The government of West Bengal has recently imposed a tax on the entry of goods into the local areas of the State. According to the Finance Minister, this will help meet 'cost for facilitating trade and industry in the State'. Many States impose entry tax on goods coming into their areas of jurisdiction. Entry Tax is imposed by States under the provisions of Entry 52 of the State List and Article 304 of the Indian Constitution. These read as under: Entry 52, List II of the Seventh Schedule (State List) “Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein.” Article 304: Restriction on trade, commerce and intercourse among States "Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law – (a) impose on goods imported from other States or the Union territories any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject, so, however, as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced; and (b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest: Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purposes of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President." Are there any restrictions to the power of States to impose entry taxes? The use of the words 'so, however, as not to discriminate ' and 'reasonable restrictions' in the above articles constrain the power of States to some extent. Several petitions challenging the imposition of entry taxes have been filed before courts. In 2008, the Supreme Court has referred the entry tax issue to a larger bench. This case is currently pending. What are the arguments in favour and against the imposition of such taxes? Arguments in favour of entry tax
Arguments against entry tax
In addition to the above, it can also be said that an entry tax goes against the principle envisaged under the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime. The GST aims to create a common market throughout India without any taxes on inter-state movement of goods. A Constitutional Amendment Bill to facilitate the implementation of GST is currently pending in Parliament.
In the last few weeks, after the 16th Lok Sabha election, there has been some debate around powers of the central government to remove Governors. News reports have suggested that the central government is seeking resignations of Governors, who were appointed by the previous central government. In this blog, we briefly look at the key constitutional provisions, the law laid down by the Supreme Court, and some recommendations made by different commissions that have examined this issue. What does the Constitution say? As per Article 155 and Article 156 of the Constitution, a Governor of a state is an appointee of the President, and he or she holds office “during the pleasure of the President”. If a Governor continues to enjoy the “pleasure of the President”, he or she can be in office for a term of five years. Because the President is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 74 of the Constitution, in effect it is the central government that appoints and removes the Governors. “Pleasure of the President” merely refers to this will and wish of the central government. The Supreme Court’s interpretation In 2010, a constitutional bench of the Supreme Court interpreted these provisions and laid down some binding principles (B.P. Singhal v. Union of India). In this case, the newly elected central government had removed the Governors of Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana and Goa in July, 2004 after the 14th Lok Sabha election. When these removals were challenged, the Supreme Court held:
In summary, this means that the central government enjoys the power to remove Governors of the different states, as long as it does not act arbitrarily, without reason, or in bad faith. Recommendations of Various Commissions Three important commissions have examined this issue. The Sarkaria Commission (1988) recommended that Governors must not be removed before completion of their five year tenure, except in rare and compelling circumstances. This was meant to provide Governors with a measure of security of tenure, so that they could carry out their duties without fear or favour. If such rare and compelling circumstances did exist, the Commission said that the procedure of removal must allow the Governors an opportunity to explain their conduct, and the central government must give fair consideration to such explanation. It was further recommended that Governors should be informed of the grounds of their removal. The Venkatachaliah Commission (2002) similarly recommended that ordinarily Governors should be allowed to complete their five year term. If they have to be removed before completion of their term, the central government should do so only after consultation with the Chief Minister. The Punchhi Commission (2010) suggested that the phrase “during the pleasure of the President” should be deleted from the Constitution, because a Governor should not be removed at the will of the central government; instead he or she should be removed only by a resolution of the state legislature. The above recommendations however were never made into law by Parliament. Therefore, they are not binding on the central government.
