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A few weeks ago, in response to the initial protests by farmers against the new central farm laws, three state assemblies – Chhattisgarh, Punjab, and Rajasthan – passed Bills to address farmers’ concerns. While these Bills await the respective Governors’ assent, protests against the central farm laws have gained momentum. In this blog, we discuss the key amendments proposed by these states in response to the central farm laws.
What are the central farm laws and what do they seek to do?
In September 2020, Parliament enacted three laws: (i) the Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Act, 2020, (ii) the Farmers (Empowerment and Protection) Agreement on Price Assurance and Farm Services Act, 2020, and (iii) the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 2020. The laws collectively seek to: (i) facilitate barrier-free trade of farmers’ produce outside the markets notified under the various state Agriculture Produce Marketing Committee (APMC) laws, (ii) define a framework for contract farming, and (iii) regulate the supply of certain food items, including cereals, pulses, potatoes, and onions, only under extraordinary circumstances such as war, famine, and extraordinary price rise.
How do the central farm laws change the agricultural regulatory framework?
Agricultural marketing in most states is regulated by the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committees (APMCs), set up under the state APMC Act. The central farm laws seek to facilitate multiple channels of marketing outside the existing APMC markets. Many of these existing markets face issues such as limited number of buyers restricting the entry of new players and undue deductions in the form of commission charges and market fees. The central laws introduced a liberalised agricultural marketing system with the aim of increasing the availability of buyers for farmers’ produce. More buyers would lead to competition in the agriculture market resulting in better prices for farmers.
Why have states proposed amendments to the central farm laws?
The central farm laws allow anyone with a PAN card to buy farmers’ produce in the ‘trade area’ outside the markets notified or run by the APMCs. Buyers do not need to get a license from the state government or APMC, or pay any tax to them for such purchase in the ‘trade area’. These changes in regulations raised concerns regarding the kind of protections available to farmers in the ‘trade area’ outside APMC markets, particularly in terms of the price discovery and payment. To address such concerns, the states of Chhattisgarh, Punjab, and Rajasthan, in varying forms, proposed amendments to the existing agricultural marketing laws.
The Punjab and Rajasthan assemblies passed Bills to amend the central Acts, in their application to these states. The Chhattisgarh Assembly passed a Bill to amend its APMC Act in response to the central Acts. These state Bills aim to prevent exploitation of farmers and ensure an optimum guarantee of fair market price for the agriculture produce. Among other things, these state Bills enable state governments to levy market fee outside the physical premises of the state APMC markets, mandate MSP for certain types of agricultural trade, and enable state governments to regulate the production, supply, and distribution of essential commodities and impose stock limits under extraordinary circumstances.
Chhattisgarh
The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Act, 2020 allows anyone with a PAN card to buy farmers’ produce in the trade area outside the markets notified or run by the APMCs. Buyers do not need to get a license from the state government or APMC, or pay any tax to them for such purchase in the trade area. The Chhattisgarh Assembly passed a Bill to amend its APMC Act to allow the state government to notify structures outside APMC markets, such as godowns, cold storages, and e-trading platforms, as deemed markets. This implies that such deemed markets will be under the jurisdiction of the APMCs as per the central Act. Thus, APMCs in Chhattisgarh can levy market fee on sale of farmers’ produce in such deemed markets (outside the APMC markets) and require the buyer to have a license.
Punjab and Rajasthan
The Punjab and Rajasthan Bills empower the respective state governments to levy a market fee (on private traders, and electronic trading platforms) for trade outside the state APMC markets. Further, they mandate that in certain cases, agricultural produce should not be sold or purchased at a price below the Minimum Support Price (MSP). For instance, in Punjab sale and purchase of wheat and paddy should not be below MSP. The Bills also provide that they will override any other law currently in force. Table 1 gives a comparison of the amendments proposed by states with the related provisions of the central farm laws.
Table 1: Comparison of the central farm laws with amendments proposed by Punjab and Rajasthan
Provision |
Central laws |
State amendments |
Market fee |
|
|
Minimum Support Price (MSP) - fixed by the central government, based on the recommendations of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices |
|
|
Penalties for compeling farmers to sell below MSP |
|
|
Delivery under farming agreements |
|
|
Regulation of essential commodities |
|
|
Imposition of stock limit |
|
|
Dispute Resolution Mechanism for Farmers |
|
|
Power of civil courts |
|
|
Special provisions |
|
|
Note: A market committee provides facilities for and regulates the marketing of agricultural produce in a designated market area.
Have the state amendments come into force?
The amendments proposed by states aim to address the concerns of farmers, but to a varying extent. The Bills have not come into force yet as they await the Governors’ assent. In addition, the Punjab and Rajasthan Bills also need the assent of the President, as they are inconsistent with the central Acts and seek to amend them. Meanwhile, amidst the ongoing protests, many farmers’ organisations are in talks with the central government to seek redressal of their grievances and appropriate changes in the central farm laws. It remains to be seen to what extent will such changes address the concerns of farmers.
A version of this article first appeared on Firstpost on December 5, 2020.
Earlier today, the Supreme Court struck down the two Acts that created an independent body for the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. One of the Acts amended the Constitution to replace the method of appointment of judges by a collegium system with that of an independent commission, called the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). The composition of the NJAC would include: (i) the Chief Justice of India (Chairperson) (ii) two other senior most judges of the Supreme Court, (iii) the Union Law Minister, and (iv) two eminent persons to be nominated by the Prime Minister, the CJI and the Leader of Opposition of the Lok Sabha. The other Act laid down the processes in relation to such appointments. Both Acts were passed by Parliament in August 2014, and received Presidential assent in December 2014. Following this, a batch of petitions that had been filed in Supreme Court challenging the two Bills on grounds of unconstitutionality, was referred to a five judge bench. It was contended that the presence of executive members in the NJAC violated the independence of the judiciary. In its judgement today, the Court held that the executive involvement in appointment of judges impinges upon the independence of the judiciary. This violates the principle of separation of powers between the executive and judiciary, which is a basic feature of the Constitution. In this context, we examine the proposals around the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. Appointment of judges before the introduction of the NJAC The method of appointment of the Chief Justice of India, SC and HC judges was laid down in the Constitution.[i] The Constitution stated that the President shall make these appointments after consulting with the Chief Justice of India and other SC and HC judges as he considers necessary. Between the years 1982-1999, the issue of method of appointment of judges was examined and reinterpreted by the Supreme Court. Since then, a collegium, consisting of the Chief Justice of India and 4 other senior most SC judges, made recommendations for persons to be appointed as SC and HC judges, to the President.[ii] Recommendations of various bodies for setting up an independent appointments commission Over the decades, several high level Commissions have examined this method of appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. They have suggested that an independent body be set up to make recommendations for such appointments. However, they differed in the representation of the judiciary, legislature and executive in making such appointments. These are summarised below. Table 1: Comparison of various recommendations on the composition of a proposed appointments body
Recommendatory Body | Suggested composition |
2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (2007) | Judiciary : CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive : Vice-President (Chairperson), PM, Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leaders of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament. Other: No representative. |
National Advisory Council (2005) | Judiciary: CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive: Vice-President (Chairman), PM (or nominee), Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leader of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament. Other: No representative. |
NCRWC (2002) | Judiciary :CJI (Chairman), two senior most SC judges Executive: Union Law Minister Legislature: No representative Other: one eminent person |
Law Commission (1987) | Judiciary : CJI (Chairman), three senior most SC judges, immediate predecessor of the CJI, three senior most CJs of HCs, [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive: Law Minister, Attorney General of India, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: No representative Other: One Law academic |
Sources: 121st Report of the Law Commission, 1987; Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002; A Consultation Paper on Superior Judiciary, NCRWC, 2001; A National Judicial Commission-Report for discussion in the National Advisory Council, 2005; Fourth Report of the 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), ‘Ethics in Governance’, 2007; PRS. It may be noted that the Law Commission, in its 2008 and 2009 reports, suggested that Government should seek a reconsideration of the judgments in the Three Judges cases. In the alternative, Parliament should pass a law restoring the primacy of the CJI, while ensuring that the executive played a role in making judicial appointments. Appointments process in different countries Internationally, there are varied methods for making appointments of judges to the higher judiciary. The method of appointment of judges to the highest court, in some jurisdictions, is outlined in Table 2. Table 2: Appointment of judges to the highest court in different jurisdictions
Country | Method of Appointment to the highest court | Who is involved in making the appointments |
UK | SC judges are appointed by a five-person selection commission. | It consists of the SC President, his deputy, and one member each appointed by the JACs of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.[iii] (The JACs comprise lay persons, members of the judiciary and the Bar and make appointments of judges of lower courts.) |
Canada | Appointments are made by the Governor in Council.[iv] | A selection panel comprising five MPs (from the government and the opposition) reviews list of nominees and submits 3 names to the Prime Minister.[v] |
USA | Appointments are made by the President. | Supreme Court Justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the United States Senate.[vi] |
Germany | Appointments are made by election. | Half the members of the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by the executive and half by the legislature.[vii] |
France | Appointments are made by the President. | President receives proposals for appointments from Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature.[viii] |
Sources: Constitutional Reform Act, 2005; Canada Supreme Court Act, 1985; Constitution of the United States of America; Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany; Constitution of France; PRS. In delivering its judgment that strikes down the setting up of an NJAC, the Court has stated that it would schedule hearings from November 3, 2015 regarding ways in which the collegium system can be strengthened.
[i] Article 124, Constitution of India (Prior to 2015 Amendments)
[ii] S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India, AIR 1982, SC 149; S.C. Advocates on Record Association vs. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268; In re: Special Reference, AIR 1999 SC 1.
[iii]. Schedule 8, Constitutional Reform Act, 2005.
[iv]. Section 4(2), Supreme Court Act (RSC, 1985).
[v]. Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the retirement of Justice Morris Fish, http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/04/23/statement-prime-minister-canada-retirement-justice-morris-fish.
[vi]. Article II, Section 2, The Constitution of the United States of America.
[vii]. Article 94 (1), Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.
[viii] Article 65, Constitution of France, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constiution_anglais_oct2009.pdf.