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The issue of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) in the Indian banking sector has become the subject of much discussion and scrutiny. The Standing Committee on Finance recently released a report on the banking sector in India, where it observed that banks’ capacity to lend has been severely affected because of mounting NPAs. The Estimates Committee of Lok Sabha is also currently examining the performance of public sector banks with respect to their burgeoning problem of NPAs, and loan recovery mechanisms available.
Additionally, guidelines for banks released by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in February 2018 regarding timely resolution of stressed assets have come under scrutiny, with multiple cases being filed in courts against the same. In this context, we examine the recent rise of NPAs in the country, some of their underlying causes, and steps taken so far to address the issue.
What is the extent and effect of the NPA problem in India?
Banks give loans and advances to borrowers. Based on the performance of the loan, it may be categorized as: (i) a standard asset (a loan where the borrower is making regular repayments), or (ii) a non-performing asset. NPAs are loans and advances where the borrower has stopped making interest or principal repayments for over 90 days.
As of March 31, 2018, provisional estimates suggest that the total volume of gross NPAs in the economy stands at Rs 10.35 lakh crore. About 85% of these NPAs are from loans and advances of public sector banks. For instance, NPAs in the State Bank of India are worth Rs 2.23 lakh crore.
In the last few years, gross NPAs of banks (as a percentage of total loans) have increased from 2.3% of total loans in 2008 to 9.3% in 2017 (Figure 1). This indicates that an increasing proportion of a bank’s assets have ceased to generate income for the bank, lowering the bank’s profitability and its ability to grant further credit.
Escalating NPAs require a bank to make higher provisions for losses in their books. The banks set aside more funds to pay for anticipated future losses; and this, along with several structural issues, leads to low profitability. Profitability of a bank is measured by its Return on Assets (RoA), which is the ratio of the bank’s net profits to its net assets. Banks have witnessed a decline in their profitability in the last few years (Figure 2), making them vulnerable to adverse economic shocks and consequently putting consumer deposits at risk.
What led to the rise in NPAs?
Some of the factors leading to the increased occurrence of NPAs are external, such as decreases in global commodity prices leading to slower exports. Some are more intrinsic to the Indian banking sector.
A lot of the loans currently classified as NPAs originated in the mid-2000s, at a time when the economy was booming and business outlook was very positive. Large corporations were granted loans for projects based on extrapolation of their recent growth and performance. With loans being available more easily than before, corporations grew highly leveraged, implying that most financing was through external borrowings rather than internal promoter equity. But as economic growth stagnated following the global financial crisis of 2008, the repayment capability of these corporations decreased. This contributed to what is now known as India’s Twin Balance Sheet problem, where both the banking sector (that gives loans) and the corporate sector (that takes and has to repay these loans) have come under financial stress.
When the project for which the loan was taken started underperforming, borrowers lost their capability of paying back the bank. The banks at this time took to the practice of ‘evergreening’, where fresh loans were given to some promoters to enable them to pay off their interest. This effectively pushed the recognition of these loans as non-performing to a later date, but did not address the root causes of their unprofitability.
Further, recently there have also been frauds of high magnitude that have contributed to rising NPAs. Although the size of frauds relative to the total volume of NPAs is relatively small, these frauds have been increasing, and there have been no instances of high profile fraudsters being penalised.
What is being done to address the problem of growing NPAs?
The measures taken to resolve and prevent NPAs can broadly be classified into two kinds – first, regulatory means of resolving NPAs per various laws (like the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code), and second, remedial measures for banks prescribed and regulated by the RBI for internal restructuring of stressed assets.
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was enacted in May 2016 to provide a time-bound 180-day recovery process for insolvent accounts (where the borrowers are unable to pay their dues). Under the IBC, the creditors of these insolvent accounts, presided over by an insolvency professional, decide whether to restructure the loan, or to sell the defaulter’s assets to recover the outstanding amount. If a timely decision is not arrived at, the defaulter’s assets are liquidated. Proceedings under the IBC are adjudicated by the Debt Recovery Tribunal for personal insolvencies, and the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) for corporate insolvencies. 701 cases have been registered and 176 cases have been resolved as of March 2018 under the IBC.
What changed recently in the RBI’s guidelines to banks?
Over the years, the RBI has issued various guidelines aimed at the resolution of stressed assets of banks. These included introduction of certain schemes such as: (i) Strategic Debt Restructuring (which allowed banks to change the management of the defaulting company), and (ii) Joint Lenders’ Forum (where lenders evolved a resolution plan and voted on its implementation). In line with the enactment of the IBC, the RBI, through a circular in February 2018, substituted all the specific pre-existing guidelines with a simplified, generic, time-bound framework for the resolution of stressed assets.
In the revised framework which replaced the earlier schemes, the RBI put in place a strict deadline of 180 days during which a resolution plan must be implemented, failing which stressed assets must be referred to the NCLT under IBC within 15 days. The framework also introduced a provision for monitoring of one-day defaults, where incipient stress is identified and flagged immediately when repayments are overdue by a day.
Borrowers whose loans were tagged as NPAs before the release of the circular recently crossed the 180-day deadline for internal resolution by banks. Some of these borrowers, including various power producers and sugar mills, had appealed against the RBI guidelines in various High Courts. A two-judge bench of the Allahabad High Court had recently ruled in favour of the RBI’s powers to issue these guidelines, and refused to grant interim relief to power producers from being taken to the NCLT for bankruptcy. All lawsuits against the circular have currently been transferred to the Supreme Court, which has now issued an order to maintain status quo on the same. This means that these cases cannot be referred to the NCLT until the Supreme Court’s decision on the circular, although the RBI’s 180-day deadline has passed. This effectively provides interim relief to the errant borrowers who had moved to court till the next hearing of the apex court on this matter, which is scheduled for November 2018.
India is one of the fastest growing aviation markets in the world. Its domestic traffic makes up 69% of the total airline traffic in South Asia. India’s airport capacity is expected to handle 1 billion trips annually by 2023. The Ministry of Civil Aviation is responsible for formulating national aviation policies and programmes. Today, Lok Sabha will discuss and vote upon the budget of the Ministry of Civil Aviation. In light of this, we discuss key issues with the aviation sector in India.
The aviation sector came under severe financial stress during the Covid-19 pandemic. After air travel was suspended in March 2020, airline operators in India reported losses worth more than Rs 19,500 crore while airports reported losses worth more than Rs 5,120 crore. However, several airline companies were under financial stress before the pandemic affected passenger travel. For instance, in the past 15 years, seventeen airlines have exited the market. Out of those, two airlines, Air Odisha Aviation Pvt Ltd and Deccan Charters Pvt Ltd exited the market in 2020. Air India has been reporting consistent losses over the past four years. All other major private airlines in India such as Indigo and Spice Jet faced losses in 2018-19.
Figure 1: Operating profit/loss of major airlines in India (in Rs crore)
Note: Vistara Airlines commenced operations in 2015, while Air Asia began in 2014; Negative values indicate operating loss.
Source: Unstarred Question 1812 answered on August 4, 2021, and Unstarred Question 1127 answered on September 21, 2020; Rajya Sabha; PRS.
Sale of Air India
Air India has accounted for the biggest expenditure head of the Ministry of Civil Aviation since 2011-12. Between 2009-10 and 2020-21, the government spent Rs 1,22,542 crore on Air India through budgeted allocations. In October 2021, the sale of Air India to Talace Ltd., which is a subsidiary of Tata Sons Pvt Ltd, was approved. The bid for Air India was finalised at Rs 18,000 crore.
Up to January 2020, Air India had accumulated debt worth Rs 60,000 crore. The central government is repaying this debt in the financial year 2021-22. After the finalisation of the sale, the government allocated roughly Rs 71,000 crore for expenses related to Air India.
In addition to loan repayment, in 2021-22, the government will provide Air India with a fresh loan (Rs 4,500 crore) and grants (Rs 1,944 crore) to recover from the shock of Covid-19. To pay for the medical benefits of retired employees of Air India, a recurring expense of Rs 165 crore will be borne by the central government each year.
In 2022-23, Rs 9,260 crore is allocated towards servicing the debt of AIAHL (see Table 1). AIAHL is a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) formed by the government to hold the assets and liabilities of Air India while the process of its sale takes place.
Table 1: Breakdown of expenditure on Air India (in Rs crore)
Major Head |
2020-21 Actual |
2021-22 RE |
2022-23 BE |
% change from 2021-22 RE to 2022-23 BE |
|
Equity infusion in AIAHL |
- |
62,057 |
- |
-100% |
|
Debt servicing of AIAHL |
2,184 |
2,217 |
9,260 |
318% |
|
Medical benefit to retired employees |
- |
165 |
165 |
0% |
|
Loans to AI |
- |
4,500 |
- |
-100% |
|
Grants for cash losses during Covid-19 |
- |
1,944 |
- |
-100% |
|
Total |
2,184 |
70,883 |
9,425 |
-87% |
|
Note: BE – Budget Estimate; RE – Revised Estimate; AAI: Airports Authority of India; AIAHL – Air India Asset Holding Limited; AI – Air India. Percentage change is from RE 2021-22 to BE 2022-23.
Source: Demands for Grants 2022-23, Ministry of Civil Aviation; PRS.
Privatisation of Airports
Airports Authority of India (AAI) is responsible for creating, upgrading, maintaining and managing civil aviation infrastructure in the country. As on June 23, 2020, it operates and manages 137 airports in the country. Domestic air traffic has more than doubled from around 61 million passengers in 2013-14 to around 137 million in 2019-20. International passenger traffic has grown from 47 million in 2013-14 to around 67 million in 2019-20, registering a growth of over 6% per annum. As a result, airports in India are witnessing rising levels of congestion. Most major airports are operating at 85% to 120% of their handling capacity. In response to this, the government has decided to privatise some airports to address the problem of congestion.
AAI has leased out eight of its airports through Public Private Partnership (PPP) for operation, management and development on long term lease basis. Six of these airports namely, Ahmedabad, Jaipur, Lucknow, Guwahati, Thiruvananthapuram, and Mangaluru have been leased out to M/s Adani Enterprises Limited (AEL) for 50 years (under PPP). The ownership of these airports remains with AAI and the operations will be back with AAI after the concession period is over. The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) had noted that the government expects to have 24 PPP airports by 2024.
Figure 2: Allocation towards AAI (in Rs crore)
Note: BE – Budget Estimate; RE – Revised Estimate; AAI – Airports Authority of India; IEBR – Internal and Extra-Budgetary Resources;
Source: Demand for Grant documents, Ministry of Civil Aviation; PRS.
The Committee also noted a structural issue in the way airport concessions are given. As of now, entities that bid the highest amount are given the rights to operate an airport. This leads them to pass on the high charge to airline operators. This system does not consider the actual cost of the services and leads to an arbitrary increase in the cost of airline operators. The Ministry sees the role of AAI in future policy issues to include providing high quality, safe and customer-oriented airport and air navigation services. In 2022-23, the government has allocated Rs 150 crore to AAI, which is almost ten times higher than the budget estimates of 2021-22.
Regional Connectivity Scheme (RCS-UDAN)
The top 15 airports in the country account for about 83% of the total passenger traffic. These airports are also close to their saturation limit, and hence the Ministry notes that there is a need to add more Tier-II and Tier-III cities to the aviation network. The Regional Connectivity Scheme was introduced in 2016 to stimulate regional air connectivity and make air travel affordable to the masses. The budget for this scheme is Rs 4,500 crore over five years from 2016-17 to 2021-22. As of December 16, 2021, 46% of this amount has been released. In 2022-23, the scheme has been allocated Rs 601 crore, which is 60% lower than the revised estimates of 2021-22 (Rs 994 crore).
Under the scheme, airline operators are incentivised to operate on under-served routes by providing them with viability gap funding and airport fee waivers. AAI, which is the implementing agency of this scheme, has sanctioned 948 routes to boost regional connectivity. As of January 31, 2022, 43% of these routes have been operationalised. As per the Ministry, lack of availability of land and creation of regional infrastructure has led to delays in the scheme. Issues with obtaining licenses and unsustainable operation of awarded routes also contribute to the delay. As per the Ministry, these issues, along with the setback faced due to the pandemic acted as major obstacles for the effective utilisation of funds.
Figure 3: Expenditure on Regional Connectivity Scheme (in Rs crore)
Note: BE – Budget Estimate; RE – Revised Estimate;
Source: Demand for Grants documents, Ministry of Civil Aviation; PRS.
Potential of air cargo
The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) had noted India’s cargo industry’s huge potential with respect to its geographical location, its growing economy, and its growth in domestic and international trade in the last decade. In 2019-20, all Indian airports together handled 3.33 million metric tonnes (MMT) of freight. This is much lower than the cargo handled by Hong Kong (4.5 MMT), Memphis (4.8 MMT), and Shanghai (3.7 MMT), which are the top three airports in terms of the volume of freight handled. The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) has noted inadequate infrastructure as a major bottleneck in developing the country’s air cargo sector. To reduce such bottleneck, it recommended the Ministry to establish dedicated cargo airports, and automate air cargo procedures and information systems to streamline redundant processes.
The Committee has also highlighted that the Open Sky Policy enables foreign cargo carriers to freely operate cargo services to and from any airports in India having customs/immigration facilities. They account for 90-95% of the total international cargo carried to and from the country. On the other hand, Indian air cargo operators face discriminatory practices and regulatory impediments for operating international cargo flights in foreign countries. The Committee urged the Ministry to provide a level-playing field for Indian air cargo operators and to ensure equal opportunities for them. The Ministry revised the Open Sky Policy in December 2020. Under the revised policy, the operations of foreign ad hoc and pure non-scheduled freighter charter service flights have been restricted to six airports - Bengaluru, Chennai, Delhi, Kolkata, Hyderabad, and Mumbai.
Rising cost of Aviation Turbine Fuel
The cost of Aviation Turbine Fuel (ATF) forms around 40% of the total operating cost of airlines and impacts their financial viability. ATF prices have been consistently rising over the past years, placing stress on the balance sheets of airline companies. As per recent news reports, airfares are expected to rise as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is making ATF costlier.
ATF attracts VAT which is variable across states and does not have a provision for input tax credit. High rates of aviation fuel coupled with high VAT rates are adversely affecting airline companies.
Table 2: Expenditure on ATF by airlines over the years (in Rs crore)
Year |
National Carriers |
Private Domestic Airlines |
2016-17 |
7,286 |
10,506 |
2017-18 |
8,563 |
13,596 |
2018-19 |
11,788 |
20,662 |
2019-20 |
11,103 |
23,354 |
2020-21 |
3,047 |
7,452 |
Source: Unstarred Question 2581, Rajya Sabha; PRS.
The Ministry, in January 2020, has reduced the tax burden on ATF by eliminating fuel throughput charges that were levied by airport operators at all airports across India. Central excise on ATF was reduced from 14% to 11% w.e.f. October 11, 2018. State governments have also reduced VAT/Sales Tax on ATF drawn on RCS airports to 1% or less for 10 years. For non-RCS-UDAN operations, various state governments have reduced VAT/Sales Tax on ATF to within 5%. The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) has recommended ATF to be included within the ambit of GST and that applicable GST should not exceed 12% on ATF with full Input Tax Credit.
For more details, please refer to the Demand for Grants Analysis of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, 2022-23.