This week, the centre issued two Ordinances to amend: (i) the Salary, Allowances, and Pension of Members of Parliament Act, 1954 to reduce the salaries of MPs by 30% for a period of one year, and (ii) the Salaries and Allowances of Ministers Act, 1952, to reduce the sumptuary allowance of Ministers by 30% for one year. The government also amended the rules notified under the 1954 Act to reduce certain allowances of MPs for one year, and suspended the MPLAD Scheme for two years. These changes are being made to supplement the financial resources of the centre to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. These amendments raise larger questions on the effect they have on the capacity of the state to fight the pandemic, and the way in which salaries of MPs should be determined.
Overview of Amendments
The 1954 Act lays out the salary and various allowances that an MP is entitled to during their term in Parliament and also provides pension to former MPs. MPs receive a salary of one lakh rupees per month, along with compensation for official expenses through various allowances. These include a daily allowance for attending Parliament, constituency allowance and office expense allowance. Under the first Ordinance, the salaries of MPs are being reduced by 30%. Further, the constituency allowance and office expense allowance are being reduced by Rs 21,000 and Rs 6,000, respectively.
The 1952 Act regulates the salaries and other allowances of Ministers (including the Prime Minister). The Act provides for the payment of a monthly sumptuary allowance (for expenditure incurred in entertaining visitors) at different rates to the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State, and Deputy Ministers. The second Ordinance is reducing the sumptuary allowances of Ministers by 30%.
Note that the 1952 Act pegs the salaries, and daily and constituency allowances of Ministers to the rates specified for an MP under the 1954 Act. Similar provisions apply to presiding officers of both Houses (other than Chairman of Rajya Sabha) who are regulated by a different Act. Therefore, the amendments to the salaries and constituency allowance of MPs will also apply to Ministers, Speaker and Deputy Speaker of Lok Sabha, and Deputy Chairman of Rajya Sabha. The salary of the Chairman of Rajya Sabha will continue to remain unaffected by the Ordinances (Rs 4 lakh per month).
Further, since 1993, MPs can also identify projects and sanction certain funds every year for public works in their constituencies under the Members of Parliament and Local Area Development (MPLAD) Scheme, 1993. Since 2011-12, each MP can spend up to Rs five crore per year under the scheme. The Union Cabinet has approved the suspension of the MPLAD Scheme for two years. Table 1 below compares the changes in salaries, allowances and MPLAD entitlements of MPs.
Table 1: Comparison of changes in the salaries, allowances and MPLAD entitlements of MPs
|
Feature |
Previous entitlement (in Rs per month) |
New entitlement (in Rs per month) |
Changes for the period of |
|
|
Salary |
1,00,000 |
70,000 |
One year |
|
|
Constituency allowance |
70,000 |
49,000 |
One year |
|
|
Office allowance |
60,000 |
54,000 |
One year |
|
|
Of which |
Office expenses |
20,000 |
14,000 |
- |
|
|
Secretarial assistance |
40,000 |
40,000 |
- |
|
Sumptuary allowance of Prime Minister |
3,000 |
2,100 |
One year |
|
|
Sumptuary allowance of Cabinet Ministers |
2,000 |
1,400 |
One year |
|
|
Sumptuary allowance of Ministers of State |
1,000 |
700 |
One year |
|
|
Sumptuary allowance of Deputy Ministers |
600 |
420 |
One year |
|
|
Funds under MPLAD Scheme |
5 crore |
NIL |
Two years |
|
Sources: 2020 Ordinances; Members of Parliament (Constituency Allowance) Amendment Rules, 2020; Members of Parliament (Office Expense Allowance) Amendment Rules, 2020; “Cabinet approves Non-operation of MPLADs for two years (2020-21 and 2021-22) for managing COVID 19”, Press Information Bureau, Cabinet, April 6, 2020; PRS.
Effect of amendments on resources to fight COVID-19
The proposed reduction to the salaries and allowances of MPs and Ministers amounts to savings of around Rs 55 crore, and the suspension of the MPLAD scheme is expected to save Rs 7800 crore. These measures comprise 0.03% and 4.5% respectively, of the estimated amount required to fight the immediate economic distress unleashed due to COVID. Government has estimated Rs 1.7 lakh crore as the requirement for COVID relief measures under the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana. Therefore, such measures to decrease MP salaries and allowances toward increasing the pool of funds for fighting the pandemic are likely to have an almost negligible impact.
How might MP salaries be set
Each MP is required to represent the interests of his constituents, formulate legislation on important national matters, hold the government accountable, and ensure efficient allocation of public resources. The salary and office allowance of an MP must be assessed in light of the responsibilities expected to be discharged by them. Ensuring MPs are reasonably compensated in terms of salaries allows MPs the means to be able to discharge their duties devotedly, enables them to make decisions in an independent manner and guarantees that citizens from all walks of life can stand a chance of running for Parliament. The question remains – who decides what is reasonable compensation for MPs.
Currently, MPs in India decide their own salaries which is passed in the form of an Act of Parliament. MPs setting their own pay leads to a conflict of interest. A way to resolve this is by setting up an independent commission to determine that salaries of MPs. This is a practice followed in certain democracies, such as New Zealand and United Kingdom. In some other countries, it is pegged to annual wage rate index such as Canada. Table 2 lists various methods used in some other countries to set salaries for legislators.
Table 2: Methods for setting salaries in different democracies
|
Countries |
Process of determining salary of legislators |
|
India |
Parliament decides by passing an Act. |
|
Australia |
Remuneration Tribunal decides the salary. This is revised annually. |
|
New Zealand |
Remuneration Authority decides the salary. This is revised annually. |
|
UK |
Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority sets the pay annually as per the changes in average earnings in the public sector given by the Office for National Statistics. |
|
Canada |
Member’s pay is adjusted each year to federal government’s annual wage rate index. |
|
Germany |
Based on income of a judge of the highest federal court and adjusted annually by the Parliament. |
Sources: Various government websites of respective countries; PRS.
India has experience with appointing independent commissions to examine the emoluments of government officials. The central government periodically sets up pay commissions to review and recommend changes to the wage structure of government employees with a view to attract talent to government services. The latest Central Pay Commission was constituted in 2014 to decides the emoluments of central government employees, armed forces personnel, employees of statutory bodies, and officers and employees of the Supreme Court. Typically, the Commissions have been chaired by a former Judge of the Supreme Court, and have included members representing government service and independent experts.
Suspending MPLADS
In contrast to these amendments, the suspension of the MPLAD Scheme is a positive step.
The MPLAD Scheme (MPLADS) was introduced in December 1993 to enable legislators to address local developmental problems for their constituents. MPLADS allows legislators to earmark up to five crore rupees every year on public works projects in their constituency and recommend these projects to the district authorities for implementation. Typically, funds under the MPLADS are expended on construction or installation of public facilities (such as school buildings, roads, and electrical facilities), supply of equipment (such as, computers in educational institutions) and sanitation projects.
In 2010, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court decided a challenge to the constitutionality of the MPLADS. It was argued that MPLADS violates the concept of separation of powers between the executive and the legislature since it provides the MP with executive powers on local public works. The Court ruled that there was no violation of the principle of separation of powers because the role of an MP in this case is recommendatory and the actual work is carried out by the local authorities.
However, the Scheme has undermined the role of an MP as a national-level policy maker. The role of an MP is to determine whether government’s budgetary allocations across development priorities are appropriate and once the money is sanctioned by Parliament is it being spent in an efficient and efficacious manner. However, focus on local administration-level issues, such as development of roads or sanitation projects, obscures the role of the MP in conducting oversight. Another fall out of having MPs responsible for MPLADS is that it skews the expectations of citizens have of their MPs – holding them accountable for resolving local development issues rather than broader policy and legislative decision making. The suspension of MPLADs will allow for MPs to focus on their role in Parliament.
The Ordinance route
Through these Ordinances, the executive has amended the salaries and allowances of MPs and Ministers. In principle, Parliament is discharged with law-making powers. In exceptional circumstances, the Constitution permits the executive to make laws through Ordinances if Parliament is not in session and immediate action is required. The two Ordinances will have to be ratified by Parliament within six weeks of its sitting in order to continue to have the force of law. Interestingly, India is one of the few countries, apart from Bangladesh and Pakistan, that vests the executive with authority to make laws, even if temporary in nature.
The Ordinance amending the salaries of MPs also raises a question on whether it is appropriate that the executive has the power to amend the emoluments of MPs – how would this affect the independence of the legislature which is tasked with holding the executive accountable.
To mitigate the spread of coronavirus in India, the central government imposed a nation-wide lockdown on March 25, 2020. The lockdown necessitated the suspension of all economic activities, except the ones classified as ‘essential’ from time to time, and the ones that can be carried out from home. As a result, all economic activities which require persons to travel or work outside home, such as manufacturing of non-essential goods and construction, have stopped since then. While this has resulted in a loss of income for many individuals and businesses, the ongoing 40-day lockdown is also going to severely impact the revenue of the central and state governments, primarily the tax revenue that they would have generated from all such economic activities.
This note discusses the possible effect of the lockdown on the revenue of the central and state governments in 2020-21. At this stage, the effect of the pandemic and the lockdown are difficult to estimate. We do not know whether there will be partial restrictions when the current lockdown ends on 3rd May or the possibility of further action during the year. Therefore, this note can be used as a first estimate to compute the impact under various scenarios. For example, a reader who believes that the effect on GDP growth would be different than the IMF’s estimate used below can extrapolate the numbers to fit his assumptions.
The central government and most of the state governments passed their budget for the financial year 2020-21 during February-March 2020, before the lockdown. The central government estimated a 10% growth in the country’s nominal GDP in 2020-21, and more than half of the states estimate their nominal GSDP growth rate in the range of 8%-13%. Due to the unforeseen impact of the lockdown on the economy, the 2020-21 GDP growth rates are expected to be lower than these estimates. As a result, the tax revenue that the central and state governments will be able to generate are expected to be much lower than the budgeted estimates, during the period of lockdown.
Centre’s revenue
Table 1 shows the revenue expected by the central government from various sources in 2020-21. 73% of the revenue (Rs 16.36 lakh crore) is expected to come through taxes. Because of the impact of lockdown, the actual tax revenue realised at the end of the year could be much lower, depending on how much the nominal GDP growth in 2020-21 gets affected. To estimate the impact on tax revenue, we assume that the tax-GDP ratio (i.e. an estimate of the tax generated out of each unit of economic activity) in 2020-21 will remain the same as the budget estimate. This may be a conservative estimate of loss of revenue due to lockdown as many permitted activities such as agriculture, government services and essential services have zero or lower-than-average taxes.
Based on this assumption, a 1%-point fall in the nominal GDP growth rate could decrease centre’s net tax revenue by about Rs 15,000 crore in 2020-21, i.e. 0.7% of its total revenue. The IMF has projected GDP growth for 2020-21 at 1.9%; given the inflation target of 4%, nominal GDP growth could be about 6%. In that scenario where the nominal GDP growth falls by 4% point from 10% to 6% in 2020-21, net tax revenue loss could be about Rs 60,000 crore (2.7% of total revenue). As mentioned above, the tax-GDP ratio would likely be lower than the budget estimate because of the type of activities permitted during the lockdown. This would increase the adverse impact on tax revenue.
There is a further assumption being made above regarding tax-GDP. While GST tends to move with overall GDP, direct taxes would depend on income growth of individuals and profit growth of companies. In a lower GDP growth environment, the effect on these two items may be higher than the deceleration of nominal GDP, bringing down the tax-GDP ratio. Further, customs duties depend on the value of imports, which may have a lower growth. This would, to some extent, be mitigated by the increase in the rate of excise duty on petroleum products.
These computations have been made considering the 2019-20 revised estimate as the base and the 2020-21 budget estimate as being realistic when it was made. However, these numbers may also be lower. For instance, if we extrapolate the net tax revenue growth rate of April 2019 to February 2020 (as released by the Controller General of Accounts) to March 2020, the shortfall is of the order of Rs 1,62,000 crore or 11% of the revised estimate. Thus, the shortfall in tax collections in 2020-21 may be significantly higher.
Table 1: Central government's revenue in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
|
Source |
Revenue |
Share in Total Revenue |
|
Net Tax Revenue |
16,35,909 |
73% |
|
Non-Tax Revenue |
3,85,017 |
17% |
|
Dividends and Profits |
1,55,395 |
6.9% |
|
Capital Receipts |
2,24,967 |
10% |
|
Disinvestment |
2,10,000 |
9.4% |
|
Total Revenue |
22,45,893 |
- |
Note: Capital receipts and total revenue do not include borrowings.
Sources: Union Budget Documents; PRS.
Other than taxes, the centre’s receipts consist of non-tax revenue and capital receipts. A significant part of non-tax revenue is from dividends and profits of public sector enterprises (PSEs) and the RBI (Rs 1.55 lakh crore). If profitability gets impacted, then there could be an adverse impact in these figures. The major chunk of capital receipts is budgeted from disinvestment of PSEs (Rs 2.1 lakh crore). Equity markets have declined sharply over the last month. If equity markets remain volatile, the disinvestment process and consequently the disinvestment receipts could get affected. Note that disinvestment receipts were targeted at Rs 2,10,000 crore, significantly higher than the Rs 50,299 crore raised in 2019-20.
Devolution to States
Like the centre, states also rely on taxes for most of their revenue. As per their 2020-21 budget, on an average, nearly 70% of their revenue is estimated to come from taxes (45% from their own taxes and 25% from their share of centre’s taxes). Lower collections in centre’s taxes because of the lockdown will also impact states’ share in them (also known as devolution). Table 2 shows the share of states in centre’s tax revenue and how they could get impacted by a lower economic growth rate due to the lockdown.
Table 2: Impact of lower economic growth during the lockdown on devolution in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
|
State/ UT |
Share in divisible pool (%) |
Devolution |
Impact of 1% point drop in national nominal GDP growth rate on Devolution |
Revenue impact as a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
|
Andhra Pradesh |
4.11 |
32,238* |
293 |
NA |
|
Arunachal Pradesh |
1.76 |
13,802 |
125 |
0.61% |
|
Assam |
3.13 |
26,776 |
243 |
0.26% |
|
Bihar |
10.06 |
91,181 |
829 |
0.45% |
|
Chhattisgarh |
3.42 |
26,803 |
244 |
0.29% |
|
Delhi |
- |
- |
- |
- |
|
Goa |
0.39 |
3,027 |
28 |
0.21% |
|
Gujarat |
3.4 |
26,646 |
242 |
0.15% |
|
Haryana |
1.08 |
8,485 |
77 |
0.09% |
|
Himachal Pradesh |
0.8 |
6,266 |
57 |
0.15% |
|
Jammu and Kashmir |
- |
15,200 |
138 |
0.16% |
|
Jharkhand |
3.31 |
25,980 |
236 |
0.31% |
|
Karnataka |
3.65 |
28,591 |
260 |
0.14% |
|
Kerala |
1.94 |
20,935 |
190 |
0.17% |
|
Madhya Pradesh |
7.89 |
61,841* |
562 |
NA |
|
Maharashtra |
6.14 |
48,109 |
437 |
0.13% |
|
Manipur |
0.72 |
5,630 |
51 |
0.28% |
|
Meghalaya |
0.77 |
5,999* |
55 |
NA |
|
Mizoram |
0.51 |
3,968 |
36 |
0.37% |
|
Nagaland |
0.57 |
4,493 |
41 |
0.28% |
|
Odisha |
4.63 |
36,300 |
330 |
0.27% |
|
Punjab |
1.79 |
14,021 |
127 |
0.14% |
|
Rajasthan |
5.98 |
46,886 |
426 |
0.25% |
|
Sikkim |
0.39 |
3,043 |
28 |
0.35% |
|
Tamil Nadu |
4.19 |
32,849 |
299 |
0.14% |
|
Telangana |
2.13 |
16,727 |
152 |
0.11% |
|
Tripura |
0.71 |
5,560 |
51 |
0.30% |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
17.93 |
1,52,863 |
1,389 |
0.33% |
|
Uttarakhand |
1.1 |
8,657 |
79 |
0.19% |
|
West Bengal |
7.52 |
65,835 |
598 |
0.33% |
|
Total |
100 |
8,38,710 |
7,624 |
0.22% |
Note: *Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so their devolution data has been computed as the total devolution to states provided in the union budget multiplied by their share. The devolution data for all other states has been taken from the state budget documents, which may not match with the union budget data in case of a few states. Revenue receipts data not available for Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya. The total for revenue receipt share has been computed excluding these three states.
Sources: Union and State Budget Documents; 15th Finance Commission Report for 2020-21; PRS.
State GST
Out of the 45% revenue coming from state’s own taxes, 35% revenue is estimated to come from three taxes – state GST (19%), sales tax/ VAT (10%), and state excise (6%). State GST is levied on the consumption of most goods and services within the state. While state GST is the largest component of states’ own tax revenue, states do not have the autonomy to change tax rates on their own as the rates are decided by the GST Council. Thus, due to lower GST revenue during the lockdown period, if a state wishes to increase GST rates for the remaining part of the year, it cannot do this on its own.
Table 3 shows the possible impact of a 1%-point decrease in the growth rates of nominal GSDP (GDP of the state) and its impact on state GST revenue in the year 2020-21. These estimates are based on the assumption that the tax-GSDP ratio during the lockdown remains same as estimated for the 2020-21 budget. However, as discussed earlier, the tax-GDP ratio for taxes such as GST is likely to decline. The analysis estimates the minimum impact on states’ GST revenue and does not captures its full extent.
Table 3: Impact of lower GSDP growth during the lockdown on state GST revenue in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
|
State/ UT |
State GST revenue |
Impact of 1% point drop in nominal GSDP growth rate on State GST revenue |
Revenue impact as a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
|
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Arunachal Pradesh |
324 |
3 |
0.01% |
|
Assam |
13,935 |
128 |
0.14% |
|
Bihar |
20,800 |
187 |
0.10% |
|
Chhattisgarh |
10,701 |
97 |
0.12% |
|
Delhi |
23,800 |
215 |
0.39% |
|
Goa |
2,772 |
26 |
0.19% |
|
Gujarat |
33,050 |
292 |
0.18% |
|
Haryana |
22,350 |
198 |
0.22% |
|
Himachal Pradesh |
3,855 |
35 |
0.09% |
|
Jammu and Kashmir |
6,065 |
55 |
0.06% |
|
Jharkhand |
9,450 |
85 |
0.11% |
|
Karnataka |
47,319 |
445 |
0.25% |
|
Kerala |
32,388 |
289 |
0.25% |
|
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Maharashtra |
1,07,146 |
957 |
0.28% |
|
Manipur |
914 |
8 |
0.05% |
|
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Mizoram |
504 |
4 |
0.04% |
|
Nagaland |
541 |
5 |
0.04% |
|
Odisha |
15,469 |
139 |
0.11% |
|
Punjab |
15,859 |
141 |
0.16% |
|
Rajasthan |
28,250 |
255 |
0.15% |
|
Sikkim |
650 |
5 |
0.07% |
|
Tamil Nadu |
46,196 |
410 |
0.19% |
|
Telangana |
27,600 |
242 |
0.17% |
|
Tripura |
1,311 |
12 |
0.07% |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
55,673 |
525 |
0.12% |
|
Uttarakhand |
5,386 |
49 |
0.12% |
|
West Bengal |
33,153 |
298 |
0.17% |
|
Total |
5,65,461 |
5,104 |
0.17% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available. 2020-21 GSDP data for Delhi was not available, so the GSDP growth rate in 2020-21 has been assumed to be the same as the growth rate in 2019-20 (10.5%).
Sources: State Budget Documents; PRS.
Sales tax/ VAT and State Excise
These two taxes have been major sources of revenue for states, estimated to contribute 16% of states’ revenue in 2020-21. With implementation of GST, states can now levy sales tax only on petroleum products (petrol, diesel, crude oil, natural gas, and aviation turbine fuel) and alcohol for human consumption. However, the lockdown has severely impacted the consumption, and thus sale, of all of these goods as most of the transportation is prohibited and businesses selling alcohol are also shut. As a result, the revenue coming from these taxes is likely to see a much larger impact as compared to the other taxes.
In addition, alcohol is also subject to state excise. Table 4 shows the average monthly impact of the lockdown on revenue from state excise. That is, this estimates the loss of revenue for each month of lockdown, with the assumption that there is no production of alcohol for human consumption during such periods.
Table 4: Average monthly impact of the lockdown on state excise revenue in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
|
State/ UT |
State excise revenue |
Average monthly impact on state excise revenue |
Monthly revenue impact as a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
|
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Arunachal Pradesh |
157 |
13 |
0.06% |
|
Assam |
1,750 |
146 |
0.16% |
|
Bihar |
0 |
0 |
0.00% |
|
Chhattisgarh |
5,200 |
433 |
0.52% |
|
Delhi |
6,300 |
525 |
0.95% |
|
Goa |
548 |
46 |
0.34% |
|
Gujarat |
144 |
12 |
0.01% |
|
Haryana |
7,500 |
625 |
0.69% |
|
Himachal Pradesh |
1,788 |
149 |
0.39% |
|
Jammu and Kashmir |
1,450 |
121 |
0.14% |
|
Jharkhand |
2,301 |
192 |
0.25% |
|
Karnataka |
22,700 |
1,892 |
1.05% |
|
Kerala |
2,801 |
233 |
0.20% |
|
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Maharashtra |
19,225 |
1,602 |
0.46% |
|
Manipur |
15 |
1 |
0.01% |
|
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Mizoram |
1 |
0 |
0.00% |
|
Nagaland |
6 |
0 |
0.00% |
|
Odisha |
5,250 |
438 |
0.35% |
|
Punjab |
6,250 |
521 |
0.59% |
|
Rajasthan |
12,500 |
1,042 |
0.60% |
|
Sikkim |
248 |
21 |
0.26% |
|
Tamil Nadu |
8,134 |
678 |
0.31% |
|
Telangana |
16,000 |
1,333 |
0.93% |
|
Tripura |
266 |
22 |
0.13% |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
37,500 |
3,125 |
0.74% |
|
Uttarakhand |
3,400 |
283 |
0.67% |
|
West Bengal |
12,732 |
1,061 |
0.59% |
|
Total |
1,74,164 |
14,514 |
0.48% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available.
Sources: State Budget Documents; PRS.
Sales tax/VAT is collected from sale of alcohol and petroleum products. We do not have any data on the reduction of sale of these items -- news reports indicating sale of alcohol in some states while petroleum products would be used by providers of essential services. For estimating the impact on sales tax/ VAT revenue, we have assumed the following three scenarios: (i) 40% shortfall in tax collections, (ii) 60% shortfall in tax collections, and (iii) 80% shortfall in tax collections in any month of lockdown. Table 5 shows the average monthly impact of the lockdown on sales tax/ VAT revenue under the three scenarios.
Table 5: Impact of lockdown on sales tax/ VAT revenue in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
|
State/ UT |
Loss of sales tax/ VAT revenue per lockdown month |
As a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
||||
|
40% shortfall |
60% shortfall |
80% shortfall |
40% shortfall |
60% shortfall |
80% shortfall |
|
|
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Arunachal Pradesh |
9 |
14 |
18 |
0.04% |
0.07% |
0.09% |
|
Assam |
178 |
267 |
356 |
0.19% |
0.29% |
0.39% |
|
Bihar |
194 |
292 |
389 |
0.11% |
0.16% |
0.21% |
|
Chhattisgarh |
138 |
207 |
276 |
0.16% |
0.25% |
0.33% |
|
Delhi |
207 |
310 |
413 |
0.37% |
0.56% |
0.75% |
|
Goa |
41 |
62 |
83 |
0.31% |
0.47% |
0.62% |
|
Gujarat |
774 |
1,162 |
1,549 |
0.48% |
0.72% |
0.95% |
|
Haryana |
357 |
535 |
713 |
0.40% |
0.59% |
0.79% |
|
Himachal Pradesh |
56 |
84 |
112 |
0.15% |
0.22% |
0.29% |
|
Jammu and Kashmir |
50 |
75 |
100 |
0.06% |
0.09% |
0.11% |
|
Jharkhand |
195 |
293 |
391 |
0.26% |
0.39% |
0.52% |
|
Karnataka |
593 |
889 |
1,186 |
0.33% |
0.49% |
0.66% |
|
Kerala |
775 |
1,163 |
1,551 |
0.68% |
1.01% |
1.35% |
|
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Maharashtra |
1,333 |
2,000 |
2,667 |
0.38% |
0.58% |
0.77% |
|
Manipur |
9 |
14 |
18 |
0.05% |
0.08% |
0.10% |
|
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Mizoram |
3 |
4 |
5 |
0.03% |
0.04% |
0.06% |
|
Nagaland |
9 |
13 |
18 |
0.06% |
0.09% |
0.12% |
|
Odisha |
292 |
438 |
583 |
0.23% |
0.35% |
0.47% |
|
Punjab |
186 |
279 |
372 |
0.21% |
0.32% |
0.42% |
|
Rajasthan |
700 |
1,050 |
1,400 |
0.40% |
0.61% |
0.81% |
|
Sikkim |
7 |
11 |
15 |
0.09% |
0.14% |
0.18% |
|
Tamil Nadu |
1,868 |
2,802 |
3,736 |
0.85% |
1.28% |
1.70% |
|
Telangana |
880 |
1,320 |
1,760 |
0.61% |
0.92% |
1.23% |
|
Tripura |
15 |
22 |
30 |
0.09% |
0.13% |
0.17% |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
943 |
1,414 |
1,886 |
0.22% |
0.33% |
0.45% |
|
Uttarakhand |
66 |
98 |
131 |
0.15% |
0.23% |
0.31% |
|
West Bengal |
251 |
377 |
503 |
0.14% |
0.21% |
0.28% |
|
Total |
10,130 |
15,195 |
20,260 |
0.34% |
0.51% |
0.67% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available.
Sources: State Budget Documents; PRS.
How much can GST compensation help?
The shortfall in state GST revenue could get offset by the GST compensation provided to states by the central government. The GST (Compensation to States) Act, 2017, requires the central government to provide compensation to states for loss of revenue arising due to GST implementation until 2022. For this purpose, the Act guarantees a 14% annual growth rate in state GST revenue, which is much higher than the growth likely in the year 2020-21. As a result, the central government would be required to provide states a compensation equivalent to the shortfall in growth in their state GST revenue, in comparison to the 14% growth.
However, it is likely that there may not be sufficient funds to provide compensation to states in 2020-21. Compensation to states is given out of the GST Compensation Fund, which consists of collections of a cess levied specifically to generate funds for this purpose. The cess is levied on coal, tobacco and its products, pan masala, automobiles, and aerated drinks. The cess collections may see a shortfall as the sale of many of these goods is likely to be affected this year. Note that domestic automobile sales declined 18% in 2019-20 over the previous year while coal production stayed constant.
In the 2020-21 budget, the central government estimated to provide Rs 1,35,368 crore as compensation to states, which is close to the total compensation estimated by states in their budgets. However, due to the lockdown, the cess collections financing these grants are estimated to decrease, whereas the compensation requirement of states is estimated to increase due to lower GST collections. While there is a risk that any incremental requirement may not be met, states’ revenue can see a much larger impact if cess collections are not even sufficient to meet their existing amounts as per the 2020-21 budgets (Table 6). States, on an average, depend on GST compensation grants for 4.4% of their revenue in 2020-21. However, states such as Gujarat, Punjab, and Delhi expect almost 14-15% of their revenue in 2020-21 to come in the form of GST compensation grants.
Table 6: GST compensation grants estimated by states in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
|
State/ UT |
GST Compensation |
GST compensation as a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
|
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
|
Arunachal Pradesh |
0 |
0.0% |
|
Assam |
1,000 |
1.1% |
|
Bihar |
3,500 |
1.9% |
|
Chhattisgarh |
2,938 |
3.5% |
|
Delhi |
7,800 |
14.1% |
|
Goa |
1,358 |
10.2% |
|
Gujarat |
22,510 |
13.9% |
|
Haryana |
7,000 |
7.8% |
|
Himachal Pradesh |
3,338 |
8.7% |
|
Jammu and Kashmir |
3,177 |
3.6% |
|
Jharkhand |
1,568 |
2.1% |
|
Karnataka |
16,116 |
9.0% |
|
Kerala |
0 |
0.0% |
|
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
|
Maharashtra |
10,000 |
2.9% |
|
Manipur |
0 |
0.0% |
|
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
|
Mizoram |
0 |
0.0% |
|
Nagaland |
0 |
0.0% |
|
Odisha |
6,200 |
5.0% |
|
Punjab |
12,975 |
14.7% |
|
Rajasthan |
4,800 |
2.8% |
|
Sikkim |
0 |
0.0% |
|
Tamil Nadu |
10,300 |
4.7% |
|
Telangana |
0 |
0.0% |
|
Tripura |
208 |
1.2% |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
7,608 |
1.8% |
|
Uttarakhand |
3,571 |
8.4% |
|
West Bengal |
4,928 |
2.7% |
|
Total |
1,30,894 |
4.4% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available.
Sources: State Budget Documents; PRS.
A similar scenario played out last year when due to the economic slowdown, the cess collections were not sufficient to meet states’ compensation requirements. As a result, states have received the GST compensation only till November 2019. Note that the GST (Compensation to States) Act, 2017 provides that the GST Council can recommend other funding mechanisms for the Compensation Fund. For instance, this can be done when there is a shortfall of money in the Fund for providing compensation to states.
Impact on State Finances
In light of such severe stress on the revenue side, states will have to either cut their budgeted expenditure or increase their borrowings to meet the budget targets. Note that because of the coronavirus pandemic and the lockdown, states are also making unforeseen expenditure in the health sector and for providing relief from the lockdown. As a result, many states have already started working on the former by drawing up plans to defer or cut their planned expenditure, or divert funds for planned expenditure towards these immediate requirements. With relatively less flexibility on the side of revenue expenditure, capital expenditure could see a larger cut in many states. For instance, revenue expenditure includes expenditure committed towards payment of interest, salaries, and pension. On average, this committed expenditure uses up 50% of states’ revenue. However, some states have already gone ahead and deferred or cut the expenditure towards payment of salaries. Also, with private consumption and investment expected to remain sluggish, reduction of government expenditure could lead to a further decline in GDP.
The other option for states is to increase their borrowings. However, states’ borrowings are limited by their FRBM laws at 3% of their GSDP (with a further 0.5% of GSDP if they fulfil some conditions). States also need the consent of the central government to borrow money. While most states had already budgeted their fiscal deficit for 2020-21 near the upper limit, it seems some states do have some fiscal space to borrow more (Table 7). However, with GSDP expected to take a hit because of the lockdown, fiscal deficit as a percentage of GSDP for all states could be higher than budgeted targets, even if they do not make any additional borrowings.
Table 7: Fiscal deficit estimates for 2020-21 as a percentage of GSDP
|
State/ UT |
2019-20 (Revised) |
2020-21 (Budgeted) |
|
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
|
Arunachal Pradesh |
3.1% |
2.4% |
|
Assam |
5.7% |
2.3% |
|
Bihar |
9.5% |
3.0% |
|
Chhattisgarh |
6.4% |
3.2% |
|
Delhi |
-0.1% |
0.5% |
|
Goa |
4.7% |
5.0% |
|
Gujarat |
1.6% |
1.8% |
|
Haryana |
2.8% |
2.7% |
|
Himachal Pradesh |
6.4% |
4.0% |
|
Jammu and Kashmir |
NA |
5.0% |
|
Jharkhand |
2.3% |
2.1% |
|
Karnataka |
2.3% |
2.6% |
|
Kerala |
3.0% |
3.0% |
|
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
|
Maharashtra |
2.7% |
1.7% |
|
Manipur |
8.9% |
4.1% |
|
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
|
Mizoram |
8.3% |
1.7% |
|
Nagaland |
9.0% |
4.8% |
|
Odisha |
3.4% |
3.0% |
|
Punjab |
3.0% |
2.9% |
|
Rajasthan |
3.2% |
3.0% |
|
Sikkim |
4.3% |
3.0% |
|
Tamil Nadu |
3.0% |
2.8% |
|
Telangana |
2.3% |
3.0% |
|
Tripura |
6.2% |
3.5% |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
3.0% |
3.0% |
|
Uttarakhand |
2.5% |
2.6% |
|
West Bengal |
2.6% |
2.2% |
|
Centre |
3.8% |
3.5% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available.
Sources: Union and State Budget Documents; PRS.
