Recently, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs approved an increase in the Minimum Support Prices (MSPs) for Kharif crops for the 2018-19 marketing season.  Subsequently, the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) released its price policy report for Kharif crops for the marketing season 2018-19.

The central government notifies MSPs based on the recommendations of the CACP.  These recommendations are made separately for the Kharif marketing season (KMS) and the Rabi marketing season (RMS).  Post harvesting, the government procures crops from farmers at the MSP notified for that season, in order to ensure remunerative prices to farmers for their produce.

In this blog post, we look at how MSPs are determined, changes brought in them over time, and their effectiveness for farmers across different states.

How are Minimum Support Prices determined?

The CACP considers various factors such as the cost of cultivation and production, productivity of crops, and market prices for the determination of MSPs.  The National Commission on Farmers(Chair: Prof. M. S. Swaminathan) in 2006 had recommended that MSPs must be at least 50% more than the cost of production.  In this year’s budget speech, the Finance Minister said that MSPs would be fixed at least at 50% more than the cost of production.

The CACP calculates cost of production at three levels: (i) A2, which includes cost of inputs such as seeds, fertilizer, labour; (ii) A2+FL, which includes the implied cost of family labour (FL); and (iii) C2, which includes the implied rent on land and interest on capital assets over and above A2+FL.

Table 1 shows the cost of production as calculated by the CACP and the approved MSPs for KMS 2018-19.  For paddy (common), the MSP was increased from Rs 1,550/quintal in 2017-18 to Rs 1,750/quintal in 2018-19.  This price would give a farmer a profit of 50.1% on the cost of production A2+FL.  However, the profit calculated on the cost of production C2 would be 12.2%.  It has been argued that the cost of production should be taken as C2 for calculating MSPs.  In such a scenario, this would have increased the MSP to Rs 2,340/quintal, much above the current MSP of Rs 1,750/quintal.

Figure 1

Which are the major crops that are procured at MSPs?

Every year, MSPs are announced for 23 crops.  However, public procurement is limited to a few crops such as paddy, wheat and, to a limited extent, pulses as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 2

The procurement is also limited to a few states.  Three states which produce 49% of the national wheat output account for 93% of procurement.  For paddy, six states with 40% production share have 77% share of the procurement.  As a result, in these states, farmers focus on cultivating these crops over other crops such as pulses, oilseeds, and coarse grains.

Due to limitations on the procurement side (both crop-wise and state-wise), all farmers do not receive benefits of increase in MSPs.  The CACP has noted in its 2018-19 price policy report that the inability of farmers to sell at MSPs is one of the key areas of concern.  Farmers who are unable to sell their produce at MSPs have to sell it at market prices, which may be much lower than the MSPs.

How have MSPs for major crops changed over time?

Higher procurement of paddy and wheat, as compared to other crops at MSPs tilts the production cycle towards these crops.  In order to balance this and encourage the production of pulses, there is a larger proportional increase in the MSPs of pulses over the years as seen in Figure 2.  In addition to this, it is also used as a measure to encourage farmers to shift from water-intensive crops such as paddy and wheat to pulses, which relatively require less water for irrigation.

Figure 3

What is the effectiveness of MSPs across states?

The MSP fixed for each crop is uniform for the entire country.  However, the production cost of crops vary across states.  Figure 3 highlights the MSP of paddy and the variation in its cost of production across states in 2018-19.

Figure 4

For example, production cost for paddy at the A2+FL level is Rs 702/quintal in Punjab and Rs 2,102/quintal in Maharashtra.  Due to this differentiation, while the MSP of Rs 1,750/quintal of paddy will result in a profit of 149% to a farmer in Punjab, it will result in a loss of 17% to a farmer in Maharashtra.  Similarly, at the C2 level, the production cost for paddy is Rs 1,174/quintal in Punjab and Rs 2,481/quintal in Maharashtra.  In this scenario, a farmer in Punjab may get 49% return, while his counterpart in Maharashtra may make a loss of 29%.

Figure 5

Figure 4 highlights the MSP of wheat and the variation in its cost of production across states in 2017-18. In the case of wheat, the cost of production in Maharashtra and West Bengal is much more than the cost in rest of the states.  At the A2+FL level, the cost of production in West Bengal is Rs 1,777/quintal.  This is significantly higher than in states like Haryana and Punjab, where the cost is Rs 736/quintal and Rs 642/quintal, respectively.  In this case, while a wheat growing farmer suffers a loss of 2% in West Bengal, a farmer in Haryana makes a profit of 136%.  The return in Punjab is even higher at 1.5 times or more the cost of production.

In the last few weeks, after the 16th Lok Sabha election, there has been some debate around powers of the central government to remove Governors.  News reports have suggested that the central government is seeking resignations of Governors, who were appointed by the previous central government.  In this blog, we briefly look at the key constitutional provisions, the law laid down by the Supreme Court, and some recommendations made by different commissions that have examined this issue. What does the Constitution say? As per Article 155 and Article 156 of the Constitution, a Governor of a state is an appointee of the President, and he or she holds office “during the pleasure of the President”.  If a Governor continues to enjoy the “pleasure of the President”, he or she can be in office for a term of five years.  Because the President is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 74 of the Constitution, in effect it is the central government that appoints and removes the Governors. “Pleasure of the President” merely refers to this will and wish of the central government. The Supreme Court’s interpretation In 2010, a constitutional bench of the Supreme Court interpreted these provisions and laid down some binding principles (B.P. Singhal v. Union of India). In this case, the newly elected central government had removed the Governors of Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana and Goa in July, 2004 after the 14th Lok Sabha election. When these removals were challenged, the Supreme Court held:

  1. The President, in effect the central government, has the power to remove a Governor at any time without giving him or her any reason, and without granting an opportunity to be heard.
  2. However, this power cannot be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner.  The power of removing Governors should only be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances for valid and compelling reasons.
  3. The mere reason that a Governor is at variance with the policies and ideologies of the central government, or that the central government has lost confidence in him or her, is not sufficient to remove a Governor.  Thus, a change in central government cannot be a ground for removal of Governors, or to appoint more favourable persons to this post.
  4. A decision to remove a Governor can be challenged in a court of law.  In such cases, first the petitioner will have to make a prima facie case of arbitrariness or bad faith on part of the central government.  If a prima facie case is established, the court can require the central government to produce the materials on the basis of which the decision was made in order to verify the presence of compelling reasons.

In summary, this means that the central government enjoys the power to remove Governors of the different states, as long as it does not act arbitrarily, without reason, or in bad faith. Recommendations of Various Commissions Three important commissions have examined this issue. The Sarkaria Commission (1988) recommended that Governors must not be removed before completion of their five year tenure, except in rare and compelling circumstances.  This was meant to provide Governors with a measure of security of tenure, so that they could carry out their duties without fear or favour.  If such rare and compelling circumstances did exist, the Commission said that the procedure of removal must allow the Governors an opportunity to explain their conduct, and the central government must give fair consideration to such explanation.  It was further recommended that Governors should be informed of the grounds of their removal. The Venkatachaliah Commission (2002) similarly recommended that ordinarily Governors should be allowed to complete their five year term.  If they have to be removed before completion of their term, the central government should do so only after consultation with the Chief Minister. The Punchhi Commission (2010) suggested that the phrase “during the pleasure of the President” should be deleted from the Constitution, because a Governor should not be removed at the will of the central government; instead he or she should be removed only by a resolution of the state legislature. The above recommendations however were never made into law by Parliament.  Therefore, they are not binding on the central government.