In the last few weeks, after the 16th Lok Sabha election, there has been some debate around powers of the central government to remove Governors.  News reports have suggested that the central government is seeking resignations of Governors, who were appointed by the previous central government.  In this blog, we briefly look at the key constitutional provisions, the law laid down by the Supreme Court, and some recommendations made by different commissions that have examined this issue. What does the Constitution say? As per Article 155 and Article 156 of the Constitution, a Governor of a state is an appointee of the President, and he or she holds office “during the pleasure of the President”.  If a Governor continues to enjoy the “pleasure of the President”, he or she can be in office for a term of five years.  Because the President is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 74 of the Constitution, in effect it is the central government that appoints and removes the Governors. “Pleasure of the President” merely refers to this will and wish of the central government. The Supreme Court’s interpretation In 2010, a constitutional bench of the Supreme Court interpreted these provisions and laid down some binding principles (B.P. Singhal v. Union of India). In this case, the newly elected central government had removed the Governors of Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana and Goa in July, 2004 after the 14th Lok Sabha election. When these removals were challenged, the Supreme Court held:

  1. The President, in effect the central government, has the power to remove a Governor at any time without giving him or her any reason, and without granting an opportunity to be heard.
  2. However, this power cannot be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner.  The power of removing Governors should only be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances for valid and compelling reasons.
  3. The mere reason that a Governor is at variance with the policies and ideologies of the central government, or that the central government has lost confidence in him or her, is not sufficient to remove a Governor.  Thus, a change in central government cannot be a ground for removal of Governors, or to appoint more favourable persons to this post.
  4. A decision to remove a Governor can be challenged in a court of law.  In such cases, first the petitioner will have to make a prima facie case of arbitrariness or bad faith on part of the central government.  If a prima facie case is established, the court can require the central government to produce the materials on the basis of which the decision was made in order to verify the presence of compelling reasons.

In summary, this means that the central government enjoys the power to remove Governors of the different states, as long as it does not act arbitrarily, without reason, or in bad faith. Recommendations of Various Commissions Three important commissions have examined this issue. The Sarkaria Commission (1988) recommended that Governors must not be removed before completion of their five year tenure, except in rare and compelling circumstances.  This was meant to provide Governors with a measure of security of tenure, so that they could carry out their duties without fear or favour.  If such rare and compelling circumstances did exist, the Commission said that the procedure of removal must allow the Governors an opportunity to explain their conduct, and the central government must give fair consideration to such explanation.  It was further recommended that Governors should be informed of the grounds of their removal. The Venkatachaliah Commission (2002) similarly recommended that ordinarily Governors should be allowed to complete their five year term.  If they have to be removed before completion of their term, the central government should do so only after consultation with the Chief Minister. The Punchhi Commission (2010) suggested that the phrase “during the pleasure of the President” should be deleted from the Constitution, because a Governor should not be removed at the will of the central government; instead he or she should be removed only by a resolution of the state legislature. The above recommendations however were never made into law by Parliament.  Therefore, they are not binding on the central government.

On October 18, it was reportein the news that the central government has been given more time for framing rules under the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019.  The President had given assent to this Act in December 2019 and the Act came into force in January 2020.   Similarly, about two years have passed since the new labour codes were passed by Parliament, and the final Rules are yet to be published.  This raises the question how long the government can take to frame Rules and what is the procedure guiding this.  In this blog, we discuss the same.

Under the Constitution, the Legislature has the power to make laws and the Executive is responsible for implementing them.  Often, the Legislature enacts a law covering the general principles and policies, and delegates the power to the Executive for specifying certain details for the implementation of a law.  For example, the Citizenship Amendment Act provides who will be eligible for citizenship.  The certificate of registration or naturalization to a person will be issued, subject to conditions, restrictions, and manner as may be prescribed by the central government through Rules.  Delay in framing Rules results in delay in implementing the law, since the necessary details are not available.  For example, new labour codes provide a social security scheme for gig economy workers such as Swiggy and Zomato delivery persons and Uber and Ola drivers.  These benefits as per these Codes are yet to be rolled out as the Rules are yet to be notified.

Timelines and checks and balances for adherence

Each House of Parliament has a Committee of Members to examine Rules, Regulations, and government orders in detail called the Committee on Subordinate Legislation.  Over the years, the recommendations of these Committees have shaped the evolution of the procedure and timelines for framing subordinate legislation.  These are reflected in the Manual of Parliamentary Procedures issued by the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, which provides detailed guidelines.

Ordinarily, Rules, Regulations, and bye-laws are to be framed within six months from the date on which the concerned Act came into force.   Post that, the concerned Ministry is required to seek an extension from the Parliamentary Committees on Subordinate Legislation.  The reason for the extension needs to be stated.   Such extensions may be granted for a maximum period of three months at a time.  For example, in case of Rules under the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019, at an earlier instance, an extension was granted on account of the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Activity

Timeline

  • Publication of Rules, Regulations, and Bye-Laws, where public consultation is required under the Act
  • A minimum of 30 days for public feedback
  • Consequently, for publication,
  • Three months, if the number of suggestions is small
  • Six months, if the number of suggestions is large
  • Publication of Rules, Regulations, and Bye-Laws, not requiring public consultation
  • Six months from the date on which the concerned Act came into force
  • Any extension for publication
  • A maximum of three months at a time

To ensure monitoring, every Ministry is required to prepare a quarterly report on the status of subordinate legislation not framed and share it with the Ministry of Law and Justice.  These reports are not available in the public domain.

Recommendations to address delays

Over the years, the Subordinate Legislation Committees in both Houses have observed multiple instances of non-adherence to the above timelines by various Ministries.  To address this, they have made the following key recommendations:

  • Statement on reasons for the delay: In 2011, Rajya Sabha Committee recommended that while laying Rules/Regulations before Parliament, the Ministry should also lay a statement explaining the reasons for the delay, if any.
  • Scrutiny of delays by the Cabinet Secretary:  In 2016, the Rajya Sabha Committee recommended that the Cabinet Secretary should continue the practice of calling the Secretaries of concerned Ministries/Departments, to explain the reasons for the delay in framing the subordinate legislation.  Each Ministry should send a quarterly status report to the Cabinet Secretariat.
  • Revisiting guidelines: In 2011, Lok Sabha Committee recommended that the 1986 guidelines should be revisited and all major recommendations of the Committee should be incorporated.  However, as per the Action Taken Report, the government observed that the ministries consider the extant guidelines adequate and these guidelines were re-iterated in 2012.

Are all Rules under an Act required to be framed?

Usually, the expressions used in an Act are “The Central Government may, by notification, make rules for carrying out the provisions of this Act.”, or “as may be prescribed”.  Hence, it may appear that the laws aim to enable rule-making instead of mandate rule-making.  However, certain provisions of an Act cannot be brought into force if the required details have not been prescribed under the Rules.  This makes the implementation of the Act consequent to the publication of respective Rules.  For example, the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022 enables the police and certain other persons to collect identity-related information about certain persons.  It provides that the manner of collection of such information may be specified by the central government.  Unless the manner is prescribed, such collection cannot take place.

That said, some other rule-making powers may be enabling in nature and subject to discretion by the concerned Ministry.  In 2016, Rajya Sabha Committee on Subordinate Legislation examined the status of Rules and Regulations to be framed under the Energy Conservation Act, 2001.  It observed that the Ministry of Power had held that two Rules and three Regulations under this Act were not necessary.   The Ministry of Law and Justice had opined that those deemed not necessary were enabling provisions meant for unforeseen circumstances.  The Rajya Sabha Committee (2016) had recommended that where the Ministry does not feel the need for framing subordinate legislation, the Minister should table a statement in Parliament, stating reasons for such a conclusion.

Some key issues related to subordinate legislation

The Legislature delegates the power to specify details for the implementation of a law to the Executive through powers for framing subordinate legislation.  Hence, it is important to ensure these are well-scrutinised so that they are within the limits envisaged in the law.

  • Capacity of Committees on Subordinate Legislation:  Parliamentary Committees on Subordinate Legislation have the responsibility to examine Rules in detail.  In past, they have examined some key rules, regulations, and notifications regarding e-commerceliability of internet-based services, and demonetisation.  However, usually, they are able to examine only a fraction of subordinate legislation in detail.  For more details, please see the PRS discussion paper here.
  • Uniformity of standards:  Countries such as UKUSAAustralia, and Canada have overarching legislation for regulating the framing of subordinate legislation.  These laws provide for the manner of public consultation, timelines, drafting standards, and a common register.  India does not have any similar law.  In India, the detail whether public consultation for subordinate legislation is required or not, is specified in respective Acts.  The General Clauses Act, 1897 also governs certain aspects of the framing of subordinate legislation.  In addition, the Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, 2014 guides the pre-legislative consultation on subordinate legislation.

See here for our recently published analysis of the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Rules, 2022, notified in September 2022.  Also, check out PRS analysis of: