During the recess, the Departmentally Related Standing Committees of Parliament examine the Demand for Grants submitted by various Ministries. The Demand for Grants are detailed explanations of that Ministry's annual budget which form part of the total budget of the government. These are examined in detail, and the committees can approve of the demands, or suggest changes. The Demand for Grants are finally discussed and voted on by the Parliament after the recess. (The post below lists the ministries whose Demand for Grants will be discussed in detail after the recess). The issue is - how effective is the institution of Parliament in examining the budget? Though India specific information on this subject is hard to find, K. Barraclough and B. Dorotinsky have cited the World Bank - OECD Budget procedures Database to formulate a table on the legislature approving the budget presented by the executive ("The Role of the Legislature in the Budget Process: A Comparative Review", Legislative Oversight and Budgeting). I reproduce the table below:
| In Practice, does the legislature generally approve the budget as presented by the Executive? (in percent) | ||||
| Answer | All Countries | OECD Countries | Presidential democracies | Parliamentary democracies |
| It generally approves the budget with no changes | 34 | 33 | 14 | 41 |
| Minor changes are made (affecting less than 3% of total spending) | 63 | 67 | 71 | 59 |
| Major changes are made (affecting more than 3% but less than 20% of total spending) | 2 | 0 | 7 | 0 |
| The budget approved is significantly different (affecting more than 20% of total spending) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sources: K. Barraclough and B. Dorotinsky; PRS. | ||||
In the last decade, some schemes have been recast as statutory entitlements – right to employment, right to education and right to food. Whereas schemes were dependent on annual budgetary allocations, there rights are now justiciable, and it would be obligatory for Parliament to allocate sufficient resources in the budget. Some of these rights also entail expenditure by state governments, with the implication that state legislatures will have to provide sufficient funds in their budgets. Importantly, the amounts required are a significant proportion of the total budget. There has been little debate on the core constitutional issue of whether any Parliament can pre-empt the role of resource allocation by future Parliaments. Whereas a future Parliament can address this issue by amending the Act, such power is not available to state legislatures. Through these Acts, Parliament is effectively constraining the spending preferences of states as expressed through their budgets passed by their respective legislative assemblies. I have discussed these issues in my column in Pragati published on August 16, 2013.
