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Last month, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released the report of the Expert Committee on Urban Co-operative Banks (Chair: Mr. N. S. Vishwanathan). In this blog, we discuss some broader issues with the functioning and regulation of urban co-operative banks (UCBs), and some of the suggestions to address these as highlighted by the committee in its report.
Need for Urban Co-operative Banks
The history of UCBs in India can be traced to the 19th century when such societies were set up drawing inspiration from the success of the co-operative movement in Britain and the co-operative credit movement in Germany. Urban co-operative credit societies, were organised on a community basis to meet the consumption-oriented credit needs of their members. UCBs are primary cooperative banks in urban and semi-urban areas. They are co-operative societies that undertake banking business. Co-operative banks accept deposits from the public and lend to their members. Co-operative banks are different from other co-operatives as they mobilise resources for lending and investment from the wider public rather than only their members.
Concerns regarding the professionalism of urban cooperative banks gave rise to the view that they should be better regulated. Large cooperative banks with paid-up share capital and reserves of one lakh rupees were brought under the scope of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 with effect from March 1, 1966. Prior to this, such banks were regulated under the scope of state-specific cooperative laws. The revised framework brought them under the ambit of supervision of the RBI. Till 1996, these banks could lend money only for non-agricultural purposes. However, this distinction does not apply today.
The Expert Committee noted that UCBs play a key role in financial inclusion. It further observed that the focus area for UCBs has traditionally been communities and localities including workplace groups. They play an important role in the delivery of last-mile credit, even more so for those sections of the population who are not integrated into the mainstream banking framework. UCBs primarily lend to wage earners, small entrepreneurs, and businesses in urban and semi-urban areas. UCBs can be more responsive than formal banking channels to the needs of the local people.
Over the years, concerns have been raised about non-professional management in UCBs and that this can lead to weaker governance and risk management in these entities. RBI has also taken regulatory action on several UCBs. For instance, in September 2019, RBI placed Punjab and Maharashtra Co-operative Bank under restrictions on allegations of serious underreporting of non-performing assets. The bank could not grant loans, make investments or accept deposits without prior approval from RBI. While these restrictions were originally put in place for six months, the time frame was extended several times and has now been extended till December 31, 2021. In addition, low capital base, poor credit management and diversion of funds have also been issues in the sector.
Shrinking share in the banking sector
There were 1,539 UCBs in the country as of March 31, 2020, with deposits worth Rs 5,01,180 crore and advances worth Rs 3,05,370 crore. Even though 94% of the entities in the banking sector were UCBs their market share in the banking sector has been low and declining and stands at around 3%. UCBs accounted for 3.24% of the deposits and 2.69% of the advances in the banking sector. The Committee noted that state-of-the-art technology adopted by new players, such as small finance banks and fintech entities, along with commercial banks can disrupt the niche customer segment of the UCBs.
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Figure 1: Growth in deposits of UCBs (in Rs crore) |
Figure 2: Growth in advances of UCBs (in Rs crore) |
Burden of non-performing assets
UCBs had the highest net non-performing asset (NNPA) ratio (5.26%) and gross non-performing asset (GNPA) ratio (10.96%) across the banking sector as of March 2020. These levels correspond to around twice that of private sector banks, and around five times that of small finance banks. The Committee noted that, as of March 2020, UCBs have the lowest level of net interest margin (difference between interest earned and interest spent relative to total interest generating assets held by the bank) and negative return on assets and return on equity.
Figure 3: Asset quality across banks (in percentage)
Sources: Report of the Expert Committee on Urban Co-operative Banks; PRS.
Supervisory Action Framework (SAF): SAF envisages corrective action by UCB and/or supervisory action by RBI on breach of financial thresholds related to asset quality, profitability and level of capital as measured by Capital to Risk-weighted Asset Ratio (CRAR). The Committee recommended that SAF should consider only asset quality (based on net non-performing asset ratio) and CRAR with an emphasis on reducing the time spent by a UCB under SAF. The RBI should begin the mandatory resolution process including reconstruction or compulsory merger as soon as a UCB reaches the third stage under SAF (CRAR less than 4.5% and/or net non-performing asset ratio above 12%).
Constraints in raising capital
The Committee also observed that UCBs are constrained in raising capital which restricts their ability to expand the business. According to co-operative principles, share capital is to be issued and refunded only at face value. Thus, investment in UCBs is less attractive as it does not lead to an increase in its value. Also, the principle of one member, one vote means that an interested investor cannot acquire a controlling stake in UCBs. It was earlier recommended that UCBs should be allowed to issue fresh capital at a premium based on the net worth of the entity at the end of the preceding year.
Listing of securities: The Committee recommended making suitable amendments to the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 to enable RBI to notify certain securities issued by any co-operative bank or class of co-operative banks to be covered under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 and the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992. This will enable their listing and trading on a recognised stock exchange. Until such amendments are made, the Committee recommended that banks can be allowed to have a system on their websites to buy/sell securities at book value subject to the condition that the bank should ensure that the prospective buyer is eligible to be admitted as a member.
Conflict between Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and co-operative laws
The fundamental difference between banking companies and co-operative banks is in the voting rights of shareholders. In banking companies, each share has a corresponding vote. But in the case of co-operative banks, each shareholder has only one vote irrespective of the number of shares held. Despite RBI being the regulator of the banking sector, the regulation of co-operative banks by RBI was restricted to functions related directly to banking. This gave rise to dual regulation with governance, audit, and winding-up related functions regulated by state governments and central government for single-state banks and multi-state banks, respectively.
2020 Amendments to the Banking Regulation Act: In September 2020, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 was amended to increase RBI’s powers over the regulation of co-operative banks including qualifications of management of these banks and supersession of board of directors. The Committee noted that due to the amendment of the Act, certain conflicts have arisen with various co-operative laws. For instance, the Act allows co-operative banks to issue shares at a premium, but it is silent on their redemption. It noted that if any co-operative societies’ legislation provides for redemption of shares only at par, then, while a co-operative bank incorporated under that legislation can issue shares at a premium, it can redeem them only at par.
Note that on September 3, 2021, the Madhya Pradesh High Court stayed a circular released by the RBI on appointment of managing director/whole-time director in UCBs. The circular provided for eligibility and propriety criteria for the appointment of such personnel in UCBs. The petitioner, Mahanagar Nagrik Sahakari Bank Maryadit, argued that the service conditions of the managing director and chief executive officer of co-operative banks are governed by bye-laws framed under the M.P. State Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. The petition noted that co-operative as a subject falls under the state list and hence the power to legislate in the field of co-operative societies falls under the domain of the states and not the central government.
Umbrella Organisation
Over the years, several committees have looked at the feasibility to set up an Umbrella Organisation (UO) for UCBs. It is an apex body of federating UCBs. In 2011, an expert committee on licensing of new UCBs recommended that there should be two separate UOs for the sector. In June 2019, RBI granted an in-principle approval to National Federation of Urban Co-operative Banks and Credit Societies Ltd to set up a UO in the form of a non-deposit taking non-banking finance company. The UO is expected to provide information technology and financial support to its federating members along with value-added services linked to treasury, foreign exchange and international remittances. It is envisaged to provide scale through network to smaller UCBs. The report of the current Committee recommended that the minimum capital of the UO should be Rs 300 crore. Once stabilised, the UO can explore the possibility of becoming a universal bank. It can also take up the role of a self-regulatory organisation for its member UCBs. The Committee also suggested that the membership of the UO can be opened-up to both financial and non-financial co-operatives who can make contributions through share capital in the UO.
Comments on the report of the Expert Committee are invited until September 30, 2021.
In the past few months, retail prices of petrol and diesel have consistently increased and have reached all-time high levels. On September 24, 2018, the retail price of petrol in Delhi was Rs 82.72/litre, and that of diesel was Rs 74.02/litre. In Mumbai, these prices were even higher at Rs 90.08/litre and Rs 78.58/litre, respectively.
The difference in retail prices in the two cities is because of the different tax rates levied by the respective state governments on the same products. This blog post explains the major tax components in the price structure of petrol and diesel and how tax rates vary across states. It also analyses the shift in the taxation of these products, its effect on retail prices, and the consequent revenue generated by the central and state governments.
What are the components of the price structure of petrol and diesel?
Retail prices of petrol and diesel in India are revised by oil companies on a daily basis, according to changes in the price of global crude oil. However, the price paid by oil companies makes up 51% of the retail price in case of petrol, and 61% in the case of diesel (Table 1). The break-up of retail prices of petrol and diesel in Delhi, as on September 24, 2018, shows that over 45% of the retail price of petrol comprises central and states taxes. In the case of diesel, this is close to 36%.
At present, the central government has the power to tax the production of petroleum products, while states have the power to tax their sale. The central government levies an excise duty of Rs 19.5/litre on petrol and Rs 15.3/litre on diesel. These make up 24% and 21% of the retail prices of petrol and diesel, respectively.
While excise duty rates are uniform across the country, states levy sales tax/value added tax (VAT), the rates of which differ across states. The figure below shows the different tax rates levied by states on petrol and diesel, which results in their varying retail prices across the country. For instance, the tax rates levied by states on petrol ranges from 17% in Goa to 39% in Maharashtra.
Note that unlike excise duty, sales tax is an ad valorem tax, i.e., it does not have a fixed value, and is charged as a percentage of the price of the product. This implies that while the excise duty component of the price structure is fixed, the sales tax component is charged as a proportion of the price paid by oil companies, which in turn depends on the global crude oil price. With the recent increase in the global prices, and subsequently the retail prices, some states such as Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, and Karnataka have announced tax rate cuts.
How have retail prices in India changed vis-à-vis the global crude oil price?
India’s dependence on imports for consumption of petroleum products has increased over the years. For instance, in 1998-99, net imports were 69% of the total consumption, which increased to 93% in 2017-18. Because of a large share of imports in the domestic consumption, any change in the global price of crude oil has a significant impact on the domestic prices of petroleum products. The following figures show the trend in price of global crude oil and retail price of petrol and diesel in India, over the last six years.
The global price of crude oil (Indian basket) decreased from USD 112/barrel in September 2012 to USD 28/barrel in January 2016. Though the global price dropped by 75% during this period, retail prices of petrol and diesel in India decreased only by 13% and 5%, respectively. This disparity in decrease of global and Indian retail prices was because of increase in taxes levied on petrol and diesel, which nullified the benefit of the sharp decline in the global price. Between October 2014and June 2016, the excise duty on petrol increased from Rs 11.02/litre to Rs 21.48/litre. In the same period, the excise duty on diesel increased from Rs 5.11/litre to Rs 17.33/litre.
Over the years, the central government has used taxes to prevent sharp fluctuations in the retail price of diesel and petrol. For instance, in the past, when global crude oil price has increased, duties have been cut. Since January 2016, the global crude oil price has increased by 158% from USD 28/barrel to USD 73/barrel in August 2018. However, during this period, excise duty has been reduced only once by Rs 2/litre in October 2017. While the central government has not signalled any excise duty cut so far, it remains to be seen if any rate cut will happen in case the global crude oil price rises further. With US economic sanctions on Iran coming into effect on November 4, 2018, India may face a shortfall in supply since Iran is India’s third largest oil supplier. Moreover, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and Russia have not indicated any increase in supply from their side yet to offset the possible effect of sanctions. As a result, in a scenario with no tax rate cut, this could increase the retail prices of petrol and diesel even further.
How has the revenue generated from taxing petroleum products changed over the years?
As a result of successive increases in excise duty between November 2014 and January 2016, the year-on-year growth rate of excise duty collections increased from 27% in 2014-15 to 80% in 2015-16. In comparison, the growth rate of sales tax collections was 6% in 2014-15 and 4% in 2015-16. The figure below shows the tax collections from the levy of excise duty and sales tax on petroleum products. From 2011-12 to 2017-18, excise duty and sales tax collections grew annually at a rate of 22% and 11%, respectively.
How is this revenue shared between centre and states?
Though central taxes are levied by the centre, it gets only 58% of the revenue from the levy of these taxes. The rest 42% is devolved to the states as per the recommendations of the 14th Finance Commission. However, excise duty levied on petrol and diesel consists of two broad components – (i) excise duty component, and (ii) road and infrastructure cess. Of this, only the revenue generated from the excise duty component is devolved to states. Revenue generated by the centre from any cess is not devolved to states.
The cess component was increased by Rs 2/litre to Rs 8/litre in the Union Budget 2018-19. However, this was done by reducing the excise duty component by the same amount, so as to keep the overall rate the same. Essentially this provision shifted the revenue of Rs 2/litre of petrol and diesel from states’ divisible pool of taxes to the cess revenue, which is entirely with the centre. This cess revenue is earmarked for financing infrastructure projects.
At present, of the Rs 19.5/litre excise duty levied on petrol, Rs 11.5/litre is the duty component, and Rs 8/litre is the cess component. Therefore, accounting for 42% share of states in the duty component, centre effectively gets a revenue of Rs 14.7/litre, while states get Rs 4.8/litre. Similarly, excise duty of Rs 15.3/litre levied on diesel consists of a cess component of Rs 8/litre. Thus, excise duty on diesel effectively generates revenue of Rs 12.2/litre for the centre and Rs 3.1/litre for states.
