Recently, the government announced that it plans to transfer benefits under various schemes directly into the bank accounts of individual beneficiaries. Benefits can be the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MNREGS) wages, scholarships, pensions and health benefits. Beneficiaries shall be identified through the Aadhaar number (Aadhaar is an individual identification number linked to a person’s demographic and biometric information). The direct cash transfer (DCT) system is going to be rolled out in 51 districts, starting January 1, 2013. It will later be extended to 18 states by April 1, 2013 and the rest by April 1, 2014 (or earlier). Presently, 34 schemes have been identified in 43 districts to implement the DCT programme. Currently, the government subsidises certain products (food grains, fertilizers, water, electricity) and services (education, healthcare) by providing them at a lower than market price to the beneficiaries. This has led to problems such as high fiscal deficit, waste of scarce resources and operational inefficiencies. The government is considering replacing this with an Aadhaar enabled DCT system. It has claimed that the new system would ensure timely payment directly to intended beneficiaries, reduce transaction costs and leakages. However, many experts have criticised both the concept of cash transfer as well as Aadhaar (see here, here, here and here). In this blog, we provide some background information about cash transfer, explain the concept of Aadhaar and examine the pros and cons of an Aadhaar enabled direct cash transfer system. Background on cash transfer Under the direct cash transfer (DCT) scheme, government subsidies will be given directly to the beneficiaries in the form of cash rather than goods. DCTs can either be unconditional or conditional. Under unconditional schemes, cash is directly transferred to eligible households with no conditions. For example, pension schemes. Conditional cash transfers provide cash directly to poor households in response to the fulfillment of certain conditions such as minimum attendance of children in schools. DCTs provide poor families the choice of using the cash as they wish. Having access to cash also relieves some of their financial constraints. Also, DCTs are simpler in design than other subsidy schemes. Even though cash transfer schemes have a high fixed cost of administration when the programme is set up, running costs are far lower (see here, here and here). Presently, the government operates a number of DCT schemes. For example, Janani Suraksha Yojana, Indira Awas Yojana and Dhanalaksmi scheme. In his 2011-12 Budget speech, the then Finance Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, had stated that the government plans to move towards direct transfer of cash subsidy for kerosene, Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG), and fertilizers. A task force headed by Nandan Nilekani was set up to work out the modalities of operationalising DCT for these items. This task force submitted its report in February 2012. The National Food Security Bill, 2011, pending in Parliament, includes cash transfer and food coupons as possible alternative mechanisms to the Public Distribution System. Key features of Aadhaar The office of Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) was set up in 2009 within the Planning Commission. In 2010, the government later introduced the National Identification Authority of India Bill in Parliament to give statutory status to this office.
For a PRS analysis of the Bill, see here. Aadhaar enabled direct cash transfers Advantages Identification through Aadhaar number: Currently, the recipient has to establish his identity and eligibility many times by producing multiple documents for verification. The verification of such documents is done by multiple authorities. An Aadhaar enabled bank account can be used by the beneficiary to receive multiple welfare payments as opposed to the one scheme, one bank approach, followed by a number of state governments. Elimination of middlemen: The scheme reduces chances of rent-seeking by middlemen who siphon off part of the subsidy. In the new system, the cash shall be transferred directly to individual bank accounts and the beneficiaries shall be identified through Aadhaar. Reduction in duplicate and ghost beneficiaries: The Aadhaar number is likely to help eliminate duplicate cards and cards for non-existent persons or ghost beneficiaries in schemes such as the PDS and MNREGS. Disadvantages Lack of clarity on whether Aadhaar is mandatory: According to UIDAI, it is not mandatory for individuals to get an Aadhaar number. However, it does not prevent any service provider from prescribing Aadhaar as a mandatory requirement for availing services. Therefore, beneficiaries may be denied a service if he does not have the Aadhaar number. It is noteworthy that the new direct cash transfer policy requires beneficiaries to have an Aadhaar number and a bank account. However, many beneficiaries do not yet have either. (Presently, there are 229 million Aadhaar number holders and 147 million bank accounts). Targeting and identification of beneficiaries: According to the government, one of the key reasons for changing to DCT system is to ensure better targeting of subsidies. However, the success of Aadhaar in weeding out ‘ghost’ beneficiaries depends on mandatory enrollment. If enrollment is not mandatory, both authentication systems (identity card based and Aadhaar based) must coexist. In such a scenario, ‘ghost’ beneficiaries and people with multiple cards will choose to opt out of the Aadhaar system. Furthermore, key schemes such as PDS suffer from large inclusion and exclusion errors. However, Aadhaar cannot address errors in targeting of BPL families. Also, it cannot address problems of MNREGS such as incorrect measurement of work and payment delays. Safeguard for maintaining privacy: Information collected when issuing Aadhaar may be misused if safeguards to maintain privacy are inadequate. Though the Supreme Court has included privacy as part of the Right to Life, India does not have a specific law governing issues related to privacy. Also, the authority is required to maintain details of every request for authentication and the response provided. However, maximum duration for which such data has to be stored is not specified. Authentication data provides insights into usage patterns of an Aadhaar number holder. Data that has been recorded over a long duration of time may be misused for activities such as profiling an individual’s behaviour.
By Rohit & Anirudh A modified 'Modernization of State Police Forces' scheme was started by the central government in 2000-01. One of the objectives was to help police forces in meeting the emerging challenges to internal security in the form of terrorism, naxalism etc. The scheme aims to modernize police forces in terms of:
Under this scheme, States have been clubbed into different categories and Centre-State cost sharing is category specific. Since 2005-06, States have been categorized as category ‘A’ and ‘B’ with 100% and 75% Central funding respectively. All the North Eastern States, namely Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and Sikkim have been placed in category ‘A’ and thus, are entitled to receive 100% Central assistance for implementation of their annual approved plans. Recently, CAG decided to evaluate the working of the scheme and commissioned ‘performance audit’ reviews covering select general category and special category States. Each review covers a contiguous five year period between 2000 and 2007, but varies across selected states. For the periods under review, each state had a plan outlay (the total amount proposed to be spent in modernizing the state's police forces). However, in most cases, the actual release of funds fell significantly short of this outlay - in some cases the Centre did not contribute its share, in others the States lagged behind. For instance, in the case of Bihar, the Centre released only 56% of its share; while in the case of Rajasthan and West Bengal, the States did not release any funds at all. The graph below shows the actual releases by the Centre and the States (as percentages of their share in the proposed outlays): 
Further, even the funds that were released were not fully utilized. Thus, the amount finally spent fell significantly short of the initial proposal. The graph below shows the actual expenditure by State: 
Following are some of the other main findings from the CAG report:
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Table 1: Summary of main findings in the CAG audit for different states for Modernisation of State Police Forces |
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Purpose for which money was sanctioned |
Summary of CAG Findings |
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Planning (Every state has to propose an Annual Action Plan every year. The plan is approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs and money is released as per the plan.) |
§ Submissions by the states to the MHA were delayed. § There were also delays in the clearance granted by the MHA. § In various states such as, a) Andhra Pradesh – the government spent money on works not covered by the Annual Action Plan. b) Bihar – Persistent delays in preparation of the Plan by the state police. c) West Bengal – the plans drawn up by the state did not include items covered under the scheme. |
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Mobility |
§ Overall shortage of vehicles was observed. Most of the new vehicles replaced the old ones. § The police response time was too long in some states. § To give examples from some states: a) Andhra Pradesh – 58 percent of vehicles procured were utilised for replacing old vehicles. b) Bihar – the shortage of vehicles was 43 percent. c) Uttar Pradesh – 2400 vehicles were procured against a shortage of nearly 10,000 vehicles. |
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Residential and non-residential buildings |
§ There were considerable delays in construction of buildings in most states. Consequently, police forces’ own security was in jeopardy. § In states such as: a) Andhra Pradesh – 53 percent of staff quarters and 43 percent of official buildings were not completed (2007). b) Bihar – The total requirement of housing was nearly 60,000. Only six percent of this were included in the Plan. c) Jharkhand – District Control rooms remained non-functional because of shortage of manpower. |
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Weapons |
§ Police force in states continue to depend on outdated weapons. § Shortages of weapons also happened as acquisition from ordnance factories was very slow. § The weapons that were procured were mostly kept in the district headquarters. § In some states such as, a) Bihar – AK-47s were kept at the disposal of bodyguards of VIPs. b) West Bengal – Adequate weapons were not supplied to extremist prone police stations. |
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Communication |
§ Police Telecommunication Networks were not set up successfully in some states. In others, network was functional only up to the district level. § Shortages of various communication equipments were also observed. § In some states such as, a) Bihar - The Police Telecommunication Network system (costing Rs. 4.96 crore) remained non-functional due to non-construction of tower. b) Maharashtra – Of the 850 purchased Remote Station Units, 452 were lying in stores. |
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Forensic Science Laboratory/ Finger Printing Bureau |
§ In most States the Forensic Science Laboratories lacked adequate infrastructure. § In the absence of automatic finger print identification systems, investigation was being done manually in some States. § In some states such as, a) Maharashtra - There were significant delays in receipt and installation. There was also shortage (284 vacant posts) of technical manpower. b) West Bengal - Performance of the Forensic Science Laboratory was poor and in some cases, the delay in issue of investigation reports was as high as 45 months. |
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Training |
§ It was observed that the percentage of police personnel trained was very low. § Training infrastructure was also inadequate. § In some states such as, a) Bihar - Only 10 per cent of total force was trained. b) West Bengal - Live training was not imparted for handling useful weapons and this severely affected the performance of police forces. |
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Sources: CAG Compendium of Performance Audit Reviews on Modernisation of Police Force; PRS. Note: The audit has been done broadly from 2000 to 2007. Consequently, the period of audit for different states may vary. |
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Table 1: Summary of main findings in the CAG audit for different states for Modernisation of State Police Forces |
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Purpose for which money was sanctioned |
Summary of CAG Findings |
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Planning (Every state has to propose an Annual Action Plan every year. The plan is approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs and money is released as per the plan.) |
§ Submissions by the states to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) were delayed. § There were also delays in the clearance granted by the MHA. § In various states such as, a) Andhra Pradesh – the government spent Rs 32 crore on works not covered by the Annual Action Plan. b) Bihar – Persistent delays in preparation of the Plan by the state police. c) West Bengal – the plans drawn up by the state did not include items covered under the scheme. |
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Mobility |
§ Overall shortage of vehicles was observed. Most of the new vehicles replaced the old ones, and no additions were made. § The police response time was too long in some states. § To give examples from some states: a) Andhra Pradesh – 58 percent of vehicles procured were utilised for replacing old vehicles. b) Bihar – the shortage of vehicles was 43 percent. c) Uttar Pradesh – 2400 vehicles were procured against a shortage of nearly 10,000 vehicles. 203 ambassador cars were procured, though only 55 were approved by the MHA. |
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Residential and non-residential buildings |
§ There were considerable delays in construction of buildings in most states. Consequently, police forces’ own security was in jeopardy. Satisfaction levels with the housing provided were also very low. § In states such as: a) Andhra Pradesh – 53 percent of staff quarters and 43 percent of official buildings were not completed (2007). b) Bihar – The total requirement of housing was nearly 60,000. Only six percent of this were included in the Plan, and only 1045 units were completed by 2006. c) Jharkhand – District Control rooms remained non-functional even after spending Rs 2 crore because of shortage of manpower. |
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Weapons |
§ It was observed that the police force in states continue to depend on outdated weapons. § Shortages of weapons also happened as acquisition from ordnance factories was very slow. § The weapons that were procured were mostly kept in the district headquarters. § In some states such as, a) Bihar – AK-47s were kept at the disposal of bodyguards of VIPs. b) West Bengal – Adequate weapons were not supplied to extremist prone police stations. |
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Communication |
§ Police Telecommunication Networks were not set up successfully in some states. In others, network was functional only up to the district level. § Shortages of various communication equipments were also observed. § In some states such as, a) Bihar - The Police Telecommunication Network system (costing Rs. 4.96 crore) remained non-functional due to non-construction of tower. b) Maharashtra – Of the 850 purchased Remote Station Units, 452 were lying in stores. |
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Forensic Science Laboratory/ Finger Printing Bureau |
§ In most States the Forensic Science Laboratories lacked adequate infrastructure. § In the absence of automatic finger print identification systems, investigation was being done manually in some States. § In some states such as, a) Maharashtra - There were significant delays in receipt and installation. There was also shortage (284 vacant posts) of technical manpower. b) West Bengal - Performance of the Forensic Science Laboratory was poor and in some cases, the delay in issue of investigation reports was as high as 45 months. |
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Training |
§ It was observed that the percentage of police personnel trained was very low. § Training infrastructure was also inadequate. § In some states such as, a) Bihar - Only 10 per cent of total force was trained. b) West Bengal - Live training was not imparted for handling useful weapons and this severely affected the performance of police forces. |
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Sources: CAG Compendium of Performance Audit Reviews on Modernisation of Police Force; PRS. Note: The audit has been done broadly from 2000 to 2007. Consequently, the period of audit for different states may vary. |
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