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In the past few months, retail prices of petrol and diesel have consistently increased and have reached all-time high levels.  On September 24, 2018, the retail price of petrol in Delhi was Rs 82.72/litre, and that of diesel was Rs 74.02/litre.  In Mumbai, these prices were even higher at Rs 90.08/litre and Rs 78.58/litre, respectively.

The difference in retail prices in the two cities is because of the different tax rates levied by the respective state governments on the same products.  This blog post explains the major tax components in the price structure of petrol and diesel and how tax rates vary across states.  It also analyses the shift in the taxation of these products, its effect on retail prices, and the consequent revenue generated by the central and state governments.

What are the components of the price structure of petrol and diesel?

Retail prices of petrol and diesel in India are revised by oil companies on a daily basis, according to changes in the price of global crude oil.  However, the price paid by oil companies makes up 51% of the retail price in case of petrol, and 61% in the case of diesel (Table 1).  The break-up of retail prices of petrol and diesel in Delhi, as on September 24, 2018, shows that over 45% of the retail price of petrol comprises central and states taxes.  In the case of diesel, this is close to 36%.

At present, the central government has the power to tax the production of petroleum products, while states have the power to tax their sale.  The central government levies an excise duty of Rs 19.5/litre on petrol and Rs 15.3/litre on diesel.  These make up 24% and 21% of the retail prices of petrol and diesel, respectively.

Table 1

While excise duty rates are uniform across the country, states levy sales tax/value added tax (VAT), the rates of which differ across states.  The figure below shows the different tax rates levied by states on petrol and diesel, which results in their varying retail prices across the country.  For instance, the tax rates levied by states on petrol ranges from 17% in Goa to 39% in Maharashtra.

Effective Sales Tax

Note that unlike excise duty, sales tax is an ad valorem tax, i.e., it does not have a fixed value, and is charged as a percentage of the price of the product.  This implies that while the excise duty component of the price structure is fixed, the sales tax component is charged as a proportion of the price paid by oil companies, which in turn depends on the global crude oil price.  With the recent increase in the global prices, and subsequently the retail prices, some states such as Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, and Karnataka have announced tax rate cuts.

How have retail prices in India changed vis-à-vis the global crude oil price?

India’s dependence on imports for consumption of petroleum products has increased over the years.  For instance, in 1998-99, net imports were 69% of the total consumption, which increased to 93% in 2017-18.  Because of a large share of imports in the domestic consumption, any change in the global price of crude oil has a significant impact on the domestic prices of petroleum products.  The following figures show the trend in price of global crude oil and retail price of petrol and diesel in India, over the last six years.

Petrol

Diesel

The global price of crude oil (Indian basket) decreased from USD 112/barrel in September 2012 to USD 28/barrel in January 2016.  Though the global price dropped by 75% during this period, retail prices of petrol and diesel in India decreased only by 13% and 5%, respectively.  This disparity in decrease of global and Indian retail prices was because of increase in taxes levied on petrol and diesel, which nullified the benefit of the sharp decline in the global price.  Between October 2014and June 2016, the excise duty on petrol increased from Rs 11.02/litre to Rs 21.48/litre.  In the same period, the excise duty on diesel increased from Rs 5.11/litre to Rs 17.33/litre.

Over the years, the central government has used taxes to prevent sharp fluctuations in the retail price of diesel and petrol.  For instance, in the past, when global crude oil price has increased, duties have been cut.  Since January 2016, the global crude oil price has increased by 158% from USD 28/barrel to USD 73/barrel in August 2018.  However, during this period, excise duty has been reduced only once by Rs 2/litre in October 2017.  While the central government has not signalled any excise duty cut so far, it remains to be seen if any rate cut will happen in case the global crude oil price rises further.  With US economic sanctions on Iran coming into effect on November 4, 2018, India may face a shortfall in supply since Iran is India’s third largest oil supplier.  Moreover, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and Russia have not indicated any increase in supply from their side yet to offset the possible effect of sanctions.  As a result, in a scenario with no tax rate cut, this could increase the retail prices of petrol and diesel even further.

How has the revenue generated from taxing petroleum products changed over the years?

As a result of successive increases in excise duty between November 2014 and January 2016, the year-on-year growth rate of excise duty collections increased from 27% in 2014-15 to 80% in 2015-16.  In comparison, the growth rate of sales tax collections was 6% in 2014-15 and 4% in 2015-16.  The figure below shows the tax collections from the levy of excise duty and sales tax on petroleum products.  From 2011-12 to 2017-18, excise duty and sales tax collections grew annually at a rate of 22% and 11%, respectively.

Tax revenue

How is this revenue shared between centre and states?

Though central taxes are levied by the centre, it gets only 58% of the revenue from the levy of these taxes.  The rest 42% is devolved to the states as per the recommendations of the 14th Finance Commission.  However, excise duty levied on petrol and diesel consists of two broad components – (i) excise duty component, and (ii) road and infrastructure cess.  Of this, only the revenue generated from the excise duty component is devolved to states.  Revenue generated by the centre from any cess is not devolved to states.

The cess component was increased by Rs 2/litre to Rs 8/litre in the Union Budget 2018-19.  However, this was done by reducing the excise duty component by the same amount, so as to keep the overall rate the same.  Essentially this provision shifted the revenue of Rs 2/litre of petrol and diesel from states’ divisible pool of taxes to the cess revenue, which is entirely with the centre.  This cess revenue is earmarked for financing infrastructure projects.

At present, of the Rs 19.5/litre excise duty levied on petrol, Rs 11.5/litre is the duty component, and Rs 8/litre is the cess component.  Therefore, accounting for 42% share of states in the duty component, centre effectively gets a revenue of Rs 14.7/litre, while states get Rs 4.8/litre.  Similarly, excise duty of Rs 15.3/litre levied on diesel consists of a cess component of Rs 8/litre.  Thus, excise duty on diesel effectively generates revenue of Rs 12.2/litre for the centre and Rs 3.1/litre for states.

After months of discussion,  the issue of FDI in retail is being deliberated in the Lok Sabha today.  In September 2012, the Cabinet had approved 51% of FDI in multi-brand retail (stores selling more than one brand).  Under these regulations, foreign retail giants like Walmart and Tesco can set up shop in India.  Discussions on permitting FDI in retail have focused on the effect of FDI on unorganised retailers, farmers and consumers. Earlier, the central government commissioned the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) to examine the impact of organised retail on unorganised retail. The Standing Committee on Commerce also tabled a report on Foreign and Domestic Investment in the Retail Sector in May, 2009 while the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) released a discussion paper examining FDI in multi-brand retail in July, 2010.  Other experts have also made arguments – both in support of, and in opposition to, the move to permit FDI in retail sales. The table below summarises some of these arguments from the perspective of various stakeholders as collated from the above reports examining the issue.

Stakeholder

Supporting arguments (source)

Opposing arguments (source)

Unorganised retail
  • No evidence of impact on job losses (ICRIER).
  • The rate of closure of unorganised retail shops (4.2%) is lower than international standards (ICRIER).
  • Evidence from Indonesia and China show that traditional and modern retail can coexist and grow  (Reardon and Gulati).
  • Majority of small retailers keen to remain in operation even after emergence of organised retail (ICRIER).
  •  Unorganised retailers in the vicinity of organised retailers saw their volume of business and profit decline but this effect weakens over time (ICRIER).
  • Other studies have estimated that traditional fruit and vegetable retailers experienced a 20-30% decline in incomes with the presence of supermarkets (Singh).
  • There is potential for employment loss in the value chain. A supermarket may create fewer jobs for the volume of produce handled (Singh).
  • Unemployment to increase as a result of retailers practicing product bundling (selling goods in combinations and bargains) and predatory pricing (Standing Committee).
Farmers
  • Significant positive impact on farmers as a result of direct sales to organised retailers.  For instance, cauliflower farmers receive a 25% higher price selling directly to organised retailers instead of government regulated markets (mandis).  Profits for farmers selling to organised retailers are about 60% higher than when selling to mandis (ICRIER).
  • Organised retail could remove supply chain inefficiencies through direct purchase from farmers and investment in better storage, distribution and transport systems.  FDI, in particular, could bring in new technology and ideas (DIPP).
  •  Current organised retail procures 60-70% from wholesale markets rather than farmers. There has been no significant impact on backend infrastructure investment (Singh).
  • There are other issues like irrigation, technology and credit in agriculture which FDI may not address (Singh).
  • Increased monopolistic strength could force farmers to sell at lower prices (Standing Committee).
Consumers
  • Organised retail lowers prices. Consumer spending increases with the entry of organised retail and lower income groups tend to save more (ICRIER).
  • It will lead to better quality and safety standards of products (DIPP).
  •  Evidence from some Latin American countries (Mexico, Nicaragua, Argentina), Africa (Kenya, Madagascar) and Asia (Thailand, Vietnam, India) reveal that supermarket prices for fruits and vegetables were higher than traditional retail prices (Singh).
  • Even with lower prices at supermarkets, low income households may prefer traditional retailers because they live far from supermarkets, they can bargain with traditional retailers and buy loose items (Singh).
  • Monopolistic power for retailers could result in high prices for consumers.

Source: ICRIER [1.  "Impact of Organized Retailing on the Unorganized Sector", ICRIER, September 2008]; Standing Committee [2.  "Foreign and domestic investment in retail sector", Standing Committee on Commerce, May 13, 2009]; Singh (2011) [3. "FDI in Retail: Misplaced Expectations and Half-truths",  Sukhpal Singh, Economic and Political Weekly, December 17, 2011];  Reardon and Gulati (2008)  [4. "Rise of supermarkets and their development implications," IFPRI Discussion Paper, Thomas Reardon and Ashok Gulati, February 2008.]; DIPP [5. "Discussion Paper on FDI in Multi-brand Retail Trading", Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, July 6, 2010]