The Finance Minister, Ms. Nirmala Sitharaman, presented the Union Budget for the financial year 2019-20 in Parliament on July 5, 2019. In the 2019-20 budget, the government presented the estimates of its expenditure and receipts for the year 2019-20. The budget also gave an account of how much money the government raised or spent in 2017-18. In addition, the budget also presented the revised estimates made by the government for the year 2018-19 in comparison to the estimates it had given to Parliament in the previous year’s budget.
What are revised estimates?
Some of the estimates made by the government might change during the course of the year. For instance, once the year gets underway, some ministries may need more funds than what was actually allocated to them in the budget, or the receipts expected from certain sources might change. Such deviations from the budget estimates get reflected in the figures released by the government at later stages as part of the subsequent budgets. Once the year ends, the actual numbers are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), post which they are presented to Parliament with the upcoming budget, i.e. two years after the estimates are made.
For instance, estimates for the year 2018-19 were presented as part of the 2018-19 budget in February 2018. In the 2019-20 interim budget presented in February 2019 (10 months after the financial year 2018-19 got underway), the government revised these estimates based on the actual receipts and expenditure accounted so far during the year and incorporated estimates for the remaining two months.
The actual receipts and expenditure accounts of the central government are maintained by the Controller General of Accounts (CGA), Ministry of Finance on a monthly basis. In addition to the monthly accounts, the CGA also publishes the provisional unaudited figures for the financial year by the end of the month of May. Once these provisional figures are audited by the CAG, they are presented as actuals in next year’s budget. The CGA reported the figures for 2018-19 on May 31, 2019.[1] The Economic Survey 2018-19 presented on July 4, 2019 uses these figures.[2]
The budget presented on July 5 replicates the revised estimates reported as part of the interim budget (February 1, 2019). Thus, it did not take into account the updated figures for the year 2018-19 from the CGA.
Table 1 gives a comparison of the 2018-19 revised estimates presented by the central government in the budget with the provisional unaudited figures maintained by the CGA for the year 2018-19.[3]
Table 1: Budget at a Glance: Comparison of 2018-19 revised estimates with CGA figures (unaudited) (Rs crore)
|
Actuals |
Budgeted |
Revised |
Provisional |
Difference |
|
|
Revenue Expenditure |
18,78,833 |
21,41,772 |
21,40,612 |
20,08,463 |
-1,32,149 |
|
Capital Expenditure |
2,63,140 |
3,00,441 |
3,16,623 |
3,02,959 |
-13,664 |
|
Total Expenditure |
21,41,973 |
24,42,213 |
24,57,235 |
23,11,422 |
-1,45,813 |
|
Revenue Receipts |
14,35,233 |
17,25,738 |
17,29,682 |
15,63,170 |
-1,66,512 |
|
Capital Receipts |
1,15,678 |
92,199 |
93,155 |
1,02,885 |
9,730 |
|
of which: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Recoveries of Loans |
15,633 |
12,199 |
13,155 |
17,840 |
4,685 |
|
Other receipts (including disinvestments) |
1,00,045 |
80,000 |
80,000 |
85,045 |
5,045 |
|
Total Receipts (without borrowings) |
15,50,911 |
18,17,937 |
18,22,837 |
16,66,055 |
-1,56,782 |
|
Revenue Deficit |
4,43,600 |
4,16,034 |
4,10,930 |
4,45,293 |
34,363 |
|
% of GDP |
2.6 |
2.2 |
2.2 |
2.4 |
|
|
Fiscal Deficit |
5,91,062 |
6,24,276 |
6,34,398 |
6,45,367 |
10,969 |
|
% of GDP |
3.5 |
3.3 |
3.4 |
3.4 |
|
|
Primary Deficit |
62,110 |
48,481 |
46,828 |
62,692 |
15,864 |
|
% of GDP |
0.4 |
0.3 |
0.2 |
0.3 |
|
Sources: Budget at a Glance, Union Budget 2019-20; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.
The 2018-19 provisional figures for revenue receipts is Rs 15,63,170 crore, which is Rs 1,66,512 crore less than the revised estimates. This is largely due to Rs 1,67,455 crore shortfall in centre’s net tax revenue between the revised estimates and the provisional estimates (Table 2).
Major taxes which see a shortfall between the gross tax revenue presented in the revised estimates vis-à-vis the provisional figures are income tax (Rs 67,346 crore) and GST (Rs 59,930 crore). Non-tax revenue and disinvestment receipts as per the provisional figures are higher than the revised estimates.
Table 2: Break up of central government receipts: Comparison of 2018-19 RE with CGA figures (unaudited) (Rs crore)
|
|
Actuals |
Budgeted |
Revised |
Provisional |
Difference |
|
Gross Tax Revenue |
19,19,009 |
22,71,242 |
22,48,175 |
20,80,203 |
-1,67,972 |
|
of which: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Corporation Tax |
5,71,202 |
6,21,000 |
6,71,000 |
6,63,572 |
-7,428 |
|
Taxes on Income |
4,30,772 |
5,29,000 |
5,29,000 |
4,61,654 |
-67,346 |
|
Goods and Services Tax |
4,42,562 |
7,43,900 |
6,43,900 |
5,83,970 |
-59,930 |
|
Customs |
1,29,030 |
1,12,500 |
1,30,038 |
1,17,930 |
-12,108 |
|
Union Excise Duties |
2,59,431 |
2,59,600 |
2,59,612 |
2,30,998 |
-28,614 |
|
A. Centre's Net Tax Revenue |
12,42,488 |
14,80,649 |
14,84,406 |
13,16,951 |
-1,67,455 |
|
B. Non Tax Revenue |
1,92,745 |
2,45,089 |
2,45,276 |
2,46,219 |
943 |
|
of which: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Interest Receipts |
13,574 |
15,162 |
12,047 |
12,815 |
768 |
|
Dividend and Profits |
91,361 |
1,07,312 |
1,19,264 |
1,13,424 |
-5,840 |
|
Other Non-Tax Revenue |
87,810 |
1,22,615 |
1,13,965 |
1,19,980 |
6,015 |
|
C. Capital Receipts (without borrowings) |
1,15,678 |
92,199 |
93,155 |
1,02,885 |
9,730 |
|
of which: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Disinvestment |
1,00,045 |
80,000 |
80,000 |
85,045 |
5,045 |
|
Receipts (without borrowings) (A+B+C) |
15,50,911 |
18,17,937 |
18,22,837 |
16,66,055 |
-1,56,782 |
|
Borrowings |
5,91,062 |
6,24,276 |
6,34,398 |
6,45,367 |
10,969 |
|
Total Receipts (including borrowings) |
21,41,973 |
24,42,213 |
24,57,235 |
23,11,422 |
-1,45,813 |
Note: Centre’s net tax revenue is gross tax revenue less share of states in central taxes. Figures for GST include receipts from the GST compensation cess. Note that GST was levied for a nine-month period during the year 2017-18, starting July 2017.
Sources: Receipts Budget, Union Budget 2019-20; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.
While the provisional figures show a considerable decrease in receipts (Rs 1,56,782 crore) as compared to the revised estimates, fiscal deficit has not shown a comparable increase. Fiscal deficit is estimated to be Rs 10,969 crore higher than the revised estimates as per the provisional accounts.
On the expenditure side, the total expenditure as per the provisional figures show a decrease of Rs 1,45,813 crore as compared to the revised estimates. Certain Ministries and expenditure items have seen a decrease in expenditure as compared to the revised estimates made by the government. As per the provisional accounts, the expenditure of the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare and the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution are Rs 22,133 crore and Rs 70,712 crore lower than the revised estimates, respectively. The decrease in the Ministries’ expenditure as a percentage of the revised estimates are 29% and 39%, respectively. The food subsidy according to CGA was Rs 1,01,904 crore, which was Rs 69,394 crore lower than the revised estimates for the year 2018-19 given in the budget documents.
[1] “Accounts of the Union Government of India (Provisional/Unaudited) for the Financial Year 2018-19”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Finance, May 31, 2019.
[2] Fiscal Developments, Economic Survey 2018-19, https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey/doc/vol2chapter/echap02_vol2.pdf.
[3] Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance, March 2018-19, http://www.cga.nic.in/MonthlyReport/Published/3/2018-2019.aspx.
In a recent judgement, the Karnataka High Court upheld the disqualification of five independent MLAs from the Assembly. These MLAs, who had previously served as Ministers in the Yeddyurappa government, were disqualified along with 11 others after they withdrew their support to the government. The disqualifications raise some important questions on the working of the anti-defection law. While the law was framed in 1985 with the specific intent of 'combating the evil of political defections', over the years several unanticipated consequences have come to the fore. The primary among these is the erosion of independence of the average legislator. The need for an anti-defection law was first felt in the late 1960s. Of the 16 States that went to polls in 1967, Congress lost majority in eight and failed to form the government in seven. Thus began the era of common minimum programmes and coalition governments. This was accompanied with another development - the phenomenon of large scale political migrations. Within a brief span of 4 years (1967-71), there were 142 defections in Parliament and 1969 defections in State Assemblies across the country. Thirty-two governments collapsed and 212 defectors were rewarded with ministerial positions. Haryana was the first State where a Congress ministry was toppled. The Bhagwat Dayal ministry was defeated in the Assembly when its nominee for speakership lost out to another candidate. Congress dissidents defected to form a new party called the Haryana Congress, entered into an alliance with the opposition and formed a new government under the Chief Ministership of Rao Birender Singh (also a Congress defector). Haryana thus became the first State to reward a defector with Chief Ministership. Another Haryana legislator, Gaya Lal, defected thrice within a fortnight. The now well know terms 'Aya Ram' and 'Gaya Ram' that are often used to describe political turncoats owe inspiration to him. It was to address this issue that the anti-defection law was passed in 1985. This law amended the Constitution and added the Tenth Schedule to the same. The Supreme Court, in Kihota Hollohon vs. Zachilhu (1992), while upholding the validity of the law held that decisions of disqualification shall be open to judicial review. It also made some observations on Section 2(1) (b) of the Tenth schedule. Section 2(1) (b) reads that a member shall be disqualified if he votes or abstains from voting contrary to any direction issued by the political party. The judgement highlighted the need to limit disqualifications to votes crucial to the existence of the government and to matters integral to the electoral programme of the party, so as not to 'unduly impinge' on the freedom of speech of members. This anti-defection law has regulated parliamentary behaviour for over 25 years now. Though it has the advantage of providing stability to governments and ensuring loyalty to party manifestos, it reduces the accountability of the government to Parliament and curbs dissent against party policies. In this context, Manish Tewari's private member bill merits mention: he suggests that anti-defection law be restricted to votes of confidence and money bills. Such a move will retain the objective of maintaining the stability of the government while allowing MPs to vote freely (subject to the discipline of the party whip) on other issues. This brings us to the question - Is the anti-defection law indispensable? Is defection peculiar to India? If not, how do other countries handle similar situations? It is interesting to note that many advanced democracies face similar problems but haven't enacted any such laws to regulate legislators. Prominent cases in UK politics include the defection of Ramsay Macdonald, the first Labour Prime Minister, in 1931. He defected from his party following disagreements on policy responses to the economic crisis. Neither Macdonald nor any of his three cabinet colleagues who defected with him resigned their seats in the House of Commons to seek a fresh mandate. Australian Parliament too has had its share of defections. Legislators have often shifted loyalties and governments have been formed and toppled in quick succession. In the US too, Congressmen often vote against the party programme on important issues without actually defecting from the party. India might have its peculiar circumstances that merit different policies. But, the very fact that some other democracies can function without such a law should get us thinking. Sources/ Notes: [1] PRS Conference note: The Anti-Defection Law – Intent and Impact [2] Column by CV Madhukar (Director, PRS) titled 'Post-independents' in the Indian Express
