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"Parliamentary approval of the creation, mandate and powers of security agencies is a necessary but not sufficient condition for upholding the rule of law. A legal foundation increases the legitimacy both of the existence of these agencies and the (often exceptional) powers that they possess." Though mechanisms for ensuring accountability of the executive to the Parliament are in place for most aspects of government in India, such mechanisms are completely absent for the oversight of intelligence agencies. In India, various intelligence agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing, and the Intelligence Bureau are creations of administrative orders, and are not subject to scrutiny by Parliament. This is in direct contrast to the practise of the Legislature's oversight of intelligence agencies in most countries.  Though different countries have different models of exercising such oversight, the common principle - that activities of intelligence agencies should be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, remains uniform. In the US for example, both the House and the Senate have a Committee which exercises such scrutiny.  These are House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, established in 1977, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, created in 1976.  Both committees have broad powers over the intelligence community.  They oversee budgetary appropriations as well as legislation on this subject.  In addition, the House Committee can do something which the Senate can not:  “tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities.”  This gives the Committee the power to look into actual tactical intelligence, and not just broader policy issues.  Intelligence agencies are also governed by a variety of laws which clearly lay out a charter of responsibilities, as well as specific exemptions allowing such agencies to do some things other government agencies ordinarily cannot. (For source, click here) In UK, the Intelligence Services Act of 1994 set up a similar framework for intelligence organisations in the UK, and also set up a mechanism for legislative oversight.  The Act set up a Committee which should consists mostly of Members of Parliament.  The members are appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of opposition, and the Committee reports to the Prime Minister.  The Prime Minister is required to present the report of the Committee before Parliament. (For the Act, click here) Recently, the Committee has expressed concerns in its 2009-10 report over the fact that it is financially dependent on the Prime Minister's office, and that there could be a conflict of interest considering it is practically a part of   the government over which it is supposed to express oversight. (For the report, click here) A study titled "Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice" captures the best components of Parliamentary oversight of intelligence bodies.  Some of these are:

  1. The entire intelligence community, including all ancillary departments and officials, should be covered by the mandate of one or more parliamentary oversight bodies.
  2. The mandate of a parliamentary oversight body might include some or all of the following (a) legality, (b) efficacy, (c) efficiency, (d) budgeting and accounting; (e) conformity with relevant human rights Conventions (f) policy/administrative aspects of the intelligence services.
  3. The recommendations and reports of the parliamentary oversight body should be (a) published; (b) debated in parliament; (c) monitored with regard to its implementation by the government and intelligence community.
  4. The resources and legal powers at the disposal of the parliamentary oversight body should match the scope of its mandate.
  5. Parliament should be responsible for appointing and, where necessary, removing members of a body exercising the oversight function in its name.
  6. Representation on parliamentary oversight bodies should be cross-party, preferably in accordance with the strengths of the political parties in parliament.
  7. Government ministers should be debarred from membership (and parliamentarians should be required to step down if they are appointed as ministers) or the independence of the committee will be compromised. The same applies to former members of agencies overseen.
  8. The oversight body should have the legal power to initiate investigations; Members of oversight bodies should have unrestricted access to all information which is necessary for executing their oversight tasks.
  9. The oversight body should have power to subpoena witnesses and to receive testimony under oath.
  10. The oversight body should take appropriate measures and steps in order to protect information from unauthorised disclosure.
  11. The committee should report to parliament at least yearly or as often as it deems necessary.
  12. The oversight body should have access to all relevant budget documents, provided that safeguards are in place to avoid leaking of classified information.

The Uttarakhand Assembly concluded a two-day session on November 30, 2022.  The session was scheduled to be held over five days.  In this post we look at the legislative business that was carried out in the Assembly, and the state of state legislatures. 

13 Bills were introduced and passed within two days 

As per the Session Agenda, a total of 19 Bills were listed for introduction in the span of two days.  13 of these were listed to be discussed and passed on the second day.  These included the Uttarakhand Protection of Freedom of Religion (Amendment) Bill, 2022, University of Petroleum and Energy Studies (Amendment), Bill, 2022, and the Uttarakhand Anti-Littering and Anti-Spitting (Amendment) Bill, 2022.

The Assembly had proposed to discuss and pass each Bill (barring two) within five minutes (see Figure 1).  Two Bills were allocated 20 minutes each for discussion and passing - the Haridwar Universities Bill, 2022, and the Public Service (Horizontal Reservation for Women) Bill, 2022.  As per news reports, the Assembly passed all 13 Bills within these two days (this excludes the Appropriation Bills).  This raises the question on the amount of scrutiny that these Bills were subject to, and the quality of such laws when the legislature intends to pass them within mere minutes.

Figure 1: Excerpt of Uttarakhand Assembly's November 2022 Session Agenda

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Law making requires deliberation, scrutiny

Our law-making institutions have several tools at their disposal to ensure that before a law is passed, it has been examined thoroughly on various aspects such as constitutionality, clarity, financial and technical capacity of the state to implement provisions, among others.  The Ministry/Department piloting a Bill could share a draft of the Bill for public feedback (pre-legislative scrutiny).  While Bills get introduced, members may raise issues on constitutionality of the proposed law.  Once introduced, Bills could be sent to legislative committees for greater scrutiny.   This allows legislators to deliberate upon individual provisions in depth, understand if there may be constitutional challenges or other issues with any provision.  This also allows experts and affected stakeholders to weigh in on the provisions, highlight issues, and help strengthen the law.  

However, when Bills are introduced and passed within mere minutes, it barely gives legislators the time to go through the provisions and mull over implications, issues, or ways to improve the law for affected parties.  It also raises the question of what the intention of the legislature is when passing laws in a hurry without any discussion.  Often, such poorly thought laws are also challenged in Courts.   

For instance, the Uttarakhand Assembly passed the Uttarakhand Freedom of Religion (Amendment) Bill, 2022 in this session (five minutes had been allocated for the discussion and passing of the Bill).  The 2022 Bill amends the 2018 Act which prohibits forceful religious conversions, and provides that conversion through allurement or marriage will be unlawful.  The Bill has provisions such as requiring an additional notice to be sent to the District Magistrate (DM) for a conversion, and that reconversion to one’s immediate previous religion will not be considered a conversion.  Some of these provisions seem similar to other laws that were passed by states and have been struck down by or have been challenged in Courts.  For example, the Madhya Pradesh High Court while examining the Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 2021 noted that providing a notice to the DM for a conversion of religion violates the right to privacy as the right includes the right to remain silent.  It extends that understanding to the right to decide on one’s faith.  The Himachal Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 2006 exempted people who reconvert to their original religion from giving a public notice of such conversion.  The Himachal Pradesh High Court had struck down this provision as discriminatory and violative of the right to equality.  The Court also noted that the right to change one’s belief cannot be taken away for maintaining public order.  

Uttarakhand MLAs may not have had an opportunity to think about how issues flagged by Courts may be addressed in a law that regulates religious conversions. 

Most other state Assemblies also pass Bills without adequate scrutiny

In 2021 44% states passed Bills on the day it was introduced or on the next day.  Between January 2018 and September 2022, the Gujarat Assembly introduced 92 Bills (excluding Appropriation Bills).  91 of these were passed in the same day as their introduction.  In the 2022 Monsoon Session, the Goa Assembly passed 28 Bills in the span of two days.   This is in addition to discussion and voting on budgetary allocation to various government departments.  

Figure 2: Time taken by state legislatures to pass Bills in 2021

Note: The chart above does not include Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. A Bill is considered passed within a day if it was passed on the day of introduction or on the next day. For states with bicameral legislatures, bills have to be passed in both Houses. This has been taken into account in the above chart for five states having Legislative Councils, except Bihar (information was not available for Council). 
Sources: Assembly websites, E-Gazette of various states and Right to Information requests; PRS.

Occasionally, the time actually spent deliberating upon a Bill is lesser than the allocated time.   This may be due to disruptions in the House.  The Himachal Pradesh Assembly provides data on the time actually spent discussing Bills.   For example, in the August 2022 Session, it spent an average of 12 minutes to discuss and pass 10 Bills.  However, the Uttarakhand Assembly allocated only five minutes to discuss each Bill in its November 2022 Session.  This indicates the lack of intent of certain state legislatures to improve their functioning.

In the case of Parliament, a significant portion of scrutiny is also carried out by the Department Related Standing Committees, even when Parliament is not in session.  In the 14th Lok Sabha (LS), 60% of the Bills introduced were sent to Committees for detailed examination, and in the 15th LS, 71% were sent.  These figures have reduced recently – in the 16th LS 27% of the Bills were sent to Committees, and so far in the 17th LS, 13% have been sent.  However, across states, sending Bills to Committees for detailed examination is often the exception than the norm.  In 2021, less than 10% of the Bills were sent to Committees.  None of the Bills passed by the Uttarakhand Assembly had been examined by a committee.   States that are an exception here include Kerala which has 14 subject Committees, and Bills are regularly sent to these for examination.  However, these Committees are headed by their respective Ministers, which reduces the scope of independent scrutiny that may be undertaken.