In the last decade, the government has implemented several schemes to address issues related to urbanisation and aid the process of urban development.  One of the schemes is the Smart Cities Mission, which intends to take advantage of the developments in information technology in developing the urban development strategy, across 100 cities.  Last week the government announced the list of 9 new Smart Cities, taking the total to 99.  In light of this, we look at the Smart Cities Mission and a few issues with it.

What is a Smart City?

The primary objective of the Mission is to develop cities that provide core infrastructure and give a decent quality of life to its citizens, a clean and sustainable environment, and apply ‘smart’ solutions.

However, the Mission document does not provide one definition of a Smart City.  Instead it allows cities to come up with their own solutions of what they identify as a Smart City.  The guidelines suggest that the core infrastructure elements in a Smart City will include: (i) adequate water supply, (ii) assured electricity supply, (iii) sanitation, including solid waste management, (iv) efficient urban mobility and public transport, (v) affordable housing, (vi) robust IT connectivity, and (vii) good governance.  ‘Smart’ solutions may include (i) energy efficient buildings, (ii) electronic service delivery, (iii) intelligent traffic management, (iv) smart metering, (v) citizen engagement, etc.

How were the Smart Cities selected?

The Mission was introduced in the form of a competition, called the Smart City challenge.  The first stage was in July 2015 when states nominated their cities for the competition.  In August 2015, the Ministry of Urban Development selected 100 of those cities to participate in the competition.  These cities were required to develop their smart city plans (SCPs) and compete against each other.  The SCPs were evaluated on the basis of the solutions, the processes followed, the feasibility and cost effectiveness of the plans, and citizen engagement.  Over the last 2 years, the Ministry has announced winner cities in batches.  So far, 99 cities have been selected under the Mission.

What information do these SCPs contain?

The cities had to prepare their SCPs with two primary strategic components: (i) area-based development, and (ii) pan-city development.  The area-based development would cover a particular area of the city, and could have either a redevelopment model, or be a completely new development.  Pan-city development would envisage application of certain smart solutions across the city to the existing infrastructure.

Each city had to formulate its own concept, vision, mission and plan for a Smart City that was appropriate to its local context and resources.  The Ministry of Urban Development provided technical assistance, through consultancy firms, to cities for helping them prepare these strategic documents.

How will the Mission be implemented?

The Mission will be implemented at the city level by a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV).  The SPV will plan, approve, release funds, implement, manage, monitor, and evaluate the Smart City development projects.

The SPV will be a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013 at the city-level.  It will be chaired by the Collector/ Municipal Commissioner of the Urban Development Authority.  The respective state and the Urban Local Body (ULB or municipality) will be the promoters in this company having 50:50 equity shareholding.

How are the Plans getting financed?

The Mission will be operated as a Centrally Sponsored Scheme.  The central government will provide financial support of up to Rs 48,000 crore over five years, that is, an average of Rs 500 crore per city.  The states and ULBs will have to contribute an equal amount.  The central government allocated Rs 4,000 crore towards the Mission in the 2017-18 budget.

Since funding from the government will meet only a part of the funding required, the rest will have to be raised from other sources including: (i) states/ ULBs own resources from collection of user fees, land monetization, etc., (ii) innovative finance mechanisms such as municipal bonds, (iii) leverage borrowings from financial institutions (such as banks), and (iv) the private sector through Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).

The total cost of projects proposed under the various SCPs of the 90 winner cities is Rs 1.9 lakh crore.  About 42% of this amount will come from central and state funding, 23% through private investments and PPPs, and 19% through convergence with other schemes (such as HRIDAY, AMRUT, Swachh Bharat-Urban).  The remaining will be generated by the cities through the levy of local taxes, and user fees.

What are some of the issues to consider?

Financial capacity of cities:  Under the Mission, cities have to generate additional revenue through various sources including market borrowings, PPPs, and land monetization.  The High Powered Expert Committee on Indian Urban Infrastructure and Services (HPEC) had observed that ULBs in India are among the weakest in the world, both in terms of capacity to raise resources and financial autonomy.  Even though ULBs have been getting higher allocations from the centre and states, and tax devolution to them has increased, their own tax bases are narrow.  Further, owing to their poor governance and financial situation, ULBs find it difficult to access external financing.

Such a situation may pose problems when implementing the Mission, where the ULBs have to raise a significant share of the revenue through external sources (PPPs, market borrowings).  For example, the Bhubaneswar Smart City Plan has a total project cost of Rs 4,537 crore (over five years), while the city’s annual budget for 2014-15 was Rs 469 crore.

In order to improve the finances of the ULBs, committees have made various recommendations, which include:

  • State governments make legislative changes to give more taxation powers and autonomy to ULBs for improving their revenue collections.
  • ULBs could raise their own revenue by tapping into land-based financing sources, and introducing reforms to strengthen non-tax revenues (such as water and sewerage charges, parking fees, etc.).
  • Municipal bonds may also be used as a source of revenue for ULBs.

The government has recently introduced a few policies and mechanisms to address municipal financing.  Examples include value capture financing through public investments in infrastructure projects, and a credit rating system for cities.  In June 2017, the Pune Municipal Corporation raised Rs 200 crore by issuing municipal bonds.

Technical capacity of the ULBs:  The Smart Cities Mission seeks to empower ULBs to raise their own revenue, and also lays emphasis on the capacity building of ULBs.  The HPEC had observed that municipal administration has suffered due to: (i) presence of untrained and unskilled manpower, and (ii) shortage of qualified technical staff and managerial supervisors.  It had recommended improving the technical capacity of ULBs by providing technical assistance to state governments, and ULBs in planning, financing, monitoring, and operation of urban programmes.  The central government had allocated Rs 10.5 crore towards the capacity building component of the Mission in 2017-18.

The Ministry of Urban Development has been running several programmes to improve capacity of ULBs.  This includes MoUs with 18 states to conduct training programmes for their ULB staff.

Coverage of the Mission:  The Mission covers 100 cities, of which 99 have been announced as winners so far.   The urban population that will be impacted through the Mission is around 96 million (data for 90 cities excluding the recently announced 9 cities).

As per Census 2011, India’s urban population was 377 million.  The Mission impacts about 25% of this population.  Further, most of the SCPs approved so far focus on area-based development, thus affecting a particular area of the cities.  About 80% of the total project cost proposed is towards this model of development.  In each city, this area-based development will cover up to 50 acres of area.  The remaining 20% of the project cost is towards pan-city development proposals, which provide smart planning solutions for the entire city.  It may be argued that even within the selected cities, the Mission will only impact few selected areas, and not necessarily help with development of the entire city.

Later this week, the GST Council will meet to discuss the issue of GST compensation to states.  The central government is required to compensate states for any loss of revenue they incur due to GST.  The Centre must pay this compensation on a bi-monthly basis, but over the past one year these payments have been delayed by several months due to lack of funds.  The COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent lockdown have amplified the issue manifold, with both centre and states facing a revenue shortfall, limiting the ability of the Centre to meet states’ compensation needs.

Why is the Centre required to compensate states for GST?

With GST implementation in 2017, the principle of indirect taxation for many goods and services changed from origin-based to destination-based.  This means that the ability to tax goods and services and raise revenue shifted from origin states (where the good or service is produced) to destination states (where it is consumed).  This change posed a risk of revenue uncertainty for some states.  This concern of states was addressed through constitutional amendments, requiring Parliament to make a law to provide for compensation to states for five years to avoid any revenue loss due to GST.

For this purpose, the GST (Compensation to States) Act was enacted in 2017 on the recommendation of the GST Council.  The Act guarantees all states an annual growth rate of 14% in their GST revenue during the period July 2017-June 2022.   If a state’s GST revenue grows slower than 14%, such ‘loss of revenue’ will be taken care of by the Centre by providing GST compensation grants to the state.  To provide these grants, the Centre levies a GST compensation cess on certain luxury and sin goods such as cigarettes and tobacco products, pan masala, caffeinated beverages, coal, and certain passenger vehicles.  The Act requires the Centre to credit this cess revenue into a separate Compensation Fund and all compensation grants to states are required to be paid out of the money available in this Fund.

How much compensation is provided to states?

For 2018-19, Centre gave Rs 81,141 crore to states as GST compensation.  However, for the year 2019-20, the compensation requirement of states nearly doubled to Rs 1.65 lakh crore.  A huge increase in requirement implies that states’ GST revenue grew at a slower rate during 2019-20.   This can be attributed to the economic slowdown seen last year, which resulted in a nominal GDP growth of 7.2%.   This was significantly lower than the 12% GDP growth forecast in the 2019-20 union budget (Figure 1).

Figure 1:  GDP growth rate (2017-21)

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Sources:  Union Budget Documents; MOSPI; PRS.

In 2019-20, the gross GST revenue (Centre+states) increased by just 4% over the previous year.  Despite this, due to the compensation guarantee, all states could achieve the growth rate of 14% in their GST revenue – much higher than the overall growth in GST revenue.  However, there was a delay in payment of compensation from Centre.   More than Rs 64,000 crore of the compensation requirement of states for 2019-20 was met in the financial year 2020-21.

What led to a delay in payment of compensation to states?

In 2019-20, the delay in payment was observed due to insufficient funds with Centre for providing compensation to states.  These funds are raised by levying a compensation cess on the sale of certain goods, some of which were affected by the economic slowdown.  For instance, in 2019-20, sales of passenger vehicles declined by almost 18% and coal offtake from domestic coal companies reduced by nearly 5%, over the previous year.  As a result, cess collections registered a growth of just 0.4% in 2019-20 (Figure 2), against the 104% increase seen in the compensation requirement of states.  This resulted in a shortfall of funds of nearly Rs 70,000 crore.

Figure 2:  Cess collections insufficient for providing compensation

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Note:  In 2017-18, GST was implemented for only nine months.  Compensation amount shown may not match with the amount released in that financial year because of delay in releases.

Sources:  Union Budget Documents; Ministry of Finance; GST Council; Lok Sabha Questions; PRS.

How can compensation be paid to states if cess collections are insufficient?

The shortfall in collections for 2019-20 was met through: (i) surplus cess collections from previous years, (ii) partial cess collections of 2020-21, and (iii) a transfer of Rs 33,412 crore of unsettled GST funds from the Centre to the Compensation Fund.   These unsettled funds are GST collections, generated in 2017-18 from inter-state and foreign trade, that have not yet been settled between centre and states.

In the 2020-21 budget, the Centre has estimated a 10% growth in nominal GDP.  However, due to the impact of COVID-19 and the lockdown, the actual growth in 2020-21 is likely to be much lower.  In such a scenario, states’ GST revenue would also be much lower than expected, thus leading to a higher compensation requirement.  However, the ability of Centre to pay compensation depends on the cess collections, which are also getting impacted this year.  For instance, cess collections during the period Apr-Jun 2020 have been 41% lower in comparison to the same period last year.  Moreover, of the Rs 14,482 crore collections made during this period, Rs 8,680 crore has been likely used up for paying compensation for 2019-20.

Note that under the GST (Compensation to States) Act, 2017, Centre can provide compensation to states only through the money available in the Compensation Fund.   The Union Finance Minister, in her budget speech in February 2020, clarified that transfers to the Fund would be limited only to collections of the GST compensation cess.  Despite a shortfall of money in the Compensation Fund, the Centre is constitutionally obligated to meet states’ compensation requirement for a period of five years.

Various measures have been suggested to address the issue of shortfall in the Fund, either by reducing the compensation payable to states (which would require Parliament to amend the Act following GST Council’s recommendation) or by supplementing the funds available with Centre for providing compensation to states.   The Act allows the GST Council to recommend other funding mechanisms/ amounts for credit into the Compensation Fund.  For example, one of the measures proposed for meeting the shortfall involves Centre using market borrowings to pay compensation to states, with the idea that these borrowings will be repaid with the help of future cess collections.  To enable this, the GST Council may recommend to Centre that the compensation cess be levied for a period beyond five years, i.e. post June 2022.

Impact on states post 2022

In 2019-20, except for a few north-eastern states, most states saw their compensation requirements increase multifold by 2-3 times, over the previous year’s figures.  Table 1 shows the compensation requirement of states for the years 2018-19 and 2019-20.  Six states (Delhi, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu) accounted for 52% of the total requirement of compensation for 2019-20.  Further, in some states such as Punjab and Delhi, compensation grants form a significant share of the overall revenue receipts (20% and 16% resepctively).  

Note that states have been guaranteed compensation only for a period of five years.  After June 2022, states dependent on compensation will observe a revenue gap due to a cut in these grants coming from Centre.  States have roughly two years to bridge this gap with other tax and non-tax sources to avoid a potential loss of revenue, and a consequent fall in the size of their state budget, which could adversely affect the economy.  To what extent will such concerns be alleviated remains to be seen based on the course of action decided by the GST Council.

Table 1:  GST compensation requirement of states for 2018-19 and 2019-20 (in Rs crore)

State

2018-19

2019-20

% increase in compensation requirement

Amount

As a % of revenue

Amount

As a % of revenue*

Andhra Pradesh

0

-

3,028

3%

-

Assam

455

1%

1,284

1%

182%

Bihar

2,798

2%

5,464

4%

95%

Chhattisgarh

2,592

4%

4,521

7%

74%

Delhi

5,185

12%

8,424

16%

62%

Goa

502

5%

1,093

9%

118%

Gujarat

7,227

5%

14,801

10%

105%

Haryana

3,916

6%

6,617

10%

69%

Himachal Pradesh

1,935

6%

2,477

8%

28%

Jammu and Kashmir

1,667

3%

3,281

5%

97%

Jharkhand

1,098

2%

2,219

4%

102%

Karnataka

12,465

8%

18,628

11%

49%

Kerala

3,532

4%

8,111

9%

130%

Madhya Pradesh

3,302

3%

6,538

4%

98%

Maharashtra

9,363

3%

19,233

7%

105%

Meghalaya

66

1%

157

2%

138%

Odisha

3,785

4%

5,122

5%

35%

Punjab

8,239

13%

12,187

20%

48%

Rajasthan

2,280

2%

6,710

5%

194%

Tamil Nadu

4,824

3%

12,305

7%

155%

Telangana

0

-

3,054

3%

-

Tripura

172

1%

293

3%

70%

Uttar Pradesh

0

-

9,123

3%

-

Uttarakhand

2,442

8%

3,375

11%

38%

West Bengal

2,615

2%

6,200

4%

137%

Note:   Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Sikkim did not require any compensation in 2018-19 and 2019-20.

*Revenue for the year 2019-20 does not takes into account those GST compensation grants which were payable to states in 2019-20 but were released by Centre in the year 2020-21. The percentage figures would be slightly lower if such grants are included in 2019-20 revenue.

Sources:  State Budget Documents; Ministry of Finance; Lok Sabha Questions; CAG; PRS.