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The Saansad Adarsh Gram Yojana was launched last week, for the development of model villages. Under the Yojana, Members of Parliament (MPs) will be responsible for developing the socio-economic and physical infrastructure of three villages each by 2019, and a total of eight villages each by 2024.
The first Adarsh Gram must be developed by 2016, and two more by 2019. From 2019 to 2024, five more Adarsh Grams must be developed by each MP, one each year. This implies that a total of 6,433 Adarsh Grams, of the 2,65,000 gram panchayats, will be created by 2024. Key features of the Yojana are outlined below.
Objectives
Key objectives of the Yojana include:
Identification of villages
MPs can select any gram panchayat, other than their own village or that of their spouse, to be developed as an Adarsh Gram. The village must have a population of 3000-5000 people if it is located in the plains, or 1000-3000 people if located in hilly areas.
Lok Sabha MPs can choose a village from their constituency, and Rajya Sabha MPs from the state from which they are elected. Nominated members can choose a village from any district of the country. MPs which represent urban constituencies can identify a village from a neighbouring rural constituency.
Funding
No new funds have been allocated for the Yojana. Resources may be raised through:
Implementation
A Village Development Plan must be created for each Adarsh Gram. While each village will develop a list of activities to be carried out, based on its own resources and requirements, possible activities have been listed in the guidelines for the scheme. For example, Adarsh Grams can work towards providing universal access to basic healthcare facilities, promoting diversified livelihoods through agriculture related livelihoods and skill development, providing pension for all eligible families, housing for all, and promoting social forestry.
The table below outlines key functionaries at the national, state, district, and village level and their responsibilities.
Table 1: Roles and responsibilities of key functionaries
| Level | Functionary | Key roles and responsibilities |
| National | Member of Parliament |
|
| Two committees, headed by the Minister of Rural Development, and Secretary, Rural Development, respectively.* |
|
|
| State | A committee headed by the Chief Secretary |
|
| District | District Collector |
|
| Village | Gram Panchayat and functionaries of schemes (at various levels) |
|
Note: *These committees will include members from other Ministries.
Sources: Saansad Adarsh Gram Yojana Guidelines, Ministry of Rural Development; PRS
Monitoring
A web based monitoring system will be established to enable the MP and other stakeholders to monitor the scheme. Outputs relating to physical and financial targets will be measured each quarter. A mid-term evaluation and post-project evaluation will be conducted through an independent agency.
More information on the scheme is available in the guidelines for the scheme, here.
The last few months saw a number of allegations of corruption in issues such as contracts for the Commonwealth Games, allocation of 2G Spectrum, and the building of the Adarsh housing society. Professor Kaushik Basu, the Chief Economic Adviser to the Ministry of Finance, has proposed a modification in order to make the anti-corruption law in the country more effective. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 penalizes both bribe giving and taking. Bribe giving is punishable under the Act with imprisonment ranging between six months to five years. He argues that bribe giving should be legalized. Professor Basu distinguishes “harassment bribes”, which he defines as “bribes that people often have to give to get what they are legally entitled to” from the remaining, “Non-Harassment Bribes” which would involve illegal benefits accruing to the bribe giver at a potential cost to the public interest. He argues that legalization of harassment bribes would reduce the nexus between the giver (victim) and the taker of a bribe. Giving complete immunity to the bribe-giver would ensure higher reporting and co-operation of the giver in bringing to justice the bribe taker. The present law acts as a deterrent to reporting of bribery. Courts have also highlighted this issue. The High Court of Delhi in the Bharadwaaj Media Case (2007) observed that a “bribe giver is normally on the mercy of the officials and babus who compel him to pay bribe even for lawful work.” The Court further observed that “Instead of expressing gratefulness to the persons who expose corruption, if the institutions start taking action against those who expose corruption, corruption is bound to progress day and night.” It can be inferred from the judgement that steps ought to be taken to provide protection to those exposing bribery. The proposed legalization of bribe-giving may result in increased reporting of bribery and co-operation of the victim during prosecution. The fear that a bribe giver may report the public official could reduce corruption, at least in terms of harassment bribes. However, this proposal may reduce the stigma attached to bribe-giving and result in corrosion of morality. Much of the recent debate around corruption and the Lok Pal Bill revolve around effective prosecution. This paper looks at the incentive structure for reporting bribe-giving, and merits public debate.
