Earlier today, the Supreme Court struck down the two Acts that created an independent body for the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. One of the Acts amended the Constitution to replace the method of appointment of judges by a collegium system with that of an independent commission, called the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). The composition of the NJAC would include: (i) the Chief Justice of India (Chairperson) (ii) two other senior most judges of the Supreme Court, (iii) the Union Law Minister, and (iv) two eminent persons to be nominated by the Prime Minister, the CJI and the Leader of Opposition of the Lok Sabha. The other Act laid down the processes in relation to such appointments. Both Acts were passed by Parliament in August 2014, and received Presidential assent in December 2014. Following this, a batch of petitions that had been filed in Supreme Court challenging the two Bills on grounds of unconstitutionality, was referred to a five judge bench. It was contended that the presence of executive members in the NJAC violated the independence of the judiciary. In its judgement today, the Court held that the executive involvement in appointment of judges impinges upon the independence of the judiciary. This violates the principle of separation of powers between the executive and judiciary, which is a basic feature of the Constitution. In this context, we examine the proposals around the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. Appointment of judges before the introduction of the NJAC The method of appointment of the Chief Justice of India, SC and HC judges was laid down in the Constitution.[i] The Constitution stated that the President shall make these appointments after consulting with the Chief Justice of India and other SC and HC judges as he considers necessary. Between the years 1982-1999, the issue of method of appointment of judges was examined and reinterpreted by the Supreme Court. Since then, a collegium, consisting of the Chief Justice of India and 4 other senior most SC judges, made recommendations for persons to be appointed as SC and HC judges, to the President.[ii] Recommendations of various bodies for setting up an independent appointments commission Over the decades, several high level Commissions have examined this method of appointment of judges to the higher judiciary. They have suggested that an independent body be set up to make recommendations for such appointments. However, they differed in the representation of the judiciary, legislature and executive in making such appointments. These are summarised below. Table 1: Comparison of various recommendations on the composition of a proposed appointments body
| Recommendatory Body | Suggested composition |
| 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (2007) | Judiciary : CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive : Vice-President (Chairperson), PM, Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leaders of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament. Other: No representative. |
| National Advisory Council (2005) | Judiciary: CJI; [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive: Vice-President (Chairman), PM (or nominee), Law Minister, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: Speaker of Lok Sabha, Leader of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament. Other: No representative. |
| NCRWC (2002) | Judiciary :CJI (Chairman), two senior most SC judges Executive: Union Law Minister Legislature: No representative Other: one eminent person |
| Law Commission (1987) | Judiciary : CJI (Chairman), three senior most SC judges, immediate predecessor of the CJI, three senior most CJs of HCs, [For HC judges: Chief Justice of the relevant High Court of that state] Executive: Law Minister, Attorney General of India, [For HC judges: Includes CM of the state] Legislature: No representative Other: One Law academic |
Sources: 121st Report of the Law Commission, 1987; Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002; A Consultation Paper on Superior Judiciary, NCRWC, 2001; A National Judicial Commission-Report for discussion in the National Advisory Council, 2005; Fourth Report of the 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), ‘Ethics in Governance’, 2007; PRS. It may be noted that the Law Commission, in its 2008 and 2009 reports, suggested that Government should seek a reconsideration of the judgments in the Three Judges cases. In the alternative, Parliament should pass a law restoring the primacy of the CJI, while ensuring that the executive played a role in making judicial appointments. Appointments process in different countries Internationally, there are varied methods for making appointments of judges to the higher judiciary. The method of appointment of judges to the highest court, in some jurisdictions, is outlined in Table 2. Table 2: Appointment of judges to the highest court in different jurisdictions
| Country | Method of Appointment to the highest court | Who is involved in making the appointments |
| UK | SC judges are appointed by a five-person selection commission. | It consists of the SC President, his deputy, and one member each appointed by the JACs of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.[iii] (The JACs comprise lay persons, members of the judiciary and the Bar and make appointments of judges of lower courts.) |
| Canada | Appointments are made by the Governor in Council.[iv] | A selection panel comprising five MPs (from the government and the opposition) reviews list of nominees and submits 3 names to the Prime Minister.[v] |
| USA | Appointments are made by the President. | Supreme Court Justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the United States Senate.[vi] |
| Germany | Appointments are made by election. | Half the members of the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by the executive and half by the legislature.[vii] |
| France | Appointments are made by the President. | President receives proposals for appointments from Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature.[viii] |
Sources: Constitutional Reform Act, 2005; Canada Supreme Court Act, 1985; Constitution of the United States of America; Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany; Constitution of France; PRS. In delivering its judgment that strikes down the setting up of an NJAC, the Court has stated that it would schedule hearings from November 3, 2015 regarding ways in which the collegium system can be strengthened.
[i] Article 124, Constitution of India (Prior to 2015 Amendments)
[ii] S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India, AIR 1982, SC 149; S.C. Advocates on Record Association vs. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268; In re: Special Reference, AIR 1999 SC 1.
[iii]. Schedule 8, Constitutional Reform Act, 2005.
[iv]. Section 4(2), Supreme Court Act (RSC, 1985).
[v]. Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the retirement of Justice Morris Fish, http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/04/23/statement-prime-minister-canada-retirement-justice-morris-fish.
[vi]. Article II, Section 2, The Constitution of the United States of America.
[vii]. Article 94 (1), Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.
[viii] Article 65, Constitution of France, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constiution_anglais_oct2009.pdf.
The Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India (Amendment) Bill, 2021 was passed by Parliament on August 4, 2021. It amends the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008. This Bill was introduced in Lok Sabha during the budget session this year in March 2021. Subsequently, it was referred to the Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism, and Culture, which submitted its report on July 22, 2021.
Typically, cities have one civilian airport which provides all aeronautical services in that area. These services include air traffic management, landing and parking of aircraft, and ground handling services. This makes airports natural monopolies in the area. To ensure that private airport operators do not misuse their monopoly, the need for an independent tariff regulator in the airport sector was felt. Hence, the Airport Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) was established as an independent body under the 2008 Act to regulate tariffs and other charges (development fee and passenger service fee) for aeronautical services at major airports.
For the remaining airports, these tariffs are determined by the Airports Authority of India (AAI), which is a body under the Ministry of Civil Aviation. In addition, AAI leases out airports under the public-private partnership (PPP) model for operation, management, and development. Before AERA was set up, AAI determined and fixed the aeronautical charges for all airports. It also prescribed performance standards for all airports and monitored them. Various committees had noted that AAI performed the role of airport operator as well as the regulator, which resulted in a conflict of interest.
The 2008 Act designates an airport as a major airport if it has an annual passenger traffic of at least 35 lakh. The central government may also designate any airport as a major airport through a notification. The Bill adds that the central government may group airports and notify the group as a major airport. Thus, when a small airport will be clubbed in a group and the group is notified as a major airport, its tariff will be determined by AERA instead of AAI. Note that AERA will not determine the tariff if such tariff or tariff structures or the amount of development fees has been incorporated in the bidding document, which is the basis for the award of operatorship of that airport.
The amendments under the Bill raise some concerns regarding the grouping of airports and the capacity of the regulator.
As of 2020, there are 125 operational airports in India (includes international airports, customs airports, and civil enclaves). The number of airports under the purview of AERA increased from 11 in 2007 to 24 in 2019. For the remaining airports, tariffs are still determined by AAI. In the last five years (2014 to 2019), air passenger traffic increased from 11.3 crore to 34.9 crore (which is an annual growth rate of 10%). Till 2030-31, air traffic in the country is expected to continue growing at an average annual rate of 10-11%.
Before 2019, an airport with annual passenger traffic of at least 15 lakh was considered a major airport. In 2019, the AERA Act was amended to increase this threshold to 35 lakh. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 2019 Bill stated that the exponential growth of the aviation sector has put tremendous pressure on AERA, while its resources are limited. Therefore, if too many airports come under the purview of AERA, it will not be able to perform its functions efficiently. Consequently, in 2019, the number of airports under the purview of AERA was reduced. Now, with the passage of the 2021 Bill, AERA will have to again regulate tariffs at more airports as and when notified by the central government. Thus, the capacity of AERA may be needed to be enhanced for extending its scope to other airports.
Table 1: List of major airports in India (as of June 2019)
|
Ahmedabad |
Delhi |
Mumbai |
|
Amritsar |
Goa |
Patna |
|
Bengaluru |
Guwahati |
Pune |
|
Bhubaneswar |
Hyderabad |
Raipur |
|
Calicut |
Jaipur |
Thiruvananthapuram |
|
Chandigarh |
Kolkata |
Tiruchirappalli |
|
Chennai |
Lucknow |
Varanasi |
|
Cochin |
Mangalore |
Kannur |
Source: AERA website as accessed on August 2, 2021; PRS.
