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The doctrine of separation of powers implies that each pillar of democracy – the executive, legislature and the judiciary – perform separate functions and act as separate entities.  The executive is vested with the power to make policy decisions and implement laws.  The legislature is empowered to issue enactments.  The judiciary is responsible for adjudicating disputes.  The doctrine is a part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution[1] even though it is not specifically mentioned in its text.  Thus, no law may be passed and no amendment may be made to the Constitution deviating from the doctrine.  Different agencies impose checks and balances upon each other but may not transgress upon each other’s functions.  Thus, the judiciary exercises judicial review over executive and legislative action, and the legislature reviews the functioning of the executive. There have been some cases where the courts have issued laws and policy related orders through their judgements.  These include the Vishakha case where guidelines on sexual harassment were issued by the Supreme Court, the order of the Court directing the Centre to distribute food grains (2010) and the appointment of the Special Investigation Team to replace the High Level Committee established by the Centre for investigating black money deposits in Swiss Banks. In 1983 when Justice Bhagwati introduced public interest litigation in India, Justice Pathak in the same judgement warned against the “temptation of crossing into territory which properly pertains to the Legislature or to the Executive Government”[2].  Justice Katju in 2007 noted that, “Courts cannot create rights where none exist nor can they go on making orders which are incapable of enforcement or violative of other laws or settled legal principles. With a view to see that judicial activism does not become judicial adventurism the courts must act with caution and proper restraint. It needs to be remembered that courts cannot run the government. The judiciary should act only as an alarm bell; it should ensure that the executive has become alive to perform its duties.” [3] While there has been some discussion on the issue of activism by the judiciary, it must be noted that there are also instances of the legislature using its law making powers to reverse the outcome of some  judgements.  (M.J. Antony has referred to a few in his article in the Business Standard here.)  We discuss below some recent instances of the legislature overturning judicial pronouncements by passing laws with retrospective effect. On September 7, 2011 the Parliament passed the Customs Amendment and Validation Bill, 2011 which retrospectively validates all duties imposed and actions taken by certain customs officials who were not authorized under the Customs Act to do the stated acts.  Some of the duties imposed were in fact challenged before the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs vs. Sayed Ali in 2011[4].  The Supreme Court struck down the levy of duties since these were imposed by unauthorised officials.  By passing the Customs Bill, 2011 the Parliament circumvented the judgement and amended the Act to authorize certain officials to levy duties retrospectively, even those that had been held to be illegal by the SC. Another instance of the legislature overriding the decision of the Supreme Court was seen in the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Ordinance, 2009 which was passed into an Act.  The Supreme Court had ruled that the price at which the Centre shall buy sugar from the mill shall include the statutory minimum price (SMP) and an additional amount of profits that the mills share with farmers.[5] The Amendment allowed the Centre to pay a fair and remunerative price (FRP) instead of the SMP.  It also did away with the requirement to pay the additional amount.  The amendment applied to all transactions for purchase of sugar by the Centre since 1974.  In effect, the amendment overruled the Court decision. The executive tried to sidestep the Apex Court decision through the Enemy Property (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 2010.  The Court had issued a writ to the Custodian of Enemy Property to return possession of certain properties to the legal heir of the owner.   Subsequently the Executive issued an Ordinance under which all properties that were divested from the Custodian in favour of legal heirs by a Court order were reverted to him.  The Ordinance lapsed and a Bill was introduced in the Parliament.  The Bill is currently being examined by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs. These examples highlight some instances where the legislature has acted to reverse judicial pronouncements.  The judiciary has also acted in several instances in the grey areas separating its role from that of the executive and the legislature.  The doctrine of separation of powers is not codified in the Indian constitution.  Indeed, it may be difficult to draw a strict line demarcating the separation.  However, it may be necessary for each pillar of the State to evolve a healthy convention that respects the domain of the others.  


[1] Keshavananda Bharti vs. State of Kerala  AIR 1973 SC 1461

[2] Bandhua Mukti Morcha  AIR 1984 SC 802

[3] Aravali Golf Club vs. Chander Hass  (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 289

[4] Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs vs. Sayed Ali (2011) 3 SCC 537

[5] Mahalakshmi Mills vs. Union of India (2009) 16 SCC 569

Later this week, the GST Council will meet to discuss the issue of GST compensation to states.  The central government is required to compensate states for any loss of revenue they incur due to GST.  The Centre must pay this compensation on a bi-monthly basis, but over the past one year these payments have been delayed by several months due to lack of funds.  The COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent lockdown have amplified the issue manifold, with both centre and states facing a revenue shortfall, limiting the ability of the Centre to meet states’ compensation needs.

Why is the Centre required to compensate states for GST?

With GST implementation in 2017, the principle of indirect taxation for many goods and services changed from origin-based to destination-based.  This means that the ability to tax goods and services and raise revenue shifted from origin states (where the good or service is produced) to destination states (where it is consumed).  This change posed a risk of revenue uncertainty for some states.  This concern of states was addressed through constitutional amendments, requiring Parliament to make a law to provide for compensation to states for five years to avoid any revenue loss due to GST.

For this purpose, the GST (Compensation to States) Act was enacted in 2017 on the recommendation of the GST Council.  The Act guarantees all states an annual growth rate of 14% in their GST revenue during the period July 2017-June 2022.   If a state’s GST revenue grows slower than 14%, such ‘loss of revenue’ will be taken care of by the Centre by providing GST compensation grants to the state.  To provide these grants, the Centre levies a GST compensation cess on certain luxury and sin goods such as cigarettes and tobacco products, pan masala, caffeinated beverages, coal, and certain passenger vehicles.  The Act requires the Centre to credit this cess revenue into a separate Compensation Fund and all compensation grants to states are required to be paid out of the money available in this Fund.

How much compensation is provided to states?

For 2018-19, Centre gave Rs 81,141 crore to states as GST compensation.  However, for the year 2019-20, the compensation requirement of states nearly doubled to Rs 1.65 lakh crore.  A huge increase in requirement implies that states’ GST revenue grew at a slower rate during 2019-20.   This can be attributed to the economic slowdown seen last year, which resulted in a nominal GDP growth of 7.2%.   This was significantly lower than the 12% GDP growth forecast in the 2019-20 union budget (Figure 1).

Figure 1:  GDP growth rate (2017-21)

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Sources:  Union Budget Documents; MOSPI; PRS.

In 2019-20, the gross GST revenue (Centre+states) increased by just 4% over the previous year.  Despite this, due to the compensation guarantee, all states could achieve the growth rate of 14% in their GST revenue – much higher than the overall growth in GST revenue.  However, there was a delay in payment of compensation from Centre.   More than Rs 64,000 crore of the compensation requirement of states for 2019-20 was met in the financial year 2020-21.

What led to a delay in payment of compensation to states?

In 2019-20, the delay in payment was observed due to insufficient funds with Centre for providing compensation to states.  These funds are raised by levying a compensation cess on the sale of certain goods, some of which were affected by the economic slowdown.  For instance, in 2019-20, sales of passenger vehicles declined by almost 18% and coal offtake from domestic coal companies reduced by nearly 5%, over the previous year.  As a result, cess collections registered a growth of just 0.4% in 2019-20 (Figure 2), against the 104% increase seen in the compensation requirement of states.  This resulted in a shortfall of funds of nearly Rs 70,000 crore.

Figure 2:  Cess collections insufficient for providing compensation

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Note:  In 2017-18, GST was implemented for only nine months.  Compensation amount shown may not match with the amount released in that financial year because of delay in releases.

Sources:  Union Budget Documents; Ministry of Finance; GST Council; Lok Sabha Questions; PRS.

How can compensation be paid to states if cess collections are insufficient?

The shortfall in collections for 2019-20 was met through: (i) surplus cess collections from previous years, (ii) partial cess collections of 2020-21, and (iii) a transfer of Rs 33,412 crore of unsettled GST funds from the Centre to the Compensation Fund.   These unsettled funds are GST collections, generated in 2017-18 from inter-state and foreign trade, that have not yet been settled between centre and states.

In the 2020-21 budget, the Centre has estimated a 10% growth in nominal GDP.  However, due to the impact of COVID-19 and the lockdown, the actual growth in 2020-21 is likely to be much lower.  In such a scenario, states’ GST revenue would also be much lower than expected, thus leading to a higher compensation requirement.  However, the ability of Centre to pay compensation depends on the cess collections, which are also getting impacted this year.  For instance, cess collections during the period Apr-Jun 2020 have been 41% lower in comparison to the same period last year.  Moreover, of the Rs 14,482 crore collections made during this period, Rs 8,680 crore has been likely used up for paying compensation for 2019-20.

Note that under the GST (Compensation to States) Act, 2017, Centre can provide compensation to states only through the money available in the Compensation Fund.   The Union Finance Minister, in her budget speech in February 2020, clarified that transfers to the Fund would be limited only to collections of the GST compensation cess.  Despite a shortfall of money in the Compensation Fund, the Centre is constitutionally obligated to meet states’ compensation requirement for a period of five years.

Various measures have been suggested to address the issue of shortfall in the Fund, either by reducing the compensation payable to states (which would require Parliament to amend the Act following GST Council’s recommendation) or by supplementing the funds available with Centre for providing compensation to states.   The Act allows the GST Council to recommend other funding mechanisms/ amounts for credit into the Compensation Fund.  For example, one of the measures proposed for meeting the shortfall involves Centre using market borrowings to pay compensation to states, with the idea that these borrowings will be repaid with the help of future cess collections.  To enable this, the GST Council may recommend to Centre that the compensation cess be levied for a period beyond five years, i.e. post June 2022.

Impact on states post 2022

In 2019-20, except for a few north-eastern states, most states saw their compensation requirements increase multifold by 2-3 times, over the previous year’s figures.  Table 1 shows the compensation requirement of states for the years 2018-19 and 2019-20.  Six states (Delhi, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu) accounted for 52% of the total requirement of compensation for 2019-20.  Further, in some states such as Punjab and Delhi, compensation grants form a significant share of the overall revenue receipts (20% and 16% resepctively).  

Note that states have been guaranteed compensation only for a period of five years.  After June 2022, states dependent on compensation will observe a revenue gap due to a cut in these grants coming from Centre.  States have roughly two years to bridge this gap with other tax and non-tax sources to avoid a potential loss of revenue, and a consequent fall in the size of their state budget, which could adversely affect the economy.  To what extent will such concerns be alleviated remains to be seen based on the course of action decided by the GST Council.

Table 1:  GST compensation requirement of states for 2018-19 and 2019-20 (in Rs crore)

State

2018-19

2019-20

% increase in compensation requirement

Amount

As a % of revenue

Amount

As a % of revenue*

Andhra Pradesh

0

-

3,028

3%

-

Assam

455

1%

1,284

1%

182%

Bihar

2,798

2%

5,464

4%

95%

Chhattisgarh

2,592

4%

4,521

7%

74%

Delhi

5,185

12%

8,424

16%

62%

Goa

502

5%

1,093

9%

118%

Gujarat

7,227

5%

14,801

10%

105%

Haryana

3,916

6%

6,617

10%

69%

Himachal Pradesh

1,935

6%

2,477

8%

28%

Jammu and Kashmir

1,667

3%

3,281

5%

97%

Jharkhand

1,098

2%

2,219

4%

102%

Karnataka

12,465

8%

18,628

11%

49%

Kerala

3,532

4%

8,111

9%

130%

Madhya Pradesh

3,302

3%

6,538

4%

98%

Maharashtra

9,363

3%

19,233

7%

105%

Meghalaya

66

1%

157

2%

138%

Odisha

3,785

4%

5,122

5%

35%

Punjab

8,239

13%

12,187

20%

48%

Rajasthan

2,280

2%

6,710

5%

194%

Tamil Nadu

4,824

3%

12,305

7%

155%

Telangana

0

-

3,054

3%

-

Tripura

172

1%

293

3%

70%

Uttar Pradesh

0

-

9,123

3%

-

Uttarakhand

2,442

8%

3,375

11%

38%

West Bengal

2,615

2%

6,200

4%

137%

Note:   Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Sikkim did not require any compensation in 2018-19 and 2019-20.

*Revenue for the year 2019-20 does not takes into account those GST compensation grants which were payable to states in 2019-20 but were released by Centre in the year 2020-21. The percentage figures would be slightly lower if such grants are included in 2019-20 revenue.

Sources:  State Budget Documents; Ministry of Finance; Lok Sabha Questions; CAG; PRS.