A recent case before the Supreme Court has once again highlighted the issue of judicial decisions potentially replacing/ amending legislation enacted by Parliament. The case importantly pertains to the judiciary’s interpretation of existing law concerning itself. The eventual outcome of the case would presumably have important implications for the way the higher judiciary interprets laws, which according to some amounts to the judiciary “legislating” rather than interpreting laws. This assertion has often been substantiated by citing cases such as Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) where the Supreme Court actually laid down the law pertaining to sexual discrimination at workplaces in the absence of a law governing the same. In numerous other cases, courts have laid down policy guidelines, or have issued administrative directions to governmental departments. In the recent case of Suraz India Trust v. Union of India, a petition has been filed asking the court to reconsider its own judgements regarding the manner of appointment and transfer of judges. It has been contended that through its judgements in 1994 and 1998 (Advocate on Record Association v. Union of India and Special Reference No. 1 of 1998) the Supreme Court has virtually amended Constitutional provisions, even though amendments to the Constitution can only be done by Parliament. This question arises since the Constitution provides for the appointment and transfer of judges by the government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. The two Supreme Court judgements however gave the primary power of appointment and transfer of judges to the judiciary itself. Importantly, one specific question which has been raised is whether the judgements referred to above really amount to amending the relevant provisions of the Constitution. Another question raised which is relevant to this discussion is whether the interpretation by courts can actually make provisions in the Constitution redundant. In its judgement on the 4th of April, the Supreme Court referred this case to the Chief Justice of India for further directions. The outcome of this judgement could potentially require the Supreme Court to define the circumstances when it interprets law, and when it “legislates”. An indication of the Supreme Court's attitude concerning this issue may be gleaned from the recent speech of the Chief Justice of India, Justice S.H. Kapadia at the M.C. Setalvad lecture. The CJI unambiguously stated that: "...In many PILs, the courts freely decree rules of conduct for government and public authorities which are akin to legislation. Such exercises have little judicial function in them. Its justification is that the other branches of government have failed or are indifferent to the solution of the problem. In such matters, I am of the opinion that the courts should be circumspect in understanding the thin line between law and governance..."
In April last year the government had notified the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011 (IT Rules) under the Information Technology Act, 2000. The IT Rules are listed for discussion in Rajya Sabha today in pursuance of a motion moved by Mr. P. Rajeeve [CPI(M)]. The motion seeks to annul these Rules and recommends that Lok Sabha also concur with the motion. The IT Rules require intermediaries (internet service providers, blogging sites like Blogger and Wordpress, and cyber cafés) to take certain action. Intermediaries are required to enter into agreements with their users prohibiting publication of certain content. Content that cannot be published includes anything that is ‘harmful to minors in any way’, ‘blasphemous’, ‘encouraging money laundering’ etc. This raises three issues. Some of the categories of content prohibited for publication are ambiguous and undefined. For instance, ‘grossly harmful’ and ‘blasphemous’ content are not defined. Publication of certain content prohibited under the IT Rules, is currently not an offences under other laws. Their publication is in fact allowed in other forms of media, such as newspapers. Newspapers are bound by Press Council Norms. These Norms do not prohibit publication of all the content specified under the IT Rules. For instance, while these Norms require newspapers to show respect to all religions and their gods, they do not prohibit publication of blasphemy. However, under the IT Rules blasphemy is prohibited. This might lead to a situation, where articles that may be published in newspapers legally, may not be reproduced on the internet for example in the e-paper or on the newspaper’s website. Prohibition of publication of certain content under the IT Rules may also violate the right to freedom of speech. Under Article 19(2) of the Constitution restrictions on the right to freedom of speech may be imposed in the interest of the State’s sovereignty, integrity, security and friendly relations with other States, public order, morality, decency, contempt of court, and for protection against defamation. The content prohibited under the IT Rules may not meet the requirement of Article 19(2). This may impinge on the right to freedom of speech and expression. Further, anyone can complain against such content to the intermediary. The intermediary is required to remove content if it falls within the description specified in the IT Rules. In the event the intermediary decides not to remove the content, it may be held liable. This could lead to a situation where, in order to minimise the risk of liability, the intermediary may block more content than it is required. This may imply adverse consequences for freedom of expression on the internet. PRS’s detailed analysis of the IT Rules may be accessed here.
