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The Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India (Amendment) Bill, 2021 was passed by Parliament on August 4, 2021. It amends the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008. This Bill was introduced in Lok Sabha during the budget session this year in March 2021. Subsequently, it was referred to the Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism, and Culture, which submitted its report on July 22, 2021.
Typically, cities have one civilian airport which provides all aeronautical services in that area. These services include air traffic management, landing and parking of aircraft, and ground handling services. This makes airports natural monopolies in the area. To ensure that private airport operators do not misuse their monopoly, the need for an independent tariff regulator in the airport sector was felt. Hence, the Airport Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) was established as an independent body under the 2008 Act to regulate tariffs and other charges (development fee and passenger service fee) for aeronautical services at major airports.
For the remaining airports, these tariffs are determined by the Airports Authority of India (AAI), which is a body under the Ministry of Civil Aviation. In addition, AAI leases out airports under the public-private partnership (PPP) model for operation, management, and development. Before AERA was set up, AAI determined and fixed the aeronautical charges for all airports. It also prescribed performance standards for all airports and monitored them. Various committees had noted that AAI performed the role of airport operator as well as the regulator, which resulted in a conflict of interest.
The 2008 Act designates an airport as a major airport if it has an annual passenger traffic of at least 35 lakh. The central government may also designate any airport as a major airport through a notification. The Bill adds that the central government may group airports and notify the group as a major airport. Thus, when a small airport will be clubbed in a group and the group is notified as a major airport, its tariff will be determined by AERA instead of AAI. Note that AERA will not determine the tariff if such tariff or tariff structures or the amount of development fees has been incorporated in the bidding document, which is the basis for the award of operatorship of that airport.
The amendments under the Bill raise some concerns regarding the grouping of airports and the capacity of the regulator.
As of 2020, there are 125 operational airports in India (includes international airports, customs airports, and civil enclaves). The number of airports under the purview of AERA increased from 11 in 2007 to 24 in 2019. For the remaining airports, tariffs are still determined by AAI. In the last five years (2014 to 2019), air passenger traffic increased from 11.3 crore to 34.9 crore (which is an annual growth rate of 10%). Till 2030-31, air traffic in the country is expected to continue growing at an average annual rate of 10-11%.
Before 2019, an airport with annual passenger traffic of at least 15 lakh was considered a major airport. In 2019, the AERA Act was amended to increase this threshold to 35 lakh. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 2019 Bill stated that the exponential growth of the aviation sector has put tremendous pressure on AERA, while its resources are limited. Therefore, if too many airports come under the purview of AERA, it will not be able to perform its functions efficiently. Consequently, in 2019, the number of airports under the purview of AERA was reduced. Now, with the passage of the 2021 Bill, AERA will have to again regulate tariffs at more airports as and when notified by the central government. Thus, the capacity of AERA may be needed to be enhanced for extending its scope to other airports.
Table 1: List of major airports in India (as of June 2019)
|
Ahmedabad |
Delhi |
Mumbai |
|
Amritsar |
Goa |
Patna |
|
Bengaluru |
Guwahati |
Pune |
|
Bhubaneswar |
Hyderabad |
Raipur |
|
Calicut |
Jaipur |
Thiruvananthapuram |
|
Chandigarh |
Kolkata |
Tiruchirappalli |
|
Chennai |
Lucknow |
Varanasi |
|
Cochin |
Mangalore |
Kannur |
Source: AERA website as accessed on August 2, 2021; PRS.
The 15th Lok Sabha is close to the end of its tenure. A key legislation that proposes major reforms in food security was listed for discussion in Parliament. The National Food Security Bill, 2011 has been scrutinised by a Standing Committee. In January, we compared the Standing Committee's recommendations with the provisions of the Bill. Since then, amendments to the Bill have been introduced in Parliament. Debates on the Bill have revolved around the method of delivering food security, the identification of beneficiaries and the financial implications of the Bill. Method of delivery The Bill aims to make the right to food a statutory right. It proposes to use the existing Public Distribution System (PDS) to deliver foodgrain to 75% of the rural and 50% of the urban population. However, the Bill also allows for cash transfers and food coupons in lieu of grains as mechanisms to deliver food security. While the PDS is known to suffer from leakages as high as 40%, cash transfers and food coupons are known to expose recipients to volatility and price inflation. Each method of delivery would have its own implications, financial and otherwise. The table below compares these methods of delivery.[i] [table id=7 /]
Identification The Bill does not universalise food entitlements. It classifies the population into two categories of beneficiaries, who shall be identified by the centre and states. Mechanisms that aim to target benefits to certain sections of the population have been prone to large inclusion and exclusion errors. A 2009 expert group study headed by N.C. Saxena that evaluated PDS, estimated that about 61% of the eligible population was excluded from the BPL list while 25% of APL households were included in the BPL list. Beneficiaries under the Food Security Bill will be identified through a similar process. It is unclear how these errors in identification of beneficiaries under the PDS will be addressed by the Bill. Financial implications - cost sharing between the centre and states A Bill that aims to deliver food security to a large section of the country would have significant financial implications. Costs shall be shared between the centre and states. Costs imposed on states (partial or full) include: nutritional support to pregnant women and lactating mothers, mid-day meals, anganwadi infrastructure, meals for children suffering from malnutrition, transport and delivery of foodgrains, creating and maintaining storage facilities, and costs associated with District Grievance Redressal Officers and State Food Commissions. Although the centre shall provide some assistance, states will have to bear a significant financial burden on account of implementation. It is unclear whether Parliament can require states to allocate funds without encroaching on the powers of state legislative assemblies. If a state chooses not to allocate the necessary funds or does not possess the funds to do so, implementation of the Bill could be seriously affected. The Standing Committee examining the Bill had recommended that an independent body, such as the Finance Commission, should be consulted regarding additional funds to be borne by states. The Right to Education Act with similar centre-state sharing of funds provides for such a consultation with the Finance Commission. Cost of implementation of the Bill Another contentious issue is the cost of implementing the Bill. The Bill estimates the cost at Rs 95,000 crore. However, experts have made varying estimates on the costs ranging from Rs 2 lakh crore to Rs 3.5 lakh crore. Ashok Gulati, Chairman of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices, estimated the cost at 2 lakh crore per year whereas the Minister of Food, K.V. Thomas was reported to have estimated the cost at Rs 3.5 lakh crore. The passage of the food security Bill in Parliament will depend on the ability of the government to build consensus on these issues. It remains to be seen how the Bill is debated next Parliament session.
[i] Kapur D., Mukhopadhyay P., and A. Subramanian. “The Case for Direct Cash Transfers to the Poor.” Economic and Political Weekly. Vol 43, No 15 (Apr 12-18, 2008). Khera, R. “Revival of the Public Distribution System: Evidence and Explanations.” Economic and Political Weekly. Vol XLVI, Nos 44 & 45 (Nov 5, 2011). Shah, M. “Direct Cash Transfers: No Magic Bullet.” Economic and Political Weekly. Vol 43, No 34, pp. 77-79 (Aug 23-29, 2008).
