In the last few weeks, after the 16th Lok Sabha election, there has been some debate around powers of the central government to remove Governors.  News reports have suggested that the central government is seeking resignations of Governors, who were appointed by the previous central government.  In this blog, we briefly look at the key constitutional provisions, the law laid down by the Supreme Court, and some recommendations made by different commissions that have examined this issue. What does the Constitution say? As per Article 155 and Article 156 of the Constitution, a Governor of a state is an appointee of the President, and he or she holds office “during the pleasure of the President”.  If a Governor continues to enjoy the “pleasure of the President”, he or she can be in office for a term of five years.  Because the President is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 74 of the Constitution, in effect it is the central government that appoints and removes the Governors. “Pleasure of the President” merely refers to this will and wish of the central government. The Supreme Court’s interpretation In 2010, a constitutional bench of the Supreme Court interpreted these provisions and laid down some binding principles (B.P. Singhal v. Union of India). In this case, the newly elected central government had removed the Governors of Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana and Goa in July, 2004 after the 14th Lok Sabha election. When these removals were challenged, the Supreme Court held:

  1. The President, in effect the central government, has the power to remove a Governor at any time without giving him or her any reason, and without granting an opportunity to be heard.
  2. However, this power cannot be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner.  The power of removing Governors should only be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances for valid and compelling reasons.
  3. The mere reason that a Governor is at variance with the policies and ideologies of the central government, or that the central government has lost confidence in him or her, is not sufficient to remove a Governor.  Thus, a change in central government cannot be a ground for removal of Governors, or to appoint more favourable persons to this post.
  4. A decision to remove a Governor can be challenged in a court of law.  In such cases, first the petitioner will have to make a prima facie case of arbitrariness or bad faith on part of the central government.  If a prima facie case is established, the court can require the central government to produce the materials on the basis of which the decision was made in order to verify the presence of compelling reasons.

In summary, this means that the central government enjoys the power to remove Governors of the different states, as long as it does not act arbitrarily, without reason, or in bad faith. Recommendations of Various Commissions Three important commissions have examined this issue. The Sarkaria Commission (1988) recommended that Governors must not be removed before completion of their five year tenure, except in rare and compelling circumstances.  This was meant to provide Governors with a measure of security of tenure, so that they could carry out their duties without fear or favour.  If such rare and compelling circumstances did exist, the Commission said that the procedure of removal must allow the Governors an opportunity to explain their conduct, and the central government must give fair consideration to such explanation.  It was further recommended that Governors should be informed of the grounds of their removal. The Venkatachaliah Commission (2002) similarly recommended that ordinarily Governors should be allowed to complete their five year term.  If they have to be removed before completion of their term, the central government should do so only after consultation with the Chief Minister. The Punchhi Commission (2010) suggested that the phrase “during the pleasure of the President” should be deleted from the Constitution, because a Governor should not be removed at the will of the central government; instead he or she should be removed only by a resolution of the state legislature. The above recommendations however were never made into law by Parliament.  Therefore, they are not binding on the central government.

Recently, Delhi witnessed large scale protests by various groups demanding stricter punishment and speedier trial in cases of sexual assault against women.  In light of the protests, the central government has constituted a Commission (headed by Justice Verma) to suggest possible amendments in the criminal law to ensure speedier disposal of cases relating to sexual assault.  Though the Supreme Court, in 1986, had recognised speedy trial to be a fundamental right, India continues to have a high number of pending cases. In 2012, the net pendency in High Courts and subordinate courts decreased by over 6 lakh cases. However, there is still a substantial backlog of cases across various courts in the country.  As per the latest information given by the Ministry of Law and Justice, there are 43.2 lakh cases pending in the High Courts and 2.69 crore cases pending in the district courts.[1]

After the recent gang-rape of a 23 year old girl, the Delhi High Court directed the state government to establish five Fast Track Courts (FTCs) for the expeditious adjudication of cases relating to sexual assault.   According to a news report, other states such as Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu have also begun the process of establishing FTCs for rape cases.  In this blog, we look at the status of pending cases in various courts in the country, the number of vacancies of judges and the status of FTCs in the country. Vacancies in the High Courts and the Subordinate Courts One of the reasons for the long delay in the disposal of cases is the high number of vacancies in position for judges in the High Courts and the District Courts of the country.  As of December 1, 2012, the working strength of the High Court judges was 613 as against the sanctioned strength of 895 judges.  This reflects a 32% vacancy of judges across various High Courts in the country.  The highest number of vacancies is in the Allahabad High Court with a working strength of 86 judges against the sanctioned strength of 160 judges (i.e. vacancy of 74 judges).   The situation is not much better at the subordinate level.  As on September 30, 2011, the sanctioned strength of judges at the subordinate level was 18,123 judges as against a working strength of 14,287 judges (i.e. 21% vacancy).  The highest vacancy is in Gujarat with 794 vacancies of judges, followed by Bihar with 690 vacancies. Fast Track Courts The 11th Finance Commission had recommended a scheme for the establishment of 1734 FTCs for the expeditious disposal of cases pending in the lower courts.  In this regard, the Commission had allocated Rs 500 crore.   FTCs were to be established by the state governments in consultation with the respective High Courts.  An average of five FTCs were to be established in each district of the country.  The judges for these FTCs were appointed on an adhoc basis.  The judges were selected by the High Courts of the respective states.  There are primarily three sources of recruitment.  First, by promoting members from amongst the eligible judicial officers; second, by appointing retired High Court judges and third, from amongst members of the Bar of the respective state. FTCs were initially established for a period of five years (2000-2005).  However, in 2005, the Supreme Court[2] directed the central government to continue with the FTC scheme, which was extended until 2010-2011.  The government discontinued the FTC scheme in March 2011.  Though the central government stopped giving financial assistance to the states for establishing FTCs, the state governments could establish FTCs from their own funds.  The decision of the central government not to finance the FTCs beyond 2011 was challenged in the Supreme Court.  In 2012, the Court upheld the decision of the central government.[3]  It held that the state governments have the liberty to decide whether they want to continue with the scheme or not.  However, if they decide to continue then the FTCs have to be made a permanent feature. As of September 3, 2012, some states such as Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Kerala decided to continue with the FTC scheme.  However, some states such as Haryana and Chhattisgarh decided to discontinue it. Other states such as Delhi and Karnataka have decided to continue the FTC scheme only till 2013.[4]

Table 1: Number of Fast Track Courts and the pending cases in FTCs                     (As on March 31, 2011)

State No of FTC No of cases transferred until March 31, 2011 Pending cases
Arunachal Pradesh 3 4,162 2,502
Bihar` 179 2,39,278 80,173
Assam 20 72,191 16,380
West Bengal 109 1,46,083 32,180
Goa 5 5,096 1,079
Punjab 15 58,570 12,223
Jharkhand 38 1,10,027 22,238
Gujarat 61 5,37.636 1,03,340
Chattisgarh 25 9,4670 18,095
Meghalaya 3 1,031 188
Rajasthan 83 1,49,447 26,423
Himachal Pradesh 9 40,126 6,699
Karnataka 87 2,18,402 34,335
Andhra Pradesh 108 2,36,928 36,975
Nagaland 2 845 129
Kerala 38 1,09,160 13,793
Mizoram 3 18,68 233
Haryana 6 38,359 4,769
Madhya Pradesh 84 3,60,602 43,239
UP 153 4,64,775 53,117
Maharashtra 51 4,23,518 41,899
Tamil Nadu 49 4,11,957 40,621
Uttarakhand 20 98,797 9006
Orissa 35 66,199 5,758
Manipur 2 3,059 198
Tripura 3 5,812 221
Total 1192 3898598 6,05,813

Sources:  Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No.498, March 3, 2012; PRS

 


[1].  Rajya Sabha Starred Question no 231 dated December 10, 2012.

[2].  Brij Mohan Lal v Union of India (2005) 3 SCR 103.

[3].  Brij Mohan Lal v Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 502. [4].  Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question no 2388 dated September 3, 2012.