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In the recently concluded Monsoon Session of Parliament , the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Rural Development released a report on the implementation of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Development Act, 2005 (MGNREGA).  This blog provides a brief introduction to the key provisions of MGNREGA , followed by an overview of the major findings and recommendations of the Standing Committee.

I. MGNREGA: A brief introduction

A. Objectives: MGNREGA, which is the largest work guarantee programme in the world, was enacted in 2005 with the primary objective of guaranteeing 100 days of wage employment per year to rural households.  Secondly, it aims at addressing causes of chronic poverty through the 'works' (projects) that are undertaken, and thus ensuring sustainable development.  Finally, there is an emphasis on strengthening the process of decentralisation through giving a significant role to Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in planning and implementing these works.

B. Key features:

  • Legal right to work: Unlike earlier employment guarantee schemes, the Act provides a legal right to employment for adult members of rural households.  At least one third beneficiaries have to be women.  Wages must be paid according to the wages specified for agricultural labourers in the state under the  Minimum Wages Act, 1948, unless the central government notifies a wage rate (this should not be less than Rs 60 per day).  At present, wage rates are determined by the central government but vary across states, ranging from Rs 135 per day to Rs 214 per day.
  • Time bound guarantee of work and unemployment allowance: Employment must be provided with 15 days of being demanded failing which an ‘unemployment allowance’ must be given.
  • Decentralised planning: Gram sabhas must recommend the works that are to be undertaken and at least 50% of the works must be executed by them.  PRIs are primarily responsible for planning, implementation and monitoring of the works that are undertaken.
  • Work site facilities: All work sites should have facilities such as crèches, drinking water and first aid.
  • Transparency and accountability: There are provisions for proactive disclosure through wall writings, citizen information boards, Management Information Systems and social audits.  Social audits are conducted by gram sabhas to enable the community to monitor the implementation of the scheme.
  • Funding:  Funding is shared between the centre and the states.  There are three major items of expenditure – wages (for unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled labour), material and administrative costs.  The central government bears 100% of the cost of unskilled labour, 75% of the cost of semi-skilled and skilled labour, 75% of the cost of materials and 6% of the administrative costs.

MGNREGA was implemented in phases, starting from February 2006, and at present it covers all districts of the country with the exception of those that have a 100% urban population.  The Act provides a list of works that can be undertaken to generate employment related to water conservation, drought proofing, land development, and flood control and protection works.  Table 1 provides information regarding employment generation and expenditure under MGNREGA.

Table 1: MGNREGA: Key indicators

Year

Number of households provided employment (in crore)

Average number of person days of work per household

Total Expenditure (in lakh)

2006-07

2.10

43

8823.35

2007-08

3.39

42

15856.88

2008-09

4.51

48

27250.10

2009-10

5.25

54

37905.23

2010-11

5.49

47

39377.27

2011-12*

4.99

43

 38034.69

2012-13**

4.25

36

 28073.51

Source: Standing Committee on Rural Development; PRS. Note: *Provisional ** As on 31.01.2013

II. Findings and Recommendations of the Standing Committee on Rural Development

A. Achievements: The Standing Committee highlighted several achievements of MGNREGA in the seven years of its implementation, especially:

  • Ensuring livelihood for people in rural areas.
  • Large scale participation of women, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCs/STs) and other traditionally marginalised sections of society.  SCs/STs account for 51% of the total person-days generated and women account for 47% of the total person-days generated.
  • Increasing the wage rate in rural areas and strengthening the rural economy through the creation of infrastructure assets.
  • Facilitating sustainable development, and
  • Strengthening PRIs by involving them in the planning and monitoring of the scheme.

B. Challenges: However, the Committee found several issues with the implementation of the scheme. As Table 1 (above) shows, the average number of days of employment provided to households has been lower than the mandated 100 days, and has been decreasing since 2010-11. Key issues that the Committee raised include

  • Fabrication of job cards: While as many as 12.5 crore households have been issued job cards out of an estimated 13.8 crore rural households ( as per the 2001 census), there are several issues related to existence of fake job cards, inclusion of fictitious names, missing entries and delays in making entries in job cards.
  • Delay in payment of wages: Most states have failed to disburse wages within 15 days as mandated by MGNREGA.  In addition, workers are not compensated for a delay in payment of wages.
  • Non payment of unemployment allowances: Most states do not pay an unemployment allowance when work is not given on demand.  The non-issuance of dated receipts of demanded work prevents workers from claiming an unemployment allowance.
  • Large number of incomplete works: There has been a delay in the completion of works under MGNREGA and inspection of projects has been irregular.  Implementing agencies were able to complete only 98 lakh works out of 296 lakh works.  As Table 2 shows, a large percentage of works remain incomplete under MGNREGA and the work completion rate appears to be decreasing in recent years.

Table 2: Work completion rate

Year

Work completion rate (%)

2006-07

46.34

2007-08

45.99

2008-09

43.76

2009-10

48.94

2010-11

50.86

2011-12*

20.25

2012-13*

15.02

Total                  33.22

Source: Standing Committee on Rural Development. Note: * As on 30.01.2013

  • Other key challenges include poor quality of assets created, several instances of corruption in the implementation of MGNREGA, and insufficient involvement of PRIs.

C. Recommendations: The Committee made the following recommendations, based on its findings:

  • Regulation of job cards: Offences such as not recording employment related information in job cards and unlawful possession of job cards with elected PRI representatives and MGNREGA functionaries should be made punishable under the Act.
  • Participation of women: Since the income of female workers typically raises the standard of living of their households to a greater extent than their male counterparts, the participation of women must be increased through raising awareness about MGNREGA.
  • Participation of people with disabilities: Special works (projects) must be identified for people with disabilities; and  special job cards must be issued and personnel must be employed to ensure their participation.
  • Utilisation of funds:  The Committee found that a large amount of funds allocated for MGNREGA have remained unutilised.  For example, in 2010-11, 27.31% of the funds remained unutilised.  The Committee recommends that the Department of Rural Development should analyse reasons for poor utilisation of funds and take steps to improve the same.  In addition, it should initiate action against officers found guilty of misappropriating funds under MGNREGA.
  • Context specific projects and convergence: Since states are at various stages of socio-economic development, they have varied requirements for development.  Therefore, state governments should be allowed to undertake works that are pertinent to their context.  There should be more emphasis on skilled and semi-skilled work under MGNREGA.  In addition, the Committee recommends a greater emphasis on convergence with other schemes such as the National Rural Livelihoods Mission, National Rural Health Mission, etc.
  • Payment of unemployment allowance: Dated receipts for demanded work should be issued so that workers can claim unemployment allowance.  Funds for unemployment allowance should be met by the central government.
  • Regular monitoring: National Level Monitors (NLMs) are deployed by the Ministry of Rural Development for regular and special monitoring of MGNREGA and to enquire into complaints regarding mis-utilisation of funds, etc.  The Committee recommends that the frequency of monitoring by NLMs should increase and appropriate measures should be taken by states based on their recommendations.  Additionally, social audits must mandatorily be held every six months.  The Committee observes that the performance of MGNREGA is better in states with effective social audit mechanisms.
  • Training of functionaries: Training and capacity building of elected representatives and other functionaries of PRIs must be done regularly as it will facilitate their involvement in the implementation of MGNREGA.

India is one of the fastest growing aviation markets in the world.  Its domestic traffic makes up 69% of the total airline traffic in South Asia.  India’s airport capacity is expected to handle 1 billion trips annually by 2023. The Ministry of Civil Aviation is responsible for formulating national aviation policies and programmes.  Today, Lok Sabha will discuss and vote upon the budget of the Ministry of Civil Aviation. In light of this, we discuss key issues with the aviation sector in India. 

The aviation sector came under severe financial stress during the Covid-19 pandemic. After air travel was suspended in March 2020, airline operators in India reported losses worth more than Rs 19,500 crore while airports reported losses worth more than Rs 5,120 crore. However, several airline companies were under financial stress before the pandemic affected passenger travel. For instance, in the past 15 years, seventeen airlines have exited the market.  Out of those, two airlines, Air Odisha Aviation Pvt Ltd and Deccan Charters Pvt Ltd exited the market in 2020.  Air India has been reporting consistent losses over the past four years. All other major private airlines in India such as Indigo and Spice Jet faced losses in 2018-19.  

Figure 1: Operating profit/loss of major airlines in India (in Rs crore)

 image

Note: Vistara Airlines commenced operations in 2015, while Air Asia began in 2014; Negative values indicate operating loss.
Source: Unstarred Question 1812 answered on August 4, 2021, and Unstarred Question 1127 answered on September 21, 2020; Rajya Sabha; PRS.

Sale of Air India

Air India has accounted for the biggest expenditure head of the Ministry of Civil Aviation since 2011-12.  Between 2009-10 and 2020-21, the government spent Rs 1,22,542 crore on Air India through budgeted allocations.  In October 2021, the sale of Air India to Talace Ltd., which is a subsidiary of Tata Sons Pvt Ltd, was approved.  The bid for Air India was finalised at Rs 18,000 crore.  

Up to January 2020, Air India had accumulated debt worth Rs 60,000 crore.  The central government is repaying this debt in the financial year 2021-22.  After the finalisation of the sale, the government allocated roughly Rs 71,000 crore for expenses related to Air India. 

In addition to loan repayment, in 2021-22, the government will provide Air India with a fresh loan (Rs 4,500 crore) and grants (Rs 1,944 crore) to recover from the shock of Covid-19.  To pay for the medical benefits of retired employees of Air India, a recurring expense of Rs 165 crore will be borne by the central government each year.   

In 2022-23, Rs 9,260 crore is allocated towards servicing the debt of AIAHL (see Table 1). AIAHL is a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) formed by the government to hold the assets and liabilities of Air India while the process of its sale takes place. 

Table 1: Breakdown of expenditure on Air India (in Rs crore)

Major Head

2020-21 Actual

2021-22 RE

2022-23 BE

% change from 2021-22 RE to 2022-23 BE

Equity infusion in AIAHL

-

62,057

-

-100%

Debt servicing of AIAHL

2,184

2,217

9,260

318%

Medical benefit to retired employees

-

165

165

0%

Loans to AI

-

4,500

-

-100%

Grants for cash losses during Covid-19

-

1,944

-

-100%

Total

2,184

70,883

9,425

-87%

           

Note: BE – Budget Estimate; RE – Revised Estimate; AAI: Airports Authority of India; AIAHL – Air India Asset Holding Limited; AI – Air India. Percentage change is from RE 2021-22 to BE 2022-23. 
Source: Demands for Grants 2022-23, Ministry of Civil Aviation; PRS.

Privatisation of Airports

Airports Authority of India (AAI) is responsible for creating, upgrading, maintaining and managing civil aviation infrastructure in the country.   As on June 23, 2020, it operates and manages 137 airports in the country.   Domestic air traffic has more than doubled from around 61 million passengers in 2013-14 to around 137 million in 2019-20.  International passenger traffic has grown from 47 million in 2013-14 to around 67 million in 2019-20, registering a growth of over 6% per annum.  As a result, airports in India are witnessing rising levels of congestion.  Most major airports are operating at 85% to 120% of their handling capacity.   In response to this, the government has decided to privatise some airports to address the problem of congestion.  

AAI has leased out eight of its airports through Public Private Partnership (PPP) for operation, management and development on long term lease basis.  Six of these airports namely, Ahmedabad, Jaipur, Lucknow, Guwahati, Thiruvananthapuram, and Mangaluru have been leased out to M/s Adani Enterprises Limited (AEL) for 50 years (under PPP).  The ownership of these airports remains with AAI and the operations will be back with AAI after the concession period is over.  The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) had noted that the government expects to have 24 PPP airports by 2024.  

Figure 2: Allocation towards AAI (in Rs crore)

image

Note: BE – Budget Estimate; RE – Revised Estimate; AAI – Airports Authority of India; IEBR – Internal and Extra-Budgetary Resources;
Source: Demand for Grant documents, Ministry of Civil Aviation; PRS. 

The Committee also noted a structural issue in the way airport concessions are given.  As of now, entities that bid the highest amount are given the rights to operate an airport.  This leads them to pass on the high charge to airline operators.  This system does not consider the actual cost of the services and leads to an arbitrary increase in the cost of airline operators.  The Ministry sees the role of AAI in future policy issues to include providing high quality, safe and customer-oriented airport and air navigation services.  In 2022-23, the government has allocated Rs 150 crore to AAI, which is almost ten times higher than the budget estimates of 2021-22. 

Regional Connectivity Scheme (RCS-UDAN)

The top 15 airports in the country account for about 83% of the total passenger traffic.  These airports are also close to their saturation limit, and hence the Ministry notes that there is a need to add more Tier-II and Tier-III cities to the aviation network.  The Regional Connectivity Scheme was introduced in 2016 to stimulate regional air connectivity and make air travel affordable to the masses.  The budget for this scheme is Rs 4,500 crore over five years from 2016-17 to 2021-22.   As of December 16, 2021, 46% of this amount has been released.  In 2022-23, the scheme has been allocated Rs 601 crore, which is 60% lower than the revised estimates of 2021-22 (Rs 994 crore).  

Under the scheme, airline operators are incentivised to operate on under-served routes by providing them with viability gap funding and airport fee waivers.  AAI, which is the implementing agency of this scheme, has sanctioned 948 routes to boost regional connectivity.  As of January 31, 2022, 43% of these routes have been operationalised.  As per the Ministry, lack of availability of land and creation of regional infrastructure has led to delays in the scheme.  Issues with obtaining licenses and unsustainable operation of awarded routes also contribute to the delay.  As per the Ministry, these issues, along with the setback faced due to the pandemic acted as major obstacles for the effective utilisation of funds.

Figure 3: Expenditure on Regional Connectivity Scheme (in Rs crore)

image
 Note: BE – Budget Estimate; RE – Revised Estimate; 
 Source: Demand for Grants documents, Ministry of Civil Aviation; PRS.

Potential of air cargo 

The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) had noted India’s cargo industry’s huge potential with respect to its geographical location, its growing economy, and its growth in domestic and international trade in the last decade.  In 2019-20, all Indian airports together handled 3.33 million metric tonnes (MMT) of freight.  This is much lower than the cargo handled by Hong Kong (4.5 MMT), Memphis (4.8 MMT), and Shanghai (3.7 MMT), which are the top three airports in terms of the volume of freight handled.  The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) has noted inadequate infrastructure as a major bottleneck in developing the country’s air cargo sector.  To reduce such bottleneck, it recommended the Ministry to establish dedicated cargo airports, and automate air cargo procedures and information systems to streamline redundant processes.   

The Committee has also highlighted that the Open Sky Policy enables foreign cargo carriers to freely operate cargo services to and from any airports in India having customs/immigration facilities.  They account for 90-95% of the total international cargo carried to and from the country.  On the other hand, Indian air cargo operators face discriminatory practices and regulatory impediments for operating international cargo flights in foreign countries.  The Committee urged the Ministry to provide a level-playing field for Indian air cargo operators and to ensure equal opportunities for them.  The Ministry revised the Open Sky Policy in December 2020.   Under the revised policy, the operations of foreign ad hoc and pure non-scheduled freighter charter service flights have been restricted to six airports - Bengaluru, Chennai, Delhi, Kolkata, Hyderabad, and Mumbai. 

Rising cost of Aviation Turbine Fuel

The cost of Aviation Turbine Fuel (ATF) forms around 40% of the total operating cost of airlines and impacts their financial viability.  ATF prices have been consistently rising over the past years, placing stress on the balance sheets of airline companies.  As per recent news reports, airfares are expected to rise as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is making ATF costlier.

ATF attracts VAT which is variable across states and does not have a provision for input tax credit.  High rates of aviation fuel coupled with high VAT rates are adversely affecting airline companies.

Table 2: Expenditure on ATF by airlines over the years (in Rs crore)

Year

National Carriers

Private Domestic Airlines

2016-17

         7,286 

       10,506 

2017-18

         8,563 

       13,596 

2018-19

       11,788 

       20,662 

2019-20

       11,103 

       23,354 

2020-21

         3,047 

         7,452 

Source: Unstarred Question 2581, Rajya Sabha; PRS. 

The Ministry, in January 2020,  has reduced the tax burden on ATF by eliminating fuel throughput charges that were levied by airport operators at all airports across India.  Central excise on ATF was reduced from 14% to 11% w.e.f. October 11, 2018.  State governments have also reduced VAT/Sales Tax on ATF drawn on RCS airports to 1% or less for 10 years.  For non-RCS-UDAN operations, various state governments have reduced VAT/Sales Tax on ATF to within 5%.  The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) has recommended ATF to be included within the ambit of GST and that applicable GST should not exceed 12% on ATF with full Input Tax Credit. 

For more details, please refer to the Demand for Grants Analysis of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, 2022-23.