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"Parliamentary approval of the creation, mandate and powers of security agencies is a necessary but not sufficient condition for upholding the rule of law. A legal foundation increases the legitimacy both of the existence of these agencies and the (often exceptional) powers that they possess." Though mechanisms for ensuring accountability of the executive to the Parliament are in place for most aspects of government in India, such mechanisms are completely absent for the oversight of intelligence agencies. In India, various intelligence agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing, and the Intelligence Bureau are creations of administrative orders, and are not subject to scrutiny by Parliament. This is in direct contrast to the practise of the Legislature's oversight of intelligence agencies in most countries.  Though different countries have different models of exercising such oversight, the common principle - that activities of intelligence agencies should be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, remains uniform. In the US for example, both the House and the Senate have a Committee which exercises such scrutiny.  These are House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, established in 1977, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, created in 1976.  Both committees have broad powers over the intelligence community.  They oversee budgetary appropriations as well as legislation on this subject.  In addition, the House Committee can do something which the Senate can not:  “tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities.”  This gives the Committee the power to look into actual tactical intelligence, and not just broader policy issues.  Intelligence agencies are also governed by a variety of laws which clearly lay out a charter of responsibilities, as well as specific exemptions allowing such agencies to do some things other government agencies ordinarily cannot. (For source, click here) In UK, the Intelligence Services Act of 1994 set up a similar framework for intelligence organisations in the UK, and also set up a mechanism for legislative oversight.  The Act set up a Committee which should consists mostly of Members of Parliament.  The members are appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of opposition, and the Committee reports to the Prime Minister.  The Prime Minister is required to present the report of the Committee before Parliament. (For the Act, click here) Recently, the Committee has expressed concerns in its 2009-10 report over the fact that it is financially dependent on the Prime Minister's office, and that there could be a conflict of interest considering it is practically a part of   the government over which it is supposed to express oversight. (For the report, click here) A study titled "Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice" captures the best components of Parliamentary oversight of intelligence bodies.  Some of these are:

  1. The entire intelligence community, including all ancillary departments and officials, should be covered by the mandate of one or more parliamentary oversight bodies.
  2. The mandate of a parliamentary oversight body might include some or all of the following (a) legality, (b) efficacy, (c) efficiency, (d) budgeting and accounting; (e) conformity with relevant human rights Conventions (f) policy/administrative aspects of the intelligence services.
  3. The recommendations and reports of the parliamentary oversight body should be (a) published; (b) debated in parliament; (c) monitored with regard to its implementation by the government and intelligence community.
  4. The resources and legal powers at the disposal of the parliamentary oversight body should match the scope of its mandate.
  5. Parliament should be responsible for appointing and, where necessary, removing members of a body exercising the oversight function in its name.
  6. Representation on parliamentary oversight bodies should be cross-party, preferably in accordance with the strengths of the political parties in parliament.
  7. Government ministers should be debarred from membership (and parliamentarians should be required to step down if they are appointed as ministers) or the independence of the committee will be compromised. The same applies to former members of agencies overseen.
  8. The oversight body should have the legal power to initiate investigations; Members of oversight bodies should have unrestricted access to all information which is necessary for executing their oversight tasks.
  9. The oversight body should have power to subpoena witnesses and to receive testimony under oath.
  10. The oversight body should take appropriate measures and steps in order to protect information from unauthorised disclosure.
  11. The committee should report to parliament at least yearly or as often as it deems necessary.
  12. The oversight body should have access to all relevant budget documents, provided that safeguards are in place to avoid leaking of classified information.

Today, a general discussion on the Union Budget 2020-21 is being held in both Houses of Parliament.  In the budget, the government presented the estimates of the money it expects to spend on various ministries, and how much money will be raised from different sources such as levy of taxes and dividends from public enterprises in 2020-21.  In addition, the budget presented the revised estimates made by the government for the year 2019-20 in comparison to the estimates it had given to Parliament in the previous year’s budget.  The budget also gave an account of how much money the government actually raised and spent in 2018-19.  

What are revised estimates?

Some of the estimates made by the government might change during the course of the year.  For instance, once the year gets underway, some ministries may need more funds than what was actually allocated to them in the budget, or the receipts expected from certain sources might change.  Such deviations from the budget estimates get reflected in the figures released by the government at later stages as part of the subsequent budgets.  Once the year ends, the actual numbers are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), post which they are presented to Parliament with the upcoming budget, i.e. two years after the estimates are made.

For instance, estimates for the year 2019-20 were presented as part of the 2019-20 budget in July 2019.  In the 2020-21 budget (February 2020), the government presented 2019-20’s revised estimates based on the actual receipts and expenditure accounted so far during the year and estimations made for the remaining 2-3 months.

Is there a way to find out the government’s actual receipts or expenditure mid-year?

The actual receipts and expenditure accounts of the central government are maintained by the Controller General of Accounts (CGA), Ministry of Finance on a monthly basis.  On January 31, 2020, the CGA updated the accounts figures for the period April to December 2019.  Thus, we have unaudited actuals for the first nine months of the financial year.

How do the actual figures for the year 2019-20 so far compare with the revised estimates?

Table 1 gives the revised estimates presented by the central government for the year 2019-20 and the monthly account figures maintained by the CGA for the nine-month period April to December 2019.  The difference between these two figures gives us the three-month target that the government will have to meet by March 2020 to reach its revised estimates.    

Till December 2019, the government has spent Rs 21.1 lakh crore, which is 78% of the revised estimates for 2019-20.  While the expenditure has reached 78% of the target, so far, the government has been able to generate only Rs 11.8 lakh crore or 61% of the receipts (excluding borrowings) for the year 2019-20.  This implies that the receipts will have to grow at a rate of 41% in the three-month period January-March 2020 to meet the revised estimates of Rs 19.3 lakh crore.   So far, receipts have grown at a rate of 4%.

Table 1:  Budget at a Glance – Comparison of 2019-20 revised estimates with Apr-Dec 2019 figures (Rs crore)

Budget

at a Glance

Actuals

Revised

Nine-month period

Three-month target

Growth rate so far

Growth target

2018-19

2019-20

Apr-Dec 2019

Jan-Mar 2020

% change
  (Apr-Dec 2018 to Apr-Dec 2019) 

% change
  (Jan-Mar 2019 to Jan-Mar 2020) 

Revenue Expenditure

20,07,399

23,49,645

18,54,125

4,95,520

14%

28%

Capital Expenditure

3,07,714

3,48,907

2,55,522

93,385

21%

-3%

Total Expenditure

23,15,113

26,98,552

21,09,647

5,88,905

15%

22%

Revenue Receipts

15,52,916

18,50,101

11,46,897

7,03,204

6%

50%

Capital Receipts

1,12,779

81,605

31,025

50,580

-33%

-24%

of which Disinvestment

94,727

65,000

18,100

46,900

-47%

-22%

Total Receipts (without borrowings)

16,65,695

19,31,706

11,77,922

7,53,784

4%

41%

Revenue Deficit

4,54,483

4,99,544

7,07,228

-2,07,684

   

Fiscal Deficit

6,49,418

7,66,846

9,31,725

-1,64,879

 

 

Primary Deficit

66,770

1,41,741

5,07,411

-3,65,670

   

Sources:  Union Budget 2020-21; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.

How do the actual tax receipts fare in comparison to the revised estimates of 2019-20?

A lower than estimated growth in nominal GDP has also affected the tax receipts of the government during the year. The 2019-20 budget estimated the nominal GDP to grow at 12% over the previous year, whereas the latest estimates suggest this growth rate to be 7.5% in 2019-20.  The revised estimates for 2019-20 show gross tax receipts of Rs 21.6 lakh crore (includes states’ share).  Till December 2019, tax receipts of Rs 13.8 lakh crore has been collected, which is 64% of the target.  The tax receipts will have to grow at 19% in the three-month period January-March 2020 to meet the target.  Table 2 shows similar comparison for the various taxes and also for the tax receipts devolved to states.  While the budget estimated a growth in receipts from all major taxes, receipts from taxes such as corporation tax (-14%), union excise duties (-2%), and customs (-12%) have declined during the period Apr-Dec 2019.

Table 2:  Tax receipts – Comparison of 2019-20 revised estimates with Apr-Dec 2019 figures (Rs crore)

Revenue

Receipts

Actuals

Revised

Nine-month period

Three-month target

Growth rate so far

Growth target

2018-19

2019-20

Apr-Dec 2019

Jan-Mar 2020

% change
  (Apr-Dec 2018 to Apr-Dec 2019) 

% change
  (Jan-Mar 2019 to Jan-Mar 2020) 

Gross Tax Revenue

20,80,465

21,63,423

13,83,035

7,80,388

-3%

19%

Devolution to States

7,61,454

6,56,046

4,76,113

1,79,933

-2%

-34%

Net Tax Revenue

13,17,211

15,04,587

9,04,944

5,99,643

-3%

57%

Dividend and Profits

1,13,420

1,99,893

1,61,979

37,914

175%

-30%

Other Non-tax Revenue

1,22,284

1,45,620

79,974

65,646

-10%

96%

Revenue Receipts

15,52,916

18,50,101

11,46,897

7,03,204

6%

50%

Note:  Figures for income tax exclude receipts from the Securities Transaction Tax.

Sources:  Receipts Budget, Union Budget 2019-20; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.

If we look at sources of receipts other than taxes, non-tax revenue during Apr-Dec 2019 is Rs 2.4 lakh crore, i.e. 69% of the estimated Rs 3.5 lakh crore.  Disinvestment receipts till date amounted to Rs 18,100 crore, i.e. 17% of the budget target of Rs 1.05 lakh crore.  Though the investment target has been revised down to Rs 65,000 crore, it implies that Rs 47,000 crore would need to be raised in the next two months.    

How does this impact the borrowings of the government?

When the expenditure planned by the government is more than its receipts, the government finances this gap through borrowings.  This gap is known as fiscal deficit and equals the borrowings required to be made for that year.  Given lower than expected receipts, the government has had to borrow more money than it had planned for.  Borrowings or fiscal deficit of the government, till December 2019, stands at Rs 9.3 lakh crore, which is 22% higher than the revised estimate of Rs 7.7 lakh crore.  Note that with three months still remaining in the financial year, fiscal deficit may further increase, in case receipts are less than expenditure.

When we look at fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP, the 2019-20 budget estimated the fiscal deficit to be at 3.3% of GDP.  This has been revised upward to 3.8% of GDP.  However, till December 2019, fiscal deficit for the year 2019-20 stands at 4.6% of GDP (taking the latest available GDP figures into account, i.e. the First Advance Estimates for 2019-20 released in January 2020).  This increase in fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP is because of two reasons: (i) an increase in borrowings as compared to the budget estimates, and (ii) a decrease in GDP as compared to the estimate made in the budget.  The latter is due to a lower than estimated growth in nominal GDP for the year 2019-20.   The 2019-20 budget estimated the nominal GDP to grow at 12% over the previous year, whereas the latest estimates suggest this growth rate to be 7.5% in 2019-20.

Note that, in addition to the expenditure shown in the budget, the government also spends through extra budgetary resources. These resources are raised by issuing bonds and through loans from the National Small Savings Fund (NSSF).  The revised estimates for 2019-20 show an expenditure of Rs 1,72,699 crore through such extra-budgetary resources. This includes an expenditure of Rs 1,10,000 crore by the Food Corporation of India financed through loans from NSSF. Since funds borrowed for such expenditure remain outside the budget, they do not get factored in the deficit and debt figures.  If borrowings made in the form of extra-budgetary resources are also taken into account, the fiscal deficit estimated for the year 2019-20 would increase from 3.8% of GDP to 4.6% of GDP due to extra-budgetary borrowings of Rs 1,72,699 crore.  This does not account for further slippage if the targeted revenue does not materialise.