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Last week, oil-marketing companies (or OMCs, such as Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited) raised the price of domestic LPG in the country. [1] The price of a domestic cylinder (14.2kg) has increased from Rs 714 in January 2020 to Rs 858.5 in February 2020. This is a 20% hike in the price of a LPG cylinder. Note that this is the sixth consecutive month for which LPG prices have been revised upwards. Figure 1 shows the variation in price of a domestic (non-subsidised) LPG cylinder in Delhi over the last year.
Figure 1: Variation in price of non-subsidised domestic LPG cylinder
Sources: Indian Oil and Corporation Limited; PRS.
How is the price of LPG cylinders determined?
LPG prices are revised every month. The price is determined by public sector OMCs namely, Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, in line with the changes in the international market prices and other market conditions. [2] The international market price affects the import parity price of petroleum products (the price that importers pay for import of product at the respective Indian ports). This includes exchange rate, ocean freight, insurance and customs duty among others.
The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas has stated that the recent hike in the price of LPG cylinder is due to a sharp rise in international LPG prices during January 2020 (from USD 448/Metric Tonne to USD 567/Metric Tonne). [3]
What is the difference between the price of a subsidised and non-subsidised cylinder?
The price determined by the OMCs reflects the price of a non-subsidised domestic LPG cylinder. The government modulates the effective price to provide subsidised LPG cylinders to consumers under the 'Pratyaksha Hastaantarit Laabh' direct benefit transfer (or DBT-PAHAL) scheme. [4] Under the scheme, a consumer (with annual income of up to Rs 10 lakh) can avail DBT cash-subsidy for a LPG cylinder. The beneficiaries buy LPG cylinders at market rate and subsequently receive subsidy directly in their bank accounts.
With the recent increase in price of a LPG cylinder, the government has increased the subsidy amount for PAHAL consumers from Rs. 153.86 per cylinder to Rs. 291.48 per cylinder (89% increase).3 This is done to ensure that the subsidized LPG consumers are insulated from the volatility of LPG prices in the international market. Table 1 shows the amount of subsidy provided by the government for LPG cylinder. Note that price of a subsidised cylinder has increased from Rs 494 to Rs 567 (14.8%) from February 2019 to February 2020.
Table 1: Difference between the price of subsidised and non-subsidised LPG cylinder
As on |
Non-subsidised cylinder |
Subsidised cylinder |
Subsidy |
February 2018 |
Rs 736.00 |
Rs 495.63 |
Rs 240.37 |
February 2019 |
Rs 659.00 |
Rs 493.53 |
Rs 165.47 |
February 2020 |
Rs 858.50 |
Rs 567.02 |
Rs 291.48 |
Sources: Unstarred Question No.1211, February 13, 2019, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Rajya Sabha.
Note: Prices are at Delhi.
How many people avail the subsidy on LPG cylinders?
Currently, there are a total of 27.16 crore LPG (domestic) connections in the country.3 Of these, 26.12 crore (94%) consumers are beneficiaries under the PAHAL scheme, and therefore, can avail LPG cylinders at subsidised rates. Note that, under the scheme, a maximum of 12 subsidised cylinders per year can be availed under one connection. Further, a household cannot have more than one connection.
What is the cost of subsidy for the government?
The subsidy on domestic LPG is met through the budgetary grants of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. In 2020-21, the government is estimated to spend Rs 37,256 crore on LPG subsidy. This includes Rs 35,605 crore for DBT-PAHAL and Rs 1,118 crore for Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana. This is an increase of 9.3% from the expenditure in 2019-20 of Rs 34,086 crore (revised estimate). Note that LPG subsidy constitutes 87% of the Ministry's total budget (Rs 42,901 crore).
Figure 2 below shows the year-wise expenditure on LPG subsidy, and as a proportion of the total budget of the Ministry from 2015-16 to 2020-21.
Figure 2: LPG subsidy over the years (2015-16 to 2020-21).
Sources: Union Budget Documents; PRS.
For more trends and analysis related to the finances of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, see here.
[1] "LPG price hiked by Rs 144.5 per cylinder", Economic Times, February 12, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/lpg-price-hiked-by-rs-144-5-per-cylinder/articleshow/74096745.cms.
[2] Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, https://www.ppac.gov.in/content/137_3_Faq.aspx.
[3] "LPG Price is Derived based on International Market Price", Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, February 13, 2020.
[4] PAHAL-Direct Benefits Transfer for LPG (DBTL) Consumers Scheme, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, http://petroleum.nic.in/dbt/whatisdbtl.html.
Recently, the Karnataka legislature passed the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) Bill, 2020. BBMP is the municipal corporation of the Greater Bengaluru metropolitan area. The BBMP Act, 2020 seeks to improve decentralisation, ensure public participation, and address certain administrative and structural concerns in Bengaluru. In this blog, we discuss some common issues in urban local governance in India, in the context of Bengaluru’s municipal administration.
The Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 provided for the establishment of urban local bodies (ULBs) (including municipal corporations) as institutions of local self-government. It also empowered state governments to devolve certain functions, authority, and power to collect revenue to these bodies, and made periodic elections for them compulsory.
Urban governance is part of the state list under the Constitution. Thus, the administrative framework and regulation of ULBs varies across states. However, experts have highlighted that ULBs across India face similar challenges. For instance, ULBs across the country lack autonomy in city management and several city-level functions are managed by parastatals (managed by and accountable to the state). Several taxation powers have also not been devolved to these bodies, leading to stressed municipal finances. These challenges have led to poor service delivery in cities and also created administrative and governance challenges at the municipal level.
BBMP was established under the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (KMC Act). The BBMP Act, 2020 replaces provisions of the KMC Act, 1976 in its application to Bengaluru. It adds a new level of zonal committees to the existing three-tier municipal structure in the city, and also gives the Corporation some more taxation powers. Certain common issues in urban local governance in India, with provisions related to them in the BBMP Act, 2020 are given below.
Functional overlap with parastatals for key functions
The Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 empowered states to devolve the responsibility of 18 functions including urban planning, regulation of land use, water supply, and slum upgradation to ULBs. However, in most Indian cities including Bengaluru, a majority of these functions are carried out by parastatals. For example, in Bengaluru, the Bengaluru Development Authority is responsible for land regulation and the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board is responsible for slum rehabilitation.
The BBMP Act, 2020 provides the Corporation with the power and responsibility to prepare and implement schemes for the 18 functions provided for in the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992. However, it does not provide clarity if new bodies at the municipal level will be created, or the existing parastatals will continue to perform these functions and if so, whether their accountability will shift from the state to the municipal corporation.
This could create a two-fold challenge in administration. First, if there are multiple agencies performing similar functions, it could lead to a functional overlap, ambiguity, and wastage of resources. Second, and more importantly, the presence of parastatals that are managed by and accountable to the state government leads to an erosion of the ULB’s autonomy. Several experts have highlighted that this lack of autonomy faced by municipal corporations in most Indian cities leads to a challenge in governance, effective service delivery, and development of urban areas.
An Expert Committee on Urban Infrastructure (2011) had recommended that activity mapping should be done for the 18 functions. Under this, functions in the exclusive domain of municipalities and those which need to be shared with the state and the central government must be specified. Experts have also recommended that the municipality should be responsible for providing civic amenities in its jurisdiction and if a parastatal exercises a civic function, it should be accountable to the municipality.
Stressed municipal finances
Indian ULBs are amongst the weakest in the world in terms of fiscal autonomy and have limited effective devolution of revenue. They also have limited capacity to raise resources through their own sources of revenue such as property tax. Municipal revenue in India accounts for only one percent of the GDP (2017-18). This leads to a dependence on transfers by the state and central government.
ULBs in states like Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, and Haryana are in poor financial condition. This has been attributed to limited powers to raise revenue and levy taxes, and problems in the management of existing resources. For instance, the finances of Bihar’s ULBs were assessed to be poor because of: (i) delays in release of grants, (ii) inadequate devolution of funds, and (iii) delays in revision of tax rates and assessments of landholdings.
In comparison, Karnataka ranks high among Indian states in key indicators for fiscal capacity like collection of property taxes, grants from Central Finance Commissions, and state government transfers. The BBMP Act, 2020 further increases the taxation powers of the Corporation, by allowing it to impose taxes on professions and entertainment.
Experts have recommended that the central government and the respective state government should provide additional funds and facilitate additional funding mechanisms for ULBs to strengthen their finances. The revenue of ULBs can be augmented through measures including assignment of greater powers of taxation to the ULBs by the state government, reforms in land and property-based taxes (such as the use of technology to cover more properties), and issuing of municipal bonds (debt instruments issued by ULBs to finance development projects).
Powers of elected municipal officials
The executive power with state-appointed municipal Commissioners and elected municipal officers differs across states. States like Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, and cities like Chennai and Hyderabad vest the executive power in the Commissioner. In contrast, the executive power of the Corporation is exercised by a Mayor-in council (consisting of the Mayor and up to 10 elected members of the Corporation) in Kolkata and Madhya Pradesh. This is unlike large metropolitan cities in other countries like New York and London, where elected Mayors are designated as executive heads. Experts have noted that charging Commissioners with executive power diluted the role of the Mayor and violated the spirit of self-governance.
Under the BBMP Act, 2020, both the elected Mayor and the state-appointed Chief Commissioner exercise several executive functions. The Mayor is responsible for approving contracts and preparing the budget estimate for the Corporation. He is also required to discharge all functions assigned to him by the Corporation. On the other hand, executive functions of the Chief Commissioner include: (i) selling or leasing properties owned by the Corporation, and (ii) regulating and issuing instructions regarding public streets.
The Expert Committee on Urban Infrastructure (2011) has recommended that the Commissioner should act as a city manager and should be recruited through a transparent search-cum-selection process led by the Mayor. A Model Municipal law, released by the Urban Development Ministry in 2003, provided that the executive power should be exercised by an Empowered Standing Committee consisting of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, and seven elected councillors.
Management of staff and human resources
Experts have noted that municipal administration in India suffers from staffing issues which leads to a failure in delivering basic urban services. These include overstaffing of untrained manpower, shortage of qualified technical staff and managerial supervisors, and unwillingness to innovate in methods for service delivery.
The BBMP Act, 2020 provides that the Corporation may make bye-laws for the due performance of duties by its employees. However, it does not mention other aspects of human resource management such as recruitment and promotion. A CAG report (2020) looking at the implementation of the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 in Karnataka has observed that the power to assess municipal staff requirements, recruiting such staff, and determining their pay, transfer and promotion vests with the state government. This is in contrast with the recommendations of several experts who have suggested that municipalities should appoint their personnel to ensure accountability, adequate recruitment, and proper management of staff.
Other states including Kerala, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu also allow the state governments to regulate recruitment and staffing for ULBs. In cities like Mumbai, and Coimbatore, and some states like Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, while the recruitment process is conducted by the respective municipal corporations, the final sanction for hiring staff lies with the state government.