India’s urban population has grown by 32% from 2001 to 2011 as compared to 18% growth in total population of the country.[1] As per Census 2011, 31% of the country’s population (377 million people) live in cities, and contribute to 63% of the country’s GDP.[2] The urban population is projected to grow up to 600 million by 2031.2 With increasing urban population, the need for providing better infrastructure and services in cities is increasing.[3] The government has introduced several schemes to address different urban issues. These include the Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT), Smart Cities Mission, Heritage City Development and Augmentation Yojana (HRIDAY), Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana – Housing for All (Urban) (PMAY-U), and Swachh Bharat Mission (Urban).
Last week the Ministry of Urban Development released the next batch of winners under the Smart Cities Mission.[4] This takes the number of smart cities to 90. The government has also announced a few policies and released data indicators to help with the implementation of the urban schemes. In light of all this, we discuss how the new schemes are changing the mandate of urban development, the fiscal challenge of implementing such schemes, and the policies that are trying to address some of these challenges.
Urbanisation in India
The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM), launched in 2005, was one of the first urban development schemes implemented by the central government. Under JnNURM, the central government specified certain mandatory and optional reforms for cities, and provided assistance to the state governments and cities that were linked to the implementation of these reforms. JnNURM focused on improving urban infrastructure and service delivery, community participation, and accountability of city governments towards citizens.
In comparison, the new urban schemes move beyond the mandate that was set by JnNURM. While AMRUT captures most of the objectives under JnNURM, the other schemes seek to address issues around sanitation (through Swachh Bharat), affordable housing (through PMAY-U), and technology innovation (through Smart Cities). Further, the new schemes seek to decentralize the planning process to the city and state level, by giving them more decision making powers.2 So, while earlier, majority of the funding came from the central and state governments, now, a significant share of the funding needs to be raised by the cities themselves.
For example, under the Smart Cities Mission, the total cost of projects proposed by the 60 smart cities (winners from the earlier rounds) is Rs 1.3 lakh crore.[5] About 42% of this amount will come from central and state funding towards the Mission, and the rest will be raised by the cities.[6]
The new schemes suggest that cities may raise these funds through: (i) their own resources such as collection of user fees, land monetization, property taxes, etc., (ii) finance mechanisms such as municipal bonds, (iii) leveraging borrowings from financial institutions, and (iv) the private sector through Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).[7]
In 2011, an Expert Committee on Indian Urban Infrastructure and Services (HPEC) had projected that creation of the required urban infrastructure would translate into an investment of Rs 97,500 crore to Rs 1,95,000 crore annually.[8] The current urban schemes are investing around Rs 32,500 crore annually.
Financial capacity of cities
Currently, the different sources of revenue that municipal corporations have access to include: (i) tax revenue (property tax, tax on electricity, toll tax, entertainment tax), (ii) non-tax revenue (user charges, building permission fees, sale and hire charges), (iii) grants-in-aid (from state and central governments), and (iv) debt (loans borrowed from financial institutions and banks, and municipal bonds).
While cities are now required to raise more financing for urban projects, they do not have the required fiscal and technical capacity.8,[9] The HPEC had observed that cities in India are among the weakest in the world, both in terms of capacity to raise resources and financial autonomy. Even though cities have been getting higher allocations from the centre and states, their own tax bases are narrow.8 Further, several taxes that cities can levy are still mandated by the state government. Because of their poor governance and financial situation, cities also find it difficult to access external financing.8,7
In order to help cities improve their finances, the government has introduced a few policies, and released a few indicators. Some of these are discussed below:
Policy proposals and data indicators
Value Capture Financing (VCF): The VCF policy framework was introduced by the Ministry of Urban Development in February 2017.[10] VCF is a principle that states that people benefiting from public investments in infrastructure should pay for it. Currently when governments invest in roads, airports and industries in an area, private property owners in that area benefit from it. However, governments recover only a limited value from such investments, constraining their ability to make further public investments elsewhere. VCF helps in capturing a part of the increment in the value of land due to such investments, and use it to fund new infrastructure projects.
The different instruments of VCF include: land value tax, fee for changing land use, betterment levy, development charges, transfer of development rights, and land pooling systems.10 For example, Karnataka uses certain value capture methods to fund its mass transit projects. The Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA), and City and Industrial Development Corporation Limited (CIDCO) have used betterment levy (tax levied on land that has gained in value because of public infrastructure investments) to finance infrastructure projects.
Municipal bonds: Municipal bonds are bonds issued by urban local bodies (municipal corporations or entities owned by municipal bodies) to raise money for financing specific projects such as infrastructure projects. The Securities and Exchange Board of India regulations (2015) regarding municipal bonds provide that, to issue such bonds, municipalities must: (i) not have negative net worth in any of the three preceding financial years, and (ii) not have defaulted in any loan repayments in the last one year.[11] Therefore, a city’s performance in the bond market depends on its fiscal performance. One of the ways to determine a city’s financial health is through credit ratings.
Credit rating of cities: In September 2016, the Ministry of Urban Development started assigning cities with credit ratings.[12] These credit ratings were assigned based on assets and liabilities of the cities, revenue streams, resources available for capital investments, accounting practices, and other governance practices.
Of the total 20 ratings ranging from AAA to D, BBB– is the ‘Investment Grade’ rating and cities rated below BBB– need to undertake necessary interventions to improve their ratings for obtaining positive response to the Municipal Bonds to be issued. By March 2017, 94 cities were assigned credit ratings, 55 of which got ‘investment grade’ ratings.[13]
Credit ratings indicate what projects might be more lucrative for investments. This, in turn, helps investors decide where to invest and determine the terms of such investments (based on the expected returns).
Earlier this month, the Pune Municipal Corporation raised Rs 200 crore through the sale of municipal bonds, to finance water supply projects under the Smart Cities Mission.[14] The city had received an AA+ credit rating (second highest rating) in the recent credit rankings assigned by the central government.
Other than credit ratings, the Ministry of Urban Development has also come up with other data indicators around cities such as the Swachh Bharat rankings, and the City Liveability Index (measuring mobility, access to healthcare and education, employment opportunities, etc). These rankings seek to foster a sense of competition across cities, and also help them map their performances year on year.
Some financing mechanisms, such as municipal bonds, have been around in India for the last two decades, but cities haven’t been able to make much use of them. It remains to be seen whether the introduction of indicators such as credit ratings helps the municipal bond market take off. While these mechanisms may improve the finances of cities, the question is would more funding solve the cities’ problems. Or would it require municipal government to take a different approach to problem solving.
[1] Census of India, 2011.
[2] Mission Statement and Guidelines, Smart Cities, Ministry of Urban Development, June 2015, http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/SmartCityGuidelines.pdf.
[3] Report on Indian Urban Infrastructure and Services, March, 2011, The High Powered Expert Committee for estimating the investment requirements for urban infrastructure services, http://icrier.org/pdf/FinalReport-hpec.pdf.
[4] “30 more smart cities announced; takes the total to 90 so far”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Urban Development, June 23, 2017.
[5] Smart Cities Mission, Ministry of Urban Development, last accessed on June 30, 2017, http://smartcities.gov.in/content/.
[6] Smart City Plans, Last accessed in June 2017.
[7] “Financing of Smart Cities”, Smart Cities Mission, Ministry of Urban Development, http://smartcities.gov.in/upload/uploadfiles/files/Financing%20of%20Smart%20Cities.pdf.
[8] “Report on Indian Urban Infrastructure and Services”, March, 2011, The High Powered Expert Committee for estimating the investment requirements for urban infrastructure services, http://icrier.org/pdf/FinalReport-hpec.pdf.
[9] Fourteenth Finance Commission, Ministry of Finance, February 2015, http://finmin.nic.in/14fincomm/14fcrengVol1.pdf.
[10] Value Capture Finance Policy Framework, Ministry of Urban Development, February 2017, http://smartcities.gov.in/upload/5901982d9e461VCFPolicyFrameworkFINAL.pdf.
[11] Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue and Listing of Debt Securities by Municipalities) Regulations, 2015, Securities and Exchange Board of India, July 15, 2015, http://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1436964571729.pdf.
[12] “Credit rating of cities under urban reforms begins”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Urban Development, September 6, 2016.
[13] “Credit Rating of Urban Local Bodies gain Momentum”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Urban Development, March 26, 2017.
[14] “Pune civic body raises Rs200 crore via municipal bonds”, LiveMint, June 19, 2017, http://www.livemint.com/Money/JOOzaSTKnC6k1EZGeFh8LJ/Pune-civic-body-raises-Rs200-crore-via-municipal-bonds.html.
Early this week, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India tabled a report on the finances of Uttar Pradesh for the financial year 2020-21. A few days prior to that, on May 26, the budget for Uttar Pradesh for 2022-23 was presented, along with which the final audited expenditure and receipt figures for the year 2020-21 were released. The year 2020-21 presented a two-fold challenge for states – loss in revenue due to impact of COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown, and the need for increased expenditure to support affected persons and economic recovery. CAG noted that Uttar Pradesh’s GSDP grew by 1.05% in 2020-21 as compared to a growth of 6.5% in 2019-20. The state reported a revenue deficit of Rs 2,367 crore in 2020-21 after reporting revenue surplus for 14 successive years since 2006-07. Revenue deficit is the excess of revenue expenditure over revenue receipts. This blog looks at the key trends in the finances of Uttar Pradesh in 2020-21 and certain observations by CAG on fiscal management by the state.
Spending and Deficits in 2020-21
Underspending: In 2020-21, total spending by the state was 26% less than the budget estimate presented in February 2020. In sectors such as water supply and sanitation, the actual expenditure was 60% less than the amount budgeted, while in agriculture and allied activities only 53% of the budgeted amount was spent. CAG observed that in 251 schemes across 57 departments, the state government did not incur any expenditure in 2020-21. These schemes had a budget provision of at least one crore rupees, and had cumulative allocation of Rs 50,617 crore. These included schemes such as Pipe Drinking Water Scheme in Bundelkhand/Vindhya and apportionment of pension liabilities. Moreover, the overall savings due to non-utilisation of funds in 2020-21 was 27.28% of total budget provisions. CAG observed that the budgetary provisions increased between 2016 and 2021. However, the utilisation of budget provisions reduced between 2018-19 and 2020-21.
Pattern of spending: CAG observed that in case of 12 departments, more than 50% of the expenditure was incurred in March 2021, the last month of the financial year. In the civil aviation department, 89% of the total expenditure was incurred in March while this figure was 62% for the social welfare department (welfare of handicapped and backward classes). CAG noted that maintaining a steady pace of expenditure is a sound practice under public financial management. However, the Uttar Pradesh Budget Manual has no specific instructions for preventing such bunching of expenditure. The CAG recommended that the state government can consider issuing guidelines to control the rush of expenditure towards the closing months of the financial year.
Management of deficit and debt: As a measure to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, an Ordinance was promulgated in June 2020 to raise the fiscal deficit limit from 3% of GSDP to 5% of GSDP for the year 2020-21. Fiscal deficit represents the gap between expenditure and receipts in a year, and this gap is filled with borrowings. The Uttar Pradesh Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2004 (FRBM Act) passed by Uttar Pradesh Assembly specifies the upper limit for debt and deficits. The Ordinance thus permitted the state government to borrow more to sustain its budget expenditure. The fiscal deficit of the state in 2020-21 was 3.20% of GSDP, well below the revised limit. At the same time, the state’s outstanding debt to GSDP in 2020-21 was 32.77% of GSDP, above the target of 32% of GSDP set under the FRBM Act. Outstanding debt represents accumulation of debt over the years.
Table 1: Spending by Uttar Pradesh in 2020-21 as compared to Budget Estimates (in Rs crore)
|
Particular |
2020-21 BE |
2020-21 Actuals |
% change from BE to Actuals |
|
Net Receipts (1+2) |
4,24,767 |
2,97,311 |
-30% |
|
1. Revenue Receipts (a+b+c+d) |
4,22,567 |
2,96,176 |
-30% |
|
a. Own Tax Revenue |
1,58,413 |
1,19,897 |
-24% |
|
b. Own Non-Tax Revenue |
31,179 |
11,846 |
-62% |
|
c. Share in central taxes |
1,52,863 |
1,06,687 |
-30% |
|
d. Grants-in-aid from the Centre |
80,112 |
57,746 |
-28% |
|
Of which GST compensation grants |
7,608 |
9,381 |
23% |
|
2. Non-Debt Capital Receipts |
2,200 |
1,135 |
-48% |
|
3. Borrowings |
75,791 |
86,859 |
15% |
|
Of which GST compensation loan |
- |
6,007 |
- |
|
Net Expenditure (4+5+6) |
4,77,963 |
3,51,933 |
-26% |
|
4. Revenue Expenditure |
3,95,117 |
2,98,543 |
-24% |
|
5. Capital Outlay |
81,209 |
52,237 |
-36% |
|
6. Loans and Advances |
1,637 |
1,153 |
-30% |
|
7. Debt Repayment |
34,897 |
26,777 |
-23% |
|
Revenue Balance |
27,451 |
-2,367 |
-109% |
|
Revenue Balance (as % of GSDP) |
1.53% |
-0.14% |
|
|
Fiscal Deficit |
53,195 |
54,622 |
3% |
|
Fiscal Deficit (as % of GSDP) |
2.97% |
3.20% |
Note: A negative revenue balance indicates a deficit. The actual fiscal deficit reported by Uttar Pradesh for 2020-21 in 2022-23 budget was 2.8% of GSDP. This difference was due to higher GSDP figure reported by the state.
Sources: Uttar Pradesh Budget Documents of various years; CAG; PRS.
Finances of State Public Sector Undertakings
Public sector undertakings (PSUs) are set up by the government to discharge commercial activities in various sectors. As on March 31, 2021, there were 115 PSUs in Uttar Pradesh. CAG analysed the performance of 38 PSUs. Out of these 38 PSUs, 22 companies earned a profit of Rs 700 crore, while 16 companies posted a loss of Rs 7,411 crore in 2020-21. Note that both the number of PSUs incurring losses and the quantum of losses has decreased since 2018-19. In 2018-19, 20 PSUs had reported losses worth Rs 15,219 crore.
Figure 1: Cumulative losses incurred by Uttar Pradesh PSUs (Rs crore)
Sources: CAG; PRS.
Losses of power sector PSUs: Three power sector PSUs—Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited, Purvanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, and Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited—were the top loss incurring PSUs. These three PSUs accounted for 73% of the total losses of Rs 7,411 crore mentioned above. Note that as of June 2022, for each unit of power supplied, the revenue realised by UP power distribution companies (discoms) is 27 paise less than cost of supply. This is better than the gap of 34 paise per unit at the national level. However, the aggregate technical and commercial losses (AT&C) of the Uttar Pradesh discoms was 27.85%, considerably higher than the national average of 17.19%. AT&C losses refer to the proportion of power supplied by a discom for which it does not receive any payment.
Off-budget borrowings: CAG also observed that the Uttar Pradesh government resorted to off-budget borrowing through state owned PSUs/authorities. Off budget borrowings are not accounted in the debt of the state government and are on books of the respective PSUs/authorities, although, debt is serviced by the state government. As a result, the outstanding debt reported in the budget does not represent the actual debt position of the state. CAG identified off-budget borrowing worth Rs 1,637 crore. The CAG recommended that the state government should avoid extra-budget borrowings. It should also credit all the loans taken by PSUs/authorities on behalf of and serviced by the state government to state government accounts.
Management of Reserve Funds
The Reserve Bank of India manages two reserve funds on the behalf of state governments. These funds are created to meet the liabilities of state governments. These funds are: (i) Consolidated Sinking Fund (CSF), and (ii) Guarantee Redemption Fund (GRF). They are funded by the contributions made by the state governments. CSF is an amortisation fund which is utilised to meet the repayment obligations of the government. Amortisation refers to payment of debt through regular instalments. The interest accumulated in the fund is used for repayment of outstanding liabilities (which is the accumulation of total borrowings at the end of a financial year, including any liabilities on the public account).
In line with the recommendation of the 12th Finance Commission, Uttar Pradesh created its CSF in March 2020. The state government may transfer at least 0.5% of its outstanding liabilities at the end of the previous year to the CSF. CAG observed that in 2020-21, Uttar Pradesh appropriated only Rs 1,000 crore to the CSF against the requirement of Rs 2,454 crore. CAG recommended that the state government should ensure at least 0.5% of the outstanding liabilities are contributed towards the CSF every year.
GRF is constituted by states to meet obligations related to guarantees. The state government may extend guarantee on loans taken by its PSUs. Guarantees are contingent liabilities of the state government, as in case of default by the company, repayment burden will fall on the state government. GRF can be used to settle guarantees extended by the government with respect to borrowings of state PSUs and other bodies. The 12th Finance Commission had recommended that states should constitute GRF. It was to be funded through guarantees fees to meet any sudden discharge of obligated guarantees extended by the states. CAG noted that Uttar Pradesh government has not constituted GRF. Moreover, the state has also not fixed any limits for extending guarantees.
For an analysis of Uttar Pradesh’s 2022-23 budget, please see here.
