The following piece by C V Madhukar appeared in the September,2011 issue of Governance Now magazine. The debate in Parliament in response to the recent Anna Hazare led agitation demanding a strong Lok Pal Bill was a fine hour for the institution of Parliament. What was even more important about the debate is that it was watched by thousands of people across the country many of whom have lost faith in the ability of our MPs to coherently articulate their point of view on substantive issues. Of course, in many cases some of these impressions about our MPs are largely formed by what the media channels tend to project, and without a full appreciation of what actually happens in Parliament. There is now a greater awareness about an important institutional mechanism called the standing committee, and other nuances about the law making process. The Lok Pal agitation brought out another important aspect of our democracy. There are still many in India who believe that peaceful protest is a powerful way to communicate the expectations of people to the government. Our elected representatives are prepared to respond collectively when such protests are held. There is a negotiated settlement possible between the agitating citizens and our political establishment within the broad construct of our Constitution. All of this means that the safety valves in our democracy are still somewhat functional, despite its many shortcomings. But the way the whole Lok Pal episode has played out so far raises a number of important questions about the functioning of our political parties and our Parliamentary system. A fundamental question is the extent to which our elected MPs are able to ‘represent’ the concerns of the people in Parliament. It has been obvious for some time now, that corruption at various levels has been a concern for many. For months before the showdown in August, there have been public expressions of the disenchantment of the people about this problem. Even though several MPs would say privately that it is time for them to do something about it as elected representatives, they were unable to come together in a way to show the people that they were serious about the issue, or that they could collectively do something significant about the problem. The government was trying in its own way to grapple with the problem, and was unable to seize the initiative, expect for a last minute effort to find a graceful way out of the immediate problem on hand. In our governance system as outlined in our Constitution, the primary and most important institution to hold the government accountable is the Parliament. To perform this role, the Parliament has a number of institutional mechanisms that have evolved over the years. The creation of the CAG as a Constitutional body that provides inputs to Parliament, the Public Accounts Committee in Parliament, the question hour in Parliament are some of the ways in which the government is held to account. Clearly all of these mechanisms together are unable to adequately do the work of overseeing the government that our MPs have been tasked with. But it is one thing for our MPs to be effective in their role holding the government to account, and a very different thing to come across collectively as being responsive to the concerns of the people. For our MPs to play their representation role more convincingly and meaningfully there are certain issues that need to be addressed. A major concern is about how our political parties are structured, where MPs are bound by tight party discipline. In a system where the party leadership decides who gets the party ticket to contest the next election, there is a natural incentive for MPs to toe the party line, even within their party forums. This is often at the cost of their personal conviction about certain issues, and may sometimes be against what the citizens could want their representatives to do. Add to this the party whip system, under which each MP has to vote along the party line or face the risk of losing his seat in Parliament. And then of course, if some MP decides to take a stand on some issue, he needs to do all the research work on his own because our elected representatives have no staff with this capability. This deadly cocktail of negative incentives, just makes it very easy for the MP to mostly just follow the party line. If the representation function were to be taken somewhat seriously, these issues need to be addressed. The 2004 World Development Report of the World Bank was focussed on accountability. An important idea in the report was that it was too costly and inefficient for people to vote a government in and wait till the next election to hold the government accountable by voting it out for the poor governance it provides. That is the reason it is essential for governments and citizens to develop ways in which processes can be developed by which the government can be held accountable even during its tenure. The myriad efforts by government such as social audits, monitoring and evaluation efforts within government departments, efforts by Parliament to hold the government accountable, efforts of civil society groups, are all ways of holding the government to account. But over and above accountability, in an age of growing aspirations and increasing transparency, our MPs must find new ways of asserting their views and those people that they seek to represent in our Parliament. This is an age which expects our politicians to be responsive, but in a responsible way. Even as the Lok Pal Bill is being deliberated upon in the standing committee, civil society groups continue to watch how MPs will come out on this Bill. There are plenty of other opportunities where MPs and Parliament can take the initiative, including electoral reforms, funding of elections, black money, etc. It remains to be seen whether our MPs will lead on these issues from the front, or will choose to be led by others. This will determine whether in the perception of the public the collective stock of our MPs will rise or continue to deplete in the months ahead.
Early this week, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India tabled a report on the finances of Uttar Pradesh for the financial year 2020-21. A few days prior to that, on May 26, the budget for Uttar Pradesh for 2022-23 was presented, along with which the final audited expenditure and receipt figures for the year 2020-21 were released. The year 2020-21 presented a two-fold challenge for states – loss in revenue due to impact of COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown, and the need for increased expenditure to support affected persons and economic recovery. CAG noted that Uttar Pradesh’s GSDP grew by 1.05% in 2020-21 as compared to a growth of 6.5% in 2019-20. The state reported a revenue deficit of Rs 2,367 crore in 2020-21 after reporting revenue surplus for 14 successive years since 2006-07. Revenue deficit is the excess of revenue expenditure over revenue receipts. This blog looks at the key trends in the finances of Uttar Pradesh in 2020-21 and certain observations by CAG on fiscal management by the state.
Spending and Deficits in 2020-21
Underspending: In 2020-21, total spending by the state was 26% less than the budget estimate presented in February 2020. In sectors such as water supply and sanitation, the actual expenditure was 60% less than the amount budgeted, while in agriculture and allied activities only 53% of the budgeted amount was spent. CAG observed that in 251 schemes across 57 departments, the state government did not incur any expenditure in 2020-21. These schemes had a budget provision of at least one crore rupees, and had cumulative allocation of Rs 50,617 crore. These included schemes such as Pipe Drinking Water Scheme in Bundelkhand/Vindhya and apportionment of pension liabilities. Moreover, the overall savings due to non-utilisation of funds in 2020-21 was 27.28% of total budget provisions. CAG observed that the budgetary provisions increased between 2016 and 2021. However, the utilisation of budget provisions reduced between 2018-19 and 2020-21.
Pattern of spending: CAG observed that in case of 12 departments, more than 50% of the expenditure was incurred in March 2021, the last month of the financial year. In the civil aviation department, 89% of the total expenditure was incurred in March while this figure was 62% for the social welfare department (welfare of handicapped and backward classes). CAG noted that maintaining a steady pace of expenditure is a sound practice under public financial management. However, the Uttar Pradesh Budget Manual has no specific instructions for preventing such bunching of expenditure. The CAG recommended that the state government can consider issuing guidelines to control the rush of expenditure towards the closing months of the financial year.
Management of deficit and debt: As a measure to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, an Ordinance was promulgated in June 2020 to raise the fiscal deficit limit from 3% of GSDP to 5% of GSDP for the year 2020-21. Fiscal deficit represents the gap between expenditure and receipts in a year, and this gap is filled with borrowings. The Uttar Pradesh Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2004 (FRBM Act) passed by Uttar Pradesh Assembly specifies the upper limit for debt and deficits. The Ordinance thus permitted the state government to borrow more to sustain its budget expenditure. The fiscal deficit of the state in 2020-21 was 3.20% of GSDP, well below the revised limit. At the same time, the state’s outstanding debt to GSDP in 2020-21 was 32.77% of GSDP, above the target of 32% of GSDP set under the FRBM Act. Outstanding debt represents accumulation of debt over the years.
Table 1: Spending by Uttar Pradesh in 2020-21 as compared to Budget Estimates (in Rs crore)
|
Particular |
2020-21 BE |
2020-21 Actuals |
% change from BE to Actuals |
|
Net Receipts (1+2) |
4,24,767 |
2,97,311 |
-30% |
|
1. Revenue Receipts (a+b+c+d) |
4,22,567 |
2,96,176 |
-30% |
|
a. Own Tax Revenue |
1,58,413 |
1,19,897 |
-24% |
|
b. Own Non-Tax Revenue |
31,179 |
11,846 |
-62% |
|
c. Share in central taxes |
1,52,863 |
1,06,687 |
-30% |
|
d. Grants-in-aid from the Centre |
80,112 |
57,746 |
-28% |
|
Of which GST compensation grants |
7,608 |
9,381 |
23% |
|
2. Non-Debt Capital Receipts |
2,200 |
1,135 |
-48% |
|
3. Borrowings |
75,791 |
86,859 |
15% |
|
Of which GST compensation loan |
- |
6,007 |
- |
|
Net Expenditure (4+5+6) |
4,77,963 |
3,51,933 |
-26% |
|
4. Revenue Expenditure |
3,95,117 |
2,98,543 |
-24% |
|
5. Capital Outlay |
81,209 |
52,237 |
-36% |
|
6. Loans and Advances |
1,637 |
1,153 |
-30% |
|
7. Debt Repayment |
34,897 |
26,777 |
-23% |
|
Revenue Balance |
27,451 |
-2,367 |
-109% |
|
Revenue Balance (as % of GSDP) |
1.53% |
-0.14% |
|
|
Fiscal Deficit |
53,195 |
54,622 |
3% |
|
Fiscal Deficit (as % of GSDP) |
2.97% |
3.20% |
Note: A negative revenue balance indicates a deficit. The actual fiscal deficit reported by Uttar Pradesh for 2020-21 in 2022-23 budget was 2.8% of GSDP. This difference was due to higher GSDP figure reported by the state.
Sources: Uttar Pradesh Budget Documents of various years; CAG; PRS.
Finances of State Public Sector Undertakings
Public sector undertakings (PSUs) are set up by the government to discharge commercial activities in various sectors. As on March 31, 2021, there were 115 PSUs in Uttar Pradesh. CAG analysed the performance of 38 PSUs. Out of these 38 PSUs, 22 companies earned a profit of Rs 700 crore, while 16 companies posted a loss of Rs 7,411 crore in 2020-21. Note that both the number of PSUs incurring losses and the quantum of losses has decreased since 2018-19. In 2018-19, 20 PSUs had reported losses worth Rs 15,219 crore.
Figure 1: Cumulative losses incurred by Uttar Pradesh PSUs (Rs crore)
Sources: CAG; PRS.
Losses of power sector PSUs: Three power sector PSUs—Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited, Purvanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, and Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited—were the top loss incurring PSUs. These three PSUs accounted for 73% of the total losses of Rs 7,411 crore mentioned above. Note that as of June 2022, for each unit of power supplied, the revenue realised by UP power distribution companies (discoms) is 27 paise less than cost of supply. This is better than the gap of 34 paise per unit at the national level. However, the aggregate technical and commercial losses (AT&C) of the Uttar Pradesh discoms was 27.85%, considerably higher than the national average of 17.19%. AT&C losses refer to the proportion of power supplied by a discom for which it does not receive any payment.
Off-budget borrowings: CAG also observed that the Uttar Pradesh government resorted to off-budget borrowing through state owned PSUs/authorities. Off budget borrowings are not accounted in the debt of the state government and are on books of the respective PSUs/authorities, although, debt is serviced by the state government. As a result, the outstanding debt reported in the budget does not represent the actual debt position of the state. CAG identified off-budget borrowing worth Rs 1,637 crore. The CAG recommended that the state government should avoid extra-budget borrowings. It should also credit all the loans taken by PSUs/authorities on behalf of and serviced by the state government to state government accounts.
Management of Reserve Funds
The Reserve Bank of India manages two reserve funds on the behalf of state governments. These funds are created to meet the liabilities of state governments. These funds are: (i) Consolidated Sinking Fund (CSF), and (ii) Guarantee Redemption Fund (GRF). They are funded by the contributions made by the state governments. CSF is an amortisation fund which is utilised to meet the repayment obligations of the government. Amortisation refers to payment of debt through regular instalments. The interest accumulated in the fund is used for repayment of outstanding liabilities (which is the accumulation of total borrowings at the end of a financial year, including any liabilities on the public account).
In line with the recommendation of the 12th Finance Commission, Uttar Pradesh created its CSF in March 2020. The state government may transfer at least 0.5% of its outstanding liabilities at the end of the previous year to the CSF. CAG observed that in 2020-21, Uttar Pradesh appropriated only Rs 1,000 crore to the CSF against the requirement of Rs 2,454 crore. CAG recommended that the state government should ensure at least 0.5% of the outstanding liabilities are contributed towards the CSF every year.
GRF is constituted by states to meet obligations related to guarantees. The state government may extend guarantee on loans taken by its PSUs. Guarantees are contingent liabilities of the state government, as in case of default by the company, repayment burden will fall on the state government. GRF can be used to settle guarantees extended by the government with respect to borrowings of state PSUs and other bodies. The 12th Finance Commission had recommended that states should constitute GRF. It was to be funded through guarantees fees to meet any sudden discharge of obligated guarantees extended by the states. CAG noted that Uttar Pradesh government has not constituted GRF. Moreover, the state has also not fixed any limits for extending guarantees.
For an analysis of Uttar Pradesh’s 2022-23 budget, please see here.
