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The Civil Damage for Nuclear Liability Bill, 2010 has been criticised on many grounds (Also click here), including (a) capping liability for the operator, (b) fixing a low cap on the amount of liability of the operator, and (c) making the operator solely liable. We summarise the main principles of civil nuclear liability mentioned in IAEA's Handbook on Nuclear Law: Strict Liability of the Operator: The operator is held liable regardless of fault. Those claiming compensation do not need to prove negligence or any other type of fault on the part of the operator. The operator is liable merely by virtue of the fact that damage has been caused. Legal channeling of liability on the operator: "The operator of a nuclear installation is exclusively liable for nuclear damage. No other person may be held liable, and the operator cannot be held liable under other legal provisions (e.g. tort law)...This concept is a feature of nuclear liability law unmatched in other fields of law." The reason for this has been quoted in the Handbook as:
"...Firstly, it is desirable to avoid difficult and lengthy questions of complicated legal cross-actions to establish in individual cases who is legally liable. Secondly, such channelling obviates the necessity for all those who might be associated with construction or operation of a nuclear installation other than the operator himself to take out insurance also, and thus allows a concentration of the insurance capacity available.”
Limiting the amount of liability: "Limitation of liability in amount is clearly an advantage for the operator. Legislators feel that unlimited liability, or very high liability amounts, would discourage people from engaging in nuclear related activities. Operators should not be exposed to financial burdens that could entail immediate bankruptcy....Whatever figure is established by the legislator will seem to be arbitrary, but, in the event of a nuclear catastrophe, the State will inevitably step in and pay additional compensation. Civil law is not designed to cope with catastrophes; these require special measures." Limitation of liability in time: "In all legal systems there is a time limit for the submission of claims. In many States the normal time limit in general tort law is 30 years. Claims for compensation for nuclear damage must be submitted within 30 years in the event of personal injury and within 10 years in the event of other damage. The 30 year period in the event of personal injury is due to the fact that radiation damage may be latent for a long time; other damage should be evident within the 10 year period." Insurance coverage: "The nuclear liability conventions require that the operator maintain insurance or provide other financial security covering its liability for nuclear damage in such amount, of such type and in such terms as the Installation State specifies....This ensures that the liability amount of the operator is always covered by an equal amount of money. The congruence principle is to the advantage both of the victims of a nuclear incident and of the operator. The victims have the assurance that their claims are financially covered, and the operator has funds available for compensation and does not need to convert assets into cash.
The presentation of the Annual Budget before the parliament is one of the mechanisms available to any legislature to scrutinise and authorise revenues and expenditures of the country. In this post I quote and summarise from two sources (Rick Stapenhurst, "The legislature and the Budget", in Legislative Oversight and Budgeting, World Bank Institute Development Studies, and The evolution of parliament’s power of the purse) which describe briefly how oversight by the legislature over the state's finances evolved historically. "The evolution of legislative "power of the purse" dates back to medieval times, when knights and burgesses in England were summoned to confirm the assent of local communities to the raising of additional taxes." By the 1300s the English parliament had begun to use its power to vote on funds depending on the acceptance of petitions presented by parliament to the monarch. In 1341, the monarch agreed that citizens should not be taxed ("charged or grieved to make common aid or sustain charge") without the assent of Parliament. "In parallel, the English Parliament began to take an interest in how money was collected, as well as how it was spent." In the 1300's itself, it started appointing commissioners to audit the accounts of tax collectors. This power of oversight however evolved gradually, and particularly over the 16th century, when the "monarchs needed parliamentary support and voting of funds for their various political and religious battles. King Henry VIII for example, gave Parliament enhanced status in policy making, in return for support during his battles with Rome." The 1689 Bill of Rights firmly established "the principle that only Parliament could authorize taxation. Still, at this stage there was still no such thing as an annual budget, and there was no comprehensive control of expenditures." The British Parliament also passed a resolution in 1713 to limit Parliament's power to "not vote sums in excess of the Government’s estimates. Consequently, the only amendments that are in order are those which aim to reduce the sums requested." "Since that time, the "power of the purse" function has been performed by legislatures around the world as a means to expand their democratic leverage on behalf of citizens."