Earlier today, the Supreme Court struck down the two Acts that created an independent body for the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. One of the Acts amended the Constitution to replace the method of appointment of judges by a collegium system with that of an independent commission, called the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). The composition of the NJAC would include: (i) the Chief Justice of India (Chairperson) (ii) two other senior most judges of the Supreme Court, (iii) the Union Law Minister, and (iv) two eminent persons to be nominated by the Prime Minister, the CJI and the Leader of Opposition of the Lok Sabha. The other Act laid down the processes in relation to such appointments. Both Acts were passed by Parliament in August 2014, and received Presidential assent in December 2014. Following this, a batch of petitions that had been filed in Supreme Court challenging the two Bills on grounds of unconstitutionality, was referred to a five judge bench. It was contended that the presence of executive members in the NJAC violated the independence of the judiciary. In its judgement today, the Court held that the executive involvement in appointment of judges impinges upon the independence of the judiciary. This violates the principle of separation of powers between the executive and judiciary, which is a basic feature of the Constitution. In this context, we examine the proposals around the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. Appointment of judges before the introduction of the NJAC The method of appointment of the Chief Justice of India, SC and HC judges was laid down in the Constitution.[i] The Constitution stated that the President shall make these appointments after consulting with the Chief Justice of India and other SC and HC judges as he considers necessary. Between the years 1982-1999, the issue of method of appointment of judges was examined and reinterpreted by the Supreme Court. Since then, a collegium, consisting of the Chief Justice of India and 4 other senior most SC judges, made recommendations for persons to be appointed as SC and HC judges, to the President.[ii] Recommendations of various bodies for setting up an independent appointments commission Over the decades, several high level Commissions have examined this method of appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. They have suggested that an independent body be set up to make recommendations for such appointments. However, they differed in the representation of the judiciary, legislature and executive in making such appointments. These are summarised below. Table 1: Comparison of various recommendations on the composition of a proposed appointments body
| Recommendatory Body | Suggested composition |
| 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (2007) | Judiciary : CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive : Vice-President (Chairperson), PM, Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leaders of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament. Other: No representative. |
| National Advisory Council (2005) | Judiciary: CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive: Vice-President (Chairman), PM (or nominee), Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leader of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament. Other: No representative. |
| NCRWC (2002) | Judiciary :CJI (Chairman), two senior most SC judges Executive: Union Law Minister Legislature: No representative Other: one eminent person |
| Law Commission (1987) | Judiciary : CJI (Chairman), three senior most SC judges, immediate predecessor of the CJI, three senior most CJs of HCs, [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive: Law Minister, Attorney General of India, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: No representative Other: One Law academic |
Sources: 121st Report of the Law Commission, 1987; Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002; A Consultation Paper on Superior Judiciary, NCRWC, 2001; A National Judicial Commission-Report for discussion in the National Advisory Council, 2005; Fourth Report of the 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), ‘Ethics in Governance’, 2007; PRS. It may be noted that the Law Commission, in its 2008 and 2009 reports, suggested that Government should seek a reconsideration of the judgments in the Three Judges cases. In the alternative, Parliament should pass a law restoring the primacy of the CJI, while ensuring that the executive played a role in making judicial appointments. Appointments process in different countries Internationally, there are varied methods for making appointments of judges to the higher judiciary. The method of appointment of judges to the highest court, in some jurisdictions, is outlined in Table 2. Table 2: Appointment of judges to the highest court in different jurisdictions
| Country | Method of Appointment to the highest court | Who is involved in making the appointments |
| UK | SC judges are appointed by a five-person selection commission. | It consists of the SC President, his deputy, and one member each appointed by the JACs of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.[iii] (The JACs comprise lay persons, members of the judiciary and the Bar and make appointments of judges of lower courts.) |
| Canada | Appointments are made by the Governor in Council.[iv] | A selection panel comprising five MPs (from the government and the opposition) reviews list of nominees and submits 3 names to the Prime Minister.[v] |
| USA | Appointments are made by the President. | Supreme Court Justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the United States Senate.[vi] |
| Germany | Appointments are made by election. | Half the members of the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by the executive and half by the legislature.[vii] |
| France | Appointments are made by the President. | President receives proposals for appointments from Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature.[viii] |
Sources: Constitutional Reform Act, 2005; Canada Supreme Court Act, 1985; Constitution of the United States of America; Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany; Constitution of France; PRS. In delivering its judgment that strikes down the setting up of an NJAC, the Court has stated that it would schedule hearings from November 3, 2015 regarding ways in which the collegium system can be strengthened.
[i] Article 124, Constitution of India (Prior to 2015 Amendments)
[ii] S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India, AIR 1982, SC 149; S.C. Advocates on Record Association vs. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268; In re: Special Reference, AIR 1999 SC 1.
[iii]. Schedule 8, Constitutional Reform Act, 2005.
[iv]. Section 4(2), Supreme Court Act (RSC, 1985).
[v]. Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the retirement of Justice Morris Fish, http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/04/23/statement-prime-minister-canada-retirement-justice-morris-fish.
[vi]. Article II, Section 2, The Constitution of the United States of America.
[vii]. Article 94 (1), Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.
[viii] Article 65, Constitution of France, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constiution_anglais_oct2009.pdf.
India is one of the fastest growing aviation markets in the world. Its domestic traffic makes up 69% of the total airline traffic in South Asia. India’s airport capacity is expected to handle 1 billion trips annually by 2023. The Ministry of Civil Aviation is responsible for formulating national aviation policies and programmes. Today, Lok Sabha will discuss and vote upon the budget of the Ministry of Civil Aviation. In light of this, we discuss key issues with the aviation sector in India.
The aviation sector came under severe financial stress during the Covid-19 pandemic. After air travel was suspended in March 2020, airline operators in India reported losses worth more than Rs 19,500 crore while airports reported losses worth more than Rs 5,120 crore. However, several airline companies were under financial stress before the pandemic affected passenger travel. For instance, in the past 15 years, seventeen airlines have exited the market. Out of those, two airlines, Air Odisha Aviation Pvt Ltd and Deccan Charters Pvt Ltd exited the market in 2020. Air India has been reporting consistent losses over the past four years. All other major private airlines in India such as Indigo and Spice Jet faced losses in 2018-19.
Figure 1: Operating profit/loss of major airlines in India (in Rs crore)
Note: Vistara Airlines commenced operations in 2015, while Air Asia began in 2014; Negative values indicate operating loss.
Source: Unstarred Question 1812 answered on August 4, 2021, and Unstarred Question 1127 answered on September 21, 2020; Rajya Sabha; PRS.
Sale of Air India
Air India has accounted for the biggest expenditure head of the Ministry of Civil Aviation since 2011-12. Between 2009-10 and 2020-21, the government spent Rs 1,22,542 crore on Air India through budgeted allocations. In October 2021, the sale of Air India to Talace Ltd., which is a subsidiary of Tata Sons Pvt Ltd, was approved. The bid for Air India was finalised at Rs 18,000 crore.
Up to January 2020, Air India had accumulated debt worth Rs 60,000 crore. The central government is repaying this debt in the financial year 2021-22. After the finalisation of the sale, the government allocated roughly Rs 71,000 crore for expenses related to Air India.
In addition to loan repayment, in 2021-22, the government will provide Air India with a fresh loan (Rs 4,500 crore) and grants (Rs 1,944 crore) to recover from the shock of Covid-19. To pay for the medical benefits of retired employees of Air India, a recurring expense of Rs 165 crore will be borne by the central government each year.
In 2022-23, Rs 9,260 crore is allocated towards servicing the debt of AIAHL (see Table 1). AIAHL is a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) formed by the government to hold the assets and liabilities of Air India while the process of its sale takes place.
Table 1: Breakdown of expenditure on Air India (in Rs crore)
|
Major Head |
2020-21 Actual |
2021-22 RE |
2022-23 BE |
% change from 2021-22 RE to 2022-23 BE |
|
|
Equity infusion in AIAHL |
- |
62,057 |
- |
-100% |
|
|
Debt servicing of AIAHL |
2,184 |
2,217 |
9,260 |
318% |
|
|
Medical benefit to retired employees |
- |
165 |
165 |
0% |
|
|
Loans to AI |
- |
4,500 |
- |
-100% |
|
|
Grants for cash losses during Covid-19 |
- |
1,944 |
- |
-100% |
|
|
Total |
2,184 |
70,883 |
9,425 |
-87% |
|
Note: BE – Budget Estimate; RE – Revised Estimate; AAI: Airports Authority of India; AIAHL – Air India Asset Holding Limited; AI – Air India. Percentage change is from RE 2021-22 to BE 2022-23.
Source: Demands for Grants 2022-23, Ministry of Civil Aviation; PRS.
Privatisation of Airports
Airports Authority of India (AAI) is responsible for creating, upgrading, maintaining and managing civil aviation infrastructure in the country. As on June 23, 2020, it operates and manages 137 airports in the country. Domestic air traffic has more than doubled from around 61 million passengers in 2013-14 to around 137 million in 2019-20. International passenger traffic has grown from 47 million in 2013-14 to around 67 million in 2019-20, registering a growth of over 6% per annum. As a result, airports in India are witnessing rising levels of congestion. Most major airports are operating at 85% to 120% of their handling capacity. In response to this, the government has decided to privatise some airports to address the problem of congestion.
AAI has leased out eight of its airports through Public Private Partnership (PPP) for operation, management and development on long term lease basis. Six of these airports namely, Ahmedabad, Jaipur, Lucknow, Guwahati, Thiruvananthapuram, and Mangaluru have been leased out to M/s Adani Enterprises Limited (AEL) for 50 years (under PPP). The ownership of these airports remains with AAI and the operations will be back with AAI after the concession period is over. The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) had noted that the government expects to have 24 PPP airports by 2024.
Figure 2: Allocation towards AAI (in Rs crore)
Note: BE – Budget Estimate; RE – Revised Estimate; AAI – Airports Authority of India; IEBR – Internal and Extra-Budgetary Resources;
Source: Demand for Grant documents, Ministry of Civil Aviation; PRS.
The Committee also noted a structural issue in the way airport concessions are given. As of now, entities that bid the highest amount are given the rights to operate an airport. This leads them to pass on the high charge to airline operators. This system does not consider the actual cost of the services and leads to an arbitrary increase in the cost of airline operators. The Ministry sees the role of AAI in future policy issues to include providing high quality, safe and customer-oriented airport and air navigation services. In 2022-23, the government has allocated Rs 150 crore to AAI, which is almost ten times higher than the budget estimates of 2021-22.
Regional Connectivity Scheme (RCS-UDAN)
The top 15 airports in the country account for about 83% of the total passenger traffic. These airports are also close to their saturation limit, and hence the Ministry notes that there is a need to add more Tier-II and Tier-III cities to the aviation network. The Regional Connectivity Scheme was introduced in 2016 to stimulate regional air connectivity and make air travel affordable to the masses. The budget for this scheme is Rs 4,500 crore over five years from 2016-17 to 2021-22. As of December 16, 2021, 46% of this amount has been released. In 2022-23, the scheme has been allocated Rs 601 crore, which is 60% lower than the revised estimates of 2021-22 (Rs 994 crore).
Under the scheme, airline operators are incentivised to operate on under-served routes by providing them with viability gap funding and airport fee waivers. AAI, which is the implementing agency of this scheme, has sanctioned 948 routes to boost regional connectivity. As of January 31, 2022, 43% of these routes have been operationalised. As per the Ministry, lack of availability of land and creation of regional infrastructure has led to delays in the scheme. Issues with obtaining licenses and unsustainable operation of awarded routes also contribute to the delay. As per the Ministry, these issues, along with the setback faced due to the pandemic acted as major obstacles for the effective utilisation of funds.
Figure 3: Expenditure on Regional Connectivity Scheme (in Rs crore)
Note: BE – Budget Estimate; RE – Revised Estimate;
Source: Demand for Grants documents, Ministry of Civil Aviation; PRS.
Potential of air cargo
The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) had noted India’s cargo industry’s huge potential with respect to its geographical location, its growing economy, and its growth in domestic and international trade in the last decade. In 2019-20, all Indian airports together handled 3.33 million metric tonnes (MMT) of freight. This is much lower than the cargo handled by Hong Kong (4.5 MMT), Memphis (4.8 MMT), and Shanghai (3.7 MMT), which are the top three airports in terms of the volume of freight handled. The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) has noted inadequate infrastructure as a major bottleneck in developing the country’s air cargo sector. To reduce such bottleneck, it recommended the Ministry to establish dedicated cargo airports, and automate air cargo procedures and information systems to streamline redundant processes.
The Committee has also highlighted that the Open Sky Policy enables foreign cargo carriers to freely operate cargo services to and from any airports in India having customs/immigration facilities. They account for 90-95% of the total international cargo carried to and from the country. On the other hand, Indian air cargo operators face discriminatory practices and regulatory impediments for operating international cargo flights in foreign countries. The Committee urged the Ministry to provide a level-playing field for Indian air cargo operators and to ensure equal opportunities for them. The Ministry revised the Open Sky Policy in December 2020. Under the revised policy, the operations of foreign ad hoc and pure non-scheduled freighter charter service flights have been restricted to six airports - Bengaluru, Chennai, Delhi, Kolkata, Hyderabad, and Mumbai.
Rising cost of Aviation Turbine Fuel
The cost of Aviation Turbine Fuel (ATF) forms around 40% of the total operating cost of airlines and impacts their financial viability. ATF prices have been consistently rising over the past years, placing stress on the balance sheets of airline companies. As per recent news reports, airfares are expected to rise as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is making ATF costlier.
ATF attracts VAT which is variable across states and does not have a provision for input tax credit. High rates of aviation fuel coupled with high VAT rates are adversely affecting airline companies.
Table 2: Expenditure on ATF by airlines over the years (in Rs crore)
|
Year |
National Carriers |
Private Domestic Airlines |
|
2016-17 |
7,286 |
10,506 |
|
2017-18 |
8,563 |
13,596 |
|
2018-19 |
11,788 |
20,662 |
|
2019-20 |
11,103 |
23,354 |
|
2020-21 |
3,047 |
7,452 |
Source: Unstarred Question 2581, Rajya Sabha; PRS.
The Ministry, in January 2020, has reduced the tax burden on ATF by eliminating fuel throughput charges that were levied by airport operators at all airports across India. Central excise on ATF was reduced from 14% to 11% w.e.f. October 11, 2018. State governments have also reduced VAT/Sales Tax on ATF drawn on RCS airports to 1% or less for 10 years. For non-RCS-UDAN operations, various state governments have reduced VAT/Sales Tax on ATF to within 5%. The Standing Committee on Transport (2021) has recommended ATF to be included within the ambit of GST and that applicable GST should not exceed 12% on ATF with full Input Tax Credit.
For more details, please refer to the Demand for Grants Analysis of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, 2022-23.
