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The Chemical Weapons Convention (Amendment) Bill, 2010 (the Bill) was recently passed by the Lok Sabha without any amendment. The Chemical Weapons Convention Act, 2000 (the Act) was enacted to give effect to the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (the CWC). The CWC aims to eliminate chemical weapons by prohibiting their development, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer or use by State Parties. The 188 State Parties of the CWC are required to take the steps necessary to prohibit these activities within their jurisdiction. India signed the Convention on January 14, 1993. The Bill was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on April 16, 2010 by the Minister of State in the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, Mr. Srikant Kumar Jena. The Standing Committee submitted its report on August 3, 2010. This Bill was passed by the Rajya Sabha on May 3, 2012 with some amendments based on the recommendations of the Standing Committee. The recommendations of the standing committee and the subsequent amendments made by the Rajya Sabha are as follows:
The Lok Sabha passed the Bill on August 30, 2012 without any amendments. The standing committee report and its summary may be accessed here and here.
"Parliamentary approval of the creation, mandate and powers of security agencies is a necessary but not sufficient condition for upholding the rule of law. A legal foundation increases the legitimacy both of the existence of these agencies and the (often exceptional) powers that they possess." Though mechanisms for ensuring accountability of the executive to the Parliament are in place for most aspects of government in India, such mechanisms are completely absent for the oversight of intelligence agencies. In India, various intelligence agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing, and the Intelligence Bureau are creations of administrative orders, and are not subject to scrutiny by Parliament. This is in direct contrast to the practise of the Legislature's oversight of intelligence agencies in most countries. Though different countries have different models of exercising such oversight, the common principle - that activities of intelligence agencies should be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, remains uniform. In the US for example, both the House and the Senate have a Committee which exercises such scrutiny. These are House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, established in 1977, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, created in 1976. Both committees have broad powers over the intelligence community. They oversee budgetary appropriations as well as legislation on this subject. In addition, the House Committee can do something which the Senate can not: “tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities.” This gives the Committee the power to look into actual tactical intelligence, and not just broader policy issues. Intelligence agencies are also governed by a variety of laws which clearly lay out a charter of responsibilities, as well as specific exemptions allowing such agencies to do some things other government agencies ordinarily cannot. (For source, click here) In UK, the Intelligence Services Act of 1994 set up a similar framework for intelligence organisations in the UK, and also set up a mechanism for legislative oversight. The Act set up a Committee which should consists mostly of Members of Parliament. The members are appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of opposition, and the Committee reports to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is required to present the report of the Committee before Parliament. (For the Act, click here) Recently, the Committee has expressed concerns in its 2009-10 report over the fact that it is financially dependent on the Prime Minister's office, and that there could be a conflict of interest considering it is practically a part of the government over which it is supposed to express oversight. (For the report, click here) A study titled "Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice" captures the best components of Parliamentary oversight of intelligence bodies. Some of these are: