The doctrine of separation of powers implies that each pillar of democracy – the executive, legislature and the judiciary – perform separate functions and act as separate entities. The executive is vested with the power to make policy decisions and implement laws. The legislature is empowered to issue enactments. The judiciary is responsible for adjudicating disputes. The doctrine is a part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution[1] even though it is not specifically mentioned in its text. Thus, no law may be passed and no amendment may be made to the Constitution deviating from the doctrine. Different agencies impose checks and balances upon each other but may not transgress upon each other’s functions. Thus, the judiciary exercises judicial review over executive and legislative action, and the legislature reviews the functioning of the executive. There have been some cases where the courts have issued laws and policy related orders through their judgements. These include the Vishakha case where guidelines on sexual harassment were issued by the Supreme Court, the order of the Court directing the Centre to distribute food grains (2010) and the appointment of the Special Investigation Team to replace the High Level Committee established by the Centre for investigating black money deposits in Swiss Banks. In 1983 when Justice Bhagwati introduced public interest litigation in India, Justice Pathak in the same judgement warned against the “temptation of crossing into territory which properly pertains to the Legislature or to the Executive Government”[2]. Justice Katju in 2007 noted that, “Courts cannot create rights where none exist nor can they go on making orders which are incapable of enforcement or violative of other laws or settled legal principles. With a view to see that judicial activism does not become judicial adventurism the courts must act with caution and proper restraint. It needs to be remembered that courts cannot run the government. The judiciary should act only as an alarm bell; it should ensure that the executive has become alive to perform its duties.” [3] While there has been some discussion on the issue of activism by the judiciary, it must be noted that there are also instances of the legislature using its law making powers to reverse the outcome of some judgements. (M.J. Antony has referred to a few in his article in the Business Standard here.) We discuss below some recent instances of the legislature overturning judicial pronouncements by passing laws with retrospective effect. On September 7, 2011 the Parliament passed the Customs Amendment and Validation Bill, 2011 which retrospectively validates all duties imposed and actions taken by certain customs officials who were not authorized under the Customs Act to do the stated acts. Some of the duties imposed were in fact challenged before the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs vs. Sayed Ali in 2011[4]. The Supreme Court struck down the levy of duties since these were imposed by unauthorised officials. By passing the Customs Bill, 2011 the Parliament circumvented the judgement and amended the Act to authorize certain officials to levy duties retrospectively, even those that had been held to be illegal by the SC. Another instance of the legislature overriding the decision of the Supreme Court was seen in the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Ordinance, 2009 which was passed into an Act. The Supreme Court had ruled that the price at which the Centre shall buy sugar from the mill shall include the statutory minimum price (SMP) and an additional amount of profits that the mills share with farmers.[5] The Amendment allowed the Centre to pay a fair and remunerative price (FRP) instead of the SMP. It also did away with the requirement to pay the additional amount. The amendment applied to all transactions for purchase of sugar by the Centre since 1974. In effect, the amendment overruled the Court decision. The executive tried to sidestep the Apex Court decision through the Enemy Property (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 2010. The Court had issued a writ to the Custodian of Enemy Property to return possession of certain properties to the legal heir of the owner. Subsequently the Executive issued an Ordinance under which all properties that were divested from the Custodian in favour of legal heirs by a Court order were reverted to him. The Ordinance lapsed and a Bill was introduced in the Parliament. The Bill is currently being examined by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs. These examples highlight some instances where the legislature has acted to reverse judicial pronouncements. The judiciary has also acted in several instances in the grey areas separating its role from that of the executive and the legislature. The doctrine of separation of powers is not codified in the Indian constitution. Indeed, it may be difficult to draw a strict line demarcating the separation. However, it may be necessary for each pillar of the State to evolve a healthy convention that respects the domain of the others.
[1] Keshavananda Bharti vs. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461
[2] Bandhua Mukti Morcha AIR 1984 SC 802
[3] Aravali Golf Club vs. Chander Hass (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 289
[4] Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs vs. Sayed Ali (2011) 3 SCC 537
[5] Mahalakshmi Mills vs. Union of India (2009) 16 SCC 569
The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021 was introduced in Lok Sabha today. It seeks to dissolve certain existing appellate bodies and transfer their functions (such as adjudication of appeals) to existing judicial bodies (mainly high courts) (see Table 1). It also amends the Finance Act, 2017, to bring certain provisions (such as qualifications, appointments, term of office, salaries and allowances of tribunal members) under the purview of the Bill. Currently, these provisions are notified through Rules under the Finance Act, 2017.
Note that the 2017 Act reorganised the Indian tribunal system to ensure uniformity in their administration by amalgamating certain tribunals based on the similarity in their functional domain. It also delegated powers to the central government to make Rules to provide for the qualifications, appointments, term of office, salaries and allowances, removal, and other conditions of service for chairpersons and members of these tribunals.
This Bill replaces an Ordinance with similar provisions that was promulgated in April 2021. The 2021 Ordinance was challenged in the Supreme Court over its compliance with past Supreme Court judgements. In July 2021, the Court struck down certain provisions of the Ordinance, such as the four-year term of office for members, and the minimum age bar of 50 years to be appointed as a member of a tribunal. Table 2 shows a detailed comparison of key provisions of the 2021 Bill with the 2021 Ordinance and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in its judgement. The Bill does not conform to the judgement of the Supreme Court and retains the provisions of the Ordinance that were struck down by the Court.
For an analysis of the 2021 Ordinance, please see our note here. For more details on the evolution of the tribunal system in India, please see our note.
Table 1: Transfer of functions of key appellate bodies as proposed under the Bill
|
Appellate body |
Role |
Proposed entity |
|
Appellate Tribunal under the Cinematograph Act, 1952 |
Adjudication of appeals against the Board of Film Certification |
High Court |
|
Appellate Board under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Registrar |
High Court |
|
Appellate Board under the Copyright Act, 1957 |
Adjudication of certain disputes and appeals against orders of the Registrar of Copyright. Disputes include those related to publications and term of the copyright |
Commercial Court or the Commercial Division of a High Court* |
|
Authority for Advance Rulings under the Customs Act, 1962 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Customs Authority for advance rulings |
High Court |
|
Appellate Board under The Patents Act, 1970 |
Adjudication of appeals against decisions of the Controller on certain matters. Matters include applications for patents and restoration of patents. |
High Court |
|
Airport Appellate Tribunal under the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 |
Adjudication of:
|
|
|
Airport Appellate Tribunal under the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Highway Administration on matters including, grant of lease or licence of highway land, removal of unauthorised occupation, and prevention of damage to highway. |
Civil Court# |
|
Appellate Tribunal under the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, 2001 |
Adjudication of appeals against certain orders of Registrar or Plant Varieties and Farmer Rights Authority |
High Court |
|
Appellate Board under the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 |
Adjudication of appeals against orders of the Registrar |
High Court |
Notes: * Constituted under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015; # Refers to a Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
Sources: The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021; Parent Acts of the appellate bodies; PRS.
Table 2: Key provisions in the 2021 Bill and the Ordinance vis-a-vis the Supreme Court judgements
|
Provisions |
2021 Ordinance |
Supreme Court Judgement of July 2021 |
2021 Bill |
|
Term of office of Chairperson and members |
Four-year term with eligibility for re-appointment. |
The Court stated that a short tenure of members (such as three years) along with provisions of re-appointment increases the influence and control of the Executive over the judiciary. In a short tenure, by the time the members achieve the required knowledge, expertise and efficiency, one term gets over. This prevents enhancement of adjudicatory experience, thereby, impacting the efficacy of tribunals. The Court struck down the provision of four -year term and reiterated its past judgements, which recommended a five-year term with eligibility for re-appointment. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
|
Minimum age requirement for appointment of Chairperson and members |
50 years |
The Court observed that the minimum age requirement of 50 years violates past Court judgements, where the Court has stated that advocates with at least 10 years of relevant experience must be eligible to be appointed as judicial members, as that is the qualification required for a High Court judge. Such a high age limit also prevents the recruitment of young talent. The provision was struck down. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
|
Time limit for appointments |
Preferably within three months from the date of the recommendations of the search-cum-selection committee. |
The Court noted that not mandating the central government to make appointments within three months (from the date of recommendation of the search-cum-selection committee) leads to delay in the appointment of members. This impacts the functioning and efficacy of tribunals. The provision was struck down over non-compliance with past judgements, which mandated the appointments to be made within three months. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
|
Number of recommendations for a post |
Two names for each post. |
The Court stated that the recommendations for appointment of members by the search-cum-selection committee should be final. The Executive must not be allowed to exercise any discretion in matter of appointments in a tribunal. The Court struck down the provision and reiterated its past judgement, which specified that the selection committee must suggest one name for each post. The Committee may recommend one name in wait list. |
Same as that in Ordinance. |
Sources: The Tribunals Reforms Ordinance, 2021; The Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2021; Madras Bar Association vs Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 000502 of 2021; PRS.
