In India, police and law and order come under the purview of state governments.[1]  Accordingly, each state has its own police force for maintaining law and order and investigating crimes.  However, due to financial and other constraints, states have critical gaps in their policing infrastructure.2  Figure 1 shows the expenditure by states on police, as a percentage of their total budget.  In 2015-16, Manipur spent the highest proportion of its state budget on police, followed by Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir.

Figure 1: Police Expenditure as a proportion of total state budget

Fig 1

Note: Figure does not include data for union territories.
Sources: Data on Police Organisations, Bureau of Police Research and Development, 2016; PRS.

 

The Ministry of Home Affairs has been supplementing resources of states under the Modernisation of Police Forces (MPF) scheme.[2]  The Union Cabinet last week approved the implementation of an umbrella scheme of MPF and has allocated funding of Rs 25,060 crore for the 2017-18 to 2019-20 period.[3]  In light of this decision, we present the key features of the scheme and examine other issues related to the police forces.

Modernisation of Police Forces scheme

The MPF scheme was initiated in 1969-70 and has undergone several revisions over the years.2  It was allocated Rs 11,946 crore for the period between 2012-13 to 2016-17, which has now been doubled after last week’s Cabinet approval.[4]  Funds from the MPF scheme are typically used for improving police infrastructure through construction of police stations and provision of modern weaponry, surveillance and communication equipment.  Upgradation of training infrastructure, police housing and computerisation are also important objectives funded through the scheme.

Following the recommendations of the Fourteenth Finance Commission, to increase the share  of central taxes to states, it was decided that the MPF scheme would be delinked from central funding from 2015-16 onwards.[5]  States were expected to finance the scheme using their own resources.  However, of the recent allocation made by the Cabinet, Rs 18,636 crore will come from the central government and Rs 6,424 crore will come from the states.3  This implies that the centre will fund almost 75% of the scheme.

Underutilisation of Funds

Data from the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) shows that funds have not been fully utilised under the MPF scheme.  In the year 2015-16, out of a total grant of Rs 9,203 crore that was made available for modernisation, states utilised only Rs 1330 crore (14%).[6]

Figure 2 shows the trend in underutilisation of modernisation funds from 2009-10 to 2015-16.  Over this period, there has been a consistent underutilisation of funds by states.  On average, states spent 55% of the funds allocated to them, with the highest being 86% utilisation in 2013-14.

Figure 2: Utilisation of funds for modernisation by states (%)

Fig 2

Sources: Data on Police Organisations, Bureau of Police Research and Development, 2016; PRS.

 

Issues related to police forces

While the MPF scheme seeks to improve police infrastructure, there are a number of structural issues that have been raised by experts over the years related to police forces.  We discuss a few of these below.

(i) Overburdened police force

Apart from the core function of maintaining law and order, police personnel carry out various other functions such as traffic management, disaster rescue and removal of encroachments.  The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2007) has noted that these extra obligations lead to overburdening of the police force.  It recommended that these functions should be carried out by other government departments or private agencies.[7]  Note that as of January 2016, 24 per cent of sanctioned police posts in India were vacant.6   This indicates that police personnel may be overburdened, which may have negative consequences on their efficiency and performance.

(ii) Poor quality of investigation

In 2015, the conviction rate for crimes recorded under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was only 47%.[9]  The Law Commission (2012) observed that one of the reasons for low conviction rates in India is poor quality of investigation by police.[8]  The police lack training and expertise required to conduct professional investigations.  They also have insufficient legal knowledge and inadequate forensic and cyber infrastructure.  In light of these deficiencies, the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2007) recommended that states should have specialised investigation units within the police force for better investigation of crimes.7

(iii) Police accountability

In India, control over the police force vests with the political executive.[10]  The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2007) noted that this has to led to abuse of police personnel and interference with their decision-making authority.7 To allow the police operational autonomy while maintaining accountability, the Supreme Court issued guidelines to the central government and state governments (and Union Territories) in the year 2006.[11]

The guidelines provided for the establishment of three institutions: (i) a State Security Commission, (ii) a Police Establishment Board, and (iii) a Police Complaints Authority.11  The Supreme Court also stated that the state Director General of Police (DGP) should be selected from three senior-most officers of the state empanelled by the Union Public Service Commission and must have a minimum two-year tenure.

In addition, the court recommended that officers in key positions in the field (Inspector General in charge of Range, Station House Officer) must be given a two-year tenure. Currently, DGPs and senior officers are selected by the political executive of the state and are not guaranteed security of tenure.[10]   In order to improve the quality of investigation, the Court recommended that investigating police must be separated from law and order police.11

These guidelines and recommendations of other expert bodies were used to create the draft Model Police Bill, 2015 by BPR&D, which states have been encouraged to adopt.  While states have partially implemented some of these guidelines, no state has adhered to them in full.[12]  In most states, the three institutions which the Supreme Court has directed states to create have not been given the authority they need to ensure accountability and insulate the police force from political misuse.12

[1]Entry 1 and 2, List II, Schedule 7, Constitution of India, 1950.

[2] Modernisation of Police Force Scheme Book, Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010 http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/Scheme-MPF-11Nov.pdf.

[3] “Cabinet approves umbrella scheme of Modernisation of Police Forces”, Press Information Bureau, 27th September 2017.

[4] Annual Report, Ministry of Home Affairs, 2015-16, http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/AR(E)1516.pdf.

[5] “Major  Programmes Under Central Assistance for State Plans”, Union Budget, 2015-16 http://indiabudget.nic.in/budget2015-2016/ub2015-16/bag/bag8.pdf.

[6] “Data on Police Organisations”, Bureau of Police Research and Development, 2016, http://bprd.nic.in/WriteReadData/userfiles/file/201701090303068737739DATABOOK2016FINALSMALL09-01-2017.pdf.

[7] “Public Order”, Second Administrative Reforms Commission, 2007, http://arc.gov.in/5th%20REPORT.pdf.

[8] “Report No. 239: Expeditious Investigation and Trial of Criminal Cases Against Influential Public Personalities”,  Law Commission of India, March 2012, http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report239.pdf.

[9] “Crime in India”, National Crime Records Bureau, 2006-15 http://ncrb.nic.in/StatPublications/CII/CII2015/FILES/Compendium-15.11.16.pdf.

[10] Section 3, Police Act, 1861.

[11] Prakash Singh vs Union of India, Supreme Court, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 310 of 1996, November 8, 2010.

[12] “Building Smart Police in India: Background into the needed Police Force Reforms”, Niti Aayog, 2016, http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/Strengthening-Police-Force.pdf.

We wrote a piece for ibnlive.com on the major differences between the government’s Lok Pal Bill, 2011 and the Jan Lok Pal Bill drafted by Anna Hazare’s group.  The note is reproduced below.   The streets are witnessing a demand that the government’s Lok Pal Bill be replaced by the Jan Lok Pal Bill (JLP) as drafted by the team led by Anna Hazare.  There are several significant differences between the two bills.  In this note, we describe the some of these differences. (See here for more on the Lok Pal Bill).   First, there is a divergence on the jurisdiction of the Lok Pal.  Both bills include ministers, MPs for any action outside Parliament, and Group A officers (and equivalent) of the government.  The government bill includes the prime minister after he demits office whereas the JLP includes a sitting prime minister.  The JLP includes any act of an MP in respect of a speech or vote in Parliament (which is now protected by Article 105 of the Constitution).  The JLP includes judges; the government bill excludes them.  The JLP includes all government officials, while the government bill does not include junior (below Group A) officials.  The government bill also includes officers of NGOs who receive government funds or any funds from the public; JLP does not cover NGOs.   Second, the two Bills differ on the composition.  The government bill has a chairperson and upto 8 members; at least half the members must have a judicial background.  The JLP has a chairperson and 10 members, of which 4 have a judicial background.   Third, the process of selecting the Lok Pal members is different.  The JLP has a two stage process.  A search committee will shortlist potential candidates.  The search committee will have 10 members; five of these would have retired as Chief Justice of India, Chief Election Commissioner or Comptroller and Auditor General; they will select the other five from civil society.   The Lok Pal chairperson and members will be selected from this shortlist by a selection committee.  The selection committee consists of the prime minister, the leader of opposition in Lok Sabha, two supreme court judges, two high court chief justices, the chief election commissioner, the comptroller and auditor general, and all previous Lok Pal chairpersons.   The government bill has a simpler process.  The selection will be made by a committee consisting of the prime minister, the leaders of opposition in both Houses of Parliament, a supreme court judge, a high court chief justice, an eminent jurist, and an eminent person in public life.  The selection committee may, at its discretion, appoint a search committee to shortlist candidates.   Fourth, there are some differences in the qualifications of a member of the Lok Pal.  The JLP requires a judicial member to have held judicial office for 10 years or been a high court or supreme court advocate for 15 years.  The government bill requires the judicial member to be a supreme court judge or a high court chief justice.  For other members, the government bill requires at least 25 years experience in anti-corruption policy, public administration, vigilance or finance.  The JLP has a lower age limit of 45 years, and disqualifies anyone who has been in government service in the previous two years.   Fifth, the process for removal of Lok Pal members is different.  The government bill permits the president to make a reference to the Supreme Court for an inquiry, followed by removal if the member is found to be biased or corrupt.  The reference may be made by the president (a) on his own, (a) on a petition signed by 100 MPs, or (c) on a petition by a citizen if the President is then satisfied that it should be referred.  The President may also remove any member for insolvency, infirmity of mind or body, or engaging in paid employment.   The JLP has a different process. The process starts with a complaint by any person to the Supreme Court.  If the court finds misbehaviour, infirmity of mind or body, insolvency or paid employment, it may recommend his removal to the President.   Sixth, the offences covered by the Bills vary.  The government bill deals only with offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act.  The JLP, in addition, includes offences by public servants under the Indian Penal Code, victimization of whistleblowers and repeated violation of citizen’s charter.   Seventh, the government bill provides for an investigation wing under the Lok Pal.  The JLP states that the CBI will be under the Lok Pal while investigating corruption cases.   Eighth, the government bill provides for a prosecution wing of the Lok Pal.  In the JLP, the CBI’s prosecution wing will conduct this function.   Ninth, the process for prosecution is different.  In the government bill, the Lok Pal may initiate prosecution in a special court.  A copy of the report is to be sent to the competent authority.  No prior sanction is required.  In the JLP, prosecution of the prime minister, ministers, MPs and judges of supreme court and high courts may be initiated only with the permission of a 7-judge bench of the Lok Pal.   Tenth, the JLP deals with grievance redressal of citizens, in addition to the process for prosecuting corruption cases.  It requires every public authority to publish citizen’s charters listing its commitments to citizens.  The government bill does not deal with grievance redressal.   Given the widespread media coverage and public discussions, it is important that citizens understand the differences and nuances.  This may be a good opportunity to enact a law which includes the better provisions of each of these two bills.