The first batch of B.Tech students will pass out in the next couple of months from six new IITs but they will not get their degrees unless Parliament passes an Amendment Bill. M.Tech students who completed their course in IIT Hyderabad last year have not yet been awarded their degrees. The Institute of Technology (Amendment) Bill, 2010 is listed for consideration and passing in the Rajya Sabha on April 30, 2012 along with the National Institutes of Technology (Amendment) Bill, 2010. Both Bills were passed in the Lok Sabha in 2011. Both Bills confer the status of institutions of national importance to a number of new institutions, which implies that they have the power to award degrees (other technical institutions have to be affiliated with a university to be able to award degrees). These institutions cannot award degrees until Rajya Sabha also passes the Bill, the President gives assent and the central government brings it into effect through a notification. Power to grant degrees The Ministry of HRD established six new Indian Institutes Technology (IITs) in 2008 and two in 2009. It also established five new Indian Institutes of Science Education and Research (IISERs). However, they are still awaiting for the power to be recognised as degree granting institutions. Entry 64 of the Union List states that only Parliament can declare an institution to be an institution of national importance (see here and here). Also, the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 states that the right to confer degrees can be exercised only by a university, deemed university or any institution specially empowered by an Act of Parliament to do so. According to news reports, students of the new IISERs who passed out in 2011 have not received their degrees because of the legislative delay. Similar problems were reported by students in IIT-Benaras Hindu University. The students of the new IITs, which were set up in 2008 would be passing out this year. It is likely that they would face similar problems. In fact, IIT-Hyderabad is already in the news for not being able to award degree to its Masters students. Highlights of the Bills The Institute of Technology (Amendment) Bill, 2010 amends the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961, which declares certain Institutes of Technology to be institutions of national importance by adding eight new Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) in Bhubaneshwar, Gandhinagar, Hyderabad, Indore, Jodhpur, Mandi, Patna, Ropar. It also seeks to integrate the Institute of Technology, Banaras Hindu University (BHU) within the ambit of the Act. All these institutions shall be declared as institutions of national importance (see here for a Bill Summary). The Bill was referred to the Standing Committee on HRD, which raised a few issues with regard to lack of clarity about the zone in which IIT-BHU shall be operating, the need to preserve the autonomy of the IITs and the need to fulfil qualitative parameters before the new IITs could transform into institutes of national importance (see here for the Standing Committee Report and a Summary). The National Institutes of Technology (Amendment) Bill, 2010 amends the National Institutes of Technology Act, 2007 to add a schedule of five Indian Institutes of Science Education and Research (IISER) (established in Kolkata, Pune, Mohali, Bhopal and Thiruvananthapuram). These institutions shall be declared to be institutions of national importance. Currently, there are 20 institutions listed as institutions of national importance under the 2007 Act (see here for a Bill Summary). The Standing Committee Report on the Bill made a few recommendations: (a) the composition of the Board of Governors should be made more expert specific in with the mandate of IISERs; (b) IISER Council should have less number of Secretaries, and (c) details of the inter-disciplinary knowledge regime should strive toward flexibility and freedom in research (see here for the Standing Committee Report and a Summary).
Earlier today, the Supreme Court struck down the two Acts that created an independent body for the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. One of the Acts amended the Constitution to replace the method of appointment of judges by a collegium system with that of an independent commission, called the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). The composition of the NJAC would include: (i) the Chief Justice of India (Chairperson) (ii) two other senior most judges of the Supreme Court, (iii) the Union Law Minister, and (iv) two eminent persons to be nominated by the Prime Minister, the CJI and the Leader of Opposition of the Lok Sabha. The other Act laid down the processes in relation to such appointments. Both Acts were passed by Parliament in August 2014, and received Presidential assent in December 2014. Following this, a batch of petitions that had been filed in Supreme Court challenging the two Bills on grounds of unconstitutionality, was referred to a five judge bench. It was contended that the presence of executive members in the NJAC violated the independence of the judiciary. In its judgement today, the Court held that the executive involvement in appointment of judges impinges upon the independence of the judiciary. This violates the principle of separation of powers between the executive and judiciary, which is a basic feature of the Constitution. In this context, we examine the proposals around the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. Appointment of judges before the introduction of the NJAC The method of appointment of the Chief Justice of India, SC and HC judges was laid down in the Constitution.[i] The Constitution stated that the President shall make these appointments after consulting with the Chief Justice of India and other SC and HC judges as he considers necessary. Between the years 1982-1999, the issue of method of appointment of judges was examined and reinterpreted by the Supreme Court. Since then, a collegium, consisting of the Chief Justice of India and 4 other senior most SC judges, made recommendations for persons to be appointed as SC and HC judges, to the President.[ii] Recommendations of various bodies for setting up an independent appointments commission Over the decades, several high level Commissions have examined this method of appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. They have suggested that an independent body be set up to make recommendations for such appointments. However, they differed in the representation of the judiciary, legislature and executive in making such appointments. These are summarised below. Table 1: Comparison of various recommendations on the composition of a proposed appointments body
| Recommendatory Body | Suggested composition |
| 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (2007) | Judiciary : CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive : Vice-President (Chairperson), PM, Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leaders of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament. Other: No representative. |
| National Advisory Council (2005) | Judiciary: CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive: Vice-President (Chairman), PM (or nominee), Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leader of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament. Other: No representative. |
| NCRWC (2002) | Judiciary :CJI (Chairman), two senior most SC judges Executive: Union Law Minister Legislature: No representative Other: one eminent person |
| Law Commission (1987) | Judiciary : CJI (Chairman), three senior most SC judges, immediate predecessor of the CJI, three senior most CJs of HCs, [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive: Law Minister, Attorney General of India, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: No representative Other: One Law academic |
Sources: 121st Report of the Law Commission, 1987; Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002; A Consultation Paper on Superior Judiciary, NCRWC, 2001; A National Judicial Commission-Report for discussion in the National Advisory Council, 2005; Fourth Report of the 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), ‘Ethics in Governance’, 2007; PRS. It may be noted that the Law Commission, in its 2008 and 2009 reports, suggested that Government should seek a reconsideration of the judgments in the Three Judges cases. In the alternative, Parliament should pass a law restoring the primacy of the CJI, while ensuring that the executive played a role in making judicial appointments. Appointments process in different countries Internationally, there are varied methods for making appointments of judges to the higher judiciary. The method of appointment of judges to the highest court, in some jurisdictions, is outlined in Table 2. Table 2: Appointment of judges to the highest court in different jurisdictions
| Country | Method of Appointment to the highest court | Who is involved in making the appointments |
| UK | SC judges are appointed by a five-person selection commission. | It consists of the SC President, his deputy, and one member each appointed by the JACs of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.[iii] (The JACs comprise lay persons, members of the judiciary and the Bar and make appointments of judges of lower courts.) |
| Canada | Appointments are made by the Governor in Council.[iv] | A selection panel comprising five MPs (from the government and the opposition) reviews list of nominees and submits 3 names to the Prime Minister.[v] |
| USA | Appointments are made by the President. | Supreme Court Justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the United States Senate.[vi] |
| Germany | Appointments are made by election. | Half the members of the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by the executive and half by the legislature.[vii] |
| France | Appointments are made by the President. | President receives proposals for appointments from Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature.[viii] |
Sources: Constitutional Reform Act, 2005; Canada Supreme Court Act, 1985; Constitution of the United States of America; Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany; Constitution of France; PRS. In delivering its judgment that strikes down the setting up of an NJAC, the Court has stated that it would schedule hearings from November 3, 2015 regarding ways in which the collegium system can be strengthened.
[i] Article 124, Constitution of India (Prior to 2015 Amendments)
[ii] S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India, AIR 1982, SC 149; S.C. Advocates on Record Association vs. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268; In re: Special Reference, AIR 1999 SC 1.
[iii]. Schedule 8, Constitutional Reform Act, 2005.
[iv]. Section 4(2), Supreme Court Act (RSC, 1985).
[v]. Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the retirement of Justice Morris Fish, http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/04/23/statement-prime-minister-canada-retirement-justice-morris-fish.
[vi]. Article II, Section 2, The Constitution of the United States of America.
[vii]. Article 94 (1), Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.
[viii] Article 65, Constitution of France, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constiution_anglais_oct2009.pdf.
