After months of discussion,  the issue of FDI in retail is being deliberated in the Lok Sabha today.  In September 2012, the Cabinet had approved 51% of FDI in multi-brand retail (stores selling more than one brand).  Under these regulations, foreign retail giants like Walmart and Tesco can set up shop in India.  Discussions on permitting FDI in retail have focused on the effect of FDI on unorganised retailers, farmers and consumers. Earlier, the central government commissioned the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) to examine the impact of organised retail on unorganised retail. The Standing Committee on Commerce also tabled a report on Foreign and Domestic Investment in the Retail Sector in May, 2009 while the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) released a discussion paper examining FDI in multi-brand retail in July, 2010.  Other experts have also made arguments – both in support of, and in opposition to, the move to permit FDI in retail sales. The table below summarises some of these arguments from the perspective of various stakeholders as collated from the above reports examining the issue.

Stakeholder

Supporting arguments (source)

Opposing arguments (source)

Unorganised retail
  • No evidence of impact on job losses (ICRIER).
  • The rate of closure of unorganised retail shops (4.2%) is lower than international standards (ICRIER).
  • Evidence from Indonesia and China show that traditional and modern retail can coexist and grow  (Reardon and Gulati).
  • Majority of small retailers keen to remain in operation even after emergence of organised retail (ICRIER).
  •  Unorganised retailers in the vicinity of organised retailers saw their volume of business and profit decline but this effect weakens over time (ICRIER).
  • Other studies have estimated that traditional fruit and vegetable retailers experienced a 20-30% decline in incomes with the presence of supermarkets (Singh).
  • There is potential for employment loss in the value chain. A supermarket may create fewer jobs for the volume of produce handled (Singh).
  • Unemployment to increase as a result of retailers practicing product bundling (selling goods in combinations and bargains) and predatory pricing (Standing Committee).
Farmers
  • Significant positive impact on farmers as a result of direct sales to organised retailers.  For instance, cauliflower farmers receive a 25% higher price selling directly to organised retailers instead of government regulated markets (mandis).  Profits for farmers selling to organised retailers are about 60% higher than when selling to mandis (ICRIER).
  • Organised retail could remove supply chain inefficiencies through direct purchase from farmers and investment in better storage, distribution and transport systems.  FDI, in particular, could bring in new technology and ideas (DIPP).
  •  Current organised retail procures 60-70% from wholesale markets rather than farmers. There has been no significant impact on backend infrastructure investment (Singh).
  • There are other issues like irrigation, technology and credit in agriculture which FDI may not address (Singh).
  • Increased monopolistic strength could force farmers to sell at lower prices (Standing Committee).
Consumers
  • Organised retail lowers prices. Consumer spending increases with the entry of organised retail and lower income groups tend to save more (ICRIER).
  • It will lead to better quality and safety standards of products (DIPP).
  •  Evidence from some Latin American countries (Mexico, Nicaragua, Argentina), Africa (Kenya, Madagascar) and Asia (Thailand, Vietnam, India) reveal that supermarket prices for fruits and vegetables were higher than traditional retail prices (Singh).
  • Even with lower prices at supermarkets, low income households may prefer traditional retailers because they live far from supermarkets, they can bargain with traditional retailers and buy loose items (Singh).
  • Monopolistic power for retailers could result in high prices for consumers.

Source: ICRIER [1.  "Impact of Organized Retailing on the Unorganized Sector", ICRIER, September 2008]; Standing Committee [2.  "Foreign and domestic investment in retail sector", Standing Committee on Commerce, May 13, 2009]; Singh (2011) [3. "FDI in Retail: Misplaced Expectations and Half-truths",  Sukhpal Singh, Economic and Political Weekly, December 17, 2011];  Reardon and Gulati (2008)  [4. "Rise of supermarkets and their development implications," IFPRI Discussion Paper, Thomas Reardon and Ashok Gulati, February 2008.]; DIPP [5. "Discussion Paper on FDI in Multi-brand Retail Trading", Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, July 6, 2010]


Last month, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released the report of the Expert Committee on Urban Co-operative Banks (Chair: Mr. N. S. Vishwanathan).  In this blog, we discuss some broader issues with the functioning and regulation of urban co-operative banks (UCBs), and some of the suggestions to address these as highlighted by the committee in its report.

Need for Urban Co-operative Banks

The history of UCBs in India can be traced to the 19th century when such societies were set up drawing inspiration from the success of the co-operative movement in Britain and the co-operative credit movement in Germany.  Urban co-operative credit societies, were organised on a community basis to meet the consumption-oriented credit needs of their members.  UCBs are primary cooperative banks in urban and semi-urban areas.  They are co-operative societies that undertake banking business.  Co-operative banks accept deposits from the public and lend to their members.  Co-operative banks are different from other co-operatives as they mobilise resources for lending and investment from the wider public rather than only their members.

Concerns regarding the professionalism of urban cooperative banks gave rise to the view that they should be better regulated.  Large cooperative banks with paid-up share capital and reserves of one lakh rupees were brought under the scope of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 with effect from March 1, 1966.  Prior to this, such banks were regulated under the scope of state-specific cooperative laws.  The revised framework brought them under the ambit of supervision of the RBI.  Till 1996, these banks could lend money only for non-agricultural purposes.  However, this distinction does not apply today.  

The Expert Committee noted that UCBs play a key role in financial inclusion.  It further observed that the focus area for UCBs has traditionally been communities and localities including workplace groups.  They play an important role in the delivery of last-mile credit, even more so for those sections of the population who are not integrated into the mainstream banking framework.  UCBs primarily lend to wage earners, small entrepreneurs, and businesses in urban and semi-urban areas.  UCBs can be more responsive than formal banking channels to the needs of the local people.

Over the years, concerns have been raised about non-professional management in UCBs and that this can lead to weaker governance and risk management in these entities.  RBI has also taken regulatory action on several UCBs.  For instance, in September 2019, RBI placed Punjab and Maharashtra Co-operative Bank under restrictions on allegations of serious underreporting of non-performing assets.  The bank could not grant loans, make investments or accept deposits without prior approval from RBI.  While these restrictions were originally put in place for six months, the time frame was extended several times and has now been extended till December 31, 2021.  In addition, low capital base, poor credit management and diversion of funds have also been issues in the sector.

Shrinking share in the banking sector

There were 1,539 UCBs in the country as of March 31, 2020, with deposits worth Rs 5,01,180 crore and advances worth Rs 3,05,370 crore.   Even though 94% of the entities in the banking sector were UCBs their market share in the banking sector has been low and declining and stands at around 3%.  UCBs accounted for 3.24% of the deposits and 2.69% of the advances in the banking sector.  The Committee noted that state-of-the-art technology adopted by new players, such as small finance banks and fintech entities, along with commercial banks can disrupt the niche customer segment of the UCBs.

Figure 1:  Growth in deposits of UCBs (in Rs crore)
  image

Source: Report of the Expert Committee on Urban Co-operative Banks; PRS.

Figure 2:     Growth in advances of UCBs (in Rs crore)
 
image

Source:  Report of the Expert Committee on Urban Co-operative Banks; PRS.

Burden of non-performing assets

UCBs had the highest net non-performing asset (NNPA) ratio (5.26%) and gross non-performing asset (GNPA) ratio (10.96%) across the banking sector as of March 2020.  These levels correspond to around twice that of private sector banks, and around five times that of small finance banks.  The Committee noted that, as of March 2020, UCBs have the lowest level of net interest margin (difference between interest earned and interest spent relative to total interest generating assets held by the bank) and negative return on assets and return on equity. 

Figure 3: Asset quality across banks (in percentage)

image
 
Sources:   Report of the Expert Committee on Urban Co-operative Banks; PRS.

Supervisory Action Framework (SAF):  SAF envisages corrective action by UCB and/or supervisory action by RBI on breach of financial thresholds related to asset quality, profitability and level of capital as measured by Capital to Risk-weighted Asset Ratio (CRAR).  The Committee recommended that SAF should consider only asset quality (based on net non-performing asset ratio) and CRAR with an emphasis on reducing the time spent by a UCB under SAF.  The RBI should begin the mandatory resolution process including reconstruction or compulsory merger as soon as a UCB reaches the third stage under SAF (CRAR less than 4.5% and/or net non-performing asset ratio above 12%).

Constraints in raising capital

The Committee also observed that UCBs are constrained in raising capital which restricts their ability to expand the business.  According to co-operative principles, share capital is to be issued and refunded only at face value.  Thus, investment in UCBs is less attractive as it does not lead to an increase in its value.   Also, the principle of one member, one vote means that an interested investor cannot acquire a controlling stake in UCBs.  It was earlier recommended that UCBs should be allowed to issue fresh capital at a premium based on the net worth of the entity at the end of the preceding year.

Listing of securities:  The Committee recommended making suitable amendments to the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 to enable RBI to notify certain securities issued by any co-operative bank or class of co-operative banks to be covered under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 and the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992.  This will enable their listing and trading on a recognised stock exchange.   Until such amendments are made, the Committee recommended that banks can be allowed to have a system on their websites to buy/sell securities at book value subject to the condition that the bank should ensure that the prospective buyer is eligible to be admitted as a member.   

Conflict between Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and co-operative laws 

The fundamental difference between banking companies and co-operative banks is in the voting rights of shareholders.  In banking companies, each share has a corresponding vote.  But in the case of co-operative banks, each shareholder has only one vote irrespective of the number of shares held.  Despite RBI being the regulator of the banking sector, the regulation of co-operative banks by RBI was restricted to functions related directly to banking.  This gave rise to dual regulation with governance, audit, and winding-up related functions regulated by state governments and central government for single-state banks and multi-state banks, respectively.  

2020 Amendments to the Banking Regulation Act: In September 2020, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 was amended to increase RBI’s powers  over the regulation of co-operative banks including qualifications of management of these banks and supersession of board of directors.  The Committee noted that due to the amendment of the Act, certain conflicts have arisen with various co-operative laws.  For instance, the Act allows co-operative banks to issue shares at a premium, but it is silent on their redemption.  It noted that if any co-operative societies’ legislation provides for redemption of shares only at par, then, while a co-operative bank incorporated under that legislation can issue shares at a premium, it can redeem them only at par.   

Note that on September 3, 2021, the Madhya Pradesh High Court stayed a circular released by the RBI on appointment of managing director/whole-time director in UCBs.  The circular provided for eligibility and propriety criteria for the appointment of such personnel in UCBs.  The petitioner, Mahanagar Nagrik Sahakari Bank Maryadit, argued that the service conditions of the managing director and chief executive officer of co-operative banks are governed by bye-laws framed under the M.P. State Cooperative Societies Act, 1960.  The petition noted that co-operative as a subject falls under the state list and hence the power to legislate in the field of co-operative societies falls under the domain of the states and not the central government.


Umbrella Organisation

Over the years, several committees have looked at the feasibility to set up an Umbrella Organisation (UO) for UCBs.  It is an apex body of federating UCBs.  In 2011, an expert committee on licensing of new UCBs recommended that there should be two separate UOs for the sector.  In June 2019, RBI granted an in-principle approval to National Federation of Urban Co-operative Banks and Credit Societies Ltd to set up a UO in the form of a non-deposit taking non-banking finance company.  The UO is expected to provide information technology and financial support to its federating members along with value-added services linked to treasury, foreign exchange and international remittances.   It is envisaged to provide scale through network to smaller UCBs.  The report of the current Committee recommended that the minimum capital of the UO should be Rs 300 crore.  Once stabilised, the UO can explore the possibility of becoming a universal bank.  It can also take up the role of a self-regulatory organisation for its member UCBs.  The Committee also suggested that the membership of the UO can be opened-up to both financial and non-financial co-operatives who can make contributions through share capital in the UO.

Comments on the report of the Expert Committee are invited until September 30, 2021.