The core group of secretaries on disinvestment has recently approved the disinvestment of five public sector undertakings (PSUs). This includes the entire shareholding of the government in four PSUs: Bharat Petroleum Corporation (BPCL), Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), North Eastern Electric Power Corporation (NEEPCO) and THDC (operates and maintains the Tehri Hydro Power Complex), and 30% of the shareholding in Container Corporation of India Limited (Concor). The government currently holds 54.8% of Concor, so the sale will reduce its stake below 25%.
Over the last few years, the government has removed legislative barriers towards privatisation of several other PSUs. This raises the question whether the government plans to privatise them.
What was the Supreme Court’s order on privatisation of PSUs?
In 2003, a similar proposal had been raised by the government for the sale of its shareholding in HPCL and BPCL. This proposal was challenged in the Supreme Court on the grounds that it would violate the provisions of the laws that transferred ownership of certain assets to the government (which later formed these PSUs). For example, BPCL was formed by nationalising Burmah Shell in India through an Act of Parliament, and merging their refinery and marketing companies. The Court ruled that the central government cannot proceed with the privatisation of HPCL and BPCL (i.e., reduce its direct or indirect ownership below 51%) without amending the concerned laws. So the government continues to hold majority stake directly in BPCL, and indirectly in HPCL ( through ONGC, another PSU).
The five Companies approved for privatisation include BPCL and SCI (into which two nationalised companies, the Jayanti Shipping Company, and the Mogul Line Limited were merged). The relevant nationalisation Acts have been repealed over the last five years.
How did the government remove the legislative barriers for privatisation?
Between 2014 and 2019, Parliament passed six Repealing and Amending Acts which repealed around 722 laws. These included laws that had transferred the ownership of companies to the central government which later formed BPCL, HPCL, and OIL. These also repealed the laws that had transferred ownership of the companies to the central government which were later merged with the SCI. This implies that now the government can go ahead with the privatisation of these government companies as the conditions imposed by the Supreme Court’s order have been fulfilled. These Repealing and Amending Acts also repealed several other nationalisation laws that were later formed into PSUs. In the Table below, we have listed some of these companies. Note that the Law Commission of India (2014) had suggested the repeal of several of these laws (including the Esso Act, the Burmah Shell Act, the Burn Company Act) on the grounds that these laws do not serve any purpose with respect to the nationalised entity. However, it had suggested that a study of all the nationalisation Acts should be done before repealing these Acts, and if necessary a savings clause should be provided in the repealing Act.
Did Parliament scrutinise these Acts before passing them?
Many of these repeals were made through the Repealing and Amending Act, 2016. These include the Acts relating to BPCL, HPCL, OIL, Coal India Limited, SCI, National Textiles Corporation, Hindustan Copper and Burn Standard Company Limited. The Bill was not referred to a Parliamentary Standing Committee, and was passed after a cursory debate (50 minutes in Lok Sabha and 20 minutes in Rajya Sabha). Similarly, the two Acts passed in 2017, that enable privatisation of SAIL, PowerGrid, and State Trading Corporation were not examined by a Standing Committee.
So what comes next?
The repeal of these Acts have cleared the legislative hurdle for privatisation of these companies. That is, the government does not need prior approval of Parliament to sell its shareholding. Therefore, it is now up to the government to decide whether it wishes to privatise these entities.
A version of this article was published by the Business Standard on October 20, 2019.
Table 1: Some Nationalisation Acts repealed since 2014 (list not exhaustive)
Company |
Act being repealed |
Repealing Act |
---|---|---|
Shipping Corporation Of India (SCI) |
The Jayanti Shipping Company (Acquisition of Shares) Act, 1971 |
Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 |
The Mogul Line Limited (Acquisition of Shares) Act, 1984 |
||
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) |
The Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976 |
Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 |
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) |
The Esso (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1974 |
Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 |
The Caltex [Acquisition of Shares of Caltex Oil Refining (India) Limited and of the Undertakings in India of Caltex (India) Limited] Act, 1977 |
||
The Kosangas Company (Acquisition of Undertaking) Act, 1979 |
||
Coal India Limited (CIL) |
The Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971 |
Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 |
The Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973 |
||
The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972. |
Repealing and Amending (Second) Act, 2017 |
|
The Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973. |
||
Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) |
The Bolani Ores Limited (Acquisition of Shares) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1978 |
Repealing and Amending (Second) Act, 2017 |
The Indian Iron and Steel Company (Acquisition of Shares) Act, 1976 |
||
Power Grid Corporation of India Limited |
The National Thermal Power Corporation Limited, the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Limited and the North-Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Power Transmission Systems) Act, 1993. |
Repealing and Amending (Second) Act, 2017 |
The Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Power Transmission System) Act, 1994. |
||
Oil India Limited (OIL) |
The Burmah Oil Company [Acquisition of Shares of Oil India Limited and of the Undertakings in India of Assam Oil Company Limited and the Burmah Oil Company (India Trading) Limited] Act, 1981 |
Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 |
State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. (STC) |
The Tea Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Sick Tea Units) Act, 1985 |
Repealing and Amending Act, 2017 |
National Textile Corporation Limited (NTC) |
The Sick Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1972 |
Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 |
The Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983 |
||
The Laxmirattan and Atherton West Cotton Mills (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1976 |
||
Hindustan Copper Limited |
The Indian Copper Corporation (Acquisition of Undertaking) Act, 1972 |
Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 |
Burn Standard Co Ltd |
The Burn Company and Indian Standard Wagon Company (Nationalisation) Act, 1976 |
Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 |
Indian Railways |
The Futwah-Islampur Light Railway Line (Nationalisation) Act, 1985 |
Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 |
Braithwaite & Co Limited, Ministry of Railways |
The Braithwaite and Company (India) Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1976. |
Repealing and Amending (Second) Act, 2017 |
The Gresham and Craven of India (Private) Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1977 |
||
Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. |
The Brentford Electric (India) Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1987 |
Repealing and Amending (Second) Act, 2017 |
The Transformers and Switchgear Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1983 |
Repealing and Amending Act, 2019 |
|
Alcock Ashdown (Guj) Limited, Government of Gujarat Undertaking |
The Alcock Ashdown Company Limited (Acquisition of Undertakings) Act, 1973. |
Repealing and Amending Act, 2019 |
Bengal Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (BCPL) |
The Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980 |
Repealing and Amending (Second) Act, 2017 |
Organisations under Department of Pharmaceuticals |
The Smith, Stainstreet and Company Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1977 |
Repealing and Amending (Second) Act, 2017 |
The Bengal Immunity Company Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1984. |
Sources: Repealing and Amending Act, 2015; Repealing and Amending (Second) Act, 2015; Repealing and Amending Act, 2016; Repealing and Amending Act, 2017; Repealing and Amending (Second) Act, 2017; Repealing and Amending Act, 2019.
Today, a general discussion on the Union Budget 2020-21 is being held in both Houses of Parliament. In the budget, the government presented the estimates of the money it expects to spend on various ministries, and how much money will be raised from different sources such as levy of taxes and dividends from public enterprises in 2020-21. In addition, the budget presented the revised estimates made by the government for the year 2019-20 in comparison to the estimates it had given to Parliament in the previous year’s budget. The budget also gave an account of how much money the government actually raised and spent in 2018-19.
What are revised estimates?
Some of the estimates made by the government might change during the course of the year. For instance, once the year gets underway, some ministries may need more funds than what was actually allocated to them in the budget, or the receipts expected from certain sources might change. Such deviations from the budget estimates get reflected in the figures released by the government at later stages as part of the subsequent budgets. Once the year ends, the actual numbers are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), post which they are presented to Parliament with the upcoming budget, i.e. two years after the estimates are made.
For instance, estimates for the year 2019-20 were presented as part of the 2019-20 budget in July 2019. In the 2020-21 budget (February 2020), the government presented 2019-20’s revised estimates based on the actual receipts and expenditure accounted so far during the year and estimations made for the remaining 2-3 months.
Is there a way to find out the government’s actual receipts or expenditure mid-year?
The actual receipts and expenditure accounts of the central government are maintained by the Controller General of Accounts (CGA), Ministry of Finance on a monthly basis. On January 31, 2020, the CGA updated the accounts figures for the period April to December 2019. Thus, we have unaudited actuals for the first nine months of the financial year.
How do the actual figures for the year 2019-20 so far compare with the revised estimates?
Table 1 gives the revised estimates presented by the central government for the year 2019-20 and the monthly account figures maintained by the CGA for the nine-month period April to December 2019. The difference between these two figures gives us the three-month target that the government will have to meet by March 2020 to reach its revised estimates.
Till December 2019, the government has spent Rs 21.1 lakh crore, which is 78% of the revised estimates for 2019-20. While the expenditure has reached 78% of the target, so far, the government has been able to generate only Rs 11.8 lakh crore or 61% of the receipts (excluding borrowings) for the year 2019-20. This implies that the receipts will have to grow at a rate of 41% in the three-month period January-March 2020 to meet the revised estimates of Rs 19.3 lakh crore. So far, receipts have grown at a rate of 4%.
Table 1: Budget at a Glance – Comparison of 2019-20 revised estimates with Apr-Dec 2019 figures (Rs crore)
Budget at a Glance |
Actuals |
Revised |
Nine-month period |
Three-month target |
Growth rate so far |
Growth target |
2018-19 |
2019-20 |
Apr-Dec 2019 |
Jan-Mar 2020 |
% change |
% change |
|
Revenue Expenditure |
20,07,399 |
23,49,645 |
18,54,125 |
4,95,520 |
14% |
28% |
Capital Expenditure |
3,07,714 |
3,48,907 |
2,55,522 |
93,385 |
21% |
-3% |
Total Expenditure |
23,15,113 |
26,98,552 |
21,09,647 |
5,88,905 |
15% |
22% |
Revenue Receipts |
15,52,916 |
18,50,101 |
11,46,897 |
7,03,204 |
6% |
50% |
Capital Receipts |
1,12,779 |
81,605 |
31,025 |
50,580 |
-33% |
-24% |
of which Disinvestment |
94,727 |
65,000 |
18,100 |
46,900 |
-47% |
-22% |
Total Receipts (without borrowings) |
16,65,695 |
19,31,706 |
11,77,922 |
7,53,784 |
4% |
41% |
Revenue Deficit |
4,54,483 |
4,99,544 |
7,07,228 |
-2,07,684 |
||
Fiscal Deficit |
6,49,418 |
7,66,846 |
9,31,725 |
-1,64,879 |
|
|
Primary Deficit |
66,770 |
1,41,741 |
5,07,411 |
-3,65,670 |
Sources: Union Budget 2020-21; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.
How do the actual tax receipts fare in comparison to the revised estimates of 2019-20?
A lower than estimated growth in nominal GDP has also affected the tax receipts of the government during the year. The 2019-20 budget estimated the nominal GDP to grow at 12% over the previous year, whereas the latest estimates suggest this growth rate to be 7.5% in 2019-20. The revised estimates for 2019-20 show gross tax receipts of Rs 21.6 lakh crore (includes states’ share). Till December 2019, tax receipts of Rs 13.8 lakh crore has been collected, which is 64% of the target. The tax receipts will have to grow at 19% in the three-month period January-March 2020 to meet the target. Table 2 shows similar comparison for the various taxes and also for the tax receipts devolved to states. While the budget estimated a growth in receipts from all major taxes, receipts from taxes such as corporation tax (-14%), union excise duties (-2%), and customs (-12%) have declined during the period Apr-Dec 2019.
Table 2: Tax receipts – Comparison of 2019-20 revised estimates with Apr-Dec 2019 figures (Rs crore)
Revenue Receipts |
Actuals |
Revised |
Nine-month period |
Three-month target |
Growth rate so far |
Growth target |
2018-19 |
2019-20 |
Apr-Dec 2019 |
Jan-Mar 2020 |
% change |
% change |
|
Gross Tax Revenue |
20,80,465 |
21,63,423 |
13,83,035 |
7,80,388 |
-3% |
19% |
Devolution to States |
7,61,454 |
6,56,046 |
4,76,113 |
1,79,933 |
-2% |
-34% |
Net Tax Revenue |
13,17,211 |
15,04,587 |
9,04,944 |
5,99,643 |
-3% |
57% |
Dividend and Profits |
1,13,420 |
1,99,893 |
1,61,979 |
37,914 |
175% |
-30% |
Other Non-tax Revenue |
1,22,284 |
1,45,620 |
79,974 |
65,646 |
-10% |
96% |
Revenue Receipts |
15,52,916 |
18,50,101 |
11,46,897 |
7,03,204 |
6% |
50% |
Note: Figures for income tax exclude receipts from the Securities Transaction Tax.
Sources: Receipts Budget, Union Budget 2019-20; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.
If we look at sources of receipts other than taxes, non-tax revenue during Apr-Dec 2019 is Rs 2.4 lakh crore, i.e. 69% of the estimated Rs 3.5 lakh crore. Disinvestment receipts till date amounted to Rs 18,100 crore, i.e. 17% of the budget target of Rs 1.05 lakh crore. Though the investment target has been revised down to Rs 65,000 crore, it implies that Rs 47,000 crore would need to be raised in the next two months.
How does this impact the borrowings of the government?
When the expenditure planned by the government is more than its receipts, the government finances this gap through borrowings. This gap is known as fiscal deficit and equals the borrowings required to be made for that year. Given lower than expected receipts, the government has had to borrow more money than it had planned for. Borrowings or fiscal deficit of the government, till December 2019, stands at Rs 9.3 lakh crore, which is 22% higher than the revised estimate of Rs 7.7 lakh crore. Note that with three months still remaining in the financial year, fiscal deficit may further increase, in case receipts are less than expenditure.
When we look at fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP, the 2019-20 budget estimated the fiscal deficit to be at 3.3% of GDP. This has been revised upward to 3.8% of GDP. However, till December 2019, fiscal deficit for the year 2019-20 stands at 4.6% of GDP (taking the latest available GDP figures into account, i.e. the First Advance Estimates for 2019-20 released in January 2020). This increase in fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP is because of two reasons: (i) an increase in borrowings as compared to the budget estimates, and (ii) a decrease in GDP as compared to the estimate made in the budget. The latter is due to a lower than estimated growth in nominal GDP for the year 2019-20. The 2019-20 budget estimated the nominal GDP to grow at 12% over the previous year, whereas the latest estimates suggest this growth rate to be 7.5% in 2019-20.
Note that, in addition to the expenditure shown in the budget, the government also spends through extra budgetary resources. These resources are raised by issuing bonds and through loans from the National Small Savings Fund (NSSF). The revised estimates for 2019-20 show an expenditure of Rs 1,72,699 crore through such extra-budgetary resources. This includes an expenditure of Rs 1,10,000 crore by the Food Corporation of India financed through loans from NSSF. Since funds borrowed for such expenditure remain outside the budget, they do not get factored in the deficit and debt figures. If borrowings made in the form of extra-budgetary resources are also taken into account, the fiscal deficit estimated for the year 2019-20 would increase from 3.8% of GDP to 4.6% of GDP due to extra-budgetary borrowings of Rs 1,72,699 crore. This does not account for further slippage if the targeted revenue does not materialise.