This week, the centre issued two Ordinances to amend: (i) the Salary, Allowances, and Pension of Members of Parliament Act, 1954 to reduce the salaries of MPs by 30% for a period of one year, and (ii) the Salaries and Allowances of Ministers Act, 1952, to reduce the sumptuary allowance of Ministers by 30% for one year. The government also amended the rules notified under the 1954 Act to reduce certain allowances of MPs for one year, and suspended the MPLAD Scheme for two years. These changes are being made to supplement the financial resources of the centre to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. These amendments raise larger questions on the effect they have on the capacity of the state to fight the pandemic, and the way in which salaries of MPs should be determined.
Overview of Amendments
The 1954 Act lays out the salary and various allowances that an MP is entitled to during their term in Parliament and also provides pension to former MPs. MPs receive a salary of one lakh rupees per month, along with compensation for official expenses through various allowances. These include a daily allowance for attending Parliament, constituency allowance and office expense allowance. Under the first Ordinance, the salaries of MPs are being reduced by 30%. Further, the constituency allowance and office expense allowance are being reduced by Rs 21,000 and Rs 6,000, respectively.
The 1952 Act regulates the salaries and other allowances of Ministers (including the Prime Minister). The Act provides for the payment of a monthly sumptuary allowance (for expenditure incurred in entertaining visitors) at different rates to the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State, and Deputy Ministers. The second Ordinance is reducing the sumptuary allowances of Ministers by 30%.
Note that the 1952 Act pegs the salaries, and daily and constituency allowances of Ministers to the rates specified for an MP under the 1954 Act. Similar provisions apply to presiding officers of both Houses (other than Chairman of Rajya Sabha) who are regulated by a different Act. Therefore, the amendments to the salaries and constituency allowance of MPs will also apply to Ministers, Speaker and Deputy Speaker of Lok Sabha, and Deputy Chairman of Rajya Sabha. The salary of the Chairman of Rajya Sabha will continue to remain unaffected by the Ordinances (Rs 4 lakh per month).
Further, since 1993, MPs can also identify projects and sanction certain funds every year for public works in their constituencies under the Members of Parliament and Local Area Development (MPLAD) Scheme, 1993. Since 2011-12, each MP can spend up to Rs five crore per year under the scheme. The Union Cabinet has approved the suspension of the MPLAD Scheme for two years. Table 1 below compares the changes in salaries, allowances and MPLAD entitlements of MPs.
Table 1: Comparison of changes in the salaries, allowances and MPLAD entitlements of MPs
Feature |
Previous entitlement (in Rs per month) |
New entitlement (in Rs per month) |
Changes for the period of |
|
Salary |
1,00,000 |
70,000 |
One year |
|
Constituency allowance |
70,000 |
49,000 |
One year |
|
Office allowance |
60,000 |
54,000 |
One year |
|
Of which |
Office expenses |
20,000 |
14,000 |
- |
|
Secretarial assistance |
40,000 |
40,000 |
- |
Sumptuary allowance of Prime Minister |
3,000 |
2,100 |
One year |
|
Sumptuary allowance of Cabinet Ministers |
2,000 |
1,400 |
One year |
|
Sumptuary allowance of Ministers of State |
1,000 |
700 |
One year |
|
Sumptuary allowance of Deputy Ministers |
600 |
420 |
One year |
|
Funds under MPLAD Scheme |
5 crore |
NIL |
Two years |
Sources: 2020 Ordinances; Members of Parliament (Constituency Allowance) Amendment Rules, 2020; Members of Parliament (Office Expense Allowance) Amendment Rules, 2020; “Cabinet approves Non-operation of MPLADs for two years (2020-21 and 2021-22) for managing COVID 19”, Press Information Bureau, Cabinet, April 6, 2020; PRS.
Effect of amendments on resources to fight COVID-19
The proposed reduction to the salaries and allowances of MPs and Ministers amounts to savings of around Rs 55 crore, and the suspension of the MPLAD scheme is expected to save Rs 7800 crore. These measures comprise 0.03% and 4.5% respectively, of the estimated amount required to fight the immediate economic distress unleashed due to COVID. Government has estimated Rs 1.7 lakh crore as the requirement for COVID relief measures under the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana. Therefore, such measures to decrease MP salaries and allowances toward increasing the pool of funds for fighting the pandemic are likely to have an almost negligible impact.
How might MP salaries be set
Each MP is required to represent the interests of his constituents, formulate legislation on important national matters, hold the government accountable, and ensure efficient allocation of public resources. The salary and office allowance of an MP must be assessed in light of the responsibilities expected to be discharged by them. Ensuring MPs are reasonably compensated in terms of salaries allows MPs the means to be able to discharge their duties devotedly, enables them to make decisions in an independent manner and guarantees that citizens from all walks of life can stand a chance of running for Parliament. The question remains – who decides what is reasonable compensation for MPs.
Currently, MPs in India decide their own salaries which is passed in the form of an Act of Parliament. MPs setting their own pay leads to a conflict of interest. A way to resolve this is by setting up an independent commission to determine that salaries of MPs. This is a practice followed in certain democracies, such as New Zealand and United Kingdom. In some other countries, it is pegged to annual wage rate index such as Canada. Table 2 lists various methods used in some other countries to set salaries for legislators.
Table 2: Methods for setting salaries in different democracies
Countries |
Process of determining salary of legislators |
India |
Parliament decides by passing an Act. |
Australia |
Remuneration Tribunal decides the salary. This is revised annually. |
New Zealand |
Remuneration Authority decides the salary. This is revised annually. |
UK |
Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority sets the pay annually as per the changes in average earnings in the public sector given by the Office for National Statistics. |
Canada |
Member’s pay is adjusted each year to federal government’s annual wage rate index. |
Germany |
Based on income of a judge of the highest federal court and adjusted annually by the Parliament. |
Sources: Various government websites of respective countries; PRS.
India has experience with appointing independent commissions to examine the emoluments of government officials. The central government periodically sets up pay commissions to review and recommend changes to the wage structure of government employees with a view to attract talent to government services. The latest Central Pay Commission was constituted in 2014 to decides the emoluments of central government employees, armed forces personnel, employees of statutory bodies, and officers and employees of the Supreme Court. Typically, the Commissions have been chaired by a former Judge of the Supreme Court, and have included members representing government service and independent experts.
Suspending MPLADS
In contrast to these amendments, the suspension of the MPLAD Scheme is a positive step.
The MPLAD Scheme (MPLADS) was introduced in December 1993 to enable legislators to address local developmental problems for their constituents. MPLADS allows legislators to earmark up to five crore rupees every year on public works projects in their constituency and recommend these projects to the district authorities for implementation. Typically, funds under the MPLADS are expended on construction or installation of public facilities (such as school buildings, roads, and electrical facilities), supply of equipment (such as, computers in educational institutions) and sanitation projects.
In 2010, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court decided a challenge to the constitutionality of the MPLADS. It was argued that MPLADS violates the concept of separation of powers between the executive and the legislature since it provides the MP with executive powers on local public works. The Court ruled that there was no violation of the principle of separation of powers because the role of an MP in this case is recommendatory and the actual work is carried out by the local authorities.
However, the Scheme has undermined the role of an MP as a national-level policy maker. The role of an MP is to determine whether government’s budgetary allocations across development priorities are appropriate and once the money is sanctioned by Parliament is it being spent in an efficient and efficacious manner. However, focus on local administration-level issues, such as development of roads or sanitation projects, obscures the role of the MP in conducting oversight. Another fall out of having MPs responsible for MPLADS is that it skews the expectations of citizens have of their MPs – holding them accountable for resolving local development issues rather than broader policy and legislative decision making. The suspension of MPLADs will allow for MPs to focus on their role in Parliament.
The Ordinance route
Through these Ordinances, the executive has amended the salaries and allowances of MPs and Ministers. In principle, Parliament is discharged with law-making powers. In exceptional circumstances, the Constitution permits the executive to make laws through Ordinances if Parliament is not in session and immediate action is required. The two Ordinances will have to be ratified by Parliament within six weeks of its sitting in order to continue to have the force of law. Interestingly, India is one of the few countries, apart from Bangladesh and Pakistan, that vests the executive with authority to make laws, even if temporary in nature.
The Ordinance amending the salaries of MPs also raises a question on whether it is appropriate that the executive has the power to amend the emoluments of MPs – how would this affect the independence of the legislature which is tasked with holding the executive accountable.
Recently, the Supreme Court collegium reiterated its recommendations for the appointment of 11 judges to certain High Courts. It had first recommended these names earlier this year and in August last year, but these appointments were not made. The Indian judiciary faces high vacancies across all levels (the Supreme Court, High Courts, and subordinate courts). Vacancy of judges in courts is one of the reasons for delays and a rising number of pending cases, as there are not enough judges to hear and decide cases. As of today, more than four crore cases are pending across all courts in India. In this blog post, we discuss vacancies across courts over the years, delays in appointment of judges, and methods to determine the adequate judge strength required to handle the caseload courts face.
High vacancy of judges across courts
Vacancies in courts keep on arising periodically due to retirement, resignation, demise, or elevation of judges. Over the years, the sanctioned strength of judges in both High Courts and subordinate courts has been increased gradually. However, vacancies persist due to insufficient appointments (see Figures 1 and 2). Between 2010 and 2020, vacancies increased from 18% to 21% across all levels of courts (from 6% to 12% in the Supreme Court, from 33% to 38% in High Courts, and from 18% to 20% in subordinate courts).
Figure 1: Vacancy of judges in High Courts |
Figure 2: Vacancy of judges in subordinate courts |
|
|
Sources: Court News 2010-2018; Vacancy Statement, and Rajya Sabha replies, Part I, Budget Session (2021), Department of Justice; PRS. |
As on November 1, 2021, the Supreme Court had a vacancy of one judge (out of a sanctioned strength of 34). Vacancy in High Courts stood at 37% (406 posts vacant out of a sanctioned strength of 1,098). Since May, 2021, the Supreme Court collegium has recommended more than 130 names for appointment as High Court judges. In three High Courts (Telangana, Patna, and Calcutta), at least half of the posts are vacant (see Figure 3). The Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice (2020) noted that every year, 35-40% of posts of High Court judges remain unfilled.
Figure 3: Vacancy of judges across High Courts (in %) (as on November 1, 2021)
|
Source: Vacancy Statement, Department of Justice; PRS. |
Appointments of High Court judges are guided by a memorandum of procedure. As per this memorandum, the appointment process is to be initiated by the concerned High Court at least six months before a vacancy occurs. However, the Standing Committee (2021) noted that this timeline is rarely adhered to by High Courts. Further, in the final stage of the process, after receiving recommendations from the Supreme Court collegium, the executive appoints judges to the High Court. No timeline is prescribed for this stage of the appointment process. In 2018 and 2019, the average time taken to appoint High Court judges after receiving the collegium’s recommendations was five to seven months.
As of today, over 3.6 crore cases are pending before subordinate courts in India. As on February 20, 2020, 21% posts for judges were vacant (5,146 posts out of the sanctioned strength of 24,018) in subordinate courts. Subordinate courts in Bihar, Haryana, and Jharkhand (among the states with high population) had a high proportion of vacancies of judges (see Figure 4). Note that the Supreme Court is monitoring the procedure for appointment of judges to subordinate courts.
For an analysis of the data on pendency and vacancies in the Indian judiciary, see here.
Figure 4: Vacancy of judges across subordinate courts (in %) (as on February 20, 2020)
|
Source: Report No. 101, Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice (2020); PRS. |
How many judges do we need?
The Law Commission of India (1987) had noted the importance of manpower planning for the judiciary. Lack of adequate number of judges means a greater workload per judge. Thus, it becomes essential to arrive at an optimal judge strength to deal with pending and new cases in courts. Over the years, different methods of calculating the required judge strength for subordinate courts (where the backlog of cases in the Indian judiciary is concentrated) have been recommended (see Table 1).
Table 1: Methods recommended for calculating the required number of judges for subordinate courts
Method of calculation |
Recommendation and its status |
Judge-to-population ratio: optimum number of judges per million population |
The Law Commission of India (1987) had recommended increasing this ratio to 50 judges per million people. This was reiterated by the Supreme Court (2001) and the Standing Committee on Home Affairs (2002). For 2020, the judge-to-population ratio was 21 judges per million population. Note that this figure is calculated based on the sanctioned strength of judges in the Supreme Court, High Courts and subordinate courts. |
Rate of disposal: number of additional judges required (to clear the existing backlog of cases and ensure that new backlog is not created) based on the average number of cases disposed per judge |
The Law Commission of India (2014) proposed this method. It rejected the judge-to-population ratio method, observing that filing of cases per capita varies substantially across geographic units depending on socio-economic conditions. |
Weighted case load method: calculating judge strength based on the disposal by judges, taking into account the nature and complexity of cases in local conditions |
The National Court Management Systems Committee (NCMS) (2016) critiqued the rate of disposal method. It proposed, as an interim measure, the weighted case load method, which addresses the existing backlog of cases as well as the new flow of cases every year in subordinate courts. In 2017, the Supreme Court accepted this model. |
Time-based weighted case load method: calculating the required judge strength taking into account the actual time spent by judges in different types of cases at varying stages based on an empirical study |
Used widely in the United States, this was the long-term method recommended by the NCMS (2016) to assess the required judge strength for subordinate courts. It involves determining the total number of ‘judicial hours’ required for disposing of the case load of each court. The Delhi High Court used this approach in a pilot project (January 2017- December 2018) to calculate the ideal judge strength for disposing of pending cases in certain courts in Delhi. |
Sources: Reports No. 120 (1987) and 245 (2014), Law Commission of India; Report No. 85, Standing Committee on Home Affairs (2002); Note for Calculating Required Judge Strength for Subordinate Courts, National Court Management Systems Committee (NCMS) (2016); Imtiyaz Ahmad vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, Supreme Court (2017); PRS.