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In a recent judgement (Judgement on Feb 23 - Baldev Singh and Ors. V. State of Punjab), the Supreme Court reduced the sentence of three persons convicted of rape from 10 years to 3 and a half years, and also asked the three convicts to pay a fine of Rs 50,000 each to the victim. In reducing the sentence, the court drew from the provision in S. 376 (punishment for rape) of the Indian Penal Code which allows the court to reduce the sentence for "adequate and special reasons". There have been a number of past cases where the Supreme Court has reversed High Court decisions reducing sentences under this provision for not giving suitable reasons. In 2007, the Supreme Court struck down a decision of the Karnataka High Court which had reduced the sentence of a convicted rapist to 3 and a half years. The High Court had stated that the sentence should be reduced since the accused was "a young boy of 18 years belonging to Vaddara Community and Illiterate". The Supreme Court stated that there is a legislative mandate to impose a sentence for not less than 10 years. Only in exceptional cases, for "adequate and special reasons" can a sentence less than 10 years be imposed. It overturned the Karnataka High Court decision saying that there was an "absence of any reason which could have been treated as "special and adequate reason"". In Baldev Singh's case, the Supreme Court said: 1. The fact that the incident is an old one (the incident took place in 1997) is a circumstance which fits into "adequate and special reasons" for reducing a sentence. 2. The parties have entered into a compromise among themselves. The issue is whether this judgement has gone beyond the legislative mandate, and whether it has adhered to the principles laid down by earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. In 2007, the Supreme Court itself stated that for a crime like rape, strong reasons have to be given to reduce the sentence envisaged by the legislature. Moreover, the provision does not envisage the settlement of a crime by payment of compensation to the victim of a crime. A criminal act is seen in law as a crime against the whole of society (which is why the state's prosecution agency, and not the victim, goes to court against alleged criminals). Therefore, criminal actions such as rape (or murder, robbery, kidnapping etc.) cannot be "settled" by the payment of compensation under the Indian Penal Code. In this light, it should be interesting to see whether the State files an appeal against this judgement.
Criminal laws in India by way of “sanctions” allow for protective discrimination in favour of public officials.[1] Under various laws, sanctions are required to investigate and prosecute public officials. Over the past 15 years these provisions of law have been revisited by the judiciary and the legislature. Recently the Supreme Court in the Subramanian Swamy Case has suggested the concept of a deemed sanction. We look at the history of the requirement of sanction under criminal laws. Requirement of sanction to investigate certain public servants of the union government was introduced through a government notification[2]. The Criminal Procedure Code 1973 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 provide that to prosecute a public servant, permission or sanction has to be secured from the government (central or state) for which the official works. Arguments that are often advanced in favour of such sanctions are that these ensure that (a) frivolous and vexatious cases are not filed, (b) public officials are not harassed, and (c) the efficacy of administrative machinery is not tampered with. Further, the requirement of sanction to investigate was also defended by the government before the Supreme Court in certain cases. In Vineet Narain vs. Union of India 1997[3], the government had argued that the CBI may not have the requisite expertise to determine whether the evidence was sufficient for filing a prima facie case. It was also argued that the Act instituting the CBI, Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946 (DSPE Act), granted the power of superintendence, and therefore direction, of the CBI to the central government. The Court in this case struck down the requirement of sanction to investigate. It held that “supervision” by the government could not extend to control over CBI’s investigations. As for prosecution, the Court affixed a time frame of three months to grant sanction. However, there was no clarity on what was to be done if sanction was not granted within such time. Following that judgment, the DSPE Act was amended in 2003, specifically requiring the CBI to secure a sanction before it investigated certain public servants. More recently, the Lokpal and Lokayukta Bill, 2011 that is pending before the Rajya Sabha, removed the requirement of sanction to investigate and prosecute public servants in relation to corruption. Recently, Mr. Subramanian Swamy approached the Supreme Court for directions on his request for sanction to prosecute Mr. A Raja in relation to the 2G Scam. As per the Supreme Court, judgment in Subramanian Swamy vs. Dr. Manmohan Singh & Anr, Mr. Swamy’s request was pending with the department for over 16 months. The Supreme Court held that denial of a timely decision on grant of sanction is a violation of due process of law (Right to equality before law read with Right to life and personal liberty). The Court reiterated the three month time frame for granting sanctions. It suggested that Parliament consider that in case the decision is not taken within three months, sanction would be deemed to be granted. The prosecution would then be responsible for filing the charge sheet within 15 days of the expiry of this period.
[1] Subramanian Swamy vs. Dr. Manmohan Singh & Anr. Civil Appeal No. 1193 of 2012 dated January 31, 2012
[2] Single Directive, No. 4.7.3
[3] AIR 1998 SC 889