In a recent judgement, the Karnataka High Court upheld the disqualification of five independent MLAs from the Assembly. These MLAs, who had previously served as Ministers in the Yeddyurappa government, were disqualified along with 11 others after they withdrew their support to the government. The disqualifications raise some important questions on the working of the anti-defection law. While the law was framed in 1985 with the specific intent of 'combating the evil of political defections', over the years several unanticipated consequences have come to the fore. The primary among these is the erosion of independence of the average legislator. The need for an anti-defection law was first felt in the late 1960s. Of the 16 States that went to polls in 1967, Congress lost majority in eight and failed to form the government in seven. Thus began the era of common minimum programmes and coalition governments. This was accompanied with another development - the phenomenon of large scale political migrations. Within a brief span of 4 years (1967-71), there were 142 defections in Parliament and 1969 defections in State Assemblies across the country. Thirty-two governments collapsed and 212 defectors were rewarded with ministerial positions. Haryana was the first State where a Congress ministry was toppled. The Bhagwat Dayal ministry was defeated in the Assembly when its nominee for speakership lost out to another candidate. Congress dissidents defected to form a new party called the Haryana Congress, entered into an alliance with the opposition and formed a new government under the Chief Ministership of Rao Birender Singh (also a Congress defector). Haryana thus became the first State to reward a defector with Chief Ministership. Another Haryana legislator, Gaya Lal, defected thrice within a fortnight. The now well know terms 'Aya Ram' and 'Gaya Ram' that are often used to describe political turncoats owe inspiration to him. It was to address this issue that the anti-defection law was passed in 1985. This law amended the Constitution and added the Tenth Schedule to the same. The Supreme Court, in Kihota Hollohon vs. Zachilhu (1992), while upholding the validity of the law held that decisions of disqualification shall be open to judicial review. It also made some observations on Section 2(1) (b) of the Tenth schedule. Section 2(1) (b) reads that a member shall be disqualified if he votes or abstains from voting contrary to any direction issued by the political party. The judgement highlighted the need to limit disqualifications to votes crucial to the existence of the government and to matters integral to the electoral programme of the party, so as not to 'unduly impinge' on the freedom of speech of members. This anti-defection law has regulated parliamentary behaviour for over 25 years now. Though it has the advantage of providing stability to governments and ensuring loyalty to party manifestos, it reduces the accountability of the government to Parliament and curbs dissent against party policies. In this context, Manish Tewari's private member bill merits mention: he suggests that anti-defection law be restricted to votes of confidence and money bills. Such a move will retain the objective of maintaining the stability of the government while allowing MPs to vote freely (subject to the discipline of the party whip) on other issues. This brings us to the question - Is the anti-defection law indispensable? Is defection peculiar to India? If not, how do other countries handle similar situations? It is interesting to note that many advanced democracies face similar problems but haven't enacted any such laws to regulate legislators. Prominent cases in UK politics include the defection of Ramsay Macdonald, the first Labour Prime Minister, in 1931. He defected from his party following disagreements on policy responses to the economic crisis. Neither Macdonald nor any of his three cabinet colleagues who defected with him resigned their seats in the House of Commons to seek a fresh mandate. Australian Parliament too has had its share of defections. Legislators have often shifted loyalties and governments have been formed and toppled in quick succession. In the US too, Congressmen often vote against the party programme on important issues without actually defecting from the party. India might have its peculiar circumstances that merit different policies. But, the very fact that some other democracies can function without such a law should get us thinking. Sources/ Notes: [1] PRS Conference note: The Anti-Defection Law – Intent and Impact [2] Column by CV Madhukar (Director, PRS) titled 'Post-independents' in the Indian Express
Recently, the Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare submitted its report to the Parliament on the National Commission for Human Resource for Health Bill, 2011. The objective of the Bill is to “ensure adequate availability of human resources in the health sector in all states”. It seeks to set up the National Commission for Human Resources for Health (NCHRH), National Board for Health Education (NBHE), and the National Evaluation and Assessment Council (NEAC) in order to determine and regulate standards of health education in the country. It separates regulation of the education sector from that of professions such as law, medicine and nursing, and establishes professional councils at the national and state levels to regulate the professions. See here for PRS Bill Summary. The Standing Committee recommended that this Bill be withdrawn and a revised Bill be introduced in Parliament after consulting stakeholders. It felt that concerns of the professional councils such as the Medical Council of India and the Dental Council of India were not adequately addressed. Also, it noted that the powers and functions of the NCHRH and the National Commission on Higher Education and Research (to be established under the Higher Education and Research Bill, 2011 to regulate the higher education sector in the country) were overlapping in many areas. Finally, it also expressed concern over the acute shortage of qualified health workers in the country as well as variations among states and rural and urban areas. As per the 2001 Census, the estimated density of all health workers (qualified and unqualified) is about 20% less than the World Health Organisation’s norm of 2.5 health workers per 1000 population. See here for PRS Standing Committee Summary. Shortfall of health workers in rural areas Public health care in rural areas is provided through a multi-tier network. At the lowest level, there are sub health-centres for every population of 5,000 in the plains and 3,000 in hilly areas. The next level consists of Primary Health Centres (PHCs) for every population of 30,000 in the plains and 20,000 in the hills. Generally, each PHC caters to a cluster of Gram Panchayats. PHCs are required to have one medical officer and 14 other staff, including one Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM). There are Community Health Centres (CHCs) for every population of 1,20,000 in the plains and 80,000 in hilly areas. These sub health centres, PHCs and CHCs are linked to district hospitals. As on March 2011, there are 14,8124 sub health centres, 23,887 PHCs and 4809 CHCs in the country.[i] Sub-Health Centres and Primary Health Centres
Table 1: State-wise comparison of vacancy in PHCs
Doctors at PHCs |
ANM at PHCs and Sub-Centres |
|||||
State | Sanctioned post | Vacancy | % of vacancy | Sanctioned post | Vacancy | % of vacancy |
Chhattisgarh | 1482 | 1058 | 71 | 6394 | 964 | 15 |
West Bengal | 1807 | 801 | 44 | 10,356 | NA | 0 |
Maharashtra | 3618 | 1326 | 37 | 21,122 | 0 | 0 |
Uttar Pradesh | 4509 | 1648 | 36 | 25,190 | 2726 | 11 |
Mizoram | 57 | 20 | 35 | 388 | 0 | 0 |
Madhya Pradesh | 1238 | 424 | 34 | 11,904 | 0 | 0 |
Gujarat | 1123 | 345 | 31 | 7248 | 817 | 11 |
Andaman & Nicobar Isld | 40 | 12 | 30 | 214 | 0 | 0 |
Odisha | 725 | 200 | 28 | 7442 | 0 | 0 |
Tamil Nadu | 2326 | 622 | 27 | 9910 | 136 | 1 |
Himachal Pradesh | 582 | 131 | 22 | 2213 | 528 | 24 |
Uttarakhand | 299 | 65 | 22 | 2077 | 0 | 0 |
Manipur | 240 | 48 | 20 | 984 | 323 | 33 |
Haryana | 651 | 121 | 19 | 5420 | 386 | 7 |
Sikkim | 48 | 9 | 19 | 219 | 0 | 0 |
Meghalaya | 127 | 23 | 18 | 667 | 0 | 0 |
Delhi | 22 | 3 | 14 | 43 | 0 | 0 |
Goa | 46 | 5 | 11 | 260 | 20 | 8 |
Karnataka | 2310 | 221 | 10 | 11,180 | 0 | 0 |
Kerala | 1204 | 82 | 7 | 4232 | 59 | 1 |
Andhra Pradesh | 2424 | 76 | 3 | 24,523 | 2876 | 12 |
Rajasthan | 1478 | 6 | 0.4 | 14,348 | 0 | 0 |
Arunachal Pradesh | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 0 |
Assam | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 0 |
Bihar | 2078 | 0 | NA | NA | NA | 0 |
Chandigarh | 0 | 0 | NA | 17 | 0 | 0 |
Dadra & Nagar Haveli | 6 | 0 | NA | 40 | 0 | 0 |
Daman & Diu | 3 | 0 | NA | 26 | 0 | 0 |
Jammu & Kashmir | 750 | 0 | NA | 2282 | 0 | 0 |
Jharkhand | 330 | 0 | NA | 4288 | 0 | 0 |
Lakshadweep | 4 | 0 | NA | NA | NA | 0 |
Nagaland | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 0 |
Puducherry | 37 | 0 | NA | 72 | 0 | 0 |
Punjab | 487 | 0 | NA | 4044 | 0 | 0 |
Tripura | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 0 |
India | 30,051 | 7,246 | 24 | 1,77,103 | 8,835 | 5 |
Sources: National Rural Health Mission (available here), PRS.Note: The data for all states is as of March 2011 except for some states where data is as of 2010. For doctors, these states are Bihar, UP, Mizoram and Delhi. For ANMs, these states are Odisha and Uttar Pradesh. |
Community Health Centres
Table 2: Vacancies in CHCs of medical specialists
Surgeons | Gynaecologists | Physicians | Paediatricians | |
State |
% of vacancy |
|||
Andaman & NicobarIsland | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
Andhra Pradesh | 74 | 0 | 45 | 3 |
Arunachal Pradesh | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Assam | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Bihar | 41 | 44 | 60 | 38 |
Chandigarh | 50 | 40 | 50 | 100 |
Chhattisgarh | 85 | 85 | 90 | 84 |
Dadra & Nagar Haveli | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Daman & Diu | 0 | 100 | 0 | 100 |
Delhi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Goa | 20 | 20 | 67 | 66 |
Gujarat | 77 | 73 | 0 | 91 |
Haryana | 71 | 80 | 94 | 85 |
Himachal Pradesh | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Jammu & Kashmir | 34 | 34 | 53 | 63 |
Jharkhand | 45 | 0 | 81 | 61 |
Karnataka | 33 | NA | NA | NA |
Kerala | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Lakshadweep | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 |
Madhya Pradesh | 78 | 69 | 76 | 58 |
Maharashtra | 21 | 0 | 34 | 0 |
Manipur | 100 | 94 | 94 | 87 |
Meghalaya | 50 | NA | 100 | 50 |
Mizoram | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Nagaland | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Odisha | 44 | 45 | 62 | 41 |
Puducherry | 0 | 0 | 100 | NA |
Punjab | 16 | 36 | 40 | 48 |
Rajasthan | 57% | 46 | 49 | 24 |
Sikkim | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Tamil Nadu | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Tripura | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Uttar Pradesh | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Uttarakhand | 69 | 63 | 74 | 40 |
West Bengal | 0 | 57 | 0 | 78 |
India | 56 | 47 | 59 | 49 |
Sources: National Rural Health Mission (available here), PRS. |
[i]. “Rural Healthcare System in India”, National Rural Health Mission (available here).