Recently, the Kelkar Committee published a roadmap for fiscal consolidation. The report stresses the need and urgency to address India’s fiscal deficit. A high fiscal deficit – the excess of government expenditure over receipts – can be problematic for many reasons. The fiscal deficit is financed by government borrowing; increased borrowing can crowd out funds available for private investment. High government spending can also lead to a rise in price levels. A full PRS summary of the report can be found here. Recent fiscal trends Last year (2011-12), the central government posted a fiscal deficit of 5.8% (of GDP), significantly higher than the targeted 4.6%. This is in stark contrast to five years ago in 2007-08, when after embarking on a path of fiscal consolidation the government’s fiscal deficit had shrunk to a 30 year low of 2.5%. In 2008-09, a combination of the Sixth Pay Commission, farmers’ debt waiver and a crisis-driven stimulus led to the deficit rising to 6% and it has not returned to those levels since. As of August this year, government accounts reveal a fiscal deficit of Rs 3,37,538 crore which is 65.7% of the targeted deficit with seven months to go in the fiscal year. With growth slowing this year, the committee expects tax receipts to fall short of expectations significantly and expenditure to overshoot budget estimates, leaving the economy on the edge of a “fiscal precipice”.
Figure 1 (source: RBI)
Committee recommendations - expenditure To tackle the deficit on the expenditure side, the committee wants to ease the subsidy burden. Subsidy expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, has crept up in the last two years (see Figure 2) and the committee expects it to reach 2.6% of GDP in 2012-13. In response, the committee calls for an immediate increase in the price of diesel, kerosene and LPG. The committee also recommends phasing out the subsidy on diesel and LPG by 2014-15. Initial reports suggest that the government may not support this phasing out of subsidies.
Figure 2 (source: RBI, Union Budget documents, PRS)
For the fertiliser subsidy, the committee recommends implementing the Department of Fertilisers proposal of a 10% price increase on urea. Last week , the government raised the price of urea by Rs 50 per tonne (a 0.9% increase). Finally, the committee explains the rising food subsidy expenditure as a mismatch between the issue price and the minimum support price and wants this to be addressed. Committee recommendations - receipts Rising subsidies have not been matched by a significant increase in receipts through taxation: gross tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has remained around 10% of GDP (see Figure 3). The committee seeks to improve collections in both direct and indirect taxes via better tax administration. Over the last decade, income from direct taxes – the tax on income – has emerged as the biggest contributor to the Indian exchequer. The committee feels that the pending Direct Tax Code Bill would result in significant losses and should be reviewed. To boost income from indirect taxes – the tax on goods and services – the committee wants the proposed Goods and Service Tax regime to be implemented as soon as possible.
Figure 3 (source: RBI)
Increasing disinvestment, the process of selling government stake in public enterprises, is another proposal to boost receipts. India has failed to meet the disinvestment estimate set out in the Budget in the last two years (Figure 4). The committee believes introducing new channels [1. The committee suggests introducing a ‘call option model’. This is a mechanism allowing the government to offer for sale multiple securities over a period of time till disinvestment targets are achieved. Investors would have the option to purchase securities at the cost of a premium. They also propose introducing ‘exchange traded funds’ which would comprise all listed securities of Central Public Sector Enterprises and would provide investors with the benefits of diversification, low cost access and flexibility.] for disinvestment would ensure that disinvestment receipts would meet this year’s target of Rs 30,000 crore.
Figure 4 (source: Union Budget documents, PRS)
Taken together, these policy changes, the committee believe would significantly improve India’s fiscal health and boost growth. Their final projections for 2012-13, in both a reform and no reform scenario, and the medium term (2013-14 and 2014-15) are presented in the table below: [table id=2 /]
We wrote a piece for ibnlive.com on the major differences between the government’s Lok Pal Bill, 2011 and the Jan Lok Pal Bill drafted by Anna Hazare’s group. The note is reproduced below. The streets are witnessing a demand that the government’s Lok Pal Bill be replaced by the Jan Lok Pal Bill (JLP) as drafted by the team led by Anna Hazare. There are several significant differences between the two bills. In this note, we describe the some of these differences. (See here for more on the Lok Pal Bill). First, there is a divergence on the jurisdiction of the Lok Pal. Both bills include ministers, MPs for any action outside Parliament, and Group A officers (and equivalent) of the government. The government bill includes the prime minister after he demits office whereas the JLP includes a sitting prime minister. The JLP includes any act of an MP in respect of a speech or vote in Parliament (which is now protected by Article 105 of the Constitution). The JLP includes judges; the government bill excludes them. The JLP includes all government officials, while the government bill does not include junior (below Group A) officials. The government bill also includes officers of NGOs who receive government funds or any funds from the public; JLP does not cover NGOs. Second, the two Bills differ on the composition. The government bill has a chairperson and upto 8 members; at least half the members must have a judicial background. The JLP has a chairperson and 10 members, of which 4 have a judicial background. Third, the process of selecting the Lok Pal members is different. The JLP has a two stage process. A search committee will shortlist potential candidates. The search committee will have 10 members; five of these would have retired as Chief Justice of India, Chief Election Commissioner or Comptroller and Auditor General; they will select the other five from civil society. The Lok Pal chairperson and members will be selected from this shortlist by a selection committee. The selection committee consists of the prime minister, the leader of opposition in Lok Sabha, two supreme court judges, two high court chief justices, the chief election commissioner, the comptroller and auditor general, and all previous Lok Pal chairpersons. The government bill has a simpler process. The selection will be made by a committee consisting of the prime minister, the leaders of opposition in both Houses of Parliament, a supreme court judge, a high court chief justice, an eminent jurist, and an eminent person in public life. The selection committee may, at its discretion, appoint a search committee to shortlist candidates. Fourth, there are some differences in the qualifications of a member of the Lok Pal. The JLP requires a judicial member to have held judicial office for 10 years or been a high court or supreme court advocate for 15 years. The government bill requires the judicial member to be a supreme court judge or a high court chief justice. For other members, the government bill requires at least 25 years experience in anti-corruption policy, public administration, vigilance or finance. The JLP has a lower age limit of 45 years, and disqualifies anyone who has been in government service in the previous two years. Fifth, the process for removal of Lok Pal members is different. The government bill permits the president to make a reference to the Supreme Court for an inquiry, followed by removal if the member is found to be biased or corrupt. The reference may be made by the president (a) on his own, (a) on a petition signed by 100 MPs, or (c) on a petition by a citizen if the President is then satisfied that it should be referred. The President may also remove any member for insolvency, infirmity of mind or body, or engaging in paid employment. The JLP has a different process. The process starts with a complaint by any person to the Supreme Court. If the court finds misbehaviour, infirmity of mind or body, insolvency or paid employment, it may recommend his removal to the President. Sixth, the offences covered by the Bills vary. The government bill deals only with offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The JLP, in addition, includes offences by public servants under the Indian Penal Code, victimization of whistleblowers and repeated violation of citizen’s charter. Seventh, the government bill provides for an investigation wing under the Lok Pal. The JLP states that the CBI will be under the Lok Pal while investigating corruption cases. Eighth, the government bill provides for a prosecution wing of the Lok Pal. In the JLP, the CBI’s prosecution wing will conduct this function. Ninth, the process for prosecution is different. In the government bill, the Lok Pal may initiate prosecution in a special court. A copy of the report is to be sent to the competent authority. No prior sanction is required. In the JLP, prosecution of the prime minister, ministers, MPs and judges of supreme court and high courts may be initiated only with the permission of a 7-judge bench of the Lok Pal. Tenth, the JLP deals with grievance redressal of citizens, in addition to the process for prosecuting corruption cases. It requires every public authority to publish citizen’s charters listing its commitments to citizens. The government bill does not deal with grievance redressal. Given the widespread media coverage and public discussions, it is important that citizens understand the differences and nuances. This may be a good opportunity to enact a law which includes the better provisions of each of these two bills.
