Earlier this week, Lok Sabha passed the Bill that provides for the allocation of coal mines that were cancelled by the Supreme Court last year.  In light of this development, this post looks at the issues surrounding coal block allocations and what the 2015 Bill seeks to achieve.

In September 2014, the Supreme Court cancelled the allocations of 204 coal blocks.  Following the Supreme Court judgement, in October 2014, the government promulgated the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 2014 for the allocation of the cancelled coal mines.  The Ordinance, which was replaced by the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Bill, 2014, could not be passed by Parliament in the last winter session, and lapsed. The government then promulgated the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Second Ordinance, 2014 on December 26, 2014.  The Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Bill, 2015 replaces the second Ordinance and was passed by Lok Sabha on March 4, 2015. Why is coal considered relevant? Coal mining in India has primarily been driven by the need for energy domestically.  About 55% of the current commercial energy use is met by coal.  The power sector is the major consumer of coal, using about 80% of domestically produced coal. As of April 1, 2014, India is estimated to have a cumulative total of 301.56 billion tonnes of coal reserves up to a depth of 1200 meters.  Coal deposits are mainly located in Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. How is coal regulated? The Ministry of Coal has the overall responsibility of managing coal reserves in the country.  Coal India Limited, established in 1975, is a public sector undertaking, which looks at the production and marketing of coal in India.  Currently, the sector is regulated by the ministry’s Coal Controller’s Organization. The Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 (CMN Act) is the primary legislation determining the eligibility for coal mining in India.  The CMN Act allows private Indian companies to mine coal only for captive use.  Captive mining is the coal mined for a specific end-use by the mine owner, but not for open sale in the market.  End-uses currently allowed under the CMN Act include iron and steel production, generation of power, cement production and coal washing.  The central government may notify additional end-uses. How were coal blocks allocated so far? Till 1993, there were no specific criteria for the allocation of captive coal blocks.  Captive mining for coal was allowed in 1993 by amendments to the CMN Act.  In 1993, a Screening Committee was set up by the Ministry of Coal to provide recommendations on allocations for captive coal mines.  All allocations to private companies were made through the Screening Committee.  For government companies, allocations for captive mining were made directly by the ministry.  Certain coal blocks were allocated by the Ministry of Power for Ultra Mega Power Projects (UMPP) through tariff based competitive bidding (bidding for coal based on the tariff at which power is sold).  Between 1993 and 2011, 218 coal blocks were allocated to both public and private companies under the CMN Act. What did the 2014 Supreme Court judgement do? In August 2012, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India released a report on the coal block allocations. CAG recommended that the allocation process should be made more transparent and objective, and done through competitive bidding. Following this report, in September 2012, a Public Interest Litigation matter was filed in the Supreme Court against the coal block allocations.  The petition sought to cancel the allotment of the coal blocks in public interest on grounds that it was arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional. In September 2014, the Supreme Court declared all allocations of coal blocks, made through the Screening Committee and through Government Dispensation route since 1993, as illegal.  It cancelled the allocation of 204 out of 218 coal blocks.  The allocations were deemed illegal on the grounds that: (i) the allocation procedure followed by the Screening Committee was arbitrary, and (ii) no objective criterion was used to determine the selection of companies.  Further, the allocation procedure was held to be impermissible under the CMN Act. Among the 218 coal blocks, 40 were under production and six were ready to start production.  Of the 40 blocks under production, 37 were cancelled and of the six ready to produce blocks, five were cancelled.  However, the allocation to Ultra Mega Power Projects, which was done via competitive bidding for lowest tariffs, was not declared illegal. What does the 2015 Bill seek to do? Following the cancellation of the coal blocks, concerns were raised about further shortage in the supply of coal, resulting in more power supply disruptions.  The 2015 Bill primarily seeks to allocate the coal mines that were declared illegal by the Supreme Court.  It provides details for the auction process, compensation for the prior allottees, the process for transfer of mines and details of authorities that would conduct the auction.  In December 2014, the ministry notified the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Rules, 2014.  The Rules provide further guidelines in relation to the eligibility and compensation for prior allottees. How is the allocation of coal blocks to be carried out through the 2015 Bill? The Bill creates three categories of mines, Schedule I, II and III.  Schedule I consists of all the 204 mines that were cancelled by the Supreme Court.  Of these mines, Schedule II consists of all the 42 mines that are under production and Schedule III consists of 32 mines that have a specified end-use such as power, iron and steel, cement and coal washing. Schedule I mines can be allocated by way of either public auction or allocation.  For the public auction route any government, private or joint venture company can bid for the coal blocks.  They can use the coal mined from these blocks for their own consumption, sale or for any other purpose as specified in their mining lease.  The government may also choose to allot Schedule I mines to any government company or any company that was awarded a power plant project through competitive bidding.  In such a case, a government company can use the coal mined for own consumption or sale.  However, the Bill does not provide clarity on the purpose for which private companies can use the coal. Schedule II and III mines are to be allocated by way of public auction, and the auctions have to be completed by March 31, 2015.  Any government company, private company or a joint venture with a specified end-use is eligible to bid for these mines. In addition, the Bill also provides details on authorities that would conduct the auction and allotment and the compensation for prior allottees.  Prior allottees are not eligible to participate in the auction process if: (i) they have not paid the additional levy imposed by the Supreme Court; or (ii) if they are convicted of an offence related to coal block allocation and sentenced to imprisonment of more than three years. What are some of the issues to consider in the 2015 Bill? One of the major policy shifts the 2015 Bill seeks to achieve is to enable private companies to mine coal in the future, in order to improve the supply of coal in the market.  Currently, the coal sector is regulated by the Coal Controller’s Organization, which is under the Ministry of Coal.  The Bill does not establish an independent regulator to ensure a level playing field for both private and government companies bidding for auction of mines to conduct coal mining operations.   In the past, when other sectors have opened up to the private sector, an independent regulatory body has been established beforehand.  For example, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, an independent regulatory body, was established when the telecom sector was opened up for private service providers.  The Bill also does not specify any guidelines on the monitoring of mining activities by the new allottees. While the Bill provides broad details of the process of auction and allotment, the actual results with regards to money coming in to the states, will depend more on specific details, such as the tender documents and floor price.  It is also to be seen whether the new allotment process ensures equitable distribution of coal blocks among the companies and creates a fair, level-playing field for them.  In the past, the functioning of coal mines has been delayed due to delays in land acquisition and environmental clearances.  This Bill does not address these issues.  The auctioning of coal blocks resulting in improving the supply of coal, and in turn addressing the problem of power shortage in the country, will also depend on the efficient functioning of the mines,  in addition to factors such as transparent allocations.

The increasing Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) in the Indian banking sector has recently been the subject of much discussion and scrutiny.  Yesterday, the Supreme Court struck down a circular dated February 12, 2018 issued by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).  The RBI circular laid down a revised framework for the resolution of stressed assets.  In this blog, we examine the extent of NPAs in India, and recent events leading up to the Supreme Court judgement.

What is the extent and effect of the NPA problem in India?

Banks give loans and advances to borrowers. Based on the performance of the loan, it may be categorised as: (i) a standard asset (a loan where the borrower is making regular repayments), or (ii) a non-performing asset. NPAs are loans and advances where the borrower has stopped making interest or principal repayments for over 90 days.

As of 2018, the total NPAs in the economy stand at Rs 9.6 lakh crore.  About 88% of these NPAs are from loans and advances of public sector banks.  Banks are required to lend a certain percentage of their loans to priority sectors.  These sectors are identified by the RBI and include agriculture, housing, education and small scale industries.[1]  In 2018, of the total NPAs, 22% were from priority sector loans, and 78% were from non-priority sector loans. 

In the last few years, gross NPAs of banks (as a percentage of total loans) have increased from 2.3% of total loans in 2008 to 9.3% in 2017 (see Figure 1). This indicates that an increasing proportion of a bank’s assets have ceased to generate income for the bank, lowering the bank’s profitability and its ability to grant further credit.

Figure 1: Gross NPAs (% of total loans)

Source: Reserve Bank of India; PRS

What has been done to address the problem of growing NPAs?

The measures taken to resolve and prevent NPAs can broadly be classified into two kinds – first, remedial measures for banks prescribed by the RBI for internal restructuring of stressed assets, and second, legislative means of resolving NPAs under various laws (like the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016).

Remedial Measures

Over the years, the RBI has issued various guidelines for banks aimed at the resolution of stressed assets in the economy. These included introduction of certain schemes such as: (i) Strategic Debt Restructuring (which allowed banks to change the management of the defaulting company), and (ii) Joint Lenders’ Forum (where lenders evolved a resolution plan and voted on its implementation).   A summary of the various schemes implemented by the RBI is provided in Table 1. 

Table 1: Non-legislative loan recovery framework

Loan restructuring

  • Banks internally undertake restructuring of loans, if the borrower is unable to repay the amount.  This involves changing the terms of repayment, which includes altering the payment schedule of loans or interest rates.

Corporate Debt Restructuring

  • Allows for restructuring of a borrower’s outstanding loans from more than one bank.  This mechanism is available if the borrower’s outstanding loans are more than Rs 10 crore.[2]

Joint Lender's Forum

  • Lenders evolve an action plan to resolve the NPA of a defaulter.[3]  If 60% of the creditors by value, and 50% of the creditors by number agree, a recovery plan will be implemented.[4]

5:25 Scheme

  • Banks can extend loan term to 25 years based on cash flow of projects for which the loan was given.  Interest rates and other terms of the loans may be readjusted every five years.[5]

Strategic Debt Restructuring

  • Banks convert their debt into equity to hold a majority of shares in a company.  This allows banks to change the management of the defaulting company.[6]

Sustainable Structuring of Stressed Assets

  • Allows for conversion of a part of the outstanding debt to equity or preference shares if: (i) project for which loan was taken has commenced operations, and (ii) borrower can repay over 50% of the loan.[7]

Sources: RBI scheme guidelines; Economic Survey 2016-17; PRS.

Legislative Measures

  • The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was enacted in May 2016 to provide a time-bound 180-day recovery process for insolvent accounts. When a default occurs, the creditors or debtor may apply to the National Company Law Tribunal for initiating the resolution process. Once the application is approved, the resolution process will have to be completed within 180 days (extendable by 90 days) from the date of approval.  The resolution process will be presided over by an insolvency professional to decide whether to restructure the loan, or to sell the defaulter’s assets to recover the outstanding amount.  If a timely decision is not arrived at, the defaulter’s assets are liquidated.
  • The Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2017: The amendment allows RBI to direct banks to initiate recovery proceedings against defaulting accounts under the IBC.  Further, under Section 35AA of the Act, RBI may also issue directions to banks for resolution of specific stressed assets. 

In June 2017, an internal advisory committee of RBI identified 500 defaulters with the highest value of NPAs.[8]  The committee recommended that 12 largest non-performing accounts, each with outstanding amounts greater than Rs 5,000 crore and totalling 25% of the NPAs of the economy, be referred for resolution under the IBC immediately.  Proceedings against the 12 largest defaulters have been initiated under the IBC. 

What was the February 12 circular issued by the RBI?

Subsequent to the enactment of the IBC, the RBI put in place a framework for restructuring of stressed assets of over Rs 2,000 crore on or after March 1, 2018.  The resolution plan for such restructuring must be unanimously approved by all lenders and implemented within 180 days from the date of the first default.  If the plan is not implemented within the stipulated time period, the stressed assets are required to be referred to the NCLT under IBC within 15 days.  Further, the framework introduced a provision for early identification and categorisation of stressed assets before they are classified as NPAs.

On what grounds was the RBI circular challenged?

Borrowers whose loans were tagged as NPAs before the release of the circular recently crossed the 180-day deadline for internal resolution by banks. Some of these borrowers, including various power producers and sugar mills, had appealed against the RBI circular in various High Courts. A two-judge bench of the Allahabad High Court ruled in favour of the RBI’s powers to issue these guidelines, and refused to grant interim relief to power producers from being taken to the NCLT for bankruptcy. These batch of petitions against the circular were transferred to the Supreme Court, which issued an order in September 2018 to maintain status quo on the same.

What did the Supreme Court order?

The Court held the circular issued by RBI was outside the scope of the power given to it under Article 35AA of the Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2017.  The Court reasoned that Section 35AA was proposed by the 2017 Act to authorise the RBI to issues directions only in relation to specific cases of default by specific debtors.  It held that the RBI circular issued directions in relation to debtors in general and this was outside their scope of power.  The court also held that consequently all IBC proceedings initiated under the RBI circular are quashed. 

During the proceedings, various companies argued that the RBI circular applies to all corporate debtors alike, without looking into each individual’s sectors problems and attempting to solve them.  For instance, several power companies provided sector specific reasons for delay in payment of bank dues.  The reasons included: (i) cancellation of coal blocks by the SC leading to non-availability of fuel, (ii) lack of enough power purchase agreements by states, (iii) non-payment of dues by DISCOMs, and (iv) delays in project implementation leading to cost overruns.  Note that, in its 40th report, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Energy analysed the impact of the RBI circular on the power sector and noted that the ‘one size fits all’ approach of the RBI is erroneous. 

 

 

[1] ‘Priority Sector Lending – Targets and Classification’ Reserve Bank of India, July 2012, https://rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=7460&Mode=0

[2] Revised Guidelines on Corporate Debt Restructuring Mechanism, Reserve Bank of India, https://www.rbi.org.in/upload/notification/pdfs/67158.pdf

[3] ‘Framework for Revitalising Distressed Assets in the Economy – Guidelines on Joint Lenders’ Forum (JLF) and Corrective Action Plan (CAP)’, Reserve Bank of India, February 26, 2016, https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=8754&Mode=0

[4] Timelines for Stressed Assets, Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, May 5, 2017, https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=10957&Mode=0

[5] Flexible Structuring of Long Term Project Loans to Infrastructure and Core Industries, RBI, July 15, 2014, https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=9101&Mode=0

[6] Chapter 4, The Economic Survey 2016-17, http://unionbudget.nic.in/es2016-17/echap04.pdf

[7] ‘RBI introduces a ‘Scheme for Sustainable Structuring of Stressed Assets’’ Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, June 13, 2016, https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=37210

[8] RBI identifies Accounts for Reference by Banks under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), Reserve Bank of India, June 13, 2017, https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=40743