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The Finance Minister, Ms. Nirmala Sitharaman, presented the Union Budget for the financial year 2019-20 in Parliament on July 5, 2019. In the 2019-20 budget, the government presented the estimates of its expenditure and receipts for the year 2019-20. The budget also gave an account of how much money the government raised or spent in 2017-18. In addition, the budget also presented the revised estimates made by the government for the year 2018-19 in comparison to the estimates it had given to Parliament in the previous year’s budget.
What are revised estimates?
Some of the estimates made by the government might change during the course of the year. For instance, once the year gets underway, some ministries may need more funds than what was actually allocated to them in the budget, or the receipts expected from certain sources might change. Such deviations from the budget estimates get reflected in the figures released by the government at later stages as part of the subsequent budgets. Once the year ends, the actual numbers are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), post which they are presented to Parliament with the upcoming budget, i.e. two years after the estimates are made.
For instance, estimates for the year 2018-19 were presented as part of the 2018-19 budget in February 2018. In the 2019-20 interim budget presented in February 2019 (10 months after the financial year 2018-19 got underway), the government revised these estimates based on the actual receipts and expenditure accounted so far during the year and incorporated estimates for the remaining two months.
The actual receipts and expenditure accounts of the central government are maintained by the Controller General of Accounts (CGA), Ministry of Finance on a monthly basis. In addition to the monthly accounts, the CGA also publishes the provisional unaudited figures for the financial year by the end of the month of May. Once these provisional figures are audited by the CAG, they are presented as actuals in next year’s budget. The CGA reported the figures for 2018-19 on May 31, 2019.[1] The Economic Survey 2018-19 presented on July 4, 2019 uses these figures.[2]
The budget presented on July 5 replicates the revised estimates reported as part of the interim budget (February 1, 2019). Thus, it did not take into account the updated figures for the year 2018-19 from the CGA.
Table 1 gives a comparison of the 2018-19 revised estimates presented by the central government in the budget with the provisional unaudited figures maintained by the CGA for the year 2018-19.[3]
Table 1: Budget at a Glance: Comparison of 2018-19 revised estimates with CGA figures (unaudited) (Rs crore)
Actuals |
Budgeted |
Revised |
Provisional |
Difference |
|
Revenue Expenditure |
18,78,833 |
21,41,772 |
21,40,612 |
20,08,463 |
-1,32,149 |
Capital Expenditure |
2,63,140 |
3,00,441 |
3,16,623 |
3,02,959 |
-13,664 |
Total Expenditure |
21,41,973 |
24,42,213 |
24,57,235 |
23,11,422 |
-1,45,813 |
Revenue Receipts |
14,35,233 |
17,25,738 |
17,29,682 |
15,63,170 |
-1,66,512 |
Capital Receipts |
1,15,678 |
92,199 |
93,155 |
1,02,885 |
9,730 |
of which: |
|
|
|
|
|
Recoveries of Loans |
15,633 |
12,199 |
13,155 |
17,840 |
4,685 |
Other receipts (including disinvestments) |
1,00,045 |
80,000 |
80,000 |
85,045 |
5,045 |
Total Receipts (without borrowings) |
15,50,911 |
18,17,937 |
18,22,837 |
16,66,055 |
-1,56,782 |
Revenue Deficit |
4,43,600 |
4,16,034 |
4,10,930 |
4,45,293 |
34,363 |
% of GDP |
2.6 |
2.2 |
2.2 |
2.4 |
|
Fiscal Deficit |
5,91,062 |
6,24,276 |
6,34,398 |
6,45,367 |
10,969 |
% of GDP |
3.5 |
3.3 |
3.4 |
3.4 |
|
Primary Deficit |
62,110 |
48,481 |
46,828 |
62,692 |
15,864 |
% of GDP |
0.4 |
0.3 |
0.2 |
0.3 |
|
Sources: Budget at a Glance, Union Budget 2019-20; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.
The 2018-19 provisional figures for revenue receipts is Rs 15,63,170 crore, which is Rs 1,66,512 crore less than the revised estimates. This is largely due to Rs 1,67,455 crore shortfall in centre’s net tax revenue between the revised estimates and the provisional estimates (Table 2).
Major taxes which see a shortfall between the gross tax revenue presented in the revised estimates vis-à-vis the provisional figures are income tax (Rs 67,346 crore) and GST (Rs 59,930 crore). Non-tax revenue and disinvestment receipts as per the provisional figures are higher than the revised estimates.
Table 2: Break up of central government receipts: Comparison of 2018-19 RE with CGA figures (unaudited) (Rs crore)
|
Actuals |
Budgeted |
Revised |
Provisional |
Difference |
Gross Tax Revenue |
19,19,009 |
22,71,242 |
22,48,175 |
20,80,203 |
-1,67,972 |
of which: |
|
|
|
|
|
Corporation Tax |
5,71,202 |
6,21,000 |
6,71,000 |
6,63,572 |
-7,428 |
Taxes on Income |
4,30,772 |
5,29,000 |
5,29,000 |
4,61,654 |
-67,346 |
Goods and Services Tax |
4,42,562 |
7,43,900 |
6,43,900 |
5,83,970 |
-59,930 |
Customs |
1,29,030 |
1,12,500 |
1,30,038 |
1,17,930 |
-12,108 |
Union Excise Duties |
2,59,431 |
2,59,600 |
2,59,612 |
2,30,998 |
-28,614 |
A. Centre's Net Tax Revenue |
12,42,488 |
14,80,649 |
14,84,406 |
13,16,951 |
-1,67,455 |
B. Non Tax Revenue |
1,92,745 |
2,45,089 |
2,45,276 |
2,46,219 |
943 |
of which: |
|
|
|
|
|
Interest Receipts |
13,574 |
15,162 |
12,047 |
12,815 |
768 |
Dividend and Profits |
91,361 |
1,07,312 |
1,19,264 |
1,13,424 |
-5,840 |
Other Non-Tax Revenue |
87,810 |
1,22,615 |
1,13,965 |
1,19,980 |
6,015 |
C. Capital Receipts (without borrowings) |
1,15,678 |
92,199 |
93,155 |
1,02,885 |
9,730 |
of which: |
|
|
|
|
|
Disinvestment |
1,00,045 |
80,000 |
80,000 |
85,045 |
5,045 |
Receipts (without borrowings) (A+B+C) |
15,50,911 |
18,17,937 |
18,22,837 |
16,66,055 |
-1,56,782 |
Borrowings |
5,91,062 |
6,24,276 |
6,34,398 |
6,45,367 |
10,969 |
Total Receipts (including borrowings) |
21,41,973 |
24,42,213 |
24,57,235 |
23,11,422 |
-1,45,813 |
Note: Centre’s net tax revenue is gross tax revenue less share of states in central taxes. Figures for GST include receipts from the GST compensation cess. Note that GST was levied for a nine-month period during the year 2017-18, starting July 2017.
Sources: Receipts Budget, Union Budget 2019-20; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.
While the provisional figures show a considerable decrease in receipts (Rs 1,56,782 crore) as compared to the revised estimates, fiscal deficit has not shown a comparable increase. Fiscal deficit is estimated to be Rs 10,969 crore higher than the revised estimates as per the provisional accounts.
On the expenditure side, the total expenditure as per the provisional figures show a decrease of Rs 1,45,813 crore as compared to the revised estimates. Certain Ministries and expenditure items have seen a decrease in expenditure as compared to the revised estimates made by the government. As per the provisional accounts, the expenditure of the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare and the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution are Rs 22,133 crore and Rs 70,712 crore lower than the revised estimates, respectively. The decrease in the Ministries’ expenditure as a percentage of the revised estimates are 29% and 39%, respectively. The food subsidy according to CGA was Rs 1,01,904 crore, which was Rs 69,394 crore lower than the revised estimates for the year 2018-19 given in the budget documents.
[1] “Accounts of the Union Government of India (Provisional/Unaudited) for the Financial Year 2018-19”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Finance, May 31, 2019.
[2] Fiscal Developments, Economic Survey 2018-19, https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey/doc/vol2chapter/echap02_vol2.pdf.
[3] Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance, March 2018-19, http://www.cga.nic.in/MonthlyReport/Published/3/2018-2019.aspx.
Earlier today, the Supreme Court struck down the two Acts that created an independent body for the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. One of the Acts amended the Constitution to replace the method of appointment of judges by a collegium system with that of an independent commission, called the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). The composition of the NJAC would include: (i) the Chief Justice of India (Chairperson) (ii) two other senior most judges of the Supreme Court, (iii) the Union Law Minister, and (iv) two eminent persons to be nominated by the Prime Minister, the CJI and the Leader of Opposition of the Lok Sabha. The other Act laid down the processes in relation to such appointments. Both Acts were passed by Parliament in August 2014, and received Presidential assent in December 2014. Following this, a batch of petitions that had been filed in Supreme Court challenging the two Bills on grounds of unconstitutionality, was referred to a five judge bench. It was contended that the presence of executive members in the NJAC violated the independence of the judiciary. In its judgement today, the Court held that the executive involvement in appointment of judges impinges upon the independence of the judiciary. This violates the principle of separation of powers between the executive and judiciary, which is a basic feature of the Constitution. In this context, we examine the proposals around the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. Appointment of judges before the introduction of the NJAC The method of appointment of the Chief Justice of India, SC and HC judges was laid down in the Constitution.[i] The Constitution stated that the President shall make these appointments after consulting with the Chief Justice of India and other SC and HC judges as he considers necessary. Between the years 1982-1999, the issue of method of appointment of judges was examined and reinterpreted by the Supreme Court. Since then, a collegium, consisting of the Chief Justice of India and 4 other senior most SC judges, made recommendations for persons to be appointed as SC and HC judges, to the President.[ii] Recommendations of various bodies for setting up an independent appointments commission Over the decades, several high level Commissions have examined this method of appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. They have suggested that an independent body be set up to make recommendations for such appointments. However, they differed in the representation of the judiciary, legislature and executive in making such appointments. These are summarised below. Table 1: Comparison of various recommendations on the composition of a proposed appointments body
Recommendatory Body | Suggested composition |
2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (2007) | Judiciary : CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive : Vice-President (Chairperson), PM, Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leaders of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament. Other: No representative. |
National Advisory Council (2005) | Judiciary: CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive: Vice-President (Chairman), PM (or nominee), Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leader of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament. Other: No representative. |
NCRWC (2002) | Judiciary :CJI (Chairman), two senior most SC judges Executive: Union Law Minister Legislature: No representative Other: one eminent person |
Law Commission (1987) | Judiciary : CJI (Chairman), three senior most SC judges, immediate predecessor of the CJI, three senior most CJs of HCs, [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive: Law Minister, Attorney General of India, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: No representative Other: One Law academic |
Sources: 121st Report of the Law Commission, 1987; Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002; A Consultation Paper on Superior Judiciary, NCRWC, 2001; A National Judicial Commission-Report for discussion in the National Advisory Council, 2005; Fourth Report of the 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), ‘Ethics in Governance’, 2007; PRS. It may be noted that the Law Commission, in its 2008 and 2009 reports, suggested that Government should seek a reconsideration of the judgments in the Three Judges cases. In the alternative, Parliament should pass a law restoring the primacy of the CJI, while ensuring that the executive played a role in making judicial appointments. Appointments process in different countries Internationally, there are varied methods for making appointments of judges to the higher judiciary. The method of appointment of judges to the highest court, in some jurisdictions, is outlined in Table 2. Table 2: Appointment of judges to the highest court in different jurisdictions
Country | Method of Appointment to the highest court | Who is involved in making the appointments |
UK | SC judges are appointed by a five-person selection commission. | It consists of the SC President, his deputy, and one member each appointed by the JACs of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.[iii] (The JACs comprise lay persons, members of the judiciary and the Bar and make appointments of judges of lower courts.) |
Canada | Appointments are made by the Governor in Council.[iv] | A selection panel comprising five MPs (from the government and the opposition) reviews list of nominees and submits 3 names to the Prime Minister.[v] |
USA | Appointments are made by the President. | Supreme Court Justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the United States Senate.[vi] |
Germany | Appointments are made by election. | Half the members of the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by the executive and half by the legislature.[vii] |
France | Appointments are made by the President. | President receives proposals for appointments from Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature.[viii] |
Sources: Constitutional Reform Act, 2005; Canada Supreme Court Act, 1985; Constitution of the United States of America; Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany; Constitution of France; PRS. In delivering its judgment that strikes down the setting up of an NJAC, the Court has stated that it would schedule hearings from November 3, 2015 regarding ways in which the collegium system can be strengthened.
[i] Article 124, Constitution of India (Prior to 2015 Amendments)
[ii] S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India, AIR 1982, SC 149; S.C. Advocates on Record Association vs. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268; In re: Special Reference, AIR 1999 SC 1.
[iii]. Schedule 8, Constitutional Reform Act, 2005.
[iv]. Section 4(2), Supreme Court Act (RSC, 1985).
[v]. Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the retirement of Justice Morris Fish, http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/04/23/statement-prime-minister-canada-retirement-justice-morris-fish.
[vi]. Article II, Section 2, The Constitution of the United States of America.
[vii]. Article 94 (1), Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.
[viii] Article 65, Constitution of France, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constiution_anglais_oct2009.pdf.