To mitigate the spread of coronavirus in India, the central government imposed a nation-wide lockdown on March 25, 2020. The lockdown necessitated the suspension of all economic activities, except the ones classified as ‘essential’ from time to time, and the ones that can be carried out from home. As a result, all economic activities which require persons to travel or work outside home, such as manufacturing of non-essential goods and construction, have stopped since then. While this has resulted in a loss of income for many individuals and businesses, the ongoing 40-day lockdown is also going to severely impact the revenue of the central and state governments, primarily the tax revenue that they would have generated from all such economic activities.
This note discusses the possible effect of the lockdown on the revenue of the central and state governments in 2020-21. At this stage, the effect of the pandemic and the lockdown are difficult to estimate. We do not know whether there will be partial restrictions when the current lockdown ends on 3rd May or the possibility of further action during the year. Therefore, this note can be used as a first estimate to compute the impact under various scenarios. For example, a reader who believes that the effect on GDP growth would be different than the IMF’s estimate used below can extrapolate the numbers to fit his assumptions.
The central government and most of the state governments passed their budget for the financial year 2020-21 during February-March 2020, before the lockdown. The central government estimated a 10% growth in the country’s nominal GDP in 2020-21, and more than half of the states estimate their nominal GSDP growth rate in the range of 8%-13%. Due to the unforeseen impact of the lockdown on the economy, the 2020-21 GDP growth rates are expected to be lower than these estimates. As a result, the tax revenue that the central and state governments will be able to generate are expected to be much lower than the budgeted estimates, during the period of lockdown.
Centre’s revenue
Table 1 shows the revenue expected by the central government from various sources in 2020-21. 73% of the revenue (Rs 16.36 lakh crore) is expected to come through taxes. Because of the impact of lockdown, the actual tax revenue realised at the end of the year could be much lower, depending on how much the nominal GDP growth in 2020-21 gets affected. To estimate the impact on tax revenue, we assume that the tax-GDP ratio (i.e. an estimate of the tax generated out of each unit of economic activity) in 2020-21 will remain the same as the budget estimate. This may be a conservative estimate of loss of revenue due to lockdown as many permitted activities such as agriculture, government services and essential services have zero or lower-than-average taxes.
Based on this assumption, a 1%-point fall in the nominal GDP growth rate could decrease centre’s net tax revenue by about Rs 15,000 crore in 2020-21, i.e. 0.7% of its total revenue. The IMF has projected GDP growth for 2020-21 at 1.9%; given the inflation target of 4%, nominal GDP growth could be about 6%. In that scenario where the nominal GDP growth falls by 4% point from 10% to 6% in 2020-21, net tax revenue loss could be about Rs 60,000 crore (2.7% of total revenue). As mentioned above, the tax-GDP ratio would likely be lower than the budget estimate because of the type of activities permitted during the lockdown. This would increase the adverse impact on tax revenue.
There is a further assumption being made above regarding tax-GDP. While GST tends to move with overall GDP, direct taxes would depend on income growth of individuals and profit growth of companies. In a lower GDP growth environment, the effect on these two items may be higher than the deceleration of nominal GDP, bringing down the tax-GDP ratio. Further, customs duties depend on the value of imports, which may have a lower growth. This would, to some extent, be mitigated by the increase in the rate of excise duty on petroleum products.
These computations have been made considering the 2019-20 revised estimate as the base and the 2020-21 budget estimate as being realistic when it was made. However, these numbers may also be lower. For instance, if we extrapolate the net tax revenue growth rate of April 2019 to February 2020 (as released by the Controller General of Accounts) to March 2020, the shortfall is of the order of Rs 1,62,000 crore or 11% of the revised estimate. Thus, the shortfall in tax collections in 2020-21 may be significantly higher.
Table 1: Central government's revenue in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
Source |
Revenue |
Share in Total Revenue |
Net Tax Revenue |
16,35,909 |
73% |
Non-Tax Revenue |
3,85,017 |
17% |
Dividends and Profits |
1,55,395 |
6.9% |
Capital Receipts |
2,24,967 |
10% |
Disinvestment |
2,10,000 |
9.4% |
Total Revenue |
22,45,893 |
- |
Note: Capital receipts and total revenue do not include borrowings.
Sources: Union Budget Documents; PRS.
Other than taxes, the centre’s receipts consist of non-tax revenue and capital receipts. A significant part of non-tax revenue is from dividends and profits of public sector enterprises (PSEs) and the RBI (Rs 1.55 lakh crore). If profitability gets impacted, then there could be an adverse impact in these figures. The major chunk of capital receipts is budgeted from disinvestment of PSEs (Rs 2.1 lakh crore). Equity markets have declined sharply over the last month. If equity markets remain volatile, the disinvestment process and consequently the disinvestment receipts could get affected. Note that disinvestment receipts were targeted at Rs 2,10,000 crore, significantly higher than the Rs 50,299 crore raised in 2019-20.
Devolution to States
Like the centre, states also rely on taxes for most of their revenue. As per their 2020-21 budget, on an average, nearly 70% of their revenue is estimated to come from taxes (45% from their own taxes and 25% from their share of centre’s taxes). Lower collections in centre’s taxes because of the lockdown will also impact states’ share in them (also known as devolution). Table 2 shows the share of states in centre’s tax revenue and how they could get impacted by a lower economic growth rate due to the lockdown.
Table 2: Impact of lower economic growth during the lockdown on devolution in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
State/ UT |
Share in divisible pool (%) |
Devolution |
Impact of 1% point drop in national nominal GDP growth rate on Devolution |
Revenue impact as a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
Andhra Pradesh |
4.11 |
32,238* |
293 |
NA |
Arunachal Pradesh |
1.76 |
13,802 |
125 |
0.61% |
Assam |
3.13 |
26,776 |
243 |
0.26% |
Bihar |
10.06 |
91,181 |
829 |
0.45% |
Chhattisgarh |
3.42 |
26,803 |
244 |
0.29% |
Delhi |
- |
- |
- |
- |
Goa |
0.39 |
3,027 |
28 |
0.21% |
Gujarat |
3.4 |
26,646 |
242 |
0.15% |
Haryana |
1.08 |
8,485 |
77 |
0.09% |
Himachal Pradesh |
0.8 |
6,266 |
57 |
0.15% |
Jammu and Kashmir |
- |
15,200 |
138 |
0.16% |
Jharkhand |
3.31 |
25,980 |
236 |
0.31% |
Karnataka |
3.65 |
28,591 |
260 |
0.14% |
Kerala |
1.94 |
20,935 |
190 |
0.17% |
Madhya Pradesh |
7.89 |
61,841* |
562 |
NA |
Maharashtra |
6.14 |
48,109 |
437 |
0.13% |
Manipur |
0.72 |
5,630 |
51 |
0.28% |
Meghalaya |
0.77 |
5,999* |
55 |
NA |
Mizoram |
0.51 |
3,968 |
36 |
0.37% |
Nagaland |
0.57 |
4,493 |
41 |
0.28% |
Odisha |
4.63 |
36,300 |
330 |
0.27% |
Punjab |
1.79 |
14,021 |
127 |
0.14% |
Rajasthan |
5.98 |
46,886 |
426 |
0.25% |
Sikkim |
0.39 |
3,043 |
28 |
0.35% |
Tamil Nadu |
4.19 |
32,849 |
299 |
0.14% |
Telangana |
2.13 |
16,727 |
152 |
0.11% |
Tripura |
0.71 |
5,560 |
51 |
0.30% |
Uttar Pradesh |
17.93 |
1,52,863 |
1,389 |
0.33% |
Uttarakhand |
1.1 |
8,657 |
79 |
0.19% |
West Bengal |
7.52 |
65,835 |
598 |
0.33% |
Total |
100 |
8,38,710 |
7,624 |
0.22% |
Note: *Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so their devolution data has been computed as the total devolution to states provided in the union budget multiplied by their share. The devolution data for all other states has been taken from the state budget documents, which may not match with the union budget data in case of a few states. Revenue receipts data not available for Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya. The total for revenue receipt share has been computed excluding these three states.
Sources: Union and State Budget Documents; 15th Finance Commission Report for 2020-21; PRS.
State GST
Out of the 45% revenue coming from state’s own taxes, 35% revenue is estimated to come from three taxes – state GST (19%), sales tax/ VAT (10%), and state excise (6%). State GST is levied on the consumption of most goods and services within the state. While state GST is the largest component of states’ own tax revenue, states do not have the autonomy to change tax rates on their own as the rates are decided by the GST Council. Thus, due to lower GST revenue during the lockdown period, if a state wishes to increase GST rates for the remaining part of the year, it cannot do this on its own.
Table 3 shows the possible impact of a 1%-point decrease in the growth rates of nominal GSDP (GDP of the state) and its impact on state GST revenue in the year 2020-21. These estimates are based on the assumption that the tax-GSDP ratio during the lockdown remains same as estimated for the 2020-21 budget. However, as discussed earlier, the tax-GDP ratio for taxes such as GST is likely to decline. The analysis estimates the minimum impact on states’ GST revenue and does not captures its full extent.
Table 3: Impact of lower GSDP growth during the lockdown on state GST revenue in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
State/ UT |
State GST revenue |
Impact of 1% point drop in nominal GSDP growth rate on State GST revenue |
Revenue impact as a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Arunachal Pradesh |
324 |
3 |
0.01% |
Assam |
13,935 |
128 |
0.14% |
Bihar |
20,800 |
187 |
0.10% |
Chhattisgarh |
10,701 |
97 |
0.12% |
Delhi |
23,800 |
215 |
0.39% |
Goa |
2,772 |
26 |
0.19% |
Gujarat |
33,050 |
292 |
0.18% |
Haryana |
22,350 |
198 |
0.22% |
Himachal Pradesh |
3,855 |
35 |
0.09% |
Jammu and Kashmir |
6,065 |
55 |
0.06% |
Jharkhand |
9,450 |
85 |
0.11% |
Karnataka |
47,319 |
445 |
0.25% |
Kerala |
32,388 |
289 |
0.25% |
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Maharashtra |
1,07,146 |
957 |
0.28% |
Manipur |
914 |
8 |
0.05% |
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Mizoram |
504 |
4 |
0.04% |
Nagaland |
541 |
5 |
0.04% |
Odisha |
15,469 |
139 |
0.11% |
Punjab |
15,859 |
141 |
0.16% |
Rajasthan |
28,250 |
255 |
0.15% |
Sikkim |
650 |
5 |
0.07% |
Tamil Nadu |
46,196 |
410 |
0.19% |
Telangana |
27,600 |
242 |
0.17% |
Tripura |
1,311 |
12 |
0.07% |
Uttar Pradesh |
55,673 |
525 |
0.12% |
Uttarakhand |
5,386 |
49 |
0.12% |
West Bengal |
33,153 |
298 |
0.17% |
Total |
5,65,461 |
5,104 |
0.17% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available. 2020-21 GSDP data for Delhi was not available, so the GSDP growth rate in 2020-21 has been assumed to be the same as the growth rate in 2019-20 (10.5%).
Sources: State Budget Documents; PRS.
Sales tax/ VAT and State Excise
These two taxes have been major sources of revenue for states, estimated to contribute 16% of states’ revenue in 2020-21. With implementation of GST, states can now levy sales tax only on petroleum products (petrol, diesel, crude oil, natural gas, and aviation turbine fuel) and alcohol for human consumption. However, the lockdown has severely impacted the consumption, and thus sale, of all of these goods as most of the transportation is prohibited and businesses selling alcohol are also shut. As a result, the revenue coming from these taxes is likely to see a much larger impact as compared to the other taxes.
In addition, alcohol is also subject to state excise. Table 4 shows the average monthly impact of the lockdown on revenue from state excise. That is, this estimates the loss of revenue for each month of lockdown, with the assumption that there is no production of alcohol for human consumption during such periods.
Table 4: Average monthly impact of the lockdown on state excise revenue in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
State/ UT |
State excise revenue |
Average monthly impact on state excise revenue |
Monthly revenue impact as a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Arunachal Pradesh |
157 |
13 |
0.06% |
Assam |
1,750 |
146 |
0.16% |
Bihar |
0 |
0 |
0.00% |
Chhattisgarh |
5,200 |
433 |
0.52% |
Delhi |
6,300 |
525 |
0.95% |
Goa |
548 |
46 |
0.34% |
Gujarat |
144 |
12 |
0.01% |
Haryana |
7,500 |
625 |
0.69% |
Himachal Pradesh |
1,788 |
149 |
0.39% |
Jammu and Kashmir |
1,450 |
121 |
0.14% |
Jharkhand |
2,301 |
192 |
0.25% |
Karnataka |
22,700 |
1,892 |
1.05% |
Kerala |
2,801 |
233 |
0.20% |
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Maharashtra |
19,225 |
1,602 |
0.46% |
Manipur |
15 |
1 |
0.01% |
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Mizoram |
1 |
0 |
0.00% |
Nagaland |
6 |
0 |
0.00% |
Odisha |
5,250 |
438 |
0.35% |
Punjab |
6,250 |
521 |
0.59% |
Rajasthan |
12,500 |
1,042 |
0.60% |
Sikkim |
248 |
21 |
0.26% |
Tamil Nadu |
8,134 |
678 |
0.31% |
Telangana |
16,000 |
1,333 |
0.93% |
Tripura |
266 |
22 |
0.13% |
Uttar Pradesh |
37,500 |
3,125 |
0.74% |
Uttarakhand |
3,400 |
283 |
0.67% |
West Bengal |
12,732 |
1,061 |
0.59% |
Total |
1,74,164 |
14,514 |
0.48% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available.
Sources: State Budget Documents; PRS.
Sales tax/VAT is collected from sale of alcohol and petroleum products. We do not have any data on the reduction of sale of these items -- news reports indicating sale of alcohol in some states while petroleum products would be used by providers of essential services. For estimating the impact on sales tax/ VAT revenue, we have assumed the following three scenarios: (i) 40% shortfall in tax collections, (ii) 60% shortfall in tax collections, and (iii) 80% shortfall in tax collections in any month of lockdown. Table 5 shows the average monthly impact of the lockdown on sales tax/ VAT revenue under the three scenarios.
Table 5: Impact of lockdown on sales tax/ VAT revenue in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
State/ UT |
Loss of sales tax/ VAT revenue per lockdown month |
As a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
||||
40% shortfall |
60% shortfall |
80% shortfall |
40% shortfall |
60% shortfall |
80% shortfall |
|
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Arunachal Pradesh |
9 |
14 |
18 |
0.04% |
0.07% |
0.09% |
Assam |
178 |
267 |
356 |
0.19% |
0.29% |
0.39% |
Bihar |
194 |
292 |
389 |
0.11% |
0.16% |
0.21% |
Chhattisgarh |
138 |
207 |
276 |
0.16% |
0.25% |
0.33% |
Delhi |
207 |
310 |
413 |
0.37% |
0.56% |
0.75% |
Goa |
41 |
62 |
83 |
0.31% |
0.47% |
0.62% |
Gujarat |
774 |
1,162 |
1,549 |
0.48% |
0.72% |
0.95% |
Haryana |
357 |
535 |
713 |
0.40% |
0.59% |
0.79% |
Himachal Pradesh |
56 |
84 |
112 |
0.15% |
0.22% |
0.29% |
Jammu and Kashmir |
50 |
75 |
100 |
0.06% |
0.09% |
0.11% |
Jharkhand |
195 |
293 |
391 |
0.26% |
0.39% |
0.52% |
Karnataka |
593 |
889 |
1,186 |
0.33% |
0.49% |
0.66% |
Kerala |
775 |
1,163 |
1,551 |
0.68% |
1.01% |
1.35% |
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Maharashtra |
1,333 |
2,000 |
2,667 |
0.38% |
0.58% |
0.77% |
Manipur |
9 |
14 |
18 |
0.05% |
0.08% |
0.10% |
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Mizoram |
3 |
4 |
5 |
0.03% |
0.04% |
0.06% |
Nagaland |
9 |
13 |
18 |
0.06% |
0.09% |
0.12% |
Odisha |
292 |
438 |
583 |
0.23% |
0.35% |
0.47% |
Punjab |
186 |
279 |
372 |
0.21% |
0.32% |
0.42% |
Rajasthan |
700 |
1,050 |
1,400 |
0.40% |
0.61% |
0.81% |
Sikkim |
7 |
11 |
15 |
0.09% |
0.14% |
0.18% |
Tamil Nadu |
1,868 |
2,802 |
3,736 |
0.85% |
1.28% |
1.70% |
Telangana |
880 |
1,320 |
1,760 |
0.61% |
0.92% |
1.23% |
Tripura |
15 |
22 |
30 |
0.09% |
0.13% |
0.17% |
Uttar Pradesh |
943 |
1,414 |
1,886 |
0.22% |
0.33% |
0.45% |
Uttarakhand |
66 |
98 |
131 |
0.15% |
0.23% |
0.31% |
West Bengal |
251 |
377 |
503 |
0.14% |
0.21% |
0.28% |
Total |
10,130 |
15,195 |
20,260 |
0.34% |
0.51% |
0.67% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available.
Sources: State Budget Documents; PRS.
How much can GST compensation help?
The shortfall in state GST revenue could get offset by the GST compensation provided to states by the central government. The GST (Compensation to States) Act, 2017, requires the central government to provide compensation to states for loss of revenue arising due to GST implementation until 2022. For this purpose, the Act guarantees a 14% annual growth rate in state GST revenue, which is much higher than the growth likely in the year 2020-21. As a result, the central government would be required to provide states a compensation equivalent to the shortfall in growth in their state GST revenue, in comparison to the 14% growth.
However, it is likely that there may not be sufficient funds to provide compensation to states in 2020-21. Compensation to states is given out of the GST Compensation Fund, which consists of collections of a cess levied specifically to generate funds for this purpose. The cess is levied on coal, tobacco and its products, pan masala, automobiles, and aerated drinks. The cess collections may see a shortfall as the sale of many of these goods is likely to be affected this year. Note that domestic automobile sales declined 18% in 2019-20 over the previous year while coal production stayed constant.
In the 2020-21 budget, the central government estimated to provide Rs 1,35,368 crore as compensation to states, which is close to the total compensation estimated by states in their budgets. However, due to the lockdown, the cess collections financing these grants are estimated to decrease, whereas the compensation requirement of states is estimated to increase due to lower GST collections. While there is a risk that any incremental requirement may not be met, states’ revenue can see a much larger impact if cess collections are not even sufficient to meet their existing amounts as per the 2020-21 budgets (Table 6). States, on an average, depend on GST compensation grants for 4.4% of their revenue in 2020-21. However, states such as Gujarat, Punjab, and Delhi expect almost 14-15% of their revenue in 2020-21 to come in the form of GST compensation grants.
Table 6: GST compensation grants estimated by states in 2020-21 (Rs crore)
State/ UT |
GST Compensation |
GST compensation as a percentage of state’s revenue receipts |
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
Arunachal Pradesh |
0 |
0.0% |
Assam |
1,000 |
1.1% |
Bihar |
3,500 |
1.9% |
Chhattisgarh |
2,938 |
3.5% |
Delhi |
7,800 |
14.1% |
Goa |
1,358 |
10.2% |
Gujarat |
22,510 |
13.9% |
Haryana |
7,000 |
7.8% |
Himachal Pradesh |
3,338 |
8.7% |
Jammu and Kashmir |
3,177 |
3.6% |
Jharkhand |
1,568 |
2.1% |
Karnataka |
16,116 |
9.0% |
Kerala |
0 |
0.0% |
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
Maharashtra |
10,000 |
2.9% |
Manipur |
0 |
0.0% |
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
Mizoram |
0 |
0.0% |
Nagaland |
0 |
0.0% |
Odisha |
6,200 |
5.0% |
Punjab |
12,975 |
14.7% |
Rajasthan |
4,800 |
2.8% |
Sikkim |
0 |
0.0% |
Tamil Nadu |
10,300 |
4.7% |
Telangana |
0 |
0.0% |
Tripura |
208 |
1.2% |
Uttar Pradesh |
7,608 |
1.8% |
Uttarakhand |
3,571 |
8.4% |
West Bengal |
4,928 |
2.7% |
Total |
1,30,894 |
4.4% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available.
Sources: State Budget Documents; PRS.
A similar scenario played out last year when due to the economic slowdown, the cess collections were not sufficient to meet states’ compensation requirements. As a result, states have received the GST compensation only till November 2019. Note that the GST (Compensation to States) Act, 2017 provides that the GST Council can recommend other funding mechanisms for the Compensation Fund. For instance, this can be done when there is a shortfall of money in the Fund for providing compensation to states.
Impact on State Finances
In light of such severe stress on the revenue side, states will have to either cut their budgeted expenditure or increase their borrowings to meet the budget targets. Note that because of the coronavirus pandemic and the lockdown, states are also making unforeseen expenditure in the health sector and for providing relief from the lockdown. As a result, many states have already started working on the former by drawing up plans to defer or cut their planned expenditure, or divert funds for planned expenditure towards these immediate requirements. With relatively less flexibility on the side of revenue expenditure, capital expenditure could see a larger cut in many states. For instance, revenue expenditure includes expenditure committed towards payment of interest, salaries, and pension. On average, this committed expenditure uses up 50% of states’ revenue. However, some states have already gone ahead and deferred or cut the expenditure towards payment of salaries. Also, with private consumption and investment expected to remain sluggish, reduction of government expenditure could lead to a further decline in GDP.
The other option for states is to increase their borrowings. However, states’ borrowings are limited by their FRBM laws at 3% of their GSDP (with a further 0.5% of GSDP if they fulfil some conditions). States also need the consent of the central government to borrow money. While most states had already budgeted their fiscal deficit for 2020-21 near the upper limit, it seems some states do have some fiscal space to borrow more (Table 7). However, with GSDP expected to take a hit because of the lockdown, fiscal deficit as a percentage of GSDP for all states could be higher than budgeted targets, even if they do not make any additional borrowings.
Table 7: Fiscal deficit estimates for 2020-21 as a percentage of GSDP
State/ UT |
2019-20 (Revised) |
2020-21 (Budgeted) |
Andhra Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
Arunachal Pradesh |
3.1% |
2.4% |
Assam |
5.7% |
2.3% |
Bihar |
9.5% |
3.0% |
Chhattisgarh |
6.4% |
3.2% |
Delhi |
-0.1% |
0.5% |
Goa |
4.7% |
5.0% |
Gujarat |
1.6% |
1.8% |
Haryana |
2.8% |
2.7% |
Himachal Pradesh |
6.4% |
4.0% |
Jammu and Kashmir |
NA |
5.0% |
Jharkhand |
2.3% |
2.1% |
Karnataka |
2.3% |
2.6% |
Kerala |
3.0% |
3.0% |
Madhya Pradesh |
NA |
NA |
Maharashtra |
2.7% |
1.7% |
Manipur |
8.9% |
4.1% |
Meghalaya |
NA |
NA |
Mizoram |
8.3% |
1.7% |
Nagaland |
9.0% |
4.8% |
Odisha |
3.4% |
3.0% |
Punjab |
3.0% |
2.9% |
Rajasthan |
3.2% |
3.0% |
Sikkim |
4.3% |
3.0% |
Tamil Nadu |
3.0% |
2.8% |
Telangana |
2.3% |
3.0% |
Tripura |
6.2% |
3.5% |
Uttar Pradesh |
3.0% |
3.0% |
Uttarakhand |
2.5% |
2.6% |
West Bengal |
2.6% |
2.2% |
Centre |
3.8% |
3.5% |
Note: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Meghalaya passed a vote on account, so data not available.
Sources: Union and State Budget Documents; PRS.
The increasing Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) in the Indian banking sector has recently been the subject of much discussion and scrutiny. Yesterday, the Supreme Court struck down a circular dated February 12, 2018 issued by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The RBI circular laid down a revised framework for the resolution of stressed assets. In this blog, we examine the extent of NPAs in India, and recent events leading up to the Supreme Court judgement.
What is the extent and effect of the NPA problem in India?
Banks give loans and advances to borrowers. Based on the performance of the loan, it may be categorised as: (i) a standard asset (a loan where the borrower is making regular repayments), or (ii) a non-performing asset. NPAs are loans and advances where the borrower has stopped making interest or principal repayments for over 90 days.
As of 2018, the total NPAs in the economy stand at Rs 9.6 lakh crore. About 88% of these NPAs are from loans and advances of public sector banks. Banks are required to lend a certain percentage of their loans to priority sectors. These sectors are identified by the RBI and include agriculture, housing, education and small scale industries.[1] In 2018, of the total NPAs, 22% were from priority sector loans, and 78% were from non-priority sector loans.
In the last few years, gross NPAs of banks (as a percentage of total loans) have increased from 2.3% of total loans in 2008 to 9.3% in 2017 (see Figure 1). This indicates that an increasing proportion of a bank’s assets have ceased to generate income for the bank, lowering the bank’s profitability and its ability to grant further credit.
Figure 1: Gross NPAs (% of total loans)
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Source: Reserve Bank of India; PRS |
What has been done to address the problem of growing NPAs?
The measures taken to resolve and prevent NPAs can broadly be classified into two kinds – first, remedial measures for banks prescribed by the RBI for internal restructuring of stressed assets, and second, legislative means of resolving NPAs under various laws (like the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016).
Remedial Measures
Over the years, the RBI has issued various guidelines for banks aimed at the resolution of stressed assets in the economy. These included introduction of certain schemes such as: (i) Strategic Debt Restructuring (which allowed banks to change the management of the defaulting company), and (ii) Joint Lenders’ Forum (where lenders evolved a resolution plan and voted on its implementation). A summary of the various schemes implemented by the RBI is provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Non-legislative loan recovery framework
Sources: RBI scheme guidelines; Economic Survey 2016-17; PRS. |
Legislative Measures
In June 2017, an internal advisory committee of RBI identified 500 defaulters with the highest value of NPAs.[8] The committee recommended that 12 largest non-performing accounts, each with outstanding amounts greater than Rs 5,000 crore and totalling 25% of the NPAs of the economy, be referred for resolution under the IBC immediately. Proceedings against the 12 largest defaulters have been initiated under the IBC.
What was the February 12 circular issued by the RBI?
Subsequent to the enactment of the IBC, the RBI put in place a framework for restructuring of stressed assets of over Rs 2,000 crore on or after March 1, 2018. The resolution plan for such restructuring must be unanimously approved by all lenders and implemented within 180 days from the date of the first default. If the plan is not implemented within the stipulated time period, the stressed assets are required to be referred to the NCLT under IBC within 15 days. Further, the framework introduced a provision for early identification and categorisation of stressed assets before they are classified as NPAs.
On what grounds was the RBI circular challenged?
Borrowers whose loans were tagged as NPAs before the release of the circular recently crossed the 180-day deadline for internal resolution by banks. Some of these borrowers, including various power producers and sugar mills, had appealed against the RBI circular in various High Courts. A two-judge bench of the Allahabad High Court ruled in favour of the RBI’s powers to issue these guidelines, and refused to grant interim relief to power producers from being taken to the NCLT for bankruptcy. These batch of petitions against the circular were transferred to the Supreme Court, which issued an order in September 2018 to maintain status quo on the same.
What did the Supreme Court order?
The Court held the circular issued by RBI was outside the scope of the power given to it under Article 35AA of the Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2017. The Court reasoned that Section 35AA was proposed by the 2017 Act to authorise the RBI to issues directions only in relation to specific cases of default by specific debtors. It held that the RBI circular issued directions in relation to debtors in general and this was outside their scope of power. The court also held that consequently all IBC proceedings initiated under the RBI circular are quashed.
During the proceedings, various companies argued that the RBI circular applies to all corporate debtors alike, without looking into each individual’s sectors problems and attempting to solve them. For instance, several power companies provided sector specific reasons for delay in payment of bank dues. The reasons included: (i) cancellation of coal blocks by the SC leading to non-availability of fuel, (ii) lack of enough power purchase agreements by states, (iii) non-payment of dues by DISCOMs, and (iv) delays in project implementation leading to cost overruns. Note that, in its 40th report, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Energy analysed the impact of the RBI circular on the power sector and noted that the ‘one size fits all’ approach of the RBI is erroneous.
[1] ‘Priority Sector Lending – Targets and Classification’ Reserve Bank of India, July 2012, https://rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=7460&Mode=0.
[2] Revised Guidelines on Corporate Debt Restructuring Mechanism, Reserve Bank of India, https://www.rbi.org.in/upload/notification/pdfs/67158.pdf.
[3] ‘Framework for Revitalising Distressed Assets in the Economy – Guidelines on Joint Lenders’ Forum (JLF) and Corrective Action Plan (CAP)’, Reserve Bank of India, February 26, 2016, https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=8754&Mode=0.
[4] Timelines for Stressed Assets, Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, May 5, 2017, https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=10957&Mode=0.
[5] Flexible Structuring of Long Term Project Loans to Infrastructure and Core Industries, RBI, July 15, 2014, https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=9101&Mode=0.
[6] Chapter 4, The Economic Survey 2016-17, http://unionbudget.nic.in/es2016-17/echap04.pdf.
[7] ‘RBI introduces a ‘Scheme for Sustainable Structuring of Stressed Assets’’ Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, June 13, 2016, https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=37210.
[8] RBI identifies Accounts for Reference by Banks under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), Reserve Bank of India, June 13, 2017, https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=40743