Does changing MP salaries and MPLAD entitlements raise resources to fight COVID-19?

Mandira Kala , Roshni Sinha - April 10, 2020

This week, the centre issued two Ordinances to amend: (i) the Salary, Allowances, and Pension of Members of Parliament Act, 1954 to reduce the salaries of MPs by 30% for a period of one year, and (ii) the Salaries and Allowances of Ministers Act, 1952, to reduce the sumptuary allowance of Ministers by 30% for one year. The government also amended the rules notified under the 1954 Act to reduce certain allowances of MPs for one year, and suspended the MPLAD Scheme for two years. These changes are being made to supplement the financial resources of the centre to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. These amendments raise larger questions on the effect they have on the capacity of the state to fight the pandemic, and the way in which salaries of MPs should be determined.

Overview of Amendments

The 1954 Act lays out the salary and various allowances that an MP is entitled to during their term in Parliament and also provides pension to former MPs. MPs receive a salary of one lakh rupees per month, along with compensation for official expenses through various allowances. These include a daily allowance for attending Parliament, constituency allowance and office expense allowance. Under the first Ordinance, the salaries of MPs are being reduced by 30%. Further, the constituency allowance and office expense allowance are being reduced by Rs 21,000 and Rs 6,000, respectively.

The 1952 Act regulates the salaries and other allowances of Ministers (including the Prime Minister). The Act provides for the payment of a monthly sumptuary allowance (for expenditure incurred in entertaining visitors) at different rates to the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State, and Deputy Ministers. The second Ordinance is reducing the sumptuary allowances of Ministers by 30%.

Note that the 1952 Act pegs the salaries, and daily and constituency allowances of Ministers to the rates specified for an MP under the 1954 Act. Similar provisions apply to presiding officers of both Houses (other than Chairman of Rajya Sabha) who are regulated by a different Act. Therefore, the amendments to the salaries and constituency allowance of MPs will also apply to Ministers, Speaker and Deputy Speaker of Lok Sabha, and Deputy Chairman of Rajya Sabha. The salary of the Chairman of Rajya Sabha will continue to remain unaffected by the Ordinances (Rs 4 lakh per month).

Further, since 1993, MPs can also identify projects and sanction certain funds every year for public works in their constituencies under the Members of Parliament and Local Area Development (MPLAD) Scheme, 1993. Since 2011-12, each MP can spend up to Rs five crore per year under the scheme. The Union Cabinet has approved the suspension of the MPLAD Scheme for two years. Table 1 below compares the changes in salaries, allowances and MPLAD entitlements of MPs.

Table 1: Comparison of changes in the salaries, allowances and MPLAD entitlements of MPs

Feature		Previous entitlement (in Rs per month)	New entitlement (in Rs per month)	Changes for the period of
Salary		1,00,000	70,000	One year
Constituency allowance		70,000	49,000	One year
Office allowance		60,000	54,000	One year
*Of which*	*Office expenses*	20,000	14,000	-
	*Secretarial assistance*	40,000	40,000	-
Sumptuary allowance of Prime Minister		3,000	2,100	One year
Sumptuary allowance of Cabinet Ministers		2,000	1,400	One year
Sumptuary allowance of Ministers of State		1,000	700	One year
Sumptuary allowance of Deputy Ministers		600	420	One year
Funds under MPLAD Scheme		5 crore	NIL	Two years

Sources: 2020 Ordinances; Members of Parliament (Constituency Allowance) Amendment Rules, 2020; Members of Parliament (Office Expense Allowance) Amendment Rules, 2020; “Cabinet approves Non-operation of MPLADs for two years (2020-21 and 2021-22) for managing COVID 19”, Press Information Bureau, Cabinet, April 6, 2020; PRS.

Effect of amendments on resources to fight COVID-19

The proposed reduction to the salaries and allowances of MPs and Ministers amounts to savings of around Rs 55 crore, and the suspension of the MPLAD scheme is expected to save Rs 7800 crore. These measures comprise 0.03% and 4.5% respectively, of the estimated amount required to fight the immediate economic distress unleashed due to COVID. Government has estimated Rs 1.7 lakh crore as the requirement for COVID relief measures under the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana. Therefore, such measures to decrease MP salaries and allowances toward increasing the pool of funds for fighting the pandemic are likely to have an almost negligible impact.

How might MP salaries be set

Each MP is required to represent the interests of his constituents, formulate legislation on important national matters, hold the government accountable, and ensure efficient allocation of public resources. The salary and office allowance of an MP must be assessed in light of the responsibilities expected to be discharged by them. Ensuring MPs are reasonably compensated in terms of salaries allows MPs the means to be able to discharge their duties devotedly, enables them to make decisions in an independent manner and guarantees that citizens from all walks of life can stand a chance of running for Parliament. The question remains – who decides what is reasonable compensation for MPs.

Currently, MPs in India decide their own salaries which is passed in the form of an Act of Parliament. MPs setting their own pay leads to a conflict of interest. A way to resolve this is by setting up an independent commission to determine that salaries of MPs. This is a practice followed in certain democracies, such as New Zealand and United Kingdom. In some other countries, it is pegged to annual wage rate index such as Canada. Table 2 lists various methods used in some other countries to set salaries for legislators.

Table 2: Methods for setting salaries in different democracies

Countries	Process of determining salary of legislators
India	Parliament decides by passing an Act.
Australia	Remuneration Tribunal decides the salary. This is revised annually.
New Zealand	Remuneration Authority decides the salary. This is revised annually.
UK	Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority sets the pay annually as per the changes in average earnings in the public sector given by the Office for National Statistics.
Canada	Member’s pay is adjusted each year to federal government’s annual wage rate index.
Germany	Based on income of a judge of the highest federal court and adjusted annually by the Parliament.

Sources: Various government websites of respective countries; PRS.

India has experience with appointing independent commissions to examine the emoluments of government officials. The central government periodically sets up pay commissions to review and recommend changes to the wage structure of government employees with a view to attract talent to government services. The latest Central Pay Commission was constituted in 2014 to decides the emoluments of central government employees, armed forces personnel, employees of statutory bodies, and officers and employees of the Supreme Court. Typically, the Commissions have been chaired by a former Judge of the Supreme Court, and have included members representing government service and independent experts.

Suspending MPLADS

In contrast to these amendments, the suspension of the MPLAD Scheme is a positive step.

The MPLAD Scheme (MPLADS) was introduced in December 1993 to enable legislators to address local developmental problems for their constituents. MPLADS allows legislators to earmark up to five crore rupees every year on public works projects in their constituency and recommend these projects to the district authorities for implementation. Typically, funds under the MPLADS are expended on construction or installation of public facilities (such as school buildings, roads, and electrical facilities), supply of equipment (such as, computers in educational institutions) and sanitation projects.

In 2010, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court decided a challenge to the constitutionality of the MPLADS. It was argued that MPLADS violates the concept of separation of powers between the executive and the legislature since it provides the MP with executive powers on local public works. The Court ruled that there was no violation of the principle of separation of powers because the role of an MP in this case is recommendatory and the actual work is carried out by the local authorities.

However, the Scheme has undermined the role of an MP as a national-level policy maker. The role of an MP is to determine whether government’s budgetary allocations across development priorities are appropriate and once the money is sanctioned by Parliament is it being spent in an efficient and efficacious manner. However, focus on local administration-level issues, such as development of roads or sanitation projects, obscures the role of the MP in conducting oversight. Another fall out of having MPs responsible for MPLADS is that it skews the expectations of citizens have of their MPs – holding them accountable for resolving local development issues rather than broader policy and legislative decision making. The suspension of MPLADs will allow for MPs to focus on their role in Parliament.

The Ordinance route

Through these Ordinances, the executive has amended the salaries and allowances of MPs and Ministers. In principle, Parliament is discharged with law-making powers. In exceptional circumstances, the Constitution permits the executive to make laws through Ordinances if Parliament is not in session and immediate action is required. The two Ordinances will have to be ratified by Parliament within six weeks of its sitting in order to continue to have the force of law. Interestingly, India is one of the few countries, apart from Bangladesh and Pakistan, that vests the executive with authority to make laws, even if temporary in nature.

The Ordinance amending the salaries of MPs also raises a question on whether it is appropriate that the executive has the power to amend the emoluments of MPs – how would this affect the independence of the legislature which is tasked with holding the executive accountable.

Parliament

Union Budget 2020-21: Are the fiscal targets realistic?

Gayatri Mann , Suyash Tiwari - February 6, 2020

Today, a general discussion on the Union Budget 2020-21 is being held in both Houses of Parliament. In the budget, the government presented the estimates of the money it expects to spend on various ministries, and how much money will be raised from different sources such as levy of taxes and dividends from public enterprises in 2020-21. In addition, the budget presented the revised estimates made by the government for the year 2019-20 in comparison to the estimates it had given to Parliament in the previous year’s budget. The budget also gave an account of how much money the government actually raised and spent in 2018-19.

What are revised estimates?

Some of the estimates made by the government might change during the course of the year. For instance, once the year gets underway, some ministries may need more funds than what was actually allocated to them in the budget, or the receipts expected from certain sources might change. Such deviations from the budget estimates get reflected in the figures released by the government at later stages as part of the subsequent budgets. Once the year ends, the actual numbers are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), post which they are presented to Parliament with the upcoming budget, i.e. two years after the estimates are made.

For instance, estimates for the year 2019-20 were presented as part of the 2019-20 budget in July 2019. In the 2020-21 budget (February 2020), the government presented 2019-20’s revised estimates based on the actual receipts and expenditure accounted so far during the year and estimations made for the remaining 2-3 months.

Is there a way to find out the government’s actual receipts or expenditure mid-year?

The actual receipts and expenditure accounts of the central government are maintained by the Controller General of Accounts (CGA), Ministry of Finance on a monthly basis. On January 31, 2020, the CGA updated the accounts figures for the period April to December 2019. Thus, we have unaudited actuals for the first nine months of the financial year.

How do the actual figures for the year 2019-20 so far compare with the revised estimates?

Table 1 gives the revised estimates presented by the central government for the year 2019-20 and the monthly account figures maintained by the CGA for the nine-month period April to December 2019. The difference between these two figures gives us the three-month target that the government will have to meet by March 2020 to reach its revised estimates.

Till December 2019, the government has spent Rs 21.1 lakh crore, which is 78% of the revised estimates for 2019-20. While the expenditure has reached 78% of the target, so far, the government has been able to generate only Rs 11.8 lakh crore or 61% of the receipts (excluding borrowings) for the year 2019-20. This implies that the receipts will have to grow at a rate of 41% in the three-month period January-March 2020 to meet the revised estimates of Rs 19.3 lakh crore. So far, receipts have grown at a rate of 4%.

Table 1: Budget at a Glance – Comparison of 2019-20 revised estimates with Apr-Dec 2019 figures (Rs crore)

Budget at a Glance	Actuals	Revised	Nine-month period	Three-month target	Growth rate so far	Growth target
Budget at a Glance	2018-19	2019-20	Apr-Dec 2019	Jan-Mar 2020	% change (Apr-Dec 2018 to Apr-Dec 2019)	% change (Jan-Mar 2019 to Jan-Mar 2020)
Revenue Expenditure	20,07,399	23,49,645	18,54,125	4,95,520	14%	28%
Capital Expenditure	3,07,714	3,48,907	2,55,522	93,385	21%	-3%
Total Expenditure	23,15,113	26,98,552	21,09,647	5,88,905	15%	22%
Revenue Receipts	15,52,916	18,50,101	11,46,897	7,03,204	6%	50%
Capital Receipts	1,12,779	81,605	31,025	50,580	-33%	-24%
of which Disinvestment	94,727	65,000	18,100	46,900	-47%	-22%
Total Receipts (without borrowings)	16,65,695	19,31,706	11,77,922	7,53,784	4%	41%
Revenue Deficit	4,54,483	4,99,544	7,07,228	-2,07,684
Fiscal Deficit	6,49,418	7,66,846	9,31,725	-1,64,879
Primary Deficit	66,770	1,41,741	5,07,411	-3,65,670

Sources: Union Budget 2020-21; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.

How do the actual tax receipts fare in comparison to the revised estimates of 2019-20?

A lower than estimated growth in nominal GDP has also affected the tax receipts of the government during the year. The 2019-20 budget estimated the nominal GDP to grow at 12% over the previous year, whereas the latest estimates suggest this growth rate to be 7.5% in 2019-20. The revised estimates for 2019-20 show gross tax receipts of Rs 21.6 lakh crore (includes states’ share). Till December 2019, tax receipts of Rs 13.8 lakh crore has been collected, which is 64% of the target. The tax receipts will have to grow at 19% in the three-month period January-March 2020 to meet the target. Table 2 shows similar comparison for the various taxes and also for the tax receipts devolved to states. While the budget estimated a growth in receipts from all major taxes, receipts from taxes such as corporation tax (-14%), union excise duties (-2%), and customs (-12%) have declined during the period Apr-Dec 2019.

Table 2: Tax receipts – Comparison of 2019-20 revised estimates with Apr-Dec 2019 figures (Rs crore)

Revenue Receipts	Actuals	Revised	Nine-month period	Three-month target	Growth rate so far	Growth target
Revenue Receipts	2018-19	2019-20	Apr-Dec 2019	Jan-Mar 2020	% change (Apr-Dec 2018 to Apr-Dec 2019)	% change (Jan-Mar 2019 to Jan-Mar 2020)
Gross Tax Revenue	20,80,465	21,63,423	13,83,035	7,80,388	-3%	19%
Devolution to States	7,61,454	6,56,046	4,76,113	1,79,933	-2%	-34%
Net Tax Revenue	13,17,211	15,04,587	9,04,944	5,99,643	-3%	57%
Dividend and Profits	1,13,420	1,99,893	1,61,979	37,914	175%	-30%
Other Non-tax Revenue	1,22,284	1,45,620	79,974	65,646	-10%	96%
Revenue Receipts	15,52,916	18,50,101	11,46,897	7,03,204	6%	50%

Note: Figures for income tax exclude receipts from the Securities Transaction Tax.

Sources: Receipts Budget, Union Budget 2019-20; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.

If we look at sources of receipts other than taxes, non-tax revenue during Apr-Dec 2019 is Rs 2.4 lakh crore, i.e. 69% of the estimated Rs 3.5 lakh crore. Disinvestment receipts till date amounted to Rs 18,100 crore, i.e. 17% of the budget target of Rs 1.05 lakh crore. Though the investment target has been revised down to Rs 65,000 crore, it implies that Rs 47,000 crore would need to be raised in the next two months.

How does this impact the borrowings of the government?

When the expenditure planned by the government is more than its receipts, the government finances this gap through borrowings. This gap is known as fiscal deficit and equals the borrowings required to be made for that year. Given lower than expected receipts, the government has had to borrow more money than it had planned for. Borrowings or fiscal deficit of the government, till December 2019, stands at Rs 9.3 lakh crore, which is 22% higher than the revised estimate of Rs 7.7 lakh crore. Note that with three months still remaining in the financial year, fiscal deficit may further increase, in case receipts are less than expenditure.

When we look at fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP, the 2019-20 budget estimated the fiscal deficit to be at 3.3% of GDP. This has been revised upward to 3.8% of GDP. However, till December 2019, fiscal deficit for the year 2019-20 stands at 4.6% of GDP (taking the latest available GDP figures into account, i.e. the First Advance Estimates for 2019-20 released in January 2020). This increase in fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP is because of two reasons: (i) an increase in borrowings as compared to the budget estimates, and (ii) a decrease in GDP as compared to the estimate made in the budget. The latter is due to a lower than estimated growth in nominal GDP for the year 2019-20. The 2019-20 budget estimated the nominal GDP to grow at 12% over the previous year, whereas the latest estimates suggest this growth rate to be 7.5% in 2019-20.

Note that, in addition to the expenditure shown in the budget, the government also spends through extra budgetary resources. These resources are raised by issuing bonds and through loans from the National Small Savings Fund (NSSF). The revised estimates for 2019-20 show an expenditure of Rs 1,72,699 crore through such extra-budgetary resources. This includes an expenditure of Rs 1,10,000 crore by the Food Corporation of India financed through loans from NSSF. Since funds borrowed for such expenditure remain outside the budget, they do not get factored in the deficit and debt figures. If borrowings made in the form of extra-budgetary resources are also taken into account, the fiscal deficit estimated for the year 2019-20 would increase from 3.8% of GDP to 4.6% of GDP due to extra-budgetary borrowings of Rs 1,72,699 crore. This does not account for further slippage if the targeted revenue does not materialise.

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Does changing MP salaries and MPLAD entitlements raise resources to fight COVID-19?

Union Budget 2020-21: Are the fiscal targets realistic?

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