Applications for LAMP Fellowship 2025-26 are now open. Apply here. The last date for submitting applications is December 21, 2024

After months of discussion,  the issue of FDI in retail is being deliberated in the Lok Sabha today.  In September 2012, the Cabinet had approved 51% of FDI in multi-brand retail (stores selling more than one brand).  Under these regulations, foreign retail giants like Walmart and Tesco can set up shop in India.  Discussions on permitting FDI in retail have focused on the effect of FDI on unorganised retailers, farmers and consumers. Earlier, the central government commissioned the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) to examine the impact of organised retail on unorganised retail. The Standing Committee on Commerce also tabled a report on Foreign and Domestic Investment in the Retail Sector in May, 2009 while the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) released a discussion paper examining FDI in multi-brand retail in July, 2010.  Other experts have also made arguments – both in support of, and in opposition to, the move to permit FDI in retail sales. The table below summarises some of these arguments from the perspective of various stakeholders as collated from the above reports examining the issue.

Stakeholder

Supporting arguments (source)

Opposing arguments (source)

Unorganised retail
  • No evidence of impact on job losses (ICRIER).
  • The rate of closure of unorganised retail shops (4.2%) is lower than international standards (ICRIER).
  • Evidence from Indonesia and China show that traditional and modern retail can coexist and grow  (Reardon and Gulati).
  • Majority of small retailers keen to remain in operation even after emergence of organised retail (ICRIER).
  •  Unorganised retailers in the vicinity of organised retailers saw their volume of business and profit decline but this effect weakens over time (ICRIER).
  • Other studies have estimated that traditional fruit and vegetable retailers experienced a 20-30% decline in incomes with the presence of supermarkets (Singh).
  • There is potential for employment loss in the value chain. A supermarket may create fewer jobs for the volume of produce handled (Singh).
  • Unemployment to increase as a result of retailers practicing product bundling (selling goods in combinations and bargains) and predatory pricing (Standing Committee).
Farmers
  • Significant positive impact on farmers as a result of direct sales to organised retailers.  For instance, cauliflower farmers receive a 25% higher price selling directly to organised retailers instead of government regulated markets (mandis).  Profits for farmers selling to organised retailers are about 60% higher than when selling to mandis (ICRIER).
  • Organised retail could remove supply chain inefficiencies through direct purchase from farmers and investment in better storage, distribution and transport systems.  FDI, in particular, could bring in new technology and ideas (DIPP).
  •  Current organised retail procures 60-70% from wholesale markets rather than farmers. There has been no significant impact on backend infrastructure investment (Singh).
  • There are other issues like irrigation, technology and credit in agriculture which FDI may not address (Singh).
  • Increased monopolistic strength could force farmers to sell at lower prices (Standing Committee).
Consumers
  • Organised retail lowers prices. Consumer spending increases with the entry of organised retail and lower income groups tend to save more (ICRIER).
  • It will lead to better quality and safety standards of products (DIPP).
  •  Evidence from some Latin American countries (Mexico, Nicaragua, Argentina), Africa (Kenya, Madagascar) and Asia (Thailand, Vietnam, India) reveal that supermarket prices for fruits and vegetables were higher than traditional retail prices (Singh).
  • Even with lower prices at supermarkets, low income households may prefer traditional retailers because they live far from supermarkets, they can bargain with traditional retailers and buy loose items (Singh).
  • Monopolistic power for retailers could result in high prices for consumers.

Source: ICRIER [1.  "Impact of Organized Retailing on the Unorganized Sector", ICRIER, September 2008]; Standing Committee [2.  "Foreign and domestic investment in retail sector", Standing Committee on Commerce, May 13, 2009]; Singh (2011) [3. "FDI in Retail: Misplaced Expectations and Half-truths",  Sukhpal Singh, Economic and Political Weekly, December 17, 2011];  Reardon and Gulati (2008)  [4. "Rise of supermarkets and their development implications," IFPRI Discussion Paper, Thomas Reardon and Ashok Gulati, February 2008.]; DIPP [5. "Discussion Paper on FDI in Multi-brand Retail Trading", Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, July 6, 2010]


In the last few years, several states have enacted laws to curb cheating in examinations, especially those for recruitment in public service commissions.   According to news reports, incidents of cheating and paper leaks have occurred on several occasions in Uttarakhand, including during the panchayat development officer exams in 2016, and the Uttarakhand Subordinate Services Selection Commission exams in 2021.  The Uttarakhand Public Service Commission papers were also leaked in January 2023.  The most recent cheating incidents led to protests and unrest in Uttarakhand.   Following this, on February 11, 2023, the state promulgated an Ordinance to bar and penalise the use of unfair means in public examinations.  The Uttarakhand Assembly passed the Bill replacing the Ordinance in March 2023.  There have been multiple reports of candidates being arrested and debarred for cheating in public examinations for posts such as forest guard and secretariat guard after the ordinance’s introduction.  Similar instances of cheating have also been noted in other states.   As per news reports, since 2015, Gujarat has not been able to hold a single recruitment exam without reported paper leaks.  In February 2023, the Gujarat Assembly also passed a law to penalise cheating in public examinations.  Other states such as Rajasthan (Act passed in 2022), Uttar Pradesh (Act passed in 1998) and Andhra Pradesh (Act passed in 1997) also have similar laws.  In this blog, we compare anti-cheating laws across some states (see Table 1), and discuss some issues to consider.

Typical provisions of anti-cheating laws

Anti-cheating laws across states generally contain provisions that penalise the use of unfair means by examinees and other groups in public examinations such as those conducted by state public sector commission examinations and higher secondary education boards.  Broadly, unfair means is defined to include the use of unauthorised help and the unauthorised use of written material by candidates.  These laws also prohibit individuals responsible for conducting examinations from disclosing any information they acquire in this role.  The more recent laws, such as the Gujarat, Uttarakhand, and Rajasthan ones, also include the impersonation of candidates and the leaking of exam papers within the definition of unfair means.  Uttarakhand, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Andhra Pradesh prohibit the use of electronic aids.  Maximum prison sentences for using such unfair means range from three months in Uttar Pradesh, to seven years in Andhra Pradesh. 

Issues to consider

The Gujarat and Uttarakhand anti-cheating Acts have relatively stringent provisions for cheating.  The Uttarakhand Act has a fixed 3-year prison sentence for examinees caught cheating or using unfair means (for the first offence).  Since the Act does not distinguish between the different types of unfair means used, an examinee could serve a sentence disproportionate to the offence committed.  In most other states, the maximum imprisonment term for such offences is three years.   Andhra Pradesh has a minimum imprisonment term of three years.  However, all these states allow for a range with respect to the penalty, that is, the judge can decide on the imprisonment term (within the specified limits) depending on the manner of cheating and the implications of such cheating.  Table 1 below compares the penalties for certain offences across eight states.

The Uttarakhand Act has a provision that debars the examinee from state competitive examinations for two to five years upon the filing of the chargesheet, rather than upon conviction.  Thus, an examinee could be deprived of giving the examination even if they were innocent but being prosecuted under the law.  This could compromise the presumption of innocence for accused candidates.  The Gujarat and Rajasthan laws also debar candidates from sitting in specified examinations for two years, but only upon conviction. 

These laws also vary in scope across states.  In Uttarakhand and Rajasthan, the laws only apply to competitive examinations for recruitment in a state department (such as a Public Commission).   In the other six states examined, these laws also apply to examinations held by educational institutions for granting educational qualifications such as diplomas and degrees.  For example, in Gujarat, exams conducted by the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board are also covered under the Gujarat Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2023.   The question is whether it is appropriate to have similar punishments for exams in educational institutions and exams for recruitment in government jobs, given the difference in stakes between them.

Sources: The Rajasthan Public Examination (Measures for Prevention of Unfair Means in Recruitment) Act, 2022; the Uttar Pradesh Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 1998; the Chhattisgarh Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2008; the Orissa Conduct of Examinations Act, 1988; the Andhra Pradesh Public Examinations (Prevention of Malpractices and Unfair means) Act, 1997; the Jharkhand Conduct of Examinations Act, 2001, the Uttarakhand Competitive Examination (Measures for Prevention and Prevention of Unfair Means in Recruitment) Act, 2023, the Gujarat Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Methods) Act, 2023; PRS.