Yesterday, the government circulated certain official amendments to the Constitution (122nd Amendment) Bill, 2014 on GST. The Bill is currently pending in Rajya Sabha. The Bill was introduced and passed in Lok Sabha in May 2015. It was then referred to a Select Committee of Rajya Sabha which submitted its report in July 2015. With the Bill listed for passage this week, we explain key provisions in the Bill, and the amendments proposed. What is the GST? Currently, indirect taxes are imposed on goods and services. These include excise duty, sales tax, service tax, octroi, customs duty etc. Some of these taxes are levied by the centre and some by the states. For taxes imposed by states, the tax rates may vary across different states. Also, goods and services are taxed differently. The Goods and Services Tax (GST) is a value added tax levied across goods and services at the point of consumption. The idea of a GST regime is to subsume most indirect taxes under a single taxation regime. This is expected to help broaden the tax base, increase tax compliance, and reduce economic distortions caused by inter-state variations in taxes. What does the 2014 Bill on GST do? The 2014 Bill amends the Constitution to give concurrent powers to Parliament and state legislatures to levy a Goods and Services tax (GST). This implies that the centre will levy a central GST (CGST), while states will be permitted to levy a state GST (SGST). For goods and services that pass through several states, or imports, the centre will levy another tax, the Integrated GST (IGST). Alcohol for human consumption has been kept out of the purview of GST. Further, GST will be levied on 5 types of petroleum products at a later date, to be decided by the GST Council. The Council is a body comprising of Finance Ministers of the centre and all states (including Delhi and Puducherry). This body will make recommendations in relation to the implementation of GST, including the rates, principles of levy, etc. The Council is also to decide the modalities for resolution of disputes that arise out of its recommendations. States may be given compensation for any revenue losses they may face from the introduction of the GST regime. Such compensation may be provided for a period of up to five years. Further, the centre may levy an additional tax, up to 1%, in the course of interstate trade. The revenues from the levy of this tax will be given to the state from where the good originates. Expert bodies like the Select Committee and the Arvind Subramanian Committee have observed that this provision could lead to cascading of taxes (as tax on tax will be levied).[i] It also distorts the creation of a national market, as a product made in one state and sold in another would be more expensive than one made and sold within the same state. What are the key changes proposed by the 2016 amendments? The amendments propose three key changes to the 2014 Bill. They relate to (i) additional tax up to 1%; (ii) compensation to states; and (iii) dispute resolution by the GST Council.
These amendments will be taken up for discussion with the Bill in Rajya Sabha this week. The Bill requires a special majority for its passage as it is a Constitution Amendment Bill (that is at least 50% majority of the total membership in the House, and 2/3rds majority of all members present and voting). If the Bill is passed with amendments, it will have to be sent back to Lok Sabha for consideration and passage. After its passage in Parliament, at least 50% state legislatures will have to pass resolutions to ratify the Bill. Once the constitutional framework is in place, the centre will have to pass simple laws to levy CGST and IGST. Similarly, all states will have to pass a simple law on SGST. These laws will specify the rates of the GST to be levied, the goods and services that will be included, the threshold of the turnover of businesses to be included, etc. Note that the Arvind Subramanian Committee, set up by the Finance Ministry, recommended the rates of GST that may be levied. The table below details the bands of rates proposed.
| Table 1: Rates of GST recommended by Expert Committee headed by Arvind Subramanian | ||
| Type of rate | Rate | Details |
| Revenue Neutral Rate | 15% | Single rate which maintains revenue at current levels. |
| Standard Rate | 17-18% | Too be applied to most goods and services |
| Lower rates | 12% | To be applied to certain goods consumed by the poor |
| Demerit rate | 40% | To be applied on luxury cars, aerated beverages, paan masala, and tobacco |
| Source: Arvind Subramanian Committee Report (2015) | ||
Several other measures related to the back end infrastructure for registration and reporting of GST, administrative officials related to GST, etc. will also have to be put in place, before GST can be rolled out. [For further details on the full list of amendments, please see here. For other details on the GST Bill, please see here.]
Recently, the Supreme Court collegium reiterated its recommendations for the appointment of 11 judges to certain High Courts. It had first recommended these names earlier this year and in August last year, but these appointments were not made. The Indian judiciary faces high vacancies across all levels (the Supreme Court, High Courts, and subordinate courts). Vacancy of judges in courts is one of the reasons for delays and a rising number of pending cases, as there are not enough judges to hear and decide cases. As of today, more than four crore cases are pending across all courts in India. In this blog post, we discuss vacancies across courts over the years, delays in appointment of judges, and methods to determine the adequate judge strength required to handle the caseload courts face.
High vacancy of judges across courts
Vacancies in courts keep on arising periodically due to retirement, resignation, demise, or elevation of judges. Over the years, the sanctioned strength of judges in both High Courts and subordinate courts has been increased gradually. However, vacancies persist due to insufficient appointments (see Figures 1 and 2). Between 2010 and 2020, vacancies increased from 18% to 21% across all levels of courts (from 6% to 12% in the Supreme Court, from 33% to 38% in High Courts, and from 18% to 20% in subordinate courts).
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Figure 1: Vacancy of judges in High Courts |
Figure 2: Vacancy of judges in subordinate courts |
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Sources: Court News 2010-2018; Vacancy Statement, and Rajya Sabha replies, Part I, Budget Session (2021), Department of Justice; PRS. |
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As on November 1, 2021, the Supreme Court had a vacancy of one judge (out of a sanctioned strength of 34). Vacancy in High Courts stood at 37% (406 posts vacant out of a sanctioned strength of 1,098). Since May, 2021, the Supreme Court collegium has recommended more than 130 names for appointment as High Court judges. In three High Courts (Telangana, Patna, and Calcutta), at least half of the posts are vacant (see Figure 3). The Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice (2020) noted that every year, 35-40% of posts of High Court judges remain unfilled.
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Figure 3: Vacancy of judges across High Courts (in %) (as on November 1, 2021)
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Source: Vacancy Statement, Department of Justice; PRS. |
Appointments of High Court judges are guided by a memorandum of procedure. As per this memorandum, the appointment process is to be initiated by the concerned High Court at least six months before a vacancy occurs. However, the Standing Committee (2021) noted that this timeline is rarely adhered to by High Courts. Further, in the final stage of the process, after receiving recommendations from the Supreme Court collegium, the executive appoints judges to the High Court. No timeline is prescribed for this stage of the appointment process. In 2018 and 2019, the average time taken to appoint High Court judges after receiving the collegium’s recommendations was five to seven months.
As of today, over 3.6 crore cases are pending before subordinate courts in India. As on February 20, 2020, 21% posts for judges were vacant (5,146 posts out of the sanctioned strength of 24,018) in subordinate courts. Subordinate courts in Bihar, Haryana, and Jharkhand (among the states with high population) had a high proportion of vacancies of judges (see Figure 4). Note that the Supreme Court is monitoring the procedure for appointment of judges to subordinate courts.
For an analysis of the data on pendency and vacancies in the Indian judiciary, see here.
Figure 4: Vacancy of judges across subordinate courts (in %) (as on February 20, 2020)
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Source: Report No. 101, Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice (2020); PRS. |
How many judges do we need?
The Law Commission of India (1987) had noted the importance of manpower planning for the judiciary. Lack of adequate number of judges means a greater workload per judge. Thus, it becomes essential to arrive at an optimal judge strength to deal with pending and new cases in courts. Over the years, different methods of calculating the required judge strength for subordinate courts (where the backlog of cases in the Indian judiciary is concentrated) have been recommended (see Table 1).
Table 1: Methods recommended for calculating the required number of judges for subordinate courts
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Method of calculation |
Recommendation and its status |
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Judge-to-population ratio: optimum number of judges per million population |
The Law Commission of India (1987) had recommended increasing this ratio to 50 judges per million people. This was reiterated by the Supreme Court (2001) and the Standing Committee on Home Affairs (2002). For 2020, the judge-to-population ratio was 21 judges per million population. Note that this figure is calculated based on the sanctioned strength of judges in the Supreme Court, High Courts and subordinate courts. |
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Rate of disposal: number of additional judges required (to clear the existing backlog of cases and ensure that new backlog is not created) based on the average number of cases disposed per judge |
The Law Commission of India (2014) proposed this method. It rejected the judge-to-population ratio method, observing that filing of cases per capita varies substantially across geographic units depending on socio-economic conditions. |
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Weighted case load method: calculating judge strength based on the disposal by judges, taking into account the nature and complexity of cases in local conditions |
The National Court Management Systems Committee (NCMS) (2016) critiqued the rate of disposal method. It proposed, as an interim measure, the weighted case load method, which addresses the existing backlog of cases as well as the new flow of cases every year in subordinate courts. In 2017, the Supreme Court accepted this model. |
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Time-based weighted case load method: calculating the required judge strength taking into account the actual time spent by judges in different types of cases at varying stages based on an empirical study |
Used widely in the United States, this was the long-term method recommended by the NCMS (2016) to assess the required judge strength for subordinate courts. It involves determining the total number of ‘judicial hours’ required for disposing of the case load of each court. The Delhi High Court used this approach in a pilot project (January 2017- December 2018) to calculate the ideal judge strength for disposing of pending cases in certain courts in Delhi. |
Sources: Reports No. 120 (1987) and 245 (2014), Law Commission of India; Report No. 85, Standing Committee on Home Affairs (2002); Note for Calculating Required Judge Strength for Subordinate Courts, National Court Management Systems Committee (NCMS) (2016); Imtiyaz Ahmad vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, Supreme Court (2017); PRS.
