the opposition) reviews list of nominees and submits 3 names to the Prime Minister.[v]
USA Appointments are made by the President. Supreme Court Justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the United States Senate.[vi]
Germany Appointments are made by election. Half the members of the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by the executive and half by the legislature.[vii]
France Appointments are made by the President. President receives proposals for appointments from Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature.[viii]

Sources: Constitutional Reform Act, 2005; Canada Supreme Court Act, 1985; Constitution of the United States of America; Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany; Constitution of France; PRS. In delivering its judgment that strikes down the setting up of an NJAC, the Court has stated that it would schedule hearings from November 3, 2015 regarding ways in which the collegium system can be strengthened.

 


[i] Article 124, Constitution of India (Prior to 2015 Amendments)

[ii] S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India, AIR 1982, SC 149; S.C. Advocates on Record Association vs. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268; In re: Special Reference, AIR 1999 SC 1.

[iii].  Schedule 8, Constitutional Reform Act, 2005.

[iv].  Section 4(2), Supreme Court Act (RSC, 1985).

[v].  Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the retirement of Justice Morris Fish, http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/04/23/statement-prime-minister-canada-retirement-justice-morris-fish.

[vi].  Article II, Section 2, The Constitution of the United States of America.

[vii].  Article 94 (1), Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.

[viii] Article 65, Constitution of France, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constiution_anglais_oct2009.pdf.