india-map

FIND YOUR MP

Switch to Hindi (हिंदी)

Applications for LAMP Fellowship 2025-26 are now open. Apply here. The last date for submitting applications is December 21, 2024

Parliament

Parliamentary oversight of intelligence agencies

Anirudh - July 8, 2010

"Parliamentary approval of the creation, mandate and powers of security agencies is a necessary but not sufficient condition for upholding the rule of law. A legal foundation increases the legitimacy both of the existence of these agencies and the (often exceptional) powers that they possess." Though mechanisms for ensuring accountability of the executive to the Parliament are in place for most aspects of government in India, such mechanisms are completely absent for the oversight of intelligence agencies. In India, various intelligence agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing, and the Intelligence Bureau are creations of administrative orders, and are not subject to scrutiny by Parliament. This is in direct contrast to the practise of the Legislature's oversight of intelligence agencies in most countries.  Though different countries have different models of exercising such oversight, the common principle - that activities of intelligence agencies should be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, remains uniform. In the US for example, both the House and the Senate have a Committee which exercises such scrutiny.  These are House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, established in 1977, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, created in 1976.  Both committees have broad powers over the intelligence community.  They oversee budgetary appropriations as well as legislation on this subject.  In addition, the House Committee can do something which the Senate can not:  “tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities.”  This gives the Committee the power to look into actual tactical intelligence, and not just broader policy issues.  Intelligence agencies are also governed by a variety of laws which clearly lay out a charter of responsibilities, as well as specific exemptions allowing such agencies to do some things other government agencies ordinarily cannot. (For source, click here) In UK, the Intelligence Services Act of 1994 set up a similar framework for intelligence organisations in the UK, and also set up a mechanism for legislative oversight.  The Act set up a Committee which should consists mostly of Members of Parliament.  The members are appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of opposition, and the Committee reports to the Prime Minister.  The Prime Minister is required to present the report of the Committee before Parliament. (For the Act, click here) Recently, the Committee has expressed concerns in its 2009-10 report over the fact that it is financially dependent on the Prime Minister's office, and that there could be a conflict of interest considering it is practically a part of   the government over which it is supposed to express oversight. (For the report, click here) A study titled "Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice" captures the best components of Parliamentary oversight of intelligence bodies.  Some of these are:

  1. The entire intelligence community, including all ancillary departments and officials, should be covered by the mandate of one or more parliamentary oversight bodies.
  2. The mandate of a parliamentary oversight body might include some or all of the following (a) legality, (b) efficacy, (c) efficiency, (d) budgeting and accounting; (e) conformity with relevant human rights Conventions (f) policy/administrative aspects of the intelligence services.
  3. The recommendations and reports of the parliamentary oversight body should be (a) published; (b) debated in parliament; (c) monitored with regard to its implementation by the government and intelligence community.
  4. The resources and legal powers at the disposal of the parliamentary oversight body should match the scope of its mandate.
  5. Parliament should be responsible for appointing and, where necessary, removing members of a body exercising the oversight function in its name.
  6. Representation on parliamentary oversight bodies should be cross-party, preferably in accordance with the strengths of the political parties in parliament.
  7. Government ministers should be debarred from membership (and parliamentarians should be required to step down if they are appointed as ministers) or the independence of the committee will be compromised. The same applies to former members of agencies overseen.
  8. The oversight body should have the legal power to initiate investigations; Members of oversight bodies should have unrestricted access to all information which is necessary for executing their oversight tasks.
  9. The oversight body should have power to subpoena witnesses and to receive testimony under oath.
  10. The oversight body should take appropriate measures and steps in order to protect information from unauthorised disclosure.
  11. The committee should report to parliament at least yearly or as often as it deems necessary.
  12. The oversight body should have access to all relevant budget documents, provided that safeguards are in place to avoid leaking of classified information.
Constitution

Explainer: Mechanisms to investigate charges against a Supreme Court judge

Roshni Sinha - April 25, 2019

This week, an in-house inquiry committee was constituted to consider a complaint against the current Chief Justice of India.  Over the years, three mechanisms have evolved to investigate cases of misconduct, including cases of sexual harassment, misbehaviour or incapacity against judges.  In this blog, we summarise the procedure for investigating such charges against judges of the Supreme Court.  

  • In-house procedure (1999): The Supreme Court has an in-house process to deal with allegations against a judge relating to the discharge of his judicial function, or with regard to his conduct or behaviour outside court.   
  • Sexual harassment guidelines: In 2013, Parliament passed the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.  Subsequently, the Supreme Court framed regulations for protection of women against sexual harassment in the Supreme Court. Under the regulations, the CJI is required to constitute a Gender Sensitisation and Internal Complaints Committee (GSICC).  The GSICC will include 7-13 members including: (i) one or two judges of the Supreme Court, and (ii) up to two outside members (having experience in social justice, women empowerment, gender justice, among others) to be nominated by the CJI.  The Regulations require the majority of the members of GSICC to be women.  As of 2018, the GSICC has received 13 complaints, out of which 10 have been disposed of. 
  • Removal for proven misbehaviour or incapacity: Charges of misconduct may also be investigated in the context of proceedings for removal of a judge.  Article 124(4) of the Constitution of India provides that a judge can be removed only by Parliament on the basis of a motion in either the Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha.  The procedure for removal of judges is elaborated in the Judges Inquiry Act, 1968.  Till date, no judge of the higher judiciary has been impeached under this process. 

Table 1: Process for investigation of charges against a Supreme Court judge

 

In-house Procedure of Supreme Court

2013 SC Sexual Harassment Regulation

Removal Proceedings

Who may file a complaint
  • Complaint of misconduct may be filed by any person.
  • Written complaint of sexual harassment by a woman.
  • Signed notice by at least 100 members of the Lok Sabha, or 50 members of the Rajya Sabha on charges of misbehaviour or incapacity by a judge. 

Persons to whom complaint must be filed
  • CJI or President of India
  • GSICC
  • Presiding Officer of the relevant House of Parliament

Preliminary Inquiry
  • The CJI is required to determine whether the complaint is either frivolous or serious. If the complaint is frivolous or relates to a pending case, no further action will be taken.
  • If the CJI finds that the complaint involves serious misconduct or impropriety, he will seek the response of the concerned Judge. 
  • Based on the response and supporting materials, if the CJI finds that the complaint needs a deeper probe, he will constitute an inquiry committee. 
  • If the GSICC is satisfied that the complaint is genuine, it will constitute a three-member Internal Sub-Committee to conduct an inquiry into the complaint. 
  • If the notice is in order, the Presiding Officer will constitute a three-member committee to investigate the complaint.

Composition of Inquiry Committee

  • The Committee will comprise three judges including a Judge of the Supreme Court and two Chief Justices of other High Courts.
  • The Committee will comprise members of the GSICC or persons nominated by the GSICC, with majority members being a woman and an outside member.
  • The committee will comprise a Supreme Court judge, Chief Justice of a High Court, and a distinguished jurist. 

Time limit for submission of inquiry report

  • No specific time limit provided.
  • To be completed within 90 days of the constitution of the Internal Sub-Committee, and forwarded to the GSICC within 10 days of completion. 
  • To be submitted to the presiding officer within 90 days.

Findings of the Committee
  • The Committee may report to the CJI that:

​1.  there is no substance in the allegation made, or,

2.  there is substance in the allegations but the misconduct is not of such serious nature as to warrant removal, or,

3.  the misconduct is serious enough to initiate removal proceedings against the judge. 
  • If the committee concludes that the allegation has been proved, it will submit its report to the GSICC to pass appropriate orders within 45 days.
  • If more than two thirds of the GSICC members differ from the conclusion of the Committee, it will, after hearing the complainant and the accused, record its reasons for differing and pass orders.
  • After concluding its investigation, the Committee will submit its report to the presiding officer, who will lay the report before the relevant House.

 

Action taken upon submission of report

  • If the finding is under category (2) above, the CJI may call and advise the Judge accordingly and direct that the report be placed on record.
  • If the finding is under category (3) above, the CJI may ask the judge to resign or seek voluntary retirement.  If the judge refuses to resign, the CJI may decide to not allocate any judicial work to the judge concerned. 
  •  Further, the CJI may inform the President of India and the Prime Minister of his reasons for the action taken and forward a copy of the inquiry report to them.
  • The GSICC has the power to: (i) to pass an order of admonition (reprimand), which may also be published in the court precinct, or (ii) pass an order to prohibit the accused from harassing or communicating with the complainant, or (iii) pass any other order to end the sexual harassment faced by the complainant.
  • GSICC may also recommend to the CJI to pass orders against the accused, including: (i) prohibiting entry of the accused into the Supreme Court for up to a year, or (ii) filing a criminal complaint before the concerned disciplinary authority governing the accused.
  • If the report records a finding of misbehaviour or incapacity, the motion for removal will be taken up for consideration and debated. 
  • The motion is required to be adopted by each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and a majority of at least two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting.
  • Once the motion is adopted in both Houses, it is sent to the President, who will issue an order for the removal of the judge.

Process for Appeals
  • No specific provision.
  • Any aggrieved person may make a representation to the CJI to set aside/modify the orders passed by the GSICC.  The CJI also has the power to issue any other orders in order to secure justice to the victim.
  • No specific provision.

Sources: Report of the Committee on In-House Procedure, December 1999, Supreme Court of India; Gender Sensitisation and Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Regulations, 2013; Article 124(4), Constitution of India; Judges Inquiry Act, 1968 read with the Judges Inquiry Rules, 1969; PRS.

Recent Posts

  1. 1. A note of gratitude to Mr. N. Vaghul
  2. 2. What is Fuelling Power Sector Losses?
  3. 3. First no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed today
  4. 4. Anti-cheating laws for competitive examinations
  5. 5. Uttarakhand Assembly concludes 2-day session; 13 Bills introduced and passed