A recent case before the Supreme Court has once again highlighted the issue of judicial decisions potentially replacing/ amending legislation enacted by Parliament. The case importantly pertains to the judiciary’s interpretation of existing law concerning itself. The eventual outcome of the case would presumably have important implications for the way the higher judiciary interprets laws, which according to some amounts to the judiciary “legislating” rather than interpreting laws. This assertion has often been substantiated by citing cases such as Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) where the Supreme Court actually laid down the law pertaining to sexual discrimination at workplaces in the absence of a law governing the same. In numerous other cases, courts have laid down policy guidelines, or have issued administrative directions to governmental departments. In the recent case of Suraz India Trust v. Union of India, a petition has been filed asking the court to reconsider its own judgements regarding the manner of appointment and transfer of judges. It has been contended that through its judgements in 1994 and 1998 (Advocate on Record Association v. Union of India and Special Reference No. 1 of 1998) the Supreme Court has virtually amended Constitutional provisions, even though amendments to the Constitution can only be done by Parliament. This question arises since the Constitution provides for the appointment and transfer of judges by the government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. The two Supreme Court judgements however gave the primary power of appointment and transfer of judges to the judiciary itself. Importantly, one specific question which has been raised is whether the judgements referred to above really amount to amending the relevant provisions of the Constitution. Another question raised which is relevant to this discussion is whether the interpretation by courts can actually make provisions in the Constitution redundant. In its judgement on the 4th of April, the Supreme Court referred this case to the Chief Justice of India for further directions. The outcome of this judgement could potentially require the Supreme Court to define the circumstances when it interprets law, and when it “legislates”. An indication of the Supreme Court's attitude concerning this issue may be gleaned from the recent speech of the Chief Justice of India, Justice S.H. Kapadia at the M.C. Setalvad lecture. The CJI unambiguously stated that: "...In many PILs, the courts freely decree rules of conduct for government and public authorities which are akin to legislation. Such exercises have little judicial function in them. Its justification is that the other branches of government have failed or are indifferent to the solution of the problem. In such matters, I am of the opinion that the courts should be circumspect in understanding the thin line between law and governance..."
The Protection of Women against Sexual Harassment Bill was passed by Rajya Sabha yesterday. Prior to this, no legislation specifically addressed the issue of sexual harassment at the workplace. In 1997, the Supreme Court issued directions in Vishakha vs. State of Rajasthan to deal with the issue. The Supreme Court had also recommended that steps be taken to enact a law on the subject. The Bill was introduced in Parliament in 2010 and was passed by the Lok Sabha on September 3, 2012. In order to protect women from harassment, the Bill establishes a mechanism for redressal of complaints related to harassment. Recently, the Verma Committee in its Report on Amendments to Criminal Laws had made recommendations on the Sexual Harassment Bill. In this blog we discuss some of the key issues raised by the Verma Committee with regard to the issue of sexual harassment at the workplace. Internal Committee: The Bill requires the establishment of a committee within organisations to inquire into complaints of sexual harassment. The Committee shall comprise four members: three would be employees of the organisation; and the fourth, a member of an NGO committed to the cause of women. The Verma Committee was of the opinion that in-house dealing of the complaints would dissuade women from filing complaints. It recommended that a separate Employment Tribunal outside the organisation be established to receive and address complaints of sexual harassment. Requirement for conciliation: Once a complaint is made, the Bill requires the complainant to attempt conciliation and settle the matter. Only in the event a settlement cannot be reached, the internal committee of the organisation would inquire into the matter. The Verma Committee was of the opinion that this is in violation of the Supreme Court’s judgment. It noted that in sexual harassment cases, an attempt to conciliate compromises the dignity of the woman. Action during pendency of the case: As per the Bill, a woman may approach the internal committee to seek a transfer for herself or the respondent or a leave to the complainant. The Verma Committee had recommended that till the disposal of the case, the complainant and the respondent should not be compelled to work together. False complaints: The Bill allows the employer to penalise false or malicious complaints as per their service rules. The Committee was of the opinion that this provision was open to abuse. A PRS analysis of the Bill may be accessed here.
