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As per news reports, the union government has filed a Presidential Reference in relation to the 2G judgment.  In this judgment the Supreme Court had cancelled 122 2G licences granting access to spectrum and had ordered their re-allocation by means of an auction.  It also held that use of first cum first serve policy (FCFS) to allocate natural resources was unconstitutional.  It had held that natural resources should be allocated through auctions. As per the news report, the Presidential Reference seeks clarity on whether the Supreme Court could interfere with policy decisions.  This issue has been discussed in a number of cases.  For instance, the Supreme Court in Directorate of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain[1] held that Courts cannot act as an appellate authority to examine the correctness, suitability and appropriateness of a policy.  It further held that Courts cannot act as advisors to the executive on policy matters which the executive is entitled to formulate.  It stated that the Court could review whether the policy violates fundamental rights, or is opposed to a Constitutional or any statutory provision, or is manifestly arbitrary.  It further stated that legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, is the subject of judicial review.  In Suresh Seth vs. Commissioner, Indore Municipal Corporation[2] a three judge bench of the Court observed that, “this Court cannot issue any direction to the Legislature to make any particular kind of enactment.  Under our constitutional scheme Parliament and Legislative Assemblies exercise sovereign power or authority to enact laws and no outside power or authority can issue a direction to enact a particular piece of legislation.” In the present case it may be argued that whereas the Court was empowered to declare a policy such as FCFS as unconstitutional, it did not have the jurisdiction to direct auctioning of spectrum and other natural resources.  The Presidential Reference may conclusively determine the Court’s jurisdiction in this regard.  However, it has been urged by a few experts that this Presidential Reference amounts to an appeal against the decision of the Court.  They have argued that this could be done only through a Review Petition (which has already been admitted by the Court). The advisory jurisdiction of the Court invoked through Presidential References, is governed by Article 143 of the Constitution.  Under Article 143 of the Constitution of India, the President is empowered to refer to the Supreme Court any matter of law or fact.  The opinion of the Court may be sought in relation to issues that have arisen or are likely to arise.  A Presidential Reference may be made in matters that are of public importance and where it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court.  The Court may refuse to answer all or any of the queries raised in the Reference. A Presidential Reference thus requires that the opinion of the Court on the issue should not have been already obtained or decided by the Court.  In the Gujarat Election Case[3] the Supreme Court took note of Presidential References that were appellate in nature.  Thus, a Presidential Reference cannot be adopted as a means to review or appeal the judgment of the Supreme Court.  Against judgments of the Court the mechanisms of review is the only option.  This position was also argued by Senior Advocate Fali S. Nariman in the Cauvery Water Case[4], where the Court refused to give an opinion. Whether the Court had the authority to determine a policy, such as FCFS, as unconstitutional is not disputed.  However, there are conflicting judgments on the extent to which a Court can interfere with the executive domain.    It would be interesting to see whether the Court would give its opinion on this issue.  In the event it does, it may bring higher level of clarity to the relationship between the executive and the judiciary.


[1] AIR 2007 SC 1640

[2] AIR2006SC767

[3] (2002) 8 SCC 237

[4] (1993) Supp 1 SCC 96(II)

A few minutes ago, the Supreme Court delivered a  judgement striking down Section 66 A of the Information Technology Act, 2000.  This was in response to a PIL that challenged the constitutionality of this provision.  In light of this, we present a background to Section 66 A and the recent developments leading up to its challenge before the Court.  What does the Information Technology Act, 2000 provide for? The Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000 provides for legal recognition for transactions through electronic communication, also known as e-commerce.  The Act also penalizes various forms of cyber crime.  The Act was amended in 2009 to insert a new section, Section 66A which was said to address cases of cyber crime with the advent of technology and the internet. What does Section 66(A) of the IT Act say? Section 66(A) of the Act criminalises the sending of offensive messages through a computer or other communication devices.  Under this provision, any person who by means of a computer or communication device sends any information that is:

  1. grossly offensive;
  2. false and meant for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will;
  3. meant to deceive or mislead the recipient about the origin of such messages, etc, shall be punishable with imprisonment up to three years and with fine

Over the past few years, incidents related to comments,  sharing of information, or thoughts expressed by an individual to a wider audience on the internet have attracted criminal penalties under Section 66(A).  This has led to discussion and debate on the ambit of the Section and its applicability to such actions. What have been the major developments in context of this Section? In the recent past, a few arrests were made under Section 66(A) on the basis of social media posts directed at notable personalities, including politicians.  These  were alleged to be offensive in nature.  In November 2012, there were various reports of alleged misuse of the law, and the penalties imposed were said to be disproportionate to the offence.  Thereafter, a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was filed in the Supreme Court, challenging this provision on grounds of unconstitutionality.  It was said to impinge upon the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. How has the government responded so far? Subsequently, the central government issued guidelines for the purposes of Section 66(A).  These guidelines clarified that prior approval of the Deputy Commissioner or Inspector General of Police was required before a police officer or police station could register a complaint under Section 66(A).  In May 2013, the Supreme Court (in relation to the above PIL) also passed an order saying that such approval was necessary before any arrest is to be made.  Since matters related to police and public order are dealt with by respective state governments, a Supreme Court order was required for these guidelines to be applicable across the country.  However, no changes have been made to Section 66 A itself.  Has there been any legislative movement with regard to Section 66(A)? A Private Member Bill was introduced in Lok Sabha in 2013 to amend Section 66(A) of the IT Act.  The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill stated that most of the offences that Section 66(A) dealt with were already covered by the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860. This had resulted in dual penalties for the same offence.  According to the Bill, there were also inconsistencies between the two laws in relation to the duration of imprisonment for the same offence.  The offence of threatening someone with injury through email attracts imprisonment of two years under the IPC and three years under the IT Act.  The Bill was eventually withdrawn. In the same year, a Private Members resolution was also moved in Parliament.  The resolution proposed to make four changes: (i) bring Section 66(A) in line with the Fundamental Rights of the Constitution; (ii) restrict the application of the provision to communication between two persons; (iii) precisely define the offence covered; and (iv) reduce the penalty and make the offence a non-cognizable one (which means no arrest could be made without a court order).  However, the resolution was also withdrawn. Meanwhile, how has the PIL proceeded? According to news reports, the Supreme Court  in February, 2015 had stated that the constitutional validity of the provision would be tested, in relation to the PIL before it.  The government argued that they were open to amend/change the provision as the intention was not to suppress freedom of speech and expression, but only deal with cyber crime.  The issues being examined by the Court relate to the powers of the police to decide what is abusive, causes annoyance, etc,. instead of the examination of the offence by the judiciary .  This is pertinent because this offence is a cognizable one, attracting a penalty of at least three years imprisonment.  The law is also said to be ambiguous on the issue of what would constitute information that is “grossly offensive,” as no guidelines have been provided for the same.  This lack of clarity could lead to increased litigation. The judgement is not available in the public domain yet. It remains to be seen on what the reasoning of the Supreme Court was, in its decision to strike down Section 66A, today.