Policy

FAQ on Civil Aviation

Pallavi - October 22, 2012

According to a press release, the Ministry of Civil Aviation is considering abolishing the development fee being levied at the Delhi and Mumbai airports.  The Ministry has already asked the Kolkata and Chennai airports not to levy a development fee.  According to the Ministry, this is being done to make air travel more affordable.  Currently, development fee charged at the Delhi Airport ranges from Rs 200 to Rs 1300.  At the Mumbai airport, the fee ranges from Rs 100 to Rs 600. It is pertinent to note that though, the Ministry has proposed abolishing the development fee, the airport operators may still levy a user development fee.  In this blog we discuss some of the aspects of development fee and user development fee. What is a development fee and a user development fee? Development Fee (DF) is primarily intended to fund the establishment or upgradation of an airport.  It is intended to bridge the gap between the cost of the project and the finance available with the airport operator.  Currently only the Mumbai and Delhi Airports levy a DF. However, there are other types of tariffs, such as a user development fee (UDF), which may be levied by the airports. UDF is generally regarded as a revenue enhancing measure.  It is levied by the airport operators to meet operational expenditure Section 22 A of the Airports Authority Act, 1994 (amended in 2003) gives the Airport Authority of India (AAI) the power to levy and collect a development fee on embarking passengers.  The Act provides that the development fee can be utilised only for: (a) funding or financing the upgradation of the airport; (b) establishing a new airport in lieu of the airport at which is levied; and (c) investing in shares of a private airport in lieu of an existing airport . Unlike DF,  UDF is not levied and collected under the Airport Authority of India Act but under Rule 89 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937. Under the Aircraft Rules, UDF may be levied and collected by either the AAI or the private operator.   According to the Airport Economic Regulatory Authority, UDF is levied to ensure that the airport operators can get a fair return on their investments. What is the role of the Airport Economic Regulatory Authority? In 2008, the Airport Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) was established to regulate aeronautical tariffs.  Among others, AERA’s functions include determining the amount of DF and UDF for major airports.  In case of non-major airports, the UDF shall be determined by the central government. What has been the role of the Supreme Court? In 2009, the central government permitted the Mumbai and Delhi Airports to levy a DF.  The rate of was prescribed by the central government and not by AERA.  In 2011, the Supreme Court held that this levy of DF was illegal.  The Court based its decision on two grounds. Firstly, the court held that the rate of DF has to be determined by the AERA and not the central government.  Secondly, the Court held that the power to levy the fee lies with the Airport Authority as the development fee can only be utilised for the performance of the purpose specified in the Act.  The court held that while the Airport Authority can utilise the development fee for any of the functions prescribed in the Act, it can assign the power to levy a development fee to a private operator only for funding or financing the upgradation or expansion of the airport. Can private operators collect a development fee and a user development fee? In 2003, the government amended the Airport Authority of India Act to allow the AAI with the prior permission of the central government to: (i) to lease the premises of airports to private entities to undertake some of the functions of the AAI; (ii) levy and collect a development fee on the embarking passengers at a rate that may be prescribed. Till 2011, the power to collect the development fee lay only with the Airport Authority.  However with the notification of the Airports Authority of India (Major Airports) Development Fees Rules, 2011, private operators have also been permitted to collect the development fee.  

At noon today, the Finance Minister introduced a Bill in Parliament to address the issue of delayed debt recovery.  The Bill  amends four laws including the SARFAESI Act and the DRT Act, which are primarily used for recovery of outstanding loans.  In this context, we examine the rise in NPAs in India and ways in which this may be dealt with.

I. An overview of Non-Performing Assets in India 

Banks give loans and advances to borrowers which may be categorised as: (i) standard asset (any loan which has not defaulted in repayment) or (ii) non-performing asset (NPA), based on their performance.  NPAs are loans and advances given by banks, on which the borrower has ceased to pay interest and principal repayments. Graph for blog In recent years, the gross NPAs of banks have increased from 2.3% of total loans in 2008 to 4.3% in 2015 (see Figure 1 alongside*).  The increase in NPAs may be due to various reasons, including slow growth in domestic market and drop in prices of commodities in the global markets.  In addition, exports of products such as steel, textiles, leather and gems have slowed down.[i] The increase in NPAs affects the credit market in the country.  This is due to the impact that non-repayment of loans has on the cash flow of banks and the availability of funds with them.[ii]  Additionally, a rising trend in NPAs may also make banks unwilling to lend.  This could be because there are lesser chances of debt recovery due to prevailing market conditions.[iii]  For example, banks may be unwilling to lend to the steel sector if companies in this sector are making losses and defaulting on current loans. There are various legislative mechanisms available with banks for debt recovery.  These include: (i) Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (DRT Act) and (ii) Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act).  The Debt Recovery Tribunals established under DRT Act allow banks to recover outstanding loans.  The SARFAESI Act allows a secured creditor to enforce his security interest without the intervention of courts or tribunals.  In addition to these, there are voluntary mechanisms such as Corporate Debt Restructuring and Strategic Debt Restructuring, which   These mechanisms allow banks to collectively restructure debt of borrowers (which includes changing repayment schedule of loans) and take over the management of a company.

II. Challenges and recommendations for reform

In recent years, several committees have given recommendations on NPAs. We discuss these below.

Action against defaulters: Wilful default refers to a situation where a borrower defaults on the repayment of a loan, despite having adequate resources. As of December 2015, the public sector banks had 7,686 wilful defaulters, which accounted for Rs 66,000 crore of outstanding loans.[iv]  The Standing Committee of Finance, in February 2016, observed that 21% of the total NPAs of banks were from wilful defaulters.  It recommended that the names of top 30 wilful defaulters of every bank be made public.  It noted that making such information publicly available would act as a deterrent for others.

Asset Reconstruction Companies (ARCs): ARCs purchase stressed assets from banks, and try to recover them. The ARCs buy NPAs from banks at a discount and try to recover the money.  The Standing Committee observed that the prolonged slowdown in the economy had made it difficult for ARCs to absorb NPAs. Therefore, it recommended that the RBI should allow banks to absorb their written-off assets in a staggered manner.  This would help them in gradually restoring their balance sheets to normal health.

Improved recovery: The process of recovering outstanding loans is time consuming. This includes time taken to resolve insolvency, which is a situation where a borrower is unable to repay his outstanding debt.  The inability to resolve insolvency is one of the factors that impacts NPAS, the credit market, and affects the flow of money in the country.[v]  As of 2015, it took over four years to resolve insolvency in India.  This was higher than other countries such as the UK (1 year) and USA (1.5 years).  The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code seeks to address this situation.  The Code, which was passed by Lok Sabha on May 5, 2016, is currently pending in Rajya Sabha. It provides a 180-day period to resolve insolvency (which includes change in repayment schedule of loans to recover outstanding loans.)  If insolvency is not resolved within this time period, the company will go in for liquidation of its assets, and the creditors will be repaid from these sale proceeds.


  [i] ‘Non-Performing Assets of Financial Institutions’, 27th Report of the Department-related Standing Committee on Finance, http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Finance/16_Finance_27.pdf. [ii] Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee, November 2015, http://finmin.nic.in/reports/BLRCReportVol1_04112015.pdf. [iii] Volume 2, Economic Survey 2015-16, http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2015-16/echapter-vol2.pdf. [iv] Starred Question No. 17, Rajya Sabha, Answered on April 26, Ministry of Finance. [v] Report of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee, Ministry of Finance, November 2015, http://finmin.nic.in/reports/BLRCReportVol1_04112015.pdf. *Source:  ‘Non-Performing Assets of Financial Institutions’, 27th Report of the Department-related Standing Committee on Finance, http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Finance/16_Finance_27.pdf; PRS.