In the last decade, the government has implemented several schemes to address issues related to urbanisation and aid the process of urban development. One of the schemes is the Smart Cities Mission, which intends to take advantage of the developments in information technology in developing the urban development strategy, across 100 cities. Last week the government announced the list of 9 new Smart Cities, taking the total to 99. In light of this, we look at the Smart Cities Mission and a few issues with it.
What is a Smart City?
The primary objective of the Mission is to develop cities that provide core infrastructure and give a decent quality of life to its citizens, a clean and sustainable environment, and apply ‘smart’ solutions.
However, the Mission document does not provide one definition of a Smart City. Instead it allows cities to come up with their own solutions of what they identify as a Smart City. The guidelines suggest that the core infrastructure elements in a Smart City will include: (i) adequate water supply, (ii) assured electricity supply, (iii) sanitation, including solid waste management, (iv) efficient urban mobility and public transport, (v) affordable housing, (vi) robust IT connectivity, and (vii) good governance. ‘Smart’ solutions may include (i) energy efficient buildings, (ii) electronic service delivery, (iii) intelligent traffic management, (iv) smart metering, (v) citizen engagement, etc.
How were the Smart Cities selected?
The Mission was introduced in the form of a competition, called the Smart City challenge. The first stage was in July 2015 when states nominated their cities for the competition. In August 2015, the Ministry of Urban Development selected 100 of those cities to participate in the competition. These cities were required to develop their smart city plans (SCPs) and compete against each other. The SCPs were evaluated on the basis of the solutions, the processes followed, the feasibility and cost effectiveness of the plans, and citizen engagement. Over the last 2 years, the Ministry has announced winner cities in batches. So far, 99 cities have been selected under the Mission.
What information do these SCPs contain?
The cities had to prepare their SCPs with two primary strategic components: (i) area-based development, and (ii) pan-city development. The area-based development would cover a particular area of the city, and could have either a redevelopment model, or be a completely new development. Pan-city development would envisage application of certain smart solutions across the city to the existing infrastructure.
Each city had to formulate its own concept, vision, mission and plan for a Smart City that was appropriate to its local context and resources. The Ministry of Urban Development provided technical assistance, through consultancy firms, to cities for helping them prepare these strategic documents.
How will the Mission be implemented?
The Mission will be implemented at the city level by a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The SPV will plan, approve, release funds, implement, manage, monitor, and evaluate the Smart City development projects.
The SPV will be a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013 at the city-level. It will be chaired by the Collector/ Municipal Commissioner of the Urban Development Authority. The respective state and the Urban Local Body (ULB or municipality) will be the promoters in this company having 50:50 equity shareholding.
How are the Plans getting financed?
The Mission will be operated as a Centrally Sponsored Scheme. The central government will provide financial support of up to Rs 48,000 crore over five years, that is, an average of Rs 500 crore per city. The states and ULBs will have to contribute an equal amount. The central government allocated Rs 4,000 crore towards the Mission in the 2017-18 budget.
Since funding from the government will meet only a part of the funding required, the rest will have to be raised from other sources including: (i) states/ ULBs own resources from collection of user fees, land monetization, etc., (ii) innovative finance mechanisms such as municipal bonds, (iii) leverage borrowings from financial institutions (such as banks), and (iv) the private sector through Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).
The total cost of projects proposed under the various SCPs of the 90 winner cities is Rs 1.9 lakh crore. About 42% of this amount will come from central and state funding, 23% through private investments and PPPs, and 19% through convergence with other schemes (such as HRIDAY, AMRUT, Swachh Bharat-Urban). The remaining will be generated by the cities through the levy of local taxes, and user fees.
What are some of the issues to consider?
Financial capacity of cities: Under the Mission, cities have to generate additional revenue through various sources including market borrowings, PPPs, and land monetization. The High Powered Expert Committee on Indian Urban Infrastructure and Services (HPEC) had observed that ULBs in India are among the weakest in the world, both in terms of capacity to raise resources and financial autonomy. Even though ULBs have been getting higher allocations from the centre and states, and tax devolution to them has increased, their own tax bases are narrow. Further, owing to their poor governance and financial situation, ULBs find it difficult to access external financing.
Such a situation may pose problems when implementing the Mission, where the ULBs have to raise a significant share of the revenue through external sources (PPPs, market borrowings). For example, the Bhubaneswar Smart City Plan has a total project cost of Rs 4,537 crore (over five years), while the city’s annual budget for 2014-15 was Rs 469 crore.
In order to improve the finances of the ULBs, committees have made various recommendations, which include:
The government has recently introduced a few policies and mechanisms to address municipal financing. Examples include value capture financing through public investments in infrastructure projects, and a credit rating system for cities. In June 2017, the Pune Municipal Corporation raised Rs 200 crore by issuing municipal bonds.
Technical capacity of the ULBs: The Smart Cities Mission seeks to empower ULBs to raise their own revenue, and also lays emphasis on the capacity building of ULBs. The HPEC had observed that municipal administration has suffered due to: (i) presence of untrained and unskilled manpower, and (ii) shortage of qualified technical staff and managerial supervisors. It had recommended improving the technical capacity of ULBs by providing technical assistance to state governments, and ULBs in planning, financing, monitoring, and operation of urban programmes. The central government had allocated Rs 10.5 crore towards the capacity building component of the Mission in 2017-18.
The Ministry of Urban Development has been running several programmes to improve capacity of ULBs. This includes MoUs with 18 states to conduct training programmes for their ULB staff.
Coverage of the Mission: The Mission covers 100 cities, of which 99 have been announced as winners so far. The urban population that will be impacted through the Mission is around 96 million (data for 90 cities excluding the recently announced 9 cities).
As per Census 2011, India’s urban population was 377 million. The Mission impacts about 25% of this population. Further, most of the SCPs approved so far focus on area-based development, thus affecting a particular area of the cities. About 80% of the total project cost proposed is towards this model of development. In each city, this area-based development will cover up to 50 acres of area. The remaining 20% of the project cost is towards pan-city development proposals, which provide smart planning solutions for the entire city. It may be argued that even within the selected cities, the Mission will only impact few selected areas, and not necessarily help with development of the entire city.
The United Nations celebrates October 16 as the World Food Day every year, with an aim to spread awareness about eradicating hunger and ensuring food security for all.[1] In this context, we examine the status of food and public distribution in India, and some challenges in ensuring food security for all.
Background
In 2017-18, over Rs 1,50,000 crore, or 7.6% of the government’s total expenditure has been allocated for providing food subsidy under the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS).[2] This allocation is made to the Department of Food and Public Distribution under the Ministry of Consumer Affairs.
Food subsidy has been the largest component of the Department’s expenditure (94% in 2017-18), and has increased six-fold over the past 10 years. This subsidy is used for the implementation of the National Food Security Act, 2013 (NFSA), which provides subsidised food grains (wheat and rice) to 80 crore people in the country.[3] The NFSA seeks to ensure improved nutritional intake for people in the country.3
One of the reasons for the six-fold increase in food subsidy is the non-revision of the price at which food grains are given to beneficiaries since 2002.[4] For example, rice is given to families under the Antyodaya Anna Yojana at Rs 3/Kg since 2002, while the cost of providing this has increased from Rs 11/Kg in 2001-02 to Rs 33/Kg in 2017-18.
Provision of food subsidy
TPDS provides food security to people below the poverty line. Over the years, the expenditure on food subsidy has increased, while the ratio of people below poverty line has reduced. A similar trend can also be seen in the proportion of undernourished persons in India, which reduced from 24% in 1990 to 15% in 2014 (see Table 1). These trends may indicate that the share of people needing subsidised food has declined.
Nutritional balance: The NFSA guarantees food grains i.e. wheat and rice to beneficiaries, to ensure nutritious food intake.3 Over the last two decades, the share of cereals or food grains as a percentage of food consumption has reduced from 13% to 8% in the country, whereas that of milk, eggs, fish and meat has increased (see Figure 1). This indicates a reduced preference for wheat and rice, and a rise in preference towards other protein rich food items. 
Methods of providing food subsidy
Food subsidy is provided majorly using two methods. We discuss these in detail below.
TPDS assures beneficiaries that they will receive food grains, and insulates them against price volatility. Food grains are delivered through fair price shops in villages, which are easy to access.[5],[6]
However, high leakages have been observed in the system, both during transportation and distribution. These include pilferage and errors of inclusion and exclusion from the beneficiary list. In addition, it has also been argued that the distribution of wheat and rice may cause an imbalance in the nutritional intake as discussed earlier.7 Beneficiaries have also reported receiving poor quality food grains as part of the system.
Cash Transfers seek to increase the choices available with a beneficiary, and provide financial assistance. It has been argued that the costs of DBT may be lesser than TPDS, owing to lesser costs incurred on transport and storage. These transfers may also be undertaken electronically.6,7
However, it has also been argued that cash received as part of DBT may be spent on non-food items. Such a system may also expose beneficiaries to inflation. In this regard, one may also consider the low penetration and access to banking in rural areas.[7]
In 2017-18, 52% of the centre’s total subsidy expenditure will be on providing food subsidy under TPDS (see Figure 2). The NFSA states that the centre and states should introduce schemes for cash transfers to beneficiaries. Other experts have also suggested replacing TPDS with a Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) system.4,[8]
The central government introduced cash subsidy to TPDS beneficiaries in September 2015.[9] As of March 2016, this was being implemented on a pilot basis in a few union territories. In 2015, a Committee on Restructuring of Food Corporation of India had also recommended introducing Aadhaar to plug leakages in PDS, and indexing it to inflation. The Committee estimated that a switch to DBT would reduce the food subsidy bill of the government by more than Rs 30,000 crore.[10]
Current challenges in PDS
Leakages in PDS: Leakages refer to food grains not reaching intended beneficiaries. According to 2011 data, leakages in PDS were estimated to be 46.7%.10,[11] Leakages may be of three types: (i) pilferage during transportation of food grains, (ii) diversion at fair price shops to non-beneficiaries, and (iii) exclusion of entitled beneficiaries from the list.6,[12]
In 2016, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) found that states had not completed the process of identifying beneficiaries, and 49% of the beneficiaries were yet to be identified. It also noted that inclusion and exclusion errors had been reported in the beneficiary lists.[13]
In February 2017, the Ministry made it mandatory for beneficiaries under NFSA to use Aadhaar as proof of identification for receiving food grains. Through this, the government aims to remove bogus ration cards, check leakages and ensure better delivery of food grains.10,[14] As of January 2017, while 100% ration cards had been digitised, the seeding of these cards with Aadhaar was at 73%.14
Storage: As of 2016-17, the total storage capacity in the country is 788 lakh tonnes, of which 354 lakh tonnes is with the Food Corporation of India and 424 lakh tonnes is with the state agencies.[15]
The CAG in its performance audit found that the available storage capacity in states was inadequate for the allocated quantity of food grains.13 For example, as of October 2015, of the 233 godowns sanctioned for construction in Maharashtra, only 93 had been completed. It also noted that in four of the last five years, the stock of food grains with the centre had been higher than the storage capacity available with Food Corporation of India.
Quality of food grains: A survey conducted in 2011 had noted that people complained about receiving poor quality food grain which had to be mixed with other grains to be edible.6 There have also been complaints about people receiving food grains containing alien substances such as pebbles. Poor quality of food may impact the willingness of people to buy food from fair price shops, and may have an adverse impact on their health.[16]
The Ministry has stated that while regular surveillance, monitoring, inspection and random sampling of all food items is under-taken by State Food Safety Officers, separate data for food grains distributed under PDS is unavailable.[17] In the absence of data with regard to quality testing results of food grains supplied under PDS, it may be difficult to ascertain whether these food items meet the prescribed quality and safety standards.
[1] About World Food Day, http://www.fao.org/world-food-day/2017/about/en/.
[2] Expenditure Budget, Union Budget 2017-18, http://unionbudget.nic.in/ub2017-18/eb/allsbe.pdf.
[3] National Food Security Act, 2013, http://indiacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/202013.pdf.
[4] “Prices, Agriculture and Food Management”, Chapter 5, Economic Survey 2015-16, http://unionbudget.nic.in/budget2016-2017/es2015-16/echapvol2-05.pdf.
[5] The Case for Direct Cash Transfers to the Poor, Economic and Political Weekly, April 2008, http://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2008_43/15/The_Case_for_Direct_Cash_Transfers_to_the_Poor.pdf.
[6] Revival of the Public Distribution System: Evidence and Explanations, The Economic and Political Weekly, November 5, 2011,
[7] ‘Report of the Internal Working Group on Branch Authorisation Policy’, Reserve Bank of India, September 2016, https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/IWG99F12F147B6E4F8DBEE8CEBB8F09F103.PDF.
[8] Working Paper 294, “Leakages from Public Distribution System”, January 2015, ICRIER, http://icrier.org/pdf/Working_Paper_294.pdf.
[9] “The Cash Transfer of Food Subsidy Rules, 2015”, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, September 3, 2015, http://dfpd.nic.in/writereaddata/Portal/News/32_1_cash.pdf.
[10] Report of the High Level Committee on Reorienting the Role and Restructuring of Food Corporation of India, January 2015, http://www.fci.gov.in/app2/webroot/upload/News/Report%20of%20the%20High%20Level%20Committee%20on%20Reorienting%20the%20Role%20and%20Restructuring%20of%20FCI_English_1.pdf.
[11] Third Report of the Standing Committee on Food, Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution: Demands for Grants 2015-16, Department of Food and Public Distribution, http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Food,%20Consumer%20Affairs%20&%20Public%20Distribution/16_Food_Consumer_Affairs_And_Public_Distribution_3.pdf.
[12] Performance Evaluation of Targeted Public Distribution System, Planning Commission of India, March 2005, http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/peoreport/peo/peo_tpds.pdf.
[13] Audit on the Preparedness for Implementation of National Food Security Act, 2013 for the year ended March, 2015, Report No. 54 of 2015, Comptroller and Auditor General of India, http://cag.gov.in/sites/default/files/audit_report_files/Union_Civil_National_Food_Security_Report_54_of_2015.pdf.
[14] Unstarred Question No. 844, Lok Sabha, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Answered on February 7, 2017, http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/11/AU844.pdf.
[15] Annual Report 2016-17, Department of Food & Public Distribution, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution, http://dfpd.nic.in/writereaddata/images/annual-140217.pdf.
[16] 30 Food Subsidy, The Economic and Political Weekly, December 27, 2014, http://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2014_49/52/Food_Subsidy.pdf.
[17] Unstarred Question No. 2124, Lok Sabha, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Answered on November 29, 2016, http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/10/AU2124.pdf.
